As a result of globalization, the number of international migrants moving to cities is rapidly increasing. The growing diversity resulting from it gives new dynamics to the urban economy and adds to the richness of city life. At the same time, international migration raises new challenges to urban management. It also questions existing urban governance models, since migrants are often affected by urban exclusion. Furthermore, local governments are seldom prepared to cope with the integration of people with different cultural, social and religious traditions, particularly in developing countries. Promoting civic identity, participation and representation among international migrants, while fighting the social and economic exclusionary attitudes that often pervade the recipient urban society, requires innovative programmes and policies, with a key role for local authorities. In this context, Un-Habitat’s Global Campaign on Urban Governance has teamed up with Università Iuav di Venezia to carry out case study research on “Urban policies and practices addressing international migration” with the aim to help developing strategies to promote positive values of urban citizenship. Based on a comparative analysis of 10 cities, with different social and economic characteristics, the research has documented issues affecting international migrants in these cities, exploring policies and instruments geared to the integration of transnational migrants. This publication brings out the research results, extracting lessons that may be useful for other cities experiencing similar challenges. It also presents recommendations on how to deal with the most urgent issues city governments will need to address when getting to grips with international migration.
INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS AND THE CITY
INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS AND THE CITY
BANGKOK BERLIN DAKAR KARACHI JOHANNESBURG NAPLES SÃO PAULO TIJUANA VANCOUVER VLADIVOSTOK

Marcello Balbo (ed)
It is estimated that currently there are about 175 million international migrants and that this number is growing rapidly. International migrants are increasingly heading towards large urban areas, where they have more income-earning opportunities. In large cities, migrants can gain access to an expanding informal sector and can rely on migrant networks and ethnic enclaves for shelter and jobs. However, spatial segregation, social exclusion, labour exploitation, and discriminatory behaviour are also commonplace in cities with significant migrant communities.

International migration clearly raises new challenges for urban management. Local authorities have little if any say over national migration policies. Similarly, they have little capacity to control migratory flows into their cities. Yet they are faced with the end results of transnational migration that challenge their core mandate of providing housing, services and employment.

UN-HABITAT’s Global Campaign on Urban Governance has teamed up with Università Iuav di Venezia to carry out case study research on ‘Urban policies and practices addressing international migration’. The research is based on a comparative analysis of 10 cities: Bangkok, Berlin, Dakar, Johannesburg, Karachi, Naples, São Paulo, Tijuana, Vancouver and Vladivostok.

This book gives an account of different policies, practices and governance models that are addressing this issue. It analyses the impact of national policies on international migration, the role of migrants in the local economy, the relationship between local and migrant communities, and the migrants’ use of urban space. It reveals the importance and the advantages of promoting communication between stakeholders and establishing channels for representation and participation of migrants in decisions affecting their livelihoods. In analysing lessons learned, the book concludes that local authorities have a key role in promoting civic engagement, social integration, participation and representation...
Urban economies are increasingly the engine of growth, both in developed and in developing countries. The World Bank estimates that also in developing countries the contribution of cities to the GNP amounts to between sixty to seventy five percent. Furthermore, urban growth features increasing complexity, mainly due to two new political trends: the shifting of urban management responsibilities from central to local governments, and globalisation becoming a major driving force in shaping urban development.

As a result of the raising economic attractiveness of urban areas, in the last decades the phenomenon of migration has grown considerably and the number of persons moving to cities from a different, often poorer country, has increased to significant figures.

Well aware of the challenges as well as opportunities migration raises on urban development, at the 1st World International Urban Forum held in Nairobi in 2002 the Italian Cooperation decided to promote a better understanding of the issue, entrusting UN-HABITAT and Università Iuav di Venezia with the task to carry out a research on the impact of international migration on urban development and management. In fact, through this project and the publication of the book, the Italian Cooperation intends to include among its priorities the issue of international migration and the actions that need to be taken to improve urban governance.

The research project main objective has been to highlight those urban policies and practices that promote positive values of urban citizenship directed to international migrants. In particular, the Italian Cooperation aims at encouraging the exchange of integration strategies at the local level based on the analysis on a number of case-studies both in the North and in the South, in the framework of a city-to-city co-operation perspective.
The common analytical framework adopted for the ten case-studies that have been selected, permits a useful comparative analysis of issues, policies and instruments in cities with different characteristics. Based on the comparison of the institutional conditions, the policies promoted by the different cities and the capacities of local governments to implement them, the research provides a tentative set of guidelines for urban policy makers.

I believe that the results achieved by the research and in the book result in a better understanding of international migration to urban areas. I am also confident that the guidelines set forth provide very useful insights for future actions local governments need to take, in developed as well as transitional and developing economies.

I wish to thank UN-HABITAT and Università Iuav di Venezia for the scientific support and the strong coordination, which made possible the research and the publication of this book.

I would also like to thank all the researchers and professionals who contributed to the project, bearing in mind that this is only one of the many steps that we need to take in order to make cities more inclusive and sustainable.

Min. Plen. Giuseppe Deodato
Director-General for Italian Technical Cooperation
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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1. International migration and the city

It is widely acknowledged today that cities are the driving force behind economic growth and provide the best opportunities for improving living conditions. Whereas cities with high population densities are nearing saturation in developed countries, in many other parts of the world this process is bound to continue unabated through much of this century. In fact, according to UN projections, over the next 25 years the growth of the world population will concentrate exclusively in the urban areas of developing countries, where the number of residents will almost double, growing from under two billion to almost four billion (UN, 2004).

While in advanced economies the management capacities of both national and local governments are sufficiently developed to face the current changes even as problems abound, in the developing world inadequate financial, human and technical resources can only have serious consequences. In the South, the integrating role of the city seems increasingly to be giving way to an exclusionary trend, as highlighted by mounting social and economic segregation as well as spatial fragmentation. Exclusion, poverty and violence are on the rise as the sense of belonging, social cohesion and the very notion of citizenship are on the wane.

In the last decade, globalisation has come to the fore as a major driving force in both the shaping of urban development and the creation of new opportunities. In this process, globalisation has also posed new challenges to urban management, as its positive effects are unevenly distributed both across and within cities. One of these challenges has to be the increasing flow of migrants crossing bor-
International migrants are defined as people who were born outside their countries of residence, including refugees who actually may not be foreign-born. A second type of condition is referred to as ‘transnational migration’, where individuals belong to two or more communities at the same time. The difference between international and transnational migrants is often blurred; it is becoming increasingly so as more and more individuals reside in a host country while maintaining strong ties with their countries of origin. In addition, they may also be members of various types of networks (political, religious and other activism) that reach out into many countries.

The growing number of international migrants is clearly linked to two factors related to globalisation: the declining costs of transportation and the rising awareness of differences in living conditions linked to the nearly universal reach of the media. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have greatly reduced the barriers of space and time for the movements of goods and many services, boosting liberalisation of international trade, expansion of foreign investment and the related movement of business people. However, for all its promotion and nurturing of new rights for cross-border movement of capital, globalisation has failed to bring down many barriers to the free movement of individuals and has only marginally promoted migrants’ rights to settle across borders. ‘While goods, firms and money are largely free to criss-cross borders, people are not’ (World Commission, 2004).

However, and regardless of a tightening of immigration controls, labour shortages in advanced and high-growth economies have nurtured labour migration. In some countries, migrants have taken over entire segments of the employment market – typically those combining low pay, poor work conditions and insecurity. This, in turn, has brought the emergence of a ‘migration industry’ in both sending and host countries, complete with recruiters, specialised travel agencies and lawyers, and this industry is spreading to cities in the South.

In Europe and North America international migration is a familiar phenomenon, but in developing countries it has received comparatively little attention. Nonetheless, in Buenos Aires as in Santiago or São Paulo migrants from countries like Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay contribute increasing portions of the urban population. Although the bulk of migration flows across Mexico head to the USA, the numbers of people from Central America and the Caribbean moving into Mexico City or the assembly plants (maquiladoras) on the border with the USA are becoming an issue for the urban governments in northern Mexico. In post-apartheid South Africa, the numbers of workers arriving in Johannesburg (and more broadly Gauteng province) from Mozambique and Angola have increased rapidly. Further up north, large communities from Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Niger have settled in Abidjan. In the cities of the Gulf area, migrants from Egypt and Jordan, as well as from the Philippines, Pakistan and India together contribute large shares of the local labour force. Finally, in Southeast Asia, extensive transnational communities have opted to live not only in Hong Kong and Singapore, but also in Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok or Karachi.

The United Nations evaluates the current total number of international migrants at some 175 million, including refugees but obviously excluding an estimated 15 to 30 million illegal or irregular migrants (United Nations Population Division, 2002) whose numbers are rapidly increasing. A breakdown by major regions shows that some 77 million international migrants reside in industrialised countries, 33 million in transition economies, 23 million in Eastern Asia, 21 million in the Middle East and North Africa and 14 million in sub-Saharan Africa.

Between 1990 and 2000, the number of individuals residing outside their country of birth rose by one third (Martin, Widgren, 2002). About 45 per cent had moved to industrialised countries and 55 percent from one developing country to another – particularly to those rich in oil, diamonds or other natural resources. Notwithstanding the scariness of reliable data, the many economic and social crises that have affected various developing countries these past several years are likely to have caused a significant increase in these flows. Clearly, the current understanding of international migration in an urban environment is inadequate. Official census counts, surveys and registration schemes largely underestimate the real extent of international migration. As noted in the majority of the case studies included in this volume, the number of illegal/unregistered migrants seems to be far from negligible and on an upward slope. Although they remain predominantly related to labour shortages in advanced economies, current international migration flows display three main features that make them significantly different from past experience – (a) the direction of the flows, (b) their nature and (c) their focus on conurbations.

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1 The present volume refers exclusively to those individuals who have decided on their own to move to a different country.
International migrants are heading increasingly towards urban areas, particularly large cities, where they have more chances of finding income-earning opportunities. In such conurbations migrants can gain access to the large and expanding informal sector; in addition, the enhanced roles which many cities have acquired in the context of globalisation have produced a new demand for low-paid service workers for different types of jobs. Finally, the networks which migrants need to rely upon for shelter and jobs on first arrival can only be found in cities.

International migrants represent an essential economic resource for the urban economies that employ them; however, the countries of origin also receive tremendous economic benefits from migrants’ remittances. Although the scale is largely underestimated, such financial transfers to developing countries currently amount to a combined equivalent of 75 to 100 billion US dollars per year, or significantly more than official development aid (ODA) from developed countries and second only to oil revenues (World Commission, 2004). Not only annual remittances to developing countries have more than doubled between 1988 and 1999, but they appear to be a much more stable source of income than public and private sector flows (Gammeltoft, 2002). In 2003 the Indian diaspora (20 million, over 135 countries) sent back home a combined amount equivalent to some 15 billion US dollars, or more than the revenues generated by India’s thriving software industry. In 2001 remittances represented some 25 per cent of total GDP in Lesotho and Jordan, and between 15 and 20 per cent in Bosnia, Albania, Nicaragua, Yemen and Moldova (IMF, 2003). An estimated 34 to 54 per cent of the Filipino population is sustained by remittances (Salazar Parreñas, 2002). Migration also has the potential to stimulate the introduction of new activities and technologies in the countries of origin, as has been the case in several East Asian countries and India.

International migration clearly includes movements of well-paid, qualified professionals – Indian engineers to Germany, schoolteachers to the Emirates or Zimbabwean doctors to South Africa. However, the bulk of international migrants add to the low-income urban population rather than the well-heeled professional classes. In fact, the majority of migrants, including many skilled professionals, find employment in those low-paid sectors and positions eschewed by local residents and which require little training – typically the construction sector, services and domestic work, or in the expanding informal sector such as street trade and handicrafts production. In Thailand, the Labour Ministry allows immigrants to work only in a limited range of sectors, reserving several skilled and most unskilled jobs for Thai citizens. In some cases, as in Naples or São Paulo, migrants end up toiling away in workshops for very low wages, typically without any labour rights nor formal contracts either, due to the frequently informal or illegal character of their employment; moreover, numerous migrants are prevented from obtaining any kind of document which could be used to regularise their stay in the country.

As mentioned earlier, streams of illegal migrants represent a significant and growing share of international migration in the developed as well as in transitional and developing economies. Commonplace as illegal migration appears to be, the reasons behind it can be quite diverse, as can the modes of entry into the country of destination (or transit, as the case may be). In those countries with restrictive access policies, the main method used by unregistered migrants is legal entry and overstay. In other countries access can be easier but the weakness or complexity of migration policies, or lack thereof, can make subsequent registration a challenging or even impossible task. Sometimes, it is the government’s geo-political strategy that directly promotes or discourages the presence – and thus the potential for regularisation – of specific ethnic groups.

Illegal or irregular status is not attractive for anyone. However, due to inade-
have come about as a result of globalisation. In a bid to face the overt negative effects of globalisation, all countries in both South and North have been promoting decentralisation policies. In practice, they have sought to transfer to local government the responsibility of providing cities with the infrastructure and services required by global competition as well as the basic services required by growing numbers of urban poor. In this devolution framework, it falls upon local authorities to cope with the demands arising from the new population settling within their city boundaries. However, in most cases the shift of responsibilities has not been matched by an increase of resources. Consequently, the attitude of most local governments is essentially of a laissez-faire type: city authorities absolve themselves from the responsibility of any pro-active supply of infrastructure and services, forcing migrant communities to rely on the private sector or self-provision to a very large extent. Lack of coordination among and within the many layers of government operating within city or metropolitan boundaries is the norm, adding to their limited capacity to manage the issue of migration, which they often regard as only temporary and marginal. In addition, the growing presence of international migrants and the attendant issues of urban segregation and poverty pose local authorities a fresh challenge, as they demand specific capacities for the management of multiculturalism and diversity. To this day, few municipal authorities (particularly in transition economies and the South) have addressed this complex and delicate task, which few have the human and technical capacities to carry out successfully.

2. Challenges and responses in key urban policy domains

Migration policies are taking on much higher political and economic profiles, especially in those countries at the receiving end of the process. Central governments could, and should, aim at setting up adequate bilateral and multilateral policies to curb illegal migration and the attendant traffic in human beings. Since most countries (and their conurbations) find themselves at both the sending and receiving ends, management of migration flows cannot be confined to unilateral policies if it is to be effective. In addition, common policies would benefit both sending and receiving countries. However, local authorities have very little say, if any, over national migration
might arise from permanent migration and at the same time contributing to social and economic development in the countries of origin.

Inclusion. International migration contributes more and more to maintaining or creating the economic dynamism of cities as foreign workers fill up those segments of the labour market which local populations eschew and contribute to urban productivity. It is well recognised that the presence of international migrants also makes cities more cosmopolitan, and therefore more attractive to the forces of globalisation. However, the increasing ethnic diversity of present-day cities all over the world, including in many countries with little or no multicultural tradition, often evoke anxiety and fear among local residents. If it is actually to be a polis, i.e., the place where different populations come together, a city must also ensure the inclusion of all its residents and tackle urban exclusion. Local authorities certainly need policies that raise urban productivity and foster economic growth; but they also increasingly need policies that manage diversity and promote integration among residents. A good many international migrants are not poor, or among the urban poorest, but they are certainly among the most excluded. Instead, they must be given access to security of tenure, health, educational services and urban infrastructure. Integration also encompasses inclusion of international migrants in the public decision-making process: cities must harness the wealth of values at work in their midst to build new collective identities and counter the individualism which liberalisation and privatisation combine to entrench in urban attitudes. A cornerstone of any such inclusive strategy must be the participation of migrants’ representatives in municipal councils. Just as fundamental to civic inclusion are public information campaigns on the origins and causes of international migration, the costs and benefits to urban communities of hosting foreign migrants, as well as the rights and duties of both migrants and host communities.

With globalisation it is impossible for those cities that act, or want to act, as hubs for international financial and technological flows to avoid finding themselves at the receiving end of international migration flows. It is quite possible that today, migrants are transforming the city to a point where the time-honoured assimilation vs. multicultural (ethnic) alternative loses its heuristic

policies; similarly, they also have very little capacity to control transnational migration flows into their cities. The fact of the matter is that local government is called upon to face the end results of transnational flows that make themselves felt in essentially three major spheres of urban policy:

**Housing and services.** This is probably the single most important problem that international migrants have to deal with when first arriving in their place (city) of destination. Even where the contribution they provide to the local economy is acknowledged, the formal markets for either housing or land (or both) tend to be out of bounds as far as migrants are concerned, to the possible exception of ‘professional migrants’. Landlords often look upon international migrants as unreliable tenants. The formation of inner city slums or the expanding ‘ethnic’ informal settlements on the outskirts also result from the fact that formal markets are inaccessible to this type of demand. As they seek to remove these barriers, local authorities can promote one of two main types of policies: (i) a direct policy that makes low-cost housing accessible to the foreign population; (ii) alternatively, and more likely, they can introduce incentives and guarantees in the housing market that will benefit both the supply and demand sides. Providing access to urban services throughout the city is a second component in any urban strategy aimed at making a city more inclusive: broader access to urban services counters the increasing fragmentation of urban space (and the concomitant flourish of ‘closed neighbourhoods’) which cities have been experiencing of late.

**Employment.** Globalisation is resulting in increased labour market polarisation in technologically advanced, transition and developing economies, and local government has an essential role to play here. Policies aimed at promoting more ‘formalised’ labour markets would benefit the large numbers of transnational migrants who work in the informal business sector where long hours, low wages and unhealthy or even dangerous work conditions are the norm. Local-level decisions can help make informal activities part of a growing formal sector and provide more decent jobs, incomes and protection, as illustrated by the well-known Warwick Junction project in Durban, South Africa, or the Porta Palazzo Market rehabilitation project in Turin, Italy. Through specific local fiscal and urban policies, local government can also facilitate the voluntary return of skilled workers to their home countries, reducing the problems that
value. Indeed, cities must be prepared to look at international migrants as indispensable to their own survival in the global urban competition.

3. Good urban governance for inclusive cities

With the Global Campaign on Urban Governance, UN-HABITAT promotes sustainable development of human settlements. The rationale behind the Campaign is to bring about the ‘Inclusive City,’ a place where everyone – regardless of wealth, gender, age, race or religion – is enabled to participate productively and positively in the opportunities which cities have to offer. The Campaign stresses that the crucial prerequisite for more inclusive cities is neither money nor technology, nor even expertise or legislative change (although all these are important): it must be good urban governance (UN-HABITAT, 2002). An expanding group of urban residents, international migrants are often denied access to urban services and opportunities and seldom have a voice in decision-making channels. This is why the relationship between city authorities and international migrants is very relevant to UN-HABITAT’s Global Campaign on Urban Governance.

The definition of ‘good’ urban governance transpires in the set of universal principles which the Campaign builds upon and which are derived from two main sources: (a) a wide range of UN Conventions and (b) UN-HABITAT’s intensive work with cities over the past decades. These principles can be summarised as follows:

- **Sustainability**: balancing the social, economic and environmental needs of present and future generations.
- **Subsidiarity**: assigning responsibilities and resources to the closest appropriate level.
- **Equity of access** to decision-making processes and the basic necessities of urban life.
- **Efficiency** in the delivery of public services and in promoting local economic development.
- **Transparency and accountability** for decision-makers and all stakeholders.
- **Civic engagement**: recognising that people are the main riches of cities, and both the purpose and the means of sustainable human development.
- **Security** for individuals and their living environment.

When reviewing these principles in the context of urban responses to international migration, it is clear that in many cities there is considerable scope to improve the quality of urban governance. In terms of sustainability, urban policies towards migration must look beyond the immediate needs and concerns of the present generation of migrants. Moreover, the consequences of these policies for future generations should be carefully considered. This requires that migration issues be part of a vision for the future of the city. This also implies that besides economics (including labour incentives, as required), urban policies pay due attention to other functions such as education and health services, for instance. The principle of subsidiarity is particularly relevant to the way in which cities deal with international migration. All over the world, city administrations are being given expanded responsibilities in many areas of service delivery. Coping with migrants is increasingly the responsibility of city administrations. Local governments are a natural focus for any efforts to reinvent governance in many areas where sensitivity to local conditions and the aspirations of the local community are of paramount importance. In these circumstances, local government has the potential to do better than national government. However, city-level migration policies and practice do not stand on their own. They need to link up with national and provincial/State levels as well as infra-city policies and practice.

Ensuring equity in migration policies is another key challenge. Respect for human rights should form the basis of any handling of migration issues in cities. The emerging concept of ‘the right to the city’ is particularly relevant when addressing the relationship between cities and international migrants. Migrants are likely to contribute to the city’s wealth when they are integrated in the system of local opportunities. Efficiency should be another guiding principle when dealing with service delivery and local economic development. Promoting partnerships with the private sector and civil society can go a long way towards realising the potential benefits which migration has to offer.

Transparency and accountability are pivotal governance principles with far-reaching implications at the local level. This does not only include adherence to the rule of law as authorities enact established procedures dealing with migrants. The twin principles of transparency and accountability also call for the opening up of channels of communication, explaining rights and responsibilities, with due consideration of language, culture and religion, as these factors...
are critical to engaging in a constructive dialogue with migrant groups. The media have a critical role to play here.

*Civic engagement* can act as a powerful lever to unleash the potential of migrants for the benefit of host cities. Good urban governance can provide the traction for local government to deliver effective development, services and poverty reduction for all urban dwellers, including international migrants. Participatory processes, including broad-based consultation platforms, have the potential to enhance representative democracy and make local government more relevant for being driven by the aspirations of the local citizenry.

Finally, the other major tenet of UN-HABITAT's Global Campaign for Urban Governance – the principle of *security* for individuals – is an issue of prime importance when dealing with migration issues. All-too often, lack of security is the defining feature of urban migrants' lives: poor work conditions, exploitation and insecure tenure. Proactive policies that tackle xenophobia and insecurity should be a priority in all cities with significant migrant populations.

Throughout history, cities have been places of hope and opportunity, and so they can be again today if we focus on exclusion, the causes behind it and strategies to stamp it out. However, segregated communities, labour exploitation, discriminatory behaviour and neglect are often commonplace today in those cities with significant migrant communities. Good urban governance through inclusive practice that gives a voice to the excluded is a good way of maximising civic potential. Cities need to understand that they have policy options available to address the multiple challenges of exclusion, the decay of citizenship and increasing conflict. The way a city deals with international migrants may be the litmus test of its approach to the challenges confronting its whole population.

Since the challenges international migrants pose to cities today are so obvious, why do we need more research on the issue? The simple reason is that international, national and local institutions need evidence that shows which approaches work, why and in which circumstances. This evidence is essential when advocating approaches to urban governance that will result in better living conditions for international migrants. Therefore, research can help to further the good urban governance agenda in two major ways:

- **Assessing the extent to which policies are implemented** and analysing their outcomes and impact, in order to improve policy formulation and implementation;
- **Assessing the outcomes and impact of specific governance arrangements**, innovations or good practice, in order objectively to determine their effectiveness and transferability.

Against this background, the contribution of the research project on international migration to the Global Campaign on Urban Governance lies in its capacity to document innovative policies and practice and assess their value and transferability.

### 4. Research methodology

Research for this volume was carried out in 10 cities that were selected to provide a comparative view on the issues, policies and instruments related to the integration of international migration in high-, middle-, low-income and transition economies. The case studies were carried out by researchers specialised in urban issues.

In April 2004, an introductory workshop was organised at the Planning Department, Università Iuav di Venezia in Venice, Italy. The workshop developed a comprehensive theoretical framework that was apt to identify the main relevant facts and circumstances, the existence (or otherwise) of policy initiatives as well as any practices addressing international migration in the selected cities, on top of highlighting the substantive issues to be considered. Based on the different perspectives and the similarities that emerged from the debate, participants laid out a common analytical framework to evaluate what planning and management tools were available in the 10 cities to cope with international migration, and how effective they were. More specifically, participants agreed that the case study should focus on:

- **The context**, identifying the specific features of international migration in any selected city, including the recent evolution of the process. Particular emphasis was given to the identification of regional migration streams and their underlying determinants, together with the evolving roles of male and female migrants.
- **The issues**, describing how migration is perceived at the local level and its effect on city politics, with particular reference to the changing forms of social cohesion or disruption, and the resulting spatial organisation.
International migrants to urban policies only matches the lack of awareness thereof. This in turn highlights the largely unmet need to improve the capacity of decision-makers and urban managers, at both national and local levels, to make informed choices on the implications of international migration.

The complex implications of international migration for urban areas affect many aspects of the economic, social and political conditions in the host cities as well as in the sending countries and cities. From the sending countries’ point of view, the fallout of emigration includes, among others, inflows of remittances and foreign exchange, the potential for technology transfers, benefits as well as shortfalls for educational levels through brain drain and brain gain, as well as promotion of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Obviously, the research in this volume could not survey all these aspects in detail, nor expected to do so. Our collective aim is to contribute to a better understanding of international migration as a process that increasingly affects many cities worldwide, and to help enhance government capacity to maximise its benefits and curb its negative consequences.

THE 10 CASE STUDIES

- National policies addressing international migration, for a review of any national policies that directly or indirectly regulate the inflow of international migrants and their effect at the city level.
- Urban policies for international migrants, highlighting the strategies city authorities have adopted to address the challenge of international migration, with particular reference to urban planning and management tools promoting migrant integration in the host urban communities.
- Lessons learned and recommendations, with particular emphasis on innovative inclusive policies along the lines of UN-HABITAT’s Global Campaign on Urban Governance.

UN-HABITAT and Università Iuav di Venezia jointly organised a second workshop in September 2004 during the 2nd World Urban Forum in Barcelona, where the intermediate results achieved by the research project were detailed and discussed. Participants took stock of the information collected so far on contextual facts and of the existence, or absence, of policy initiatives and practices in the selected cities. This gave an opportunity for an open dialogue with decision-makers and scholars and to explore further perspectives.

Although international migration is a time-honoured process and a key feature of urban development, including in developing countries, globalisation has both added to the momentum and significantly altered the substance of cross-border flows of people. The lack or inadequacy of data, primarily but not only on irregular migration, makes the issue rather difficult to investigate, particularly in the cities of the South. Moreover, and although international migration is gaining further momentum, in a number of cases it is not yet perceived as a central issue for urban policy – a perception that would confront government to generally poor housing conditions, lack of infrastructure and services, and widespread unemployment or underemployment in urban areas.

Where statistical information was found lacking or insufficient, the research work relied on more qualitative information. Based on interviews with local decision-makers and government officials, NGOs working with international migrants and the local media, the different case studies attempt to identify the actual policies (or non-policies) being implemented, as well as the many local strategies and ‘informal’ practices that actually address the issue.

The lack of information on the challenges posed by the growing number of international migrants to urban policies only matches the lack of awareness thereof. This in turn highlights the largely unmet need to improve the capacity of decision-makers and urban managers, at both national and local levels, to make informed choices on the implications of international migration.

The complex implications of international migration for urban areas affect many aspects of the economic, social and political conditions in the host cities as well as in the sending countries and cities. From the sending countries’ point of view, the fallout of emigration includes, among others, inflows of remittances and foreign exchange, the potential for technology transfers, benefits as well as shortfalls for educational levels through brain drain and brain gain, as well as promotion of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Obviously, the research in this volume could not survey all these aspects in detail, nor expected to do so. Our collective aim is to contribute to a better understanding of international migration as a process that increasingly affects many cities worldwide, and to help enhance government capacity to maximise its benefits and curb its negative consequences.

THE 10 CASE STUDIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Level of income per head</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Lower middle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Lower middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naples</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Lower middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tijuana</td>
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<td>Upper middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Lower middle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Existing Situation

Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, is located on the Chao Phraya River, 40 kilometres from the Gulf of Thailand. In 1782, Bangkok was designated the country’s fourth successive capital by King Rama I, founder of the Chakri dynasty. The city was once known as the ‘Venice of the East’ because of the extensive canal network connected to the Chao Phraya River. Transportation was mainly by boat along the canals, most of which were subsequently filled in to make way for the city’s infrastructure: buildings, streets and expressways. Traveling by boat is now only an alternative rather than the main mode of transportation. The local short name of Bangkok is ‘Krung Thep,’ i.e., ‘City of Angels.

Since the 18th century, Bangkok has evolved from a small capital into a modern city. The early days saw an inflow of Chinese migrants who settled on the other side of the river and then moved to the area, which today is Bangkok. A large number of development projects were carried out with assistance from foreign investors and migrants from a variety of countries, including British engineers and Indian workers employed in irrigation, railways, waterworks and banking (Sandhu, Mani, 1993). After Thailand established a constitutional government in 1932, Bangkok became the centre of national government, public services, trade and commerce. More Indians and Chinese migrants already living in Thailand moved to the city, as did some from overseas, as all sought jobs and/or markets for their wares.

In 1942, Thailand was forced to enter the war under military and political pressure from Japan. Japanese troops used Bangkok as a base and the city became a target for Allied bombing raids. From the 1960s onwards, and particularly during the Vietnam War, Bangkok was a favorite recreational centre for US troops and as a result, hundreds of Thai-American children were born in the city. By the early 21st century, Bangkok has increasingly been chosen as a venue for various world conferences. The capital hosted, among others, the 11th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference (2003) and the Conference on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (2004).
Today, Bangkok is the centre of government, administration, main communication facilities and leading educational and cultural facilities, together with regional offices of international institutions, financial and business firms. Furthermore, Bangkok has been the location of Thailand’s first seaport for some time and today serves as one of the country’s six major harbours. The fastest growing and most economically dynamic city in Southeast Asia, Bangkok has become one of the main regional centres of business and finance. Thailand’s soaring economic growth up until the 1997 Asian crisis and its improved performance since 2002 have attracted a large migration inflow from neighbouring countries and other parts of the world.

Apart from foreign migrants, Bangkok also received a massive inflow of internal migrants during the 20th century. Initially, internal migration resulted from continuing drought and poor soil in the northeastern part of the country. Later, more migrants from Thailand’s North, Northeast and central regions arrived, seeking employment in the industrial sector that had been developing in Bangkok and its suburban areas during the 1970s and 1980s (Chantavanich, 2001). Internal migration and inadequate housing facilities in Bangkok resulted in crowded communities and slum areas in the city, with the highest densities of internal migrants found around Bangkok Harbour and nearby. The inflow of internal migrants increased rapidly during the 1985-1996 economic boom and has continued to this day, albeit at a slower pace.

Bangkok remains the most developed, busiest and most densely populated city in Thailand, with some 10 million inhabitants in early 2005. For the country as a whole, the number of immigrants (all types of status combined) is estimated at over two million or about 3.5 per cent of Thailand’s population (63 million), of which 1.5 per cent (or 43 per cent of total immigrants) live in Bangkok.

The reality is that from its early days, Bangkok has always been a city of international migration. From this perspective, one can split the history of the Thai capital between ‘early’ and ‘new’ immigration.

**Early immigration**

Until the 20th century, Thailand did not impose any restrictions on migration from other countries. Early migration to the country dates back to the 17th century with the phased arrival of Chinese, Mon, Vietnamese and Indians who came to Bangkok for a variety of reasons. The Chinese, Vietnamese and Indian migrants have played a significant role in Bangkok’s migration history at different periods, depending on the particular national policy that applied to each group. The Chinese were the first overseas migrants to reside in Bangkok, settling in Sampeng, the ‘Chinatown’ of today’s Bangkok. The blocks of shop-houses that are so typical of Chinese communities line the streets of Chinatown. They have remained unchanged and have made Sampeng an exclusively Chinese commercial area. In the mid-19th century, Bangkok was host to an estimated 6,000 to 7,000 Chinese migrants, possibly contributing as much as one-third of Bangkok’s population. By 1909, the national census recorded some 150,000 Chinese in the capital. However, in the 1950s, fears of a spread of Communism led the Thai authorities to impose special regulations, which restricted the number of Chinese migrants allowed into Thailand to 200 a year. Today the authorities will not grant more than 100 resident visas to Chinese migrants in any single year.

As they fled the civil war that raged on and off during the 18th century in Myanmar, ethnic Mon sought shelter in Thailand, settling mainly along the northern part of the Chao Phraya River and also around Bangkok. The last influx of Mon dates back to the 1950s, after the British granted Myanmar (then known as Burma) independence in 1948. Small Mon communities live in many areas of Bangkok, with their own temples and traditional festivals. The Mon and Thai share the same traditions and culture and the Thai royal family has granted the Mon patronage and support early on. Some areas of Bangkok where Mon communities are predominant have provided shelter for the current streams of unskilled workers from Myanmar.

Bangkok has also been the destination for many Vietnamese migrants in the past, as long ago as the 1800s when the royal families of Vietnam’s three kingdoms and their followers sought refuge from invaders or armed opponents. The Vietnamese community that settled in Thailand earned a reputation with its diversified artisanship, including carpentry, bronze casting and liquor distilling. Vietnamese immigrants also served in the Thai armed forces in the earlier part of the 19th century. Following a 15 year-long war with Vietnam (1842-1857), Thailand adopted a restrictive immigration policy with regard to the Vietnamese. The effects have endured for more than a century as migration from Vietnam to Bangkok is no longer significant nowadays, and until a recent relaxation in the government’s stance,
Vietnamese descendants were not eligible for Thai citizenship.
The fourth major category of early immigrants, were Indians, who first arrived in Bangkok after World War II, mostly as traders and employees of British firms. They settled at ‘Ban Kaek’ (Thai for ‘Indian Home’) on the east bank of the Chao Phraya River, along Pahurat Road on the west bank, in the area currently known as ‘Little India’ close to Chinatown, and around the first Indian Temple, established in 1870 on Silom Road. Although Indians have mixed with other ethnic groups and many more Indian communities were established in Bangkok in the following years, the distinct Indian identity is still evident in these three areas, which rank among the most important business districts in Bangkok today. Early on, Indians in Bangkok were sole exporters of cattle and meat and were active in the import-export business. Along with the Chinese, Indian migrants and their descendants continue to play a significant role in trading and business in general, especially in textiles and related industries in Bangkok. The inflow of Indians to Bangkok continues today although an increasing proportion is made of unskilled workers.

New immigration

Before considering the new immigration of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, it is helpful to recognise the impact of Thai emigration in the 1970s and 1980s on Thailand’s domestic labour supply as the economy surged from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Thai migrants first emigrated to seek work abroad in the mid-1970s during the oil industry boom in the Middle East. Large workforce requirements opened the labour market to hundreds of thousands of Thai workers. However, the late 1980s saw a softening in the oil industry boom, which was accompanied by a declining demand for foreign workers, including Thais. Subsequently, Thai emigration shifted to the Asia-Pacific region, namely South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Other destinations which also enticed significant numbers of Thai emigrants included Israel, Brunei, Malaysia and Japan. The total number of Thai emigrants in the 1990s was estimated at around 1.6 million. The number of emigrants from Bangkok was second only to that from Northeast Thailand. By 2002, the number of Thai emigrants was estimated at 340,000, generating annual remittances of 50,000 to 60,000 million baht (Ministry of Labour, 2003). The actual number of Thai emigrants is likely to be significantly higher since many undocumented Thais work in Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan. This large number of Thai emigrants led to the revision of Thailand’s own Recruitment and Protection Act 1985 that sought to prevent the exploitation of Thai workers by recruiting companies. From 1985 to 1995, Thailand recorded the highest rate of economic growth in East and Southeast Asia, prompted by the IT, electronic and automobile sectors. Whereas high wages in other countries had drawn many Thais abroad, Thailand’s rapid growth boosted the demand for unskilled workers. This was particularly the case in labour-intensive activities, which attracted many migrants from neighbouring countries to fill in the gap caused by Thai emigration since the 1970s. Today, Thailand as a whole continues to attract foreign investors as well as skilled and unskilled workers. Moreover, increasing numbers of retirees from overseas countries such as Japan and Britain have been moving to Thailand in recent years. The numbers of long-term visitors, i.e., those staying for 12 months or longer, are also rising and include foreign students and business people.

As for Bangkok, the capital has been attracting an increasing number of immigrants as its economy and spending on infrastructure record healthy growth rates. This has generated more employment opportunities for skilled labour in the capital-intensive sectors that are typically associated with high earnings, better work conditions, improved career paths and relative job stability. The more labour-intensive sectors have been growing as well: unskilled immigrants fill in those positions shunned by local Thais due to lower wages, unstable employment, fewer opportunities for promotion and their ‘3D’ (dirty, dangerous and disdained) nature (Stern, Chantavanich, 1998). Finally, the recovery in Thailand’s economy since 1999 has contributed to the continuation of foreign investment flows.

Immigration in Bangkok

Figures on immigration are available only at the national, aggregate level. Over two million foreign migrants were residing in Thailand in 2003, including some 800,000 undocumented immigrant workers (or 36 per cent of the total); 1.00 Thai baht = 0.026 US dollar.
514,424 (23 per cent) duly documented foreigners with temporary permission to work; 402,258 (18 per cent) migrants overstaying their visas; 288,780 (13 per cent) registered unskilled workers from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar; 11,139 (5 per cent) asylum seekers from Myanmar; 81,195 (3.7 per cent) skilled workers who had registered and obtained work permits; and illegal migrants from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar registered under the Thai government amnesty policy (three per cent).

According to the 2003 census, some 62,300 international migrants lived in Bangkok, equivalent to about 11 per cent of the city’s population (5.8 million). However, this figure understates the actual number as it does not include undocumented migrants, whose number reportedly is at least equal to that of registered migrants.

Between 2001 and 2004, the number of skilled workers in Bangkok grew 50 per cent (Table 1), including in particular an inflow of managers, lawyers and technicians. The rising tide of skilled migrants into the Thai capital suggests that most such high-ranking, well-remunerated professionals bring their families with them. Consequently, the demand for housing can be expected to rise, especially in the metropolitan area and close to public transport; further concentrations of expatriates in housing compounds are also likely.

As the services sector continues to gather momentum, it can be expected to generate more professional employment opportunities and attract more skilled workers from abroad. However, Thailand, as always, will be one in several countries competing with China, Taiwan and South Korea for this category of workers. Thai authorities normally grant temporary work permits to immigrants on an annual basis, with extensions allowed if specific criteria are met. Immigrants entering Thailand under the Board of Investment (BOI) scheme (for details, see below under Elite card and foreign investment promotion) are the most privileged as they are allowed to stay as long as their business operates in Thailand. Furthermore, projects associated with the BOI scheme (whether the funding is local or foreign) generate a significant number of jobs for overseas workers with temporary work permits and for local people as well. In 2002 and 2003, Japanese investors contributed the largest share by far (61.3 per cent) of foreign investment in Thailand, way ahead of other significant investors from the European Union, Singapore and Taiwan. Japan’s unrivalled share of foreign investment in Thailand is matched by the proportion of Japanese nationals in the top cadre of foreign skilled workers (67 per cent).

**TABLE 1 - SKILLED IMMIGRANTS IN BANGKOK, 2001 - 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manager, senior management, lawyer</td>
<td>16,014</td>
<td>21,039</td>
<td>25,948</td>
<td>28,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>5,206</td>
<td>6,413</td>
<td>7,178</td>
<td>7,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>1,918</td>
<td>2,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and office staff</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales and services staff</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>1,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker in agriculture and fishery</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman and machine operator</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic worker</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>1,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intern</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6,645</td>
<td>5,169</td>
<td>4,087</td>
<td>3,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30,682</td>
<td>36,686</td>
<td>42,189</td>
<td>45,905</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thai Labour Ministry, May 2004

Figures from the Thai Labour Ministry identify the types of work undertaken by unskilled workers with work permits in 2003 (Figure 1). Fisheries and related work were the greatest source of employment for the unskilled, followed by factory work, domestic work, husbandry and farming. However, as mentioned earlier, the data do not include undocumented unskilled workers. Through successive amnesties, the Thai government has sought to reduce this undocumented category by allowing illegal unskilled workers from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar to apply for temporary work permits (and in the process become registered). With improved access and equal rights slowly accruing to these workers, the number of those migrants already in Thailand who took advantage of the government’s proposed regularisation increased sharply in 2003. The numbers of undocumented migrants from other countries (including China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal are insignificant (Asian Research Centre for Migration, 2002; Archavanichkul, 2004).
The work and living conditions of immigrants

Work conditions for skilled immigrants are usually extremely good in Thailand. Although working hours may be different from those in the countries of origin. On the other hand, commitments to sustainable development and environment-friendly corporate strategies may be lacking, which can adversely affect immigrants’ overall conditions as compared to their home country. For skilled immigrants, living conditions (including accommodation) are often superior to those they left behind, and this applies to incomes as well (through special expatriate allowances). A large proportion of skilled immigrants residing in Thailand for extended periods often bring their families over to share luxurious rented or company houses or serviced apartments in metropolitan Bangkok with all amenities within easy reach. For example, Japanese restaurants and grocery stores stocking Japanese foodstuffs can be found very close to concentrations of Japanese migrants. Similarly, clusters of professionals from China, Britain, the USA, India and Africa attract shops catering to the respective specific needs of each community. Every year a number of skilled workers apply for permanent residence, the largest shares being from China, India, Japan, Britain and the USA.

Skilled immigrant workers also include those who arrived on tourist visas (usually for up to 90 days, with extensions possible for up to one year) and yet work in Thailand, often in self-owned or joint-venture businesses and sometimes for a subsidiary of a foreign-owned firm. Many tourists apply for extensions (Table 2) or travel to a neighbouring country, like Laos, to apply for a new tourist visa. Although this procedure has allowed many tourists to remain in Thailand for years, in 2004 the Thai Government introduced new regulations requiring the appropriate visa to be obtained at the outset.

### TABLE 2 - NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS APPLYING FOR EXTENSION TO TEMPORARY VISAS IN 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for applying for visa extension</th>
<th>Number of submissions</th>
<th>Number gaining permission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourist visa</td>
<td>80,858</td>
<td>48,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transit visa</td>
<td>72,182</td>
<td>9,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector business</td>
<td>36,472</td>
<td>32,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government sector</td>
<td>25,966</td>
<td>24,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying with Thai spouse/family</td>
<td>15,629</td>
<td>5,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (study, retire, ill, etc.)</td>
<td>4,847</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying with permanent foreign residents</td>
<td>1,471</td>
<td>1,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under BOI scheme and other laws</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>3,456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thailand Immigration Bureau

For unskilled immigrants, work conditions depend on individual legal status. Those with work permits are now protected under Thailand’s labour laws whereas undocumented workers are not. However, and regardless of status, both groups will likely be exposed to ‘3D’ jobs, with all the pitfalls attached to these positions: lack of employment security, poor wages, greater danger of work accidents, lack of holidays and sick leave, and few opportunities for promotion. Recent studies found that in Bangkok many young foreign unskilled immigrants without work permits often face long working hours, dangerous work, low pay if any and no days off, along with physical and even sexual abuse (Vungsiriphisal et al., 1999). Many undocumented workers are exposed to toxic chemicals or contaminated wastes in the workplace and without adequate protection; the buildings where they work may have no ventilation and the workers have no access to healthcare facilities (Punpuing, Kittisuksathit, 2003). Those in domestic employment have disproportionately felt the brunt of poor work conditions evidenced by long, late work hours, with very low wages if any, no holidays and, again, potential exposure to physical and sexual abuse (Punpuing, Kittisuksathit, 2003).

Illegal workers are obviously unlikely to report any ill-treatment to the authori-
ties. Poor work conditions still existed in the early years of the 21st century, according to reports from NGOs (Foundation for Children Development, 2001) and international institutions (Beesey, 2004).

Unskilled undocumented migrants also have to cope with difficult living conditions. With wages typically well below the average, these workers are forced to live in the cheaper areas of the Bangkok conurbation with poor quality housing and infrastructure; on top of these come heavy pollution, high crime rates, the prevalence of disease and other health disorders as well as lack of access to good hospitals. A number of NGOs reported that in some small factories, the workers were provided accommodation in the form of sleeping areas next to their workstations. Finally, many of the undocumented workers send whatever money they can to relatives overseas, putting their local living conditions under further pressure.

2. The Issues

Despite the traditional Thai saying: ‘We always offer the best (food) to our guests who come to visit us. We entertain them the best we can’ the way the people of Bangkok today look at immigrants is very different from what it used to be, and it has a lot to do with the respective countries of origin. These different degrees of welcome in turn have major effects on the integration process of those migrants that are not perceived favourably. Bangkok has always been at the receiving end of a large, multicultural foreign migrant community. Living in apparent harmony between various cultures has both contributed to, and resulted from, seemingly positive perceptions towards immigrants.

Today, a number of factors have radically changed the perception among people in Bangkok. To begin with, there has been a lack of consensus over the contribution of foreign migrants to Thailand’s economy. However, such doubts are not directed at skilled migrants. The increasing demand for professional personnel in manufacturing sectors such as telecommunications, IT, and the automobile industry has been a driving force behind the need for skilled workers from overseas, due to short local availability. However, government regulations look to promote a balance between Thai and foreign workers in foreign subsidiaries through restrictions on the number of foreign workers employed in these companies. Also affecting local perceptions of immigrants today is the fact that unskilled Thai workers compete with immigrants for employment opportunities. Initially, unskilled migrants from neighbouring countries were unwelcome with local workers, who saw them as obstacles to improvements in local work conditions and wages. The Thai Trade Unions protested in 1993 when the government for the first time proceeded to regularise illegal workers from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Later, when the number of Thai applicants in certain sectors including fisheries, construction, manual and domestic work began to shrink, the outcry from Thais against unskilled labour from those three countries was less vocal. It is obvious that in Thailand, as elsewhere, jobs considered undesirable by the local population (the above-mentioned ‘3Ds’) are left to the foreign unskilled workforce.

Turning to the general public, there appear to be both positive and negative perceptions of unskilled immigrants in Thailand. Those Thais aware of migrants’ contribution to the country’s economic health in light of the shortages experienced in labour-intensive, poorly paid, uninviting manufacturing sectors, have a positive perception of foreign workers. This view stands in sharp contrast to that of another part of the population, who considers unskilled immigrants as disease-carriers, job-stealers and criminals. Such claims have occasionally been leveled in the media, which tend to sensationalise any potential tension. Workers from Myanmar are further stigmatised by some Thais because of conflicts between the two countries that ended over 200 years ago. Finally, it is worth noting that until the media began to highlight the problems of a few unskilled workers, implying that they represented the norm rather than the exception, the basic attitude of Thai public opinion was a lack of interest in illegal workers, who so far had attracted little attention. Today, however, any public notice these workers attract is generally of an unfavourable nature, which helps to create negative perceptions in the minds of those receptive to media exaggeration. For example, in January 2009, insurgents from Myanmar seized a hospital in Rajburi province, 100 kilometres away from Bangkok; the event triggered vast amounts of public outcry and argument among Thais over the risks of hiring mi-

3 Kom Chad Luk, May 25, 2004
grant labour from that country, regardless of a complete lack of connections between the insurgents and immigrant workers. Media coverage of this event was intense and further inflamed the controversy over immigration. In January 2003, after the Thai consulate in Cambodia was attacked and set on fire for no apparent reason, questions were raised as to the desirability of unskilled migrants from Cambodia residing and working in Thailand. The incident prompted protests in Bangkok against the Cambodian government, and media reports only strengthened the public’s hostile attitude vis-à-vis Cambodian workers at that time. Still, the querying of Thai immigration policies on both occasions was short-lived and there has been little sign of any negative, long-term impact of these episodes on relations between Thais and workers from Myanmar and Cambodia. This is not to suggest that today, these workers are readily welcomed and accepted in Thailand; rather, there appears to be a fair amount of public tolerance, although there are pockets of opposition to their presence in Thailand.

**Discrimination**

Unskilled workers who have entered Thailand illegally but have obtained work permits through subsequent amnesty are at risk from various forms of discrimination including low wages, physical abuse, sexual abuse and an absence of protection in the workplace. Few employers are aware of foreign migrants’ rights, let alone care about them. Furthermore, the combination of amnesty with delivery of a work permit and effective employment did not prevent some beneficiaries from arrest and deportation (and for such misdemeanours as carrying a copy of the work permit rather than the original). In addition, once granted work permits do not confer legal status upon illegal/undocumented workers: they simply allow these migrants to work. At the time when some newly documented workers were arrested, there were claims of corruption and bribes paid to the authorities to avoid deportation. A further major concern for these workers was that their fate ultimately rested in their employers’ hands, because the moment and employer makes a worker redundant his/her work permit is no longer valid. Even when documented, very few unskilled workers understand the rights they are entitled to, for lack of any formal education; even when aware of their rights, these workers may find it impossible to exercise them. NGO reports describe the vulnerable conditions which the families of unskilled workers – and children in particular – endure as a direct result of their lack of skills and questionable legal status. Unskilled migrant workers of both genders are exposed to various forms of discrimination and exploitation. These include pregnancy tests when applying for a amnesty, a work permit or an extension of an existing permit. Overall, their very poor work and living conditions (with earnings below national minimum wages) (Asian Research Centre for Migration, 2002) can only affect their health and general well-being.

The illegal status of those unskilled workers with work permits makes them especially vulnerable to exploitation. This begins when the unskilled immigrant cannot gain entry into Thailand illegally by him/herself and seeks the services of middlemen. Middlemen accompany the unskilled workers into Thailand, often to the ultimate destination, and sometimes help ‘clients’ to find employment. Most ‘clients’ are under formal commitments to repay the middlemen for their services, since workers are usually devoid of any financial resources when illegally entering the country. Once a migrant has a job, the wages are typically subject to garnishment in order to ensure payment to the middleman; the sum ultimately repaid is often in excess of the amount that had been agreed in the first place. The worst forms of exploitation that these unskilled workers have come across include being trafficked into the sex trade and slave labour, being physically and sexually abused (Myint Wai, 2004) and working without payment. Other forms of exploitation, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, include long work hours, unsafe or unhealthy workplace conditions, and child labour. In other words, amnesty and work permits in no way guarantee illegal immigrants against continued exploitation.

**Job security**

The work permit granted to foreign workers, legal and illegal alike (through an amnesty for the latter), is for a specified period, usually one year, and is renewable every year (so far, without any limitation) should the worker wish to remain in Thailand. For renewal to be granted, a work contract is required. For skilled workers, the contract is signed by employers and usually guarantees job security for a certain period, as well as protection of rights under Thai labour laws.
Even when registered under an amnesty, most unskilled migrants have no written contracts with their employers and consequently are at risk of being fired at any time. Having work permits does not spare migrant workers frequent threats of deportation from employers unless they agree to low wages and poor conditions. There have also been documented cases of unskilled migrants employed in construction, domestic work and factories that were laid off just before payday. Finally, when first applying for a work permit and on every successive application for renewal, unskilled migrant workers must be accompanied by their employers to the interview with Thai labour authorities.

Housing

For foreign skilled workers, housing is not a problem as their remuneration affords them comfortable accommodation. Although not entitled to own land or a house (except for those migrants entering Thailand under the BOI or Elite card scheme, as discussed later in the Policy section), skilled immigrants can buy condominium flats in Thailand for the long term, or rent property, as most do, if they are there for shorter periods. Landlords are reportedly keener to rent condominiums out to skilled immigrants rather than to Thais, as foreigners seem to be willing to spend more on rental accommodation. When traveling through metropolitan Bangkok, one can spot a number of condominium compounds where certain ethnic groups are concentrated, with the associated shops and services nearby.

For unskilled immigrants, accommodation is a major concern as their below-average incomes reduce their options. Cheap, rented rooms or housing can be found in abundance in most low-income neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, many unskilled workers, including those with work permits, are fearful of arrest and deportation, and therefore prefer to keep a distance from the local community and live separately.

Social services

Although the country is not usually considered as well developed, the Thai welfare State provides its population with two major services – healthcare and education – and at minimum cost. Healthcare is accessible to anyone in Thailand. However, skilled immigrants are more likely to use private hospital facilities, which they expect to be better quality and multilingual. In addition, medical insurance is often included in the remuneration ‘packages’ employers put together for skilled expatriate staff.

As for unskilled immigrants, they often treat ordinary ailments with medicines acquired without any prescription (as these are not mandatory in Thailand) from drug shops and only in serious cases will they venture into public hospitals. Furthermore, documented unskilled immigrants have no health insurance for the length of their first one-year work permit. As a result, very few seek public healthcare services as they fear being arrested, not to mention further disincentives such as the costs of treatment, communication problems with medical staff and what they perceive as health personnel’s negative attitudes towards them. However, once work permits are renewed, unskilled immigrants take advantage of healthcare insurance and increase their use of public health facilities, even though problems of communication and fears of arrest endure. In addition, health coverage is usually not extended to the workers’ family members.

Thai government policies make primary and secondary education available free of charge in public schools for every child in the country. The only costs borne by parents are for school clothing and equipment. Private schools impose tuition fees, as well as higher costs for school uniforms and equipment. A number of international schools and private universities provide English-speaking tuition and Chinese, Japanese and Indian schools offer bilingual instruction. The costs of attending these institutions vary but, within individual family budget constraints, they do provide immigrants (especially professional staff with families) with a greater range of options.

Migrant children

Thailand is host to an estimated 100,000 children under 15 years, many of whom born in Thailand, whose parents entered the country illegally. These children are considered stateless if their parents entered the country illegally and without documents. However, under the Thai Nationality Act, if the illegal migrants arrived in Thailand before 1992, their children are eligible for Thai cit-
Citizenship, irrespective of their place of birth (in Thailand or abroad) and whether their parent(s) has/have subsequently secured a work permit or not. Children whose parents arrived after 1992 are ineligible for citizenship. Children born in Thailand to these more recently arrived illegal workers do not receive birth certificates, only a document mentioning their names and those of their immigrant parents. Since a full-fledged birth certificate is an invaluable document for later life, lack thereof may expose these children to difficulties in the future. Until recently, access to education has been difficult for children of unskilled immigrants, even for those born in Thailand. They face three main problems: (a) some schools are reluctant to enroll the progeny of illegal immigrants, (b) communication can be difficult, and (c) the cultural divide may be too wide. Access to education also runs against barriers of an economic and administrative nature. Parents may not send their children to school because they have no employment security. Moreover, and at odds with the Ministry of Education’s insistence that State school is open to all including immigrants (whether legal and illegal), many school principals reportedly claim that the status of migrant children is blurred. In addition, a number of migrant children attending local schools and completing their education have not received their education certificate, making them unable to pursue their curriculum any further should they wish to do so.

Ethnic communities

Not all immigrants in Bangkok remain within their local ethnic groups, yet a large majority maintain distinct cultural identities while integrating quite smoothly into the local communities. As mentioned earlier, traditional food shops cater to the needs and tastes of the concentrations of businesses/homes of immigrant groups across Bangkok. Ethnic groups often hold community meetings in religious buildings such as a temples or mosques; and although second- or third-generation immigrants may be fluent in Thai, the older generations continue to speak their native languages.

Chinatown: Bangkok has been host to a Chinese community for a long time. Already the largest group of immigrants to Thailand between the 17th and 19th centuries, the Chinese have retained this dominant position to this day. Thai authorities welcomed Chinese immigrants until the Communist takeover in China in 1949. Up until then, an estimated 10,000 Chinese migrants came to Thailand every year. However, since 1949 the Thai government has set a strict quota and has even reduced it to 100 per year, compared to 200 in earlier years. Still, the Chinese and Thai have lived together in harmony. Bangkok’s Chinatown is where the original immigrants settled hundreds of years ago, with many of their descendants residing there today while others have moved elsewhere. As in most Chinatowns around the world, the Chinese hold many festivals that attract large numbers of local and tourist onlookers. Little Japan: there had been no Japanese community in Bangkok or Thailand until the early 1970s, when a rising number of long-term Japanese immigrants accompanied increasing Japanese foreign investment. From 6,424 in 1980, their number more than doubled to 14,289 in 1990 and by 2004, the Japanese population in Thailand had surged to 28,776. The majority of Japanese migrants do not apply for permanent residence and they stay in Bangkok: in 2003, only two per cent of Japanese immigrants had a permanent residence in Thailand and approximately 75 per cent lived in Bangkok. Japanese business people own and operate many businesses along Sukhumvit Road, an important commercial thoroughfare in metropolitan Bangkok. The road also features many Japanese-occupied condominiums along with an abundance of Japanese restaurants, bars, bookshops and groceries. Given the large numbers of Japanese residents in Bangkok, many businesses, especially in the service sector, have been set up to cater to their requirements. Little India: Indians in Bangkok have played a significant role in the textile industry since their arrival in the early years of the 20th century. By the late 1990s, 75 per cent of the 30,000 Indian migrants in Thailand were living in Bangkok. Like the Chinese and Japanese, Indian migrants concentrate in certain areas, often near ethnic businesses and/or religious institutions. In Bangkok, the highest concentrations of Indian shops and residents can be found along Sampeng Road and in Sao Chingcha. These areas also feature Indian-run schools. Indian festivals never fail to draw in crowds of local people and tourists. On top of these three major communities, migrants from other Asian countries (Myanmar, Cambodia, Nepal, and Bangladesh) contribute large shares of Bangkok’s suburban population. Metropolitan Bangkok is also host to communities of migrants from Africa and the Middle East. As for European and American migrants, they are scattered all over the Thai capital.
The illegal migrants who first arrived in Thailand in the 1990s could neither speak nor understand the Thai language. Only those from Laos, whose language is very similar to Thai, could mix or communicate with local people, especially those from northeastern Thailand (along the Lao border). Burmese workers were the slowest group to learn to speak Thai. They preferred to stay with their compatriots, speaking their own language, watching Burmese videos and listening to Burmese songs. Cambodians learned the Thai language faster because they had watched Thai television before moving to the country, and some were returned refugees who had spent many years in refugee camps along the Thai border during the 1980s. Of those three groups, therefore, Lao migrants were those whose cultural integration in Thai society was the swiftest, and Cambodians came next. The Burmese (including ethnic Mon and Karen) were slow at integration; however, the ethnic Shan were an exception because they speak a language known as Tai that is very close to the northern Thai dialect, enabling them comfortably to mix with migrants from northern Thailand in Bangkok. Therefore, because of their Thai communication skills, the Lao and the Shan come out as the two groups whose social inclusion and acceptance by local communities were the easiest.

The presence of ethnic communities alongside Thai nationals generally reflects local acceptance of foreign migrants. Welcoming attitudes extend far more readily to skilled immigrants and foreign investors than to those from impoverished countries who may have entered the country illegally. The poorer category is the more likely to suffer ill-treatment at the hands of employers and to inspire negative media coverage. Nevertheless, as the poor represent only a small proportion of the populations of both Bangkok and Thailand, their presence is not a major concern or issue for the general public. Neither the capital nor the country at large has ever experienced any conflict between individual ethnic communities and/or with the local Thai community. Any adverse public reaction to an isolated event is usually muted and short-lived. At the same time, the degree of cultural integration of immigrants or long-term residents in Thailand varies across ethnic communities. Those who try to master the Thai language, or for whom English is a second language, have a greater likelihood of integrating. This inability to communicate stands as a significant obstacle to integration, as it contributes to an absence of interaction with Thai people. As illegal migrants have been moving into Thailand for over 10 years, many, with more Cambodians and Burmese (including Mon and Karen ethnics) among them, end up speaking Thai after such a long time. However, important as this is, speaking the language does not bring automatic social inclusion, as illegal immigrants continue to remain undesirable in the public’s eyes. Unfavourable press coverage can undermine their image with those local people receptive to sensationalism, hindering integration even further. As mentioned earlier, Thai media tend to focus on illegal immigrants when covering crime or transmissible diseases, suggesting that these people are undesirable to Thai society. Consequently, a negative perception of the poorer immigrants prevails.

Of all the official and non-official organisations dealing with immigration in Thailand, government bodies are the least involved in social inclusion. The National Security Council and the Interior Ministry are responsible for regulating the flows of migrants into the country. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare is in charge of the welfare and protection of Thai workers abroad and of migrant workers in Thailand; however, these arrangements have proved ineffective so far, due to inadequate resources. Several local and international NGOs provide various types of support and assistance to unskilled immigrants in Bangkok and other areas. Services include counseling, legal assistance, emergency short-term shelter for immigrant children and women, and training in social skills. Vis-à-vis public opinion and decision-makers, NGOs also look to raise public awareness of the plight of poor immigrants and engage in advocacy. For instance, NGOs have successfully fought in favour of keeping HIV out of the list of diseases the contraction of which would preclude unskilled immigrants from being granted work permits.

3. International migration and national policies

Thailand’s immigration policy features two different facets, with direct consequences on its capital city. On the one hand, Thailand overtly welcomes and favours skilled immigrants through various schemes and measures. The Board of Investment (BOI) Act 1977 (revised in 2001) is a good case in point. The 2000-2001 economic crisis saw a significant fall in foreign investment in Thailand, trig-
gering a revival in the BOI-based strategy aimed at restoring the country's financial health. The strategy considered foreign investors and skilled immigrants as highly beneficial to the enhancement of Thailand's financial system.

On the other hand, Thailand's national immigration policy towards unskilled immigrant workers has been far more discriminating in nature. Regardless of existing labour shortages and the strong need for unskilled workers in Bangkok, the government has insisted on introducing national security principles in its policy with regard to immigrant workers. The principles emphasise the strict control of foreigners, including through specific quotas lest immigrants become a threat to national security.

Not until 2001 did the Thai government shift its quota policy to expand the number of registered unskilled migrant workers to 500,000, and again to 1.2 million in 2004. However, increases in the limited numbers of registered unskilled migrant workers did not go hand in hand with a policy of adequate protection of workers’ rights (including welfare and wages). Unlike those immigrants associated with foreign investment capital, who are warmly welcomed and well catered for in Thailand, those immigrants (predominantly from neighbouring Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia) whose only capital is unskilled work ability feel shunned and discarded, without access to anything like the status and privileges enjoyed by their wealthier counterparts.

National policies on unskilled labour immigration

Thailand’s immigration policies are based on two major pieces of legislation: the Foreign Employment Act 1978 and the Immigration Act 1979. The two statutes broadly allow immigrants to come and stay legally in Thailand, and consider undocumented unskilled workers as illegal immigrants. Under the Immigration Act, only those immigrants who travel with proper documents are allowed to enter the country, whereas those who enter illegally (i.e., without proper documents) will be expelled. The government has used a loophole in the Immigration Act to allow illegal immigrants to work temporarily while waiting to be deported (Art. 23). This has effectively enabled these migrants to take the sort of jobs that were barred to foreign workers under the Foreign Employment Act.

Immigration policies for unskilled workers began to take shape in Thailand during the 1990s because of a massive inflow of people taking flight from the political upheaval in neighbouring Myanmar. Thai policy on unskilled immigration unfolded in four successive stages:

- **Up until 1999**, during the initial period, the government came under pressure from business groups to relax legislation that prohibited unskilled worker immigration to Thailand. Therefore, the government used a loophole in the Immigration Act of 1992 to allow the registration of illegal migrants. Registered migrant workers from Myanmar were allowed to work for a period of up to a year in 1995 and 1996 and their number increased to 239,652 in 36 of Thailand’s 76 provinces by 1996. The 1995 registration process was when Bangkok was first included in the area-based policy and from that point onwards, immigrants have been free to come and work in the Thai capital. In 1997, a committee was created under the National Security Council that included a central unit in charge of supervising immigrant worker policy. The aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis saw the expulsion of some 300,000 temporary foreign workers in a bid to reduce the unemployment rate, which rose to 4.4 per cent in 1998 regardless. In that same year, 90,91 the government allowed foreign migrants to work in 54 provinces, including Bangkok. The fall in the number of registered migrant workers was partly a reflection of a sharp drop in the construction sector during and after the financial and economic crises, and occurred as many provinces insisted that they needed immigrant workers.

- In 1999-2000 and as immigrant worker registration continued, Thai authorities took better notice of migrants’ active presence in the country. The public at large similarly became more aware of the problems immigrants were facing, especially in urban areas. Nonetheless, those civil society groups that advocated immigrants’ well-being and social inclusion as fundamental guidelines for national policy met with little success, if any. In this period, the government set a quota in a bid to control and restrict the number of illegal workers who would be allowed to register, which effectively amounted to more than 100,000 in 1999 and 2000, at a time when the public became more aware of their predicament, especially in urban areas.

- In 2001, and in order to clarify the number of undocumented workers for the sake of efficient management, the Thai government granted an amnesty to all illegal (i.e., unregistered) immigrants residing in Thailand, including those...
who were self-employed. No quota was set and in the end 568,000 workers, representing all sectors of employment, took advantage of the government's offer and were granted one-year work permits. Another amnesty-cum-registration process was launched in 2002, when the number of those who took advantage dropped to 409,339.

In 2002-2003, Thai authorities entered into negotiations with those of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos to secure their cooperation in a bid to regularise the status of migrant workers from these countries who wanted to remain in Thailand. In 2002-2003, the Thai government signed a string of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with those of Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar on the issue of international migration in the region. The MOUs focused on the following critical areas:
- government-to-government recruitment of immigrant workers for specific periods of employment in Thailand.
- incentives for workers to return to their home countries once their period of employment in Thailand is over.
- labour rights protection and dispute settlement.
- steps to tackle illegal employment.

Under the memoranda, the three above-mentioned countries agreed to introduce a screening process for those of their citizens who wished to migrate to Thailand. This screening process makes it easier for Thai authorities to determine the nationality of applicants, since until then some illegal foreign workers falsely claimed that their nationality was one of the three allowed to work in Thailand. If their nationality is proven and confirmed, the country of origin will accept the ultimate return of those migrants. At the time of writing (late 2004), the four countries were still negotiating over the procedures required to determine migrants' nationality and were discussing a detailed action plan.

As the terms of the MOUs were being discussed, in 2003 representatives of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand met in Pagan (Myanmar) and signed what has since been known as the Pagan Declaration. The document highlights the importance of partnership to enhance economic growth, facilitate production, create employment and reduce income gaps. More generally, the declaration advocates sustainable peace, stability and prosperity in the four countries (Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003). Under the Economic Cooperation Strategy (ECS) outlined in the document, the four countries pledged to address some of the root causes of migration, including poverty and economic discrepancies, both from a strategic and a practical point of view. Alongside the twin efforts (the MOUs and the Pagan Declaration) undertaken with neighbouring governments, the Thai authorities maintained their policy of illegal foreign worker registration. A fresh amnesty in 2003 produced only 288,780 new individual registrations. Obviously, Thai employers and migrant workers had taken advantage of the 2002 amnesty and balked at the fees associated with work permit renewal. Therefore, a good many of them did not show up in 2003 and the registered number dropped to just 50 per cent of the 2001 figure. The Thai government responded with yet another amnesty, in 2004, in a further attempt to clarify the actual number of foreign workers, help determine their future status and maintain control of inflows.

In summary, since 1992 Thailand has implemented a registration process to identify undocumented foreign workers. The country has gradually expanded the number of employment sectors and provinces where employers could register foreign workers and employ them for one to two years. In total, six registration exercises took place followed by amnesties in 2001 and 2004 with the same ultimate goal, namely, better control and management of unskilled worker immigration.

In Bangkok, registration of foreign workers first took place in 1995 and as it continued, the numbers increased gradually. In the early years, workers were registered mainly in the construction sector as the capital was in the midst of a real estate development boom. In 2000, the aftermath of the financial crisis nearly brought the sector to a standstill, particularly in the capital. Subsequently, domestic employment became the dominant source of jobs for unskilled immigrants in Bangkok, as evidenced by an increasing proportion of female foreign workers. Unlike construction, domestic work (in individual households) is not one of the categories of employment protected by current labour laws. Bangkok is home to the highest number of domestic workers in Thailand. Of the 240,000 immigrants working for 71,620 employers in Bangkok in 2004, some 10,000 did so as domestic help.

Under tourism and healthcare services, promotion focuses on hotels, resorts, homes for the elderly and health rehabilitation centres. Educational services include international schools and vocational training centres. Regional operational headquarters of all types of service firms and trade and investment services are the two major categories promoted under ‘work’ (Department of Investment Marketing, BOI). As Bangkok is both the economic and administrative capital of Thailand, the city acts as a hub for all investment promotion schemes and transactions. Therefore, the national policy for skilled workers and foreign investors is of primary importance to Bangkok and has a major impact on the local economy and population.

Citizenship and resident status

The Nationality Act 1965 entitles children born in Thailand to foreign-born parents to Thai nationality if their parents are living in Thailand legally. However, as most unskilled workers entered the country illegally, their children born in Thailand do not qualify for Thai nationality. Foreign professionals are eligible to ask for permanent resident status under the condition that they earn high incomes and keep the minimum required deposit in a Thai bank, as mentioned earlier. Obviously, poor, illegal foreign workers cannot meet these criteria and many will become illegal overstayers if their one- or two-year registration is not renewed. Every year, the Thai Immigration Office expels more than 200,000 illegal foreigners, many of them living in Bangkok.

The degree of integration of illegal immigrants into Thai society is minimal. The authorities believed that unskilled immigrants would stay temporarily in Thailand and return home when employment was terminated, but this was not to be the case. Instead, more illegal immigrants arrived and old arrivals have been there for the long term. An estimated 40,000 babies have been born to illegal immigrants on Thai soil. Since their parents violated immigration laws, these children do not qualify for Thai citizenship and are stateless; as for their parents, they find it difficult to access housing and welfare services.

National policy regarding foreign investors and skilled workers

Thai policy regarding skilled/professional immigrants is based on three major pieces of legislation: the Immigration Act 1979, the Board of Investment (BOI) Act 2001, and statutory law on the acquisition of land, as amended in 2002.

Under the BOI Act, skilled workers, experts and spouses are allowed to come to live in Thailand. These professionals may also purchase land for their businesses and they are exempted from both import and income taxes for a minimum five years. The Immigration Act 1979 embedded a new policy of granting one-year visas to foreigners living in Thailand based on either marriage to a Thai national, or running a business, or looking after a child or parent who is a Thai citizen. However, one-year visas will also be granted to foreigners with high incomes or who keep large amounts of cash in Thai banks. More specifically, access to one-year visas is conditioned on a 400,000-baht deposit in a Thai bank, or a monthly income of at least 40,000 baht, and proof of family links if the applicant is married to a Thai citizen. As for foreign entrepreneurs, they must pay income tax, with applicable rates a function of nationality.

With regard to land acquisition, the Condominium Act 1999 allows foreigners (e.g., skilled foreign workers or foreign investors willing to live in Thailand) to purchase condominium units. They can do so in a proportion no higher than 49 per cent of all the total space of all units in the relevant condominium development. However, foreigners can have ownership in excess of 49 per cent if the condominium is located in Bangkok and other government-designated municipalities. In these areas, skilled migrants can expand ownership beyond the initial 49 per cent after 2004.

It is blatantly obvious that current and past Thai governments have deliberately adopted immigration policies that, in effect, welcome wealthy foreigners to come and live in the country. The policy seeks to encourage these prospective immigrants to stay for extended periods or even indefinitely in Thailand, while also allowing them to own real estate, and it appears that the wealthier the immigrant, the larger the welcome mat. Foreigners are encouraged to migrate to Thailand for the long term if engaged in three major sectors: tourism and healthcare services, educational services and ‘work’.

5 From 60,000 baht for Americans, Canadians and Japanese to 25,000 baht for Africans.
4. Migrants’ rights and urban policies

Rights to healthcare and educational services

Immigrants who enter Thailand legally gain access to both healthcare and educational services at the same costs as Thai nationals. Registered foreign workers are required to purchase health insurance during their period of employment; as such, they are entitled to healthcare services like their Thai counterparts. However, their dependents are not included under the health insurance scheme. Therefore, dependents of foreign workers suffer from ill health on a much broader scale than the general population, with hospitalisation a last resort due to the costs involved. Although in 2002 the Thai Ministry of Health spent up to seven million US dollars on healthcare for immigrant patients who could not afford treatment, the illegal/undocumented status of many workers bars them from access to proper care. In addition, preventive measures, including family planning and child immunization, are frequently unavailable to those staying in Thailand illegally.

As for rights to basic education for migrant children in Thailand, they are more effective than those to healthcare are. In 1992, the Ministry of Education declared that all children in the country had the right to attend school. However, initially this did not include children of illegal workers. The government subsequently extended the 1992 policy to include migrant children whose parents had registered for work permits. Even so, illegal/undocumented immigrants are understandably reluctant to register their children at local schools, thereby perpetuating their poor socio-economic conditions into the next generation. NGOs have advocated extended access to education for all children, including the stateless, but the Thai National Security Council rejected the proposal. Still, migrant children of both illegal/undocumented and legal/documented parents in Thailand’s border areas have benefited more from educational opportunities than those in the country’s major conurbations, as border towns have grown accustomed to providing education to young people from the other side of the line. However, a significant problem in Thailand is that the government’s 1992 education policy has not been implemented on a universal scale. In those schools with large numbers of migrant pupils, teachers have been facing a heavy additional burden because these children were often illiterate in the Thai language. Consequently, teachers have to spend more time with them to help them catch up with local peers, and as they balk at the extra effort many seek alternative jobs.

After the 2004 registration, the authorities allowed only children of registered immigrants to attend public schools. A variety of problems ensued. Some immigrants reportedly did not value education enough to send their children to school. Others could not afford school uniforms and materials. In some places, immigrants made their own schooling arrangements and contributed 100 to 150 baht a month to have their progeny taught in their own language, which more often than not was Burmese.

Immigrant rights to housing and infrastructure

Documented foreign businessmen (skilled workers) are entitled to own condominium apartments. Only those waved into Thailand under the Board of Investment (BOI) Act are allowed to own land, though. The Condominium Act 1999 allows skilled immigrants to own up to 49 per cent of all units in a condominium and the proportion can be increased after 2004. They can also individually own a two-acre strip of land (about 1 hectare). However, such rights are at odds with those of unskilled illegal immigrants, most of whom stay in dormitories, or the factory compound, or their employer’s place of residence. The remainder (usually those with a family) live on their own in cramped rented accommodation. Most such dormitories or rented rooms are of poor quality and condition, and often unhygienic due to congestion and lack of ventilation. Some locations have been found without any latrines or sewage, some without any direct access to electricity or clean water, which occupants had to pay special charges for to Thai landlords. Official health statistics show that disproportionate numbers of individuals with severe diarrhea and respiratory conditions have to bear with these poor living conditions in migrant enclaves. Since Thai authorities never expected undocumented immigrant workers to stay for extended periods, they never envisaged the need for more suitable accommodation.
sectors hiring immigrant workers also extended beyond farming and fisheries to construction, domestic work, manufacturing and general manual work. As a result, the government had to include more business sectors for registration, along with more eligible provinces as well. Thai authorities also tried to set quotas for the numbers to be registered in each industry, but the 2001 and 2004 amnesties made it possible for migrant workers to be hired in unlimited numbers. Quite obviously, this policy has been relatively passive as well as piecemeal and shortsighted. The government has attempted a trade-off between pressure from businesses to increase the quotas for the sake of economic development on the one hand, and its own concerns for national security on the other hand. Consequently, the Thai government has never considered the social impact that immigrants were having on the areas where they worked and resided. Urban welfare policies in terms of housing, education and healthcare for immigrants were never envisaged. The emergence and existence of immigrant workers in Thai society became a phenomenon that evolved naturally, away from the public eye. Public policy largely ignored immigrants. Furthermore, the Thai government has tended to be reactive rather than proactive as it responded to potential issues or problems, instead of anticipating them. This was the case when it introduced the compulsory reporting, by hotel managers and landlords, of any new non-Thai guests or tenants. As for the more recent issuance of birth certificates to newborn babies of immigrant parents, the move arose from public concern over stateless children and Thailand’s obligations deriving from its endorsement of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Until then, these children had been denied the right to birth certificates as a matter of policy, lest they used the certificates to demand Thai citizenship at some later point in their lives. This exemplifies the almost total absence of long-term immigration policies in Thailand and the ad hoc kind of decision-making that prevails. This passive, shortsighted policy has brought about some new problems even as long-standing issues have not been resolved properly in urban areas.

The Elite card and foreign investment promotion

In 2003, Thailand introduced a new scheme, the Elite card, to promote tourism, foreign investment and immigration among the more affluent foreign

Urban planning laws and regulations

In Thailand’s major conurbations like Bangkok or Chiangmai, the presence of immigrant workers is less conspicuous than in other areas, due to the multi-ethnic and multicultural character of these cities, and although each features a number of ethnic enclaves. Unskilled immigrant workers often live in rented rooms or with employers. In a contrast with their skilled, wealthier counterparts, they have no right to real estate ownership. The Thai government supervises the presence and flows of immigrants through its dedicated regulatory framework. Managers of hotels, guesthouses, rented houses and apartments are required to report the names of all new tenants/boarders/guests to the Immigration Office within 24 hours, and can do so electronically. Anyone ignoring the regulation is liable to a fine ranging from 1,600 to 20,000 baht.

Apart from this particular regulation, there are no urban laws, regulations or policies directed at immigrants in Bangkok. The last election for governor of the capital, held in September 2004, did not elicit any new policies regarding immigrants. This suggests that Bangkok city authorities remain unaware of a succession of new, challenging problems arising from immigration and of the subsequent need for a relevant policy to tackle them.

Immigrant worker registration

Since launch in 1992 and as it has been constantly renewed to this day, Thailand’s registration scheme for immigrant workers has stood as a glaring example of inadequate urban labour migration development and implementation. In the early days, the government was not fully aware of the growing numbers of immigrants, which it saw as a temporary problem to be resolved with one single decision. In 1992, the authorities allowed only workers from Myanmar to work in four border provinces. When migrant workers ignored the guidelines and went to work in other areas, the government gave in and extended the list of authorised provinces. Thai authorities subsequently extended compulsory registration to Lao and Cambodian nationals working illegally in Thailand. Then those business
travelers/investors. The Elite card offers special services and amenities to holders, including investment opportunities and privileges. The card carries exemption from entry visa requirements, along with automatic permission to stay in Thailand for five years, discounts on Thai Airways International flights, special rates for private airplane or helicopter rental, as well as easy access to golf clubs. Ability to buy property/land for personal and investment purposes is yet another benefit attached to the Elite card. It costs between 25,000 and 50,000 US dollars to buy the card from the Thai government.

Earlier, in 2000, the Thai Board of Investment (BOI) announced the granting of permanent residence in the country to those former Thai citizens who had changed nationality, as well as to foreign investors and technicians, in order to enable them to invest and bring expertise to the country. Investors must bring into Thailand no less than 10 to 16 million baht for themselves and their spouses and children (BOI Announcement N° 1/2544). As for experts or technicians, they must have an annual income of no less than US$ 20,000 (or about 800,000 baht). Former Thai citizens looking to return permanently must submit evidence of a fund transfer into the country through the national commercial banking system.

Neither the investment promotion scheme nor the Elite card has met with unqualified success, although the schemes should not be considered failures. At the time of writing, the authorities had issued some 600 Elite cards, and the amount of funds deposited in Thailand by investors and experts under the new BOI guidelines (see below) had increased marginally, from 33 billion baht in 2001 to 34 billion baht in 2003. The major problem with the Elite card is that the private sector is expected to provide the discounted services under a scheme launched by the authorities. The question is, who will bear the cost of the discounted/special rates advertised by the government? Will the authorities compensate the private sector for the reduced income derived from discounted services to Elite cardholders? As the questions fail to receive any clear-cut answers that might satisfy the private sector (which otherwise would bear the cost of the scheme), cooperation between business and government over the Elite card has been minimal – yet another inconsistency between policy-making and effective delivery.

The BOI Investment promotion policy is more workable than the Elite card. The reason is that permanent residence status is granted by a public authority and therefore does not require the private sector to make any commitments to foreign investors. As a result, the BOI policy is also more manageable than the Elite card. However, it has not been a roaring success because some investors already conducting business in Thailand have come into the country as tourists. Some Asian businessmen (from Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Malaysia or South Korea) have set themselves a pattern whereby they operate their businesses illegally in Thailand for a short period (one to three months) and leave the country before their tourist visas expire, only to return within three months with a fresh tourist visa. This is a frequent occurrence in Bangkok as well as in other urban areas in Thailand. The government is not equipped to monitor and crack down on such illegal business operations. This modus operandi enables these ‘tourists’ to invest in Thailand without bringing the significant amounts of money required under BOI legislation. These migrants can even evade taxation (both personal income and company taxes) since their businesses have no formal legal existence.

Since most foreign investors reside in Bangkok, the BOI policy and the Elite card can be considered as urban policies concerned with ‘desirable’ immigration. The two schemes appear as the latest upshot of the government’s consistent encouragement of foreign direct investment into Thailand since the 1970s. At that time, the Thai economy was undergoing structural adjustment. Contrary to government expectations, the manufacturing sector failed to dominate the economy through a strong export performance. Instead, the services sector became Thailand’s locomotive. Therefore, the government decided to provide attractive services to foreign business people in a bid to lure FDI into the country. This policy was successful in the 1980s and 1990s as many newly industrialised countries, including Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, chose to take advantage of Thailand’s abundant natural resources and relatively low, competitive labour costs. By the mid-1990s, though, new opportunities in Asia, especially in low-cost China and Vietnam, resulted in tough competition for FDI, which seemed to have peaked as far as Thailand was concerned. This caused the Thai government to bolster its BOI promotion scheme in the 1990s. However, for all the efforts made under the BOI plan, media coverage of the odd bout of violence (with political or religious motivations) in Thailand (although not yet in Bangkok) combines with allegations of rampant corruption among government officials to discourage potential foreign investors.
5. Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Absence of urban policy and national policy inconsistencies

Bangkok city authorities have never adopted any immigration policy of their own although the Thai capital is a popular destination for many immigrants. As a result, city authorities do not take illegal immigrants residing in Bangkok into account when developing planning policies. In this situation, any provision of housing, education and healthcare, etc., to the public is only with Thai nationals in mind. Moreover, illegal immigrants find it difficult to celebrate their traditional or religious festivals due to lack of access to public space; more generally, they are not expected to participate or share in the public space used by Thai nationals. As far as national policies are concerned, the registration scheme for immigrant workers reflects policy inconsistency over time. The scheme was originally designed to control the numbers of foreign workers and their location (quota-based and area-based registration; however, those registrations that closely followed amnesties did not carry any quotas or area specification. Such inconsistencies derive from the ongoing power play between Thailand’s National Security Council and the business community. It should be highlighted that the absence of any welfare policies and the inconsistency in immigration policies hit unskilled and undocumented immigrants particularly hard. NGO failure to play a more significant role in the issue only further demonstrates the collective blind eye to the needs of the many low-income immigrants living in Bangkok. The Thai government’s registration and work permit renewal schemes are purely passive, where curative measures are required to handle illegal unskilled migration with any degree of dynamism. Bangkok has yet to develop and implement an active urban policy regarding immigrant workers. In the end, such lack of a comprehensive policy will make Bangkok an increasingly unattractive place to live, especially for those illegal immigrants that the Thai government is not keen at taking into consideration.

The need for an adequate database

One reason why Bangkok is not ready to handle the inflow of unskilled foreign migrants is a lack or absence of reliable and current information about these people. Overseas, Bangkok is known as Thailand’s capital city, with a diversified economy. It is also known for criminal activities such as prostitution, homosexual sex, drugs and human trafficking. The Longman Dictionary describes Bangkok as the city of prostitutes and many Bangkok people are unsettled by such a description. More recently, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported, ‘Bangkok has traditionally been Asia’s gay capital’ (October 28, 2004). However, such activities are mostly conducted underground and city authorities have no formal data on them. Nor do they have any adequate data on undocumented immigrants. Official statistics include only Bangkok-born individuals and those who reported their own immigration into Bangkok through the existing household registration system. Whereas the record shows that some six million people live there, Bangkok actually houses more than seven million people, including those who did not properly register their residence in the capital. The limited nature of data on immigrants in Bangkok and the current focus on Thai citizens will be of little assistance to city authorities if they are ever to develop any appropriate policy with regard to immigrants. As a result and for the time being, the capital’s administrative body and its population are largely unaware that immigrants are living among them. In the recent run-up to the election for Bangkok’s governor in September 2004, neither the candidates nor the voters mentioned immigration as a major issue for city authorities to address. They were more concerned about environmental degradation (air and water pollution), the urban poor (local Thais rather than unskilled foreign workers), traffic congestion and the need for better public transportation. Immigration policy was not and is not on the agenda. As long as the apparent lack of awareness and absence of an adequate database continue, no relevant, efficient, targeted immigration policy can take shape in Bangkok.

Media reporting and immigrants

Newspaper headlines tend to sensationalise the negative aspects of immigrants and confine coverage to problems alleged to be a result of their presence. These include claims about the incidence and geographical prevalence of crime (suggesting that unskilled immigrants are brutal and all-too prone to cause damage or injury to Thais), claims that they carry transmissible diseases like...
dengue fever, tuberculosis and malaria, and that they are dishonest and dirty, etc. Even the Ministry of Labour, in one of its campaigns encouraging Bangkok employers to have their illegal immigrant staff registered, stated that immigrant workers were like vipers and that Thai citizens should avoid them. The local tabloid newspaper *Thai Rath* systematically carries reports about migrant workers who slash employers’ throats or rob them, or rape local women, or get drunk and become aggressive and kill one another. Such perceptions do not just stand in the way of immigrants’ integration into the urban way of life: they also marginalise these communities. The media shape public opinion to a significant extent, but in Thailand and for that matter Bangkok, those who run them do not seem to be aware of the importance of intelligent, non-biased reporting. Some sort of training programme is required for the media to blunt their systematic hostility to unskilled immigrants and ensure that they provide the general public with a more balanced perspective on immigration issues.

Urban policies that catered specifically to Bangkok and were inclusive of its whole population – i.e., including unskilled immigrants, legal and otherwise – would enhance public awareness and elicit concern for the plight of unskilled immigrants. Any effective urban policy addressing the needs of unskilled immigrants should focus on the following four points:

1) **Granting civil rights and protection to those immigrants who come to Bangkok and stay there legally is essential.** The most recent registration of immigrant workers showed that Bangkok has the highest number by far of registered immigrants (more than 80,000); therefore, municipal authorities must learn how to manage a city with such a significant foreign community. In addition, since most such immigrants are in manual work and domestic employment, city authorities as well as the Ministry of Labour must learn how to monitor and integrate these people into the city’s social fabric.

2) **NGOs have proved to be an invaluable source of assistance to immigrants.** Bangkok city leaders should recognise this major contribution and find ways of cooperating with these organisations. Some type of partnership should be arranged in those areas/suburbs where migrant communities are established. NGOs excel in the provision of social services such as arranging special tuition for immigrants’ children, operating reproductive health clinics, offering legal advice, etc. The Bangkok municipality can provide support and facilities to such NGOs. Illegal immigrants and dependents of registered immigrant workers, particularly children, should receive special medical attention. Family planning and child immunisation must be of an outreach nature if they are to benefit those who most need them, the majority of whom are ‘underground’. In Bangkok, birth certificates should also be granted for newborn babies of illegal immigrants.

3) **It is imperative that the local media be trained in multicultural and ethnic-friendly journalism.** This should enable them to look at the immigration phenomenon and immigrants from a different and far more sensitive perspective. The media can play a constructive role in bridging the gap of understanding and cooperation between foreign migrants and local people. As part of civil society, the media can be a contributing factor of urban governance in Bangkok.

4) **One factor preventing Bangkok from becoming a metropolis where immigrants find it easy to integrate in the local community is the lack of relevant laws and regulations.** The Bangkok municipality should develop a local legal framework on which it can base an immigration policy focusing on the well-being of immigrants. The effectiveness of such a legal framework must also be ensured.
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table

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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>University, Bangkok.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Migrants in this paper always are international migrants - domestic migration within Germany is ignored here.

2. ‘Foreigner’ is the legal status of people living in Berlin who are not German citizens; ‘migrant’ is a more general category which includes foreigners, naturalised immigrants, and non-documented individuals born outside Germany.

BERLIN, GERMANY
INTEGRATION THROUGH MULTICULTURAL EMPOWERMENT AND REPRESENTATION

Hartmut Häussermann
Andreas Kapphan
Julia Gerometta

1. Migrants in Berlin

A short history of immigration in Berlin

The largest city in Germany with a population of 3.3 million, Berlin holds a unique position within the Federal Republic due to the fact that until 1990 it was divided into two parts. The western part was attached to the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the eastern part served as the capital of the German Democratic Republic. Since Berlin became the capital of a reunited Germany, tremendous changes have occurred in the economic and political spheres and in migration patterns as well. Until 1990, migration headed almost exclusively towards the western part of the city where jobs were on offer, whereas today the presence of migrants can be observed in growing numbers in the eastern part as well. In 2003, there were 444,000 foreigners (Ausländer) or non-Germans, accounting for 13 per cent of the total population. Today the share of foreigners in west Berlin (17 per cent) remains much higher than in the eastern part (six per cent), reflecting the very different histories of migration policies in the two areas. Post-war migration to Berlin started in the 1960s with the recruitment of so-called ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter) from Mediterranean countries, especially Turkey and Yugoslavia. A guest worker held a limited permit of residence and was supposed to leave the country after a period of three to five years. Guest workers were young males because the jobs they were recruited for were mainly in manufacturing and were physically demanding.

Between 1960 and 1974, the share of foreigners in the West Berlin population rose from one to nine per cent (Table 1). After the statutory ‘recruitment standstill’ (Anwerbestopp) in 1973, which put an end to guest worker hiring, migrants were granted resident status. Many of them not only remained in the city but also brought their
families over to Berlin, leading to a significant increase in the number of foreigners. During the 1980s, Berlin became a destination of choice for asylum seekers and refugees. The number of people from Poland, Iran, Vietnam, Palestine and the Lebanon increased during this period in the western part. East Berlin also hosted refugees from all over the world, though in small numbers only. Most of the immigrants in East Berlin were contract workers from the Socialist ‘brother states’ like Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba and Poland.

**TABLE 1 - FOREIGNERS IN BERLIN, 1960 TO 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Berlin Total</th>
<th>West Berlin Total</th>
<th>East Berlin Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>22,065</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>91,339</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>230,317</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>245,620</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>355,356</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>324,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>442,554</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>368,310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin, 2003

After unification in the 1990s, migration affected both east and west Berlin. In east Berlin, the share of foreigners in the total population rose from 1.6 per cent in 1989 to 5.9 per cent in 2002. When the communist regimes in eastern Europe collapsed in 1989, a significant and ever-increasing number of people from eastern countries moved to Berlin, particularly from Poland and the former Soviet Union. Among them were labour migrants (such as Polish contract workers), refugees (Jews from the former Soviet Union), and ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) or ‘resettlers’, returning to their historic country of origin. The number of migrants from the European Union (EU) also increased during the 1990s, including new labour migrants, students and official representatives in the new capital of the reunited Germany.

**Population with a migration background**

Available statistics only show the current number of foreigners in Berlin. However, this statistical category proves to be too narrow when discussing urban policies towards migration. We need to include a broader range of conditions, from people belonging to ethnic minorities to others who have to cope with the usual problems of migrants. Additionally, the community of resettlers from the former Soviet Union cannot be counted as ‘foreigners’ since they are German citizens. This is why, for the purposes of this chapter, we develop and use a different category, which we call ‘people with a migration background’.

Migrants from Turkey represent the largest group among people with a migration background in Berlin, as they do in official statistics. In 2002, Berlin was host to 123,000 individuals who held the sole Turkish nationality. Next came 56,000 migrants from Yugoslavia or its succession states, 33,000 from the former Soviet Union (i.e., CIS) countries and 31,000 from Poland (not including ethnic German migrants from Poland or the former Soviet Union). The other non-Germans came from more than 160 other countries, of which more than one third (69,000) from the countries making up the EU at the time. Migrants from the Lebanon and Palestine are more numerous than residents from France or Great Britain (Table 2).

**TABLE 2 - FOREIGNERS IN BERLIN BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total foreign population</td>
<td>230,317</td>
<td>355,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of total population (per cent)</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>114,067</td>
<td>137,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia and succeeding states</td>
<td>31,854</td>
<td>42,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union or CIS*</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>10,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3,512</td>
<td>26,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lebanon &amp; Palestine*</td>
<td>11,843</td>
<td>19,768*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>28,319</td>
<td>40,482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Berlin (West) only; 2 CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States; 3 Lebanese and “unclear” nationality; 4 As at 30 June 2002

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin, 2003

The figures in Table 2 do not include those individuals who also have, or only have, German nationality, such as the so-called ‘ethnic Germans’ or ‘resettlers’, who migrated back from the former Eastern bloc and often have a foreign cultural background. Moreover, foreigners do not include naturalised individuals (i.e., individuals who have acquired German citizenship other than at birth) and undocumented residents. In the 1990s, the resettlers came predominantly from the former Soviet
Union and, together with co-migrating family members, amounted to an estimated 55,000 (Burchard, 2002). Altogether 195,000 individuals have become German by naturalisation since 1945. Although a majority (166,000) retain their original (foreign) nationality, statistically they no longer register as foreigners. Most were naturalised after 1991, when a new piece of legislation on foreigners gave those with permanent residence in the country the right to German nationality (Table 3). In addition, some 100,000 individuals from abroad live in Berlin without being documented, on an ‘illegal’ basis, i.e., without the right of stay (Aufenthaltsrecht) in Germany. This figure is a joint estimate made by the police and welfare organisations at the end of the 1990s. Since 1975, children with one parent holding German citizenship receive German nationality at birth. So do, since the year 2000, the 11,000 children born to parents holding non-German citizenship. This figure does not include children who are born as Germans with one or both parents holding German citizenship and having a migrant background.

**Table 3 - Number of foreigners, 1991 to 2002: Moves in and out, Naturalisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Incoming</th>
<th>Outgoing</th>
<th>Naturalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>340,046</td>
<td>56,474</td>
<td>30,527</td>
<td>7,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>425,129</td>
<td>72,793</td>
<td>46,591</td>
<td>12,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>434,268</td>
<td>50,007</td>
<td>43,693</td>
<td>6,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>444,774</td>
<td>47,055</td>
<td>36,882</td>
<td>6,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin, 2003

Most illegal migrants are estimated to come from Russia, Ukraine and Poland, and the balance from Latin America, Africa and Asia. Legally, they are duty-bound to leave the country and ‘illegals’, as they are called in Germany, are under permanent threat of imprisonment for breaching legal strictures on the duration of undocumented residence (up to one year), and of being deported if and when found out by the police. Still, in many cases, passport controls do not automatically lead to deportation, with the police showing some leniency, albeit on an informal, discretionary basis.

Although illegal migrants in Germany are entitled to human rights (as opposed to civic rights), there is no institution they can turn to in order to have them enforced, which deprives them of any effective rights or nearly so. The problem of irregular (i.e., illegal/undocumented) immigration arose in Germany during the economic boom of the 1960s and early 1970s, when German industry needed to supplement the national workforce with migrant labour. After the 1973 standstill on guest worker recruitment, irregular immigration became a target of German internal policy. From that point onwards, and together with stricter immigration controls, the issue was dealt with by forced expulsion (deportation). This applied to those illegal migrants whose status did not grant a right (or toleration) to stay in Germany, such as refugee, asylum seeker or guest worker status. As the German authorities have taken closely to monitor rising numbers of irregular migrants, they impose more and more legal strictures on foreigners and asylum seekers, and seek to deter potential bogus asylum seekers through cuts in welfare entitlements.

More recently, the range of methods and instruments used to enforce immigration policy has broadened to include passport controls in public areas, raids on building sites and restaurants as potential workplaces for ‘illegals’, sophisticated screening at border checkpoints, international cooperation, expulsion and deportation. However, instead of reducing the numbers of illegal immigrants (now an estimated 500,000 in Germany), this policy only manages to make their status more and more insecure; it takes them close to a condition where they no longer have any rights at all. This is apparent in the labour market, where undocumented immigrants have no rights of redress against unacceptably low wages and exploitation, fall victims to a growing organised traffic in human beings, and find themselves unequal before the law with regard (for instance) to the right to family unification or to education and healthcare (Erzbischoefliches Ordinariat Berlin, 1999). The total number of individuals with migrant backgrounds residing in Berlin can be estimated at over 800,000.

With the 2000 statute and for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, Germany grants a right to full-fledged immigration, but then only to highly skilled migrants, with further exceptions for family unification, asylum-seekers (under stringent conditions), refugees and exceptional professional niches. In fact, Germany’s 2000 statute is an instrument designed to restrict immigration.

**Employment and unemployment**

Immigrants in Berlin were initially employed in manufacturing. Over the course of their stay, more and more have switched to services such as hotels and retail,
cleaning and security. In the 1990s the number of migrants employed in construction increased significantly, as the city centre was redeveloped, new towns were built on the outskirts and government buildings mushroomed as Berlin became the German capital again. Berlin is also the capital of Berlin State, whose boundaries coincide with those of the city, and the Berlin Senate acts both as the city's municipal council and the State's law-making assembly.

In 1985, more than 50 per cent of Berlin's foreigners worked in manufacturing, a sector traditionally requiring low-skilled workers. Close to 20 years later, the percentage working in manufacturing industries was still higher among migrants than among the native population, although their total share had decreased tremendously due to the rapid de-industrialisation in Berlin since the late 1980s: by 2002, approximately one in four foreigners were still employed in manufacturing. Today, the majority of migrants are found working in the services sector, where they are over-represented compared to Germans. Retail, transport, hotels and catering provide jobs to one in three migrants. Germans are much more represented in well-paid and secure civil service positions, where only four per cent of the foreign workforce are employed, compared to 12 per cent of the natives (Table 4).

**TABLE 4 - EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR, 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Incoming</th>
<th>Outgoing</th>
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</tr>
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<td>444,774</td>
<td>47,055</td>
<td>36,882</td>
<td>6,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin: Microcensus, 2003

Massive economic restructuring in Berlin has caused a decline in the number of jobs in most economic sectors. The overall number of employed individuals ‘liable to social security’ declined from 1.38 million in 1992 to 1.08 million in 2003. As for foreigners ‘employed and liable to social security’, their numbers fell from 100,000 in 1992 to 68,000 in 2003. Employment among foreigners has increasingly turned into self-employment and part-time employment in less secure positions, often without a contract. At the same time, unemployment rose dramatically during the 1990s as the total number of available jobs kept falling.

Whereas in 1990 the 11.5 per cent unemployment rate among foreigners was the same as among Germans, from 1994 onwards it rose rapidly: from 21.7 per cent in 1994 to 33.3 per cent in 1999 and to 37.3 in 2002, compared to an average unemployment rate of 18.9 per cent that year.

As the number of jobs declines, access to the labour market becomes more difficult for the unemployed and for new migrants. Moreover, Germany only recognises educational degrees granted in Austria, Switzerland and France, together with some of those held by ethnic Germans, raising further barriers for migrants aiming to access the German labour market. The major groups affected by unemployment are unskilled workers, young people, those aged over 50 years, and individuals with a migration background. There are more unemployed among those who combine two or more of these features, such as young unskilled individuals with a migration background.

**Income**

As a consequence of higher unemployment and their position at the bottom of the labour market, the income level of foreigners in Berlin is much lower than for Germans. For 72 per cent of the migrants who have one, income is lower than 1,100 euros a month, compared to only 49 per cent of Germans. On the other hand, 28 per cent of income-earning Germans are paid more than 1,500 euros a month, compared to only 14 per cent of foreigners (Table 5).

**TABLE 5 - INCOME LEVELS, 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inhabitants (1,000s)</th>
<th>Income (euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>2,961.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per cent</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>427.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per cent</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin: Microcensus, 2003

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3 1.00 euro = 1.3 US dollar
the quality of housing in council estates is relatively good and attractive to mi-
grants, these areas have their problems. Prices have been rising since housing
subsidies were reduced. Moreover, these exclusively residential areas at the peri-
phery offer fewer job opportunities than the old housing areas in the inner city,
making it even more difficult for migrants to earn a living.

Map 1 shows that the share of migrants (foreigners) is higher in some inner-city
areas as well as in a number of localities on the outskirts4.

2. Issues in the political discourse

Both immigration and the conditions of migrants have always featured in Ger-
many’s political debate. However, the predominant concern is shifting. This
section gives a short overview of the main factors that have shaped the issues
in the political discourse. The local discourse cannot easily be separated from
debates at the national level.

Spatial segregation

From 1955, when the German government first signed an agreement with Italy
to attract immigrant workers, until November 1973, when such recruitment was
halted, the economic benefit of labour migration for the country was the main
aspect under which immigration featured in the German public debate. At the
time, housing was the major issue associated with migration at the local eche-
lon. Housing should be adequate, temporary and cheap: such was the con-
sensus among foreign migrants and the German authorities. In the early days,
the employing firms arranged accommodation for the guest workers on the as-
sumption that these would only stay for one or two years. However and as
time went by, an increasing number of migrants brought their families over.
This development forced them into the private housing market, since permis-
sion to migrate to Germany was granted only to those immigrants with an ac-
commodation contract. In Berlin, immigrants found apartments mainly in the

4 The concentrations of ethnic Germans from Russia, such as in the northern part of Marzahn district, are not shown on
the map, because they are German and therefore not categorised as foreigners.
old run-down housing stock of the urban renovation zones, which were in low demand from Germans. These areas were located especially in the Kreuzberg, Wedding and Tiergarten districts.

The issue of residential segregation did not come up until the 1970s, and not only in West Berlin but in all German cities. Residential segregation of ethnic minorities was seen as a danger at that time, as it would stand in the way of integration. This view is part of the conventional wisdom of urban planners and local politicians.

In 1975, quantitative restrictions (quotas) were imposed on foreign residents in the three Berlin districts mentioned above, in a bid to limit the number of migrants moving in there. However, the quotas had no noticeable effect as nothing could stand in the way of family unification. The restrictions were formally abolished only in the late 1980s. Since then, and although residential segregation has remained a talking point in the political debate over immigration in Germany, no further attempt has been made to regulate immigrant residential patterns.

Improvements in migrants' housing conditions came with the urban renewal projects of the 1980s. The combination of more effective welfare services, more inclusive governance and migrant participation in the projects that was first experienced in Kreuzberg at the time has since become a paradigm of German urban renovation. Moreover, Berlin opened up municipal 'social housing' (Sozialer Wohnungsbau) to foreigners in 1979. In the 1980s new migrants, such as those from Poland and Iran, gained access to these council estates. Today, migrants have better access to the housing market and enjoy better housing conditions compared to the 1950s and 1960s; nonetheless, conditions remain difficult for them, particularly for the newly arrived, who often reside in neglected high-rise estates with high proportions of poor residents.

**Segregation and social integration**

As migrants' relatives came to Berlin for the sake of family unification, the question of social integration arose, whereas so far it had not been an issue with guest workers who were supposed to be there only temporarily. The debates initially focused on labour migrants' children and addressed the provision of
school and pre-school facilities. In the 1980s, the policy of classes for migrant children only (Auslaenderregelklassen) was abandoned. However, the impact of high proportions of migrant pupils in schools has been – and still is – considered a hindrance to German students, because of many migrants’ poor German language skills. This causes better-off families with high educational aspirations to move out of those areas with high shares of migrant children in schools, which in turn leads to an increase in ethnic and social segregation.

Crime, delinquency and alienation

The issues of crime and delinquency also came up in the mid-1980s in the local media. Violence among second-generation young migrants turned into a severe problem originating in increased unemployment, barriers to upward social mobility, and ethnic discrimination. Most of the violence typically takes place between the ethnic groups themselves, or among a same age group. When in 1987 a street party celebrating May Day (or Labour Day, as it is known in Europe) degenerated into a severe clash between the street and the police, former Kreuzberg squatters and punk types were not the only ones to join in the riots as young Turks rallied to their support. This was the first time in Germany when young migrants participated in street unrest, triggering fears that in Berlin they would tend to react to discrimination and poverty like blacks in the USA, Great Britain or France before them. As a result, integration schemes, youth centres and social workers became widespread in Kreuzberg.

Alienation from their ethnic culture along with an enduring status as outsiders within the dominant culture usually combine to put the sense of identity of second- and third-generation migrants under pressure. Therefore, it is of the highest importance for urban policies to develop a climate of acceptance and respect for these young people, who tend to stand away from both cultures, creating a virtual hyper-culture in between.

During the 1990s, several incidents concurred seriously to affect the sentiment among many migrants. As the numbers of asylum seekers kept rising, numerous racist attacks on migrant shelters and homes took place in the early 1990s in the peripheral districts of east Berlin as well as in suburban and rural areas. Migrants living in the inner-city areas were afraid of moving out because of the ambient racism, particularly in the eastern part of the city. As a result, the Berlin authorities took a number of steps to counter racism and discrimination, many of which were co-funded by the federal government. Today, with the decrease in the numbers of asylum-seeking migrants and the increase in new migrants in the eastern part of the city, racist attacks have been curbed though not eradicated.

Life opportunities and educational achievements

With massive restructuring in German manufacturing, more than one in two non-German employees in the sector have lost their jobs. Unemployment among foreigners is actually more than twice as high as in the German labour force. Moreover, new and second-generation migrants find it difficult to access the labour market. To make things worse, their degree of participation in vocational training remains very low, after the decline that came with German reunification, when young eastern Berliners competed with migrants for training opportunities. Unemployment is especially high among Turkish and Arabic migrants. With their low educational qualifications, they are worst off on the labour market. Berlin’s economic conditions hinder migrant social mobility, resulting in a growing segment of precarious self-employed and long-term unemployed among Turks and Arabs.

The upshot of this predicament is that the current debate focuses on the improvement of the German school system. The debate has been triggered by the ‘Programme for International Student Assessment’ (PISA), an international comparative study on knowledge and skills of pupils aged 15. The study included the 28 member-States of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). As Germany ranked only in the middle bracket of western countries, it was argued that this must reflect migrants’ very poor performance at school. It was also deplored that German schools did not enable mobility between the various curricular options that sort out pupils after the fourth (in Berlin usually the sixth) form.

The fact of the matter is, migrants in Germany fare worse at examinations than the country’s average. In 2000, 11.7 per cent of all school leavers were foreigners, but so were also 26.9 per cent of those who left without sitting for exams or without certification (Table 6). The higher the degree, the lower is the share of young
There are altogether more than 70 places in Berlin where Muslims meet to worship, located in factory buildings, backyards or on the ground floors of ordinary houses. These places are often too small to serve the needs of the religious communities. More and more initiatives for the construction of formal mosques have emerged over the past few years. Meanwhile, two have already been built – one in an industrial area and another by the main airport – and at least five more are planned in the residential areas of Kreuzberg, Neukölln and Wedding. The growing importance of Islam in the first and second generations of migrants has triggered animated debates about cultural differences. One outcome has been the introduction of a new notion – ‘parallel society’ – in the discussion. As ethnic and religious communities become better organised and expand their activities while residential segregation becomes more entrenched, some read these developments as signs that migrants are becoming detached from the mainstream. Fears are that spatial segregation and poor German language skills can only reinforce tendencies to retrenchment – and the formation of a ‘parallel society’ among Islamic communities.

Against this background, the Commissioner for Migration and Integration of the Berlin Senate has convened the organisations and individuals involved to several meetings for open discussions, as part of an ongoing effort to intensify communication between city authorities and the different ethnic and religious groups. In the public and political debates, concerns over the emergence of a ‘parallel society’ with little connection, if any, to German collective institutions are being voiced. However, these concerns only involve the (especially Islamic) Turkish communities. The other ethnic groups (including Poles or migrants from the Balkans) are either not large enough to form visible communities, or culturally not so different from the Germans as some Turks can be.

Religious practice and representation: Muslims in Berlin

Since the end of the 1990s, the various Muslim associations have been discussing plans for a central mosque in Berlin5. However, as of early 2005 they had failed to agree between them on a single place of worship which could serve all the different Islamic denominations.

The public debate on the mosques has revolved around issues such as the ‘right’ place for them, suspected occult contributions towards construction costs (a rich source of conspiracy fantasies), and the political and religious inclinations of the various Islamic associations. As Muslim associations remain shrouded in some obscurity, construction plans usually cause enormous fears among local resident communities.

5 In the mid-1980s Günter Grass, the writer and Nobel laureate, came up with the provocative proposal to build a central mosque next to the Brandenburg Gate, in an abrupt challenge to public disdain of the city’s growing Muslim community.
preneurs and students, as well as temporary workers on Berlin's numerous construction sites.
- **Temporary immigration of skilled individuals** (including students, artists, sport professionals, chefs, clerics, etc): German laws allow temporary residence for these and other well-specified (niche) purposes.
- **Refugee migration and asylum**: During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number of refugees and asylum seekers was quite high in Germany. Since 1993, only those individuals who have not travelled through ‘secure countries’ on their way to Germany can apply for asylum. Since then, fewer than 100,000 individuals have fallen in this category every year. Formally recognised asylum seekers contribute less than five per cent to Germany's total migrant population; however, more than 50 per cent are granted only temporary asylum for as long as they are unable to go back to their home countries, for instance because of an ongoing civil war.
- **Immigration of 'ethnic Germans'**: Individuals of German descent are allowed into Germany and entitled to German citizenship. In 1993, the law was changed and migrants had to prove their German language skills. Since then, only people from the former Soviet Union are entitled to welfare benefits and municipal assistance when arriving in Germany.
- **Illegal immigration** is not well documented. Some sources mention more than half a million illegal/undocumented migrants in Germany.

Over the past few years, Germany’s ruling ‘red-green’ coalition (social democrats and the pro-ecology party) has come to terms with the need for a new immigration law, which eventually came on the statute book in 2004. The 2004 statute adds a further channel of entry to the above-mentioned list as it allows into Germany those migrants that may be required by the labour market. This possibility had only existed since 1999 for highly skilled migrants, especially in IT (information technologies), and it became the starting point for the Immigration Act 2004.

Official modes of entry confer temporary resident status on migrants. After five to eight years’ legally granted temporary residence, the status can be changed to an indefinite duration. Migrants are free to settle where they like, to the exception of asylum seekers and ethnic Germans during their first years in Germany. Those who are not under any restrictions typically opt for those

### 3. National policies and their impact on urban policies

#### Modes of entry, residence and work permits

As mentioned earlier, Germany is host to a large number of migrants and has had a steady history of immigration since 1955. Foreigners currently contribute nine per cent to the country’s total population (82.5 million). Nevertheless, Germany has for a long time declined to be perceived as an immigration country. The practical import is that migrants are subject to a minute administrative framework. The following list of the eight different types of status prepared for them suggests as much, with each specific status coinciding with a different mode of entry into the country:

- **Temporary labour migration based on bilateral agreements with the sending countries**: Historically, this temporary migration has resulted in a permanent residential status as ‘guest worker’. Today agreements of this type are in force with a number of Eastern European countries.
- **Migration of family members under 16 years of age**: This chain migration caused an expansion in the number of foreigners after the 1973 recruitment standstill.
- **Immigration of marriage partners**: Migrant marriages with partners from the country of origin cause steady immigration flows, such as from Turkey and Kazakhstan. Marriage migration also occurs with people from other countries (e.g., Thailand and the Baltic countries) who marry predominantly German partners.
- **Freedom of movement within the European Union**: During the 1990s, the number of EU citizens grew in Berlin as in the rest of Germany. Apart from diplomats, the additions included international business personnel, entre-
places with the higher concentrations of their own ethnic group and with the better economic opportunities. For most migrants, residence is not automatically associated with a work permit. Refugees and spouses can access the labour market after three years' residence. Except for ethnic Germans and EU citizens, access to the labour market is restricted. Restrictions can involve geographically defined areas of economic activity, specific economic sectors, temporary access to the labour market, or prohibition of self-employment. For instance, seasonal workers are granted labour permits that are temporary (e.g., three months), restricted to an economic sector (e.g., agriculture) and often geographically defined, e.g., only in the Land (State) of Brandenburg.

Nationality and political rights

The statutory framework for migrants' civic and political rights in Germany was set out in the Foreigners Act 1991 and the Citizenship Act 1999. In 1991, foreigners were granted the right to be naturalised on proof of several years' residence in Germany and of their continuing ability to sustain themselves. The 1999 statute marked the eventual triumph of *jus soli* over Germany's time-honoured *jus sanguinis*. In other words, from 1999 onwards, an individual's nationality is determined primarily by their birthplace and no longer by their parents' nationality. As a result, the progeny of foreign citizens with permanent residence and born in Germany since 1999 is German by law. These young people will have both their parents' and the German nationalities until their 18th birthday, when they will be required to opt for a single nationality (a procedure known as the 'optional model'). The 1991 and 1999 statutes have both had a very significant effect on the legal status of migrants and their statistical registration. After naturalisation, statistics no longer mention an individual's origins. Some 25 per cent of Berlin's Turkish migrants have opted for naturalisation. In other German Laender (States), the number of naturalisations has increased since the year 2000 after a low in the 1990s. During the 1980s and 1990s, the left-wing opposition introduced the notion of double nationality in Germany’s political agenda. This proved somewhat problematic, as foreigners were reluctant or unable to give up their original nationalities for a number of valid reasons, although they were aware of the potential benefits attached to German nationality. For some, attachment to the home country was too strong. Others found that their country of origin denied any right to give up their original citizenship. With a change in Turkey's legislation in the mid-1990s, the number of Turks opting for naturalisation has increased in Germany. However, German courts reject the notion of double nationality and, as a result, migrants with both their original and German nationalities remain an exception. Naturalised foreigners hold the same political rights as Germans. The most important one is the right to vote and to be elected in national (federal), state and municipal polls. Plans to allow all foreigners to vote in municipal elections have been turned down by the German Constitutional Court. Only locally-registered citizens of other EU countries are entitled to vote in municipal elections. Migrants from outside the European Union have no rights to vote or to be elected.

The impact of migration on urban policies

Local authorities cannot influence the numbers or origins of those migrants who opt to reside within their boundaries. By the same token, there is only so much they can do with regard to economic developments and shifts in the national labour market. Nevertheless, they have some room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis immigration at their, i.e., the local level. On top of making rules and regulations, it is for cities and municipal authorities to take care of the economic and social integration of migrants. Migration policy is basically an urban issue, and local authorities are predominantly responsible for practical integration schemes. However, since foreign migrants have no right to vote, they are unable to exercise political power or pressure on the formal political-administrative system. In response to this situation, informal political systems have evolved at the municipal echelon. Some cities have set up advisory boards for foreigners (Auslaenderbeiraete) and Berlin's own such body (established in 2004) has recently become operational. As its ‘advisory’ name suggests, the board has no law-making capacity, but it is able to bring topics on the political agenda. It has the capacity to act as a pressure group advocating foreigners’ interests. The Berlin *Migrationsbeirat* (migration board) is discussed in the next section.
In Germany, municipal authorities cater to most of the direct needs of the population, namely welfare and housing benefits, children, youth and family care, urban planning, infrastructure and transport. Municipalities are also in charge of integration schemes and language tuition, as well as urban renewal, even though States run their own programmes to promote specific activities at the local level. In line with the new immigration law, federal authorities will subsidise a large proportion of the costs of the language tuition which municipal authorities are organising for migrants. As far as urban renewal and neighbourhood development are concerned, the States and the federal government have also taken responsibility, through promotion of specific policies, including the 'Social City' ('Soziale Stadt') programme. However, the current contraction of the financial resources available to local authorities is seriously hindering the success of their efforts in favour of migrants and integration.

4. Urban policies in Berlin: Approaches and practical steps

The Commissioner for Foreigners

Urban policies for migrants face problems which usually cannot be addressed in traditional ways. The overall aim of all such policies is immigrant integration, but often it is not clear what this means in practice. Decisions and policies do not affect Germans and migrants in the same ways; those directed at immigrants seek to improve their socio-economic conditions and political participation, giving them equal opportunities and access to goods and services, as well as tackling discrimination and unfair treatment.

In 1981 the Berlin Senate established its own ‘Commissioner for Foreigners’, one of the first such positions in Germany. The decision came as a signal that the problems of foreigners had turned into a political issue. Over time, the Commissioner has come to play a significant role in integration and migration policies. The position carries no formal law-making capacity; instead the Commissioner advises the Berlin Senate and administration on integration and migration issues and provides these institutions with all the relevant facts and figures they need. The Commissioner coordinates and inspires the city's integration policies as determined by the Berlin Senate and administration and is involved in decisions regarding integration and migration. The budget allocated to the Commissioner is relatively small, yet it is the largest of its kind in Germany and so is his staff. The position is widely recognised and the Commissioner’s proposals find resonance with a broad audience among politicians and civil society (Senatsverwaltung, 2001; Die Ausländerbeauftragte, 2001).

When in 2003 the State/city assembly appointed a new ‘Commissioner of the Berlin Senate for Integration and Migration’ (replacing the Commissioner for Foreigners), policies went through a paradigm shift. The new denomination signalled a change away from a policy concerned with foreigners to one focused on migrant integration, i.e., a multicultural urban policy that integrated German and migrant organisations and institutions against a background where diversity was seen as one of Berlin’s central assets. This change of paradigm represents a policy landmark, since migrants are effectively considered as part of Berlin’s multicultural, diverse community. The commissioner’s main political objectives are laid out in a document, ‘Cornerstones of integration policy 2003-2005’ (see below).

The commissioner works to establish networks between ethnic minority groups themselves, and between them and those institutions representing the Berlin and German communities. The new Advisory Board is an emanation of this new policy, as it entrenches institutional participation of minority groups in the political process.

The ‘Cornerstones’ document stresses that in view of the structural changes in social and economic conditions, integration policy poses Berlin a major challenge. In particular, the document pinpoints the inordinately high rates of unemployment, especially among non-Germans (around 40 per cent), as well as the decline in educational achievement among younger-generation migrants. The document highlights integration policy as one of the decisive factors that will determine the future of Berlin. It challenges the capital to make the most of the benefits attached to immigration and to reduce any risks that come with it.

According to the ‘Cornerstones’ report, migration and integration policies for the years to come must link the many projects exemplifying good practice in Berlin and bring the various policy approaches under a single, targeted policy concept. The current policy (Der Beauftragte, 2004b) concentrates on the following areas for action:

- Improved opportunities for the younger generation, through enhanced access to education for children and parents, and better transition from school
to vocational training.

- Promotion of employment opportunities for migrants, with easier access to the labour market.
- A more welcoming attitude of public administration and welfare services to different cultures.
- Practical steps against discrimination and right-wing extremism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.
- Enhanced migrant participation in the decision-making process, and a more active discussion of Berlin as a conscious immigration city (immigrant city Berlin).

The Advisory Board and official migrant representation

At the initiative of the Commissioner for Integration and Migration, an Advisory Board was established in 2003. The Board brings together members of the Berlin Senate and administration, employers' trade groups, public trusts and NGOs. Last but not least, it includes elected representatives from six major migrant groups, whom the board principal considers as the driving forces of the advisory body (Leuschner, 2004). The remit of the Advisory Board is to 'develop proposals for the promotion and development of Berlin's migration and integration policies, with the cooperation of representatives of the migrant federations and other non-governmental organisations as well as the Senate Administrations' (Der Beauftragte, 2004b).

The Integrationsbeirat (Integration Board), as the Advisory Board is officially known, was established in October 2003. The immigration law to be approved in January 2005 will detail its tasks regarding integration of migrants and their families. (Leuschner, 2004)

For the time being, four topics feature on the Board's agenda: (a) employment; (b) improvement of educational prospects; (c) the need for the local administration to adopt more open attitudes to different cultures (especially in social and cultural services, routine functions and decision-makers); and (c) the best ways of promoting the 'immigrant city Berlin' project. In addition, a date for an annual 'Integration Day' has been agreed upon, when a 'prize for integration' will be awarded.

The importance of an area-based approach to urban integration policy as well as the need for gender-related integration policies have been stressed during the board's first 'Berlin Integration Day' in September 2004. As a guiding principle for integration policy in the city, the Board has opted for a vision of Berlin as 'a great immigration city', based on a 'mutual integration of immigrants and native Berliners'. Another remit for the Board is the supervision of naturalisation in the Regional State of Berlin: the objective is to arrive at uniform implementation in all district offices as well as at a more foreigner-friendly process (Der Beauftragte, 2004c).

Altogether, the Berlin Regional State Advisory Board for Integration and Migration Issues (as it is formally known) provides an adequate forum for the collective development and promotion of Berlin's integration policies. The Board addresses migrant issues with competence and depth as part of a socio-democratic multicultural integration policy with a liberal approach to immigration. The Board effectively introduces relevant issues into formal decision-making, and gives those more resonance with a large audience both within the local government and administration, and with Berlin's native German and migrant communities as well. In the process, the Board single-handedly though quite officially promotes numerous aspects of good governance regarding urban migration and integration policy. Although it is too early to assess its achievements, the first year of operation has already been promising. The migrant issue is becoming so pressing in Berlin, and political awareness has so improved, that the Board has the potential to play a prominent role in future.

Language tuition for migrant parents

The poor educational achievements of first-, second- and now third-generation migrants in the Berlin school system are considered as the main reason behind migrants' significant exclusion from the labour market. This situation prompted the city authorities in 1998 to launch a scheme promoting the educational achievement of migrants' children.

Third-generation migrants, whose families have lived in Germany for up to 40 years, display a worrying decrease in educational achievement. Children's educational success is a function of family background, and singularly of mothers' attitudes, rather than of the schools themselves. Therefore the rationale behind
the scheme is to enhance mothers' involvement in the process of education, which must start with improved German language skills. Many women, especially those from Turkey and Arabic countries, have a Muslim background; this may result in rather confined social lives with very few contacts – and opportunities to speak German – outside the family.

Learning German through one's mother can contribute to the language acquisition process of both a child and her/his mother. This also plays a symbolic function for the children in terms of educational orientation, as mothers set an example and provide a supportive learning environment.

The new ‘Berlin special programme – Adult education centre classes for mothers/parents with non German mother tongue at Berlin schools’ (as the scheme is formally known) is a low-threshold offer of German language tuition specially directed at migrant mothers. It is available in the schools of the four inner-city districts of Mitte, Tempelhof-Schoeneberg, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln. The programme involves systematic cooperation both between the Adult Education Centres (Volkshochschulen) and the district schools, and between the schools and the pupils’ parents. The schools advertise the tuition programmes via four distinct channels: (a) information letters; (b) a multi-lingual video on the programme; (c) information meetings; and (d) the teachers in class-related parents’ meetings.

The programme turns schools into places where parents, not just children, meet. This has a stimulating effect on cooperation between parents and schools as well as on parent support to children's learning.

Like the integration courses to be organised as mandated under the new Immigration Act 2005, the mothers’ classes offer more than mere language tuition. Some lessons deal with German society and institutions and mothers are also taken on tours to local cultural landmarks, such as Berlin’s local history museums. Tutors develop well-adapted lecture materials and in the process the women are also exposed to campaigns and topics dealing with children's health and protection, in cooperation with local healthcare organisations. To complement the scheme, child care facilities (crèches) enable mothers with younger children to attend the courses. All in all, the scheme has a double empower-ment effect: not only do women become more familiar with Germany's language, society and institutions; they also find opportunities to make contact with other women in similar situations and in the process gain a life of their own outside the narrow family confines.

In 2000, close to 200 classes were in operation, with 35,000 tuition units and 4,000 migrant women participating. By early 2005 demand was higher than supply and the scheme was considered a major success.

Critical to the success of the adult tuition programme is its capacity to reach out to migrants from a broad range of countries and educational backgrounds, from well-educated to illiterate with little to no knowledge of the German language. This flexibility makes it easier for the programme to reach its objectives.

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**Educational qualifications and vocational training**

With their poor educational achievements at odds with a labour market where qualifications give access to skilled employment, young migrants in Berlin face significantly higher risks of unemployment or low-paid jobs. The Berlin Senate has included this issue in its agenda with the support of the Commissioner for Integration and Migration. The city authorities have launched various schemes that highlight good governance practice to facilitate young migrant access to vocational training. The schemes include:

- **Kumulus**, the first, largest and longest running project, targeting the transition phases between school, vocational training and professional life.
- **Carrier**, a short-term EU project that promotes mentoring of young migrants by senior, successful role model individuals.
- **Start**, a scholarship and support programme for young migrants with promising secondary school achievements.

**‘Kumulus’ and vocational training**

*Kumulus* is a team of experts from various ethnic backgrounds who support young migrants during the transition from school to vocational training to professional life. The experts provide relevant information and act as mentors to young people and their parents as they grapple with these and related problems. Based on their own backgrounds, the mentors share their experiences of
migration and integration with their young ‘clients’ and act as role models. The project started in 1993 when Kumulus opened an information office in the central Berlin district of Schoeneberg. Its role was to advise young migrants (and their parents) on the best ways of accessing professional life. Later, the information office developed into a formal referral centre for vocational training posts, with permission from the Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit). The next step for Kumulus was to put young migrants directly in touch with vocational training opportunities. Since then, the scheme has also encouraged businesses, including ethnic businesses, to offer vocational training opportunities as well. Over the past 10 years, the scheme has accompanied and supported tens of thousands of young migrants. The Kumulus project is funded jointly by the Senate administration for Health, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, the Commissioner for integration, and the European Social Fund (ESF). Individual projects and associations also contribute expertise. Support to the transition from school to vocational training and professional qualification is organised in close cooperation between all the partners involved in the vocational training process. These partners include schools, professional training schools and public-sector organisations supporting vocational training, the Federal Labour Office, German firms and entrepreneurs as well as ethnic businesses. Kumulus staff includes migrants with a vocational training background as role models, professional interpreters and supervisors. Migrant associations and the German and migrant media also support the scheme. All the organisations involved make their know-how and networks available to improve professional labour market access for young migrants. Hopes are that over time, tens of thousands more of these young people will benefit from Kumulus and take advantage of the scarce vocational training opportunities available in Berlin. The Kumulus project stands as an apt example of good governance in the area of migrant integration. It provides equal opportunities for migrants and cooperates with a wide range of stakeholders to make the best possible use of available resources. Its specific targeting (migrants) contributes to its effective use of ethnic resources to link them up with German institutions (Arbeit und Bildung, 2004).

‘Carrier’: support for gifted migrant students

With this new, privately funded project, gifted and successful students from secondary schools can apply for funding to reach their full educational potential in Berlin. The Carrier scheme was originally launched in other German States and only started in Berlin in 2004. Its life-span is restricted to four years, during which it will grant scholarships to 10 students every year. Scholarships include a year-long monthly lump-sum of 100.00 euros and a computer with Internet access, together with ‘immaterial’ support. Participants receive a new grant after every successful academic year and until they gain a university degree. The aim is to prepare them either for academic careers or for leadership positions in society. The sponsors of the scheme assume that such young successful migrants will take on a symbolic value for their community and serve as role models for other migrants. They will demonstrate that professional achievement and social advancement are possible if and when supported by individual effort. By its very nature, the Carrier programme signals a shift away from a deficit-oriented approach and in favour of the promotion of existing individual capacity and potential. At the same time, support of young people with migrant backgrounds who show promise at school supplements other ongoing schemes, as it further contributes to break the barriers that stand in the way of social advancement for the post-migration generation. However, the modest size of the scheme, in terms of both the number of scholarships and the funding available for each, goes to show that this approach is still at its very beginning and does not receive as much attention as it should. One can only hope that Carrier will be able to build on its own success to expand. Coordination of the project in Berlin lies with the Senate administration for Education, Youth and Sports. The steering committee regroups the sponsors, which include the Hertie Foundation, the Deutsche Bank Foundation and the Berlin Senate (Der Beauftragte, 2004a).

‘Start’

In 2004 the Berlin authorities also imported another migrant-oriented scheme, known as Start, this time from the EU as it had proved successful in several other European cities. Start brings together young migrants leaving school for vocational training, on one side, and more senior migrants who are either vocational tutors or successful professionals, on the other side. The
mentoring which the young migrants receive is expected to launch them on successful integration pathways which, in turn, will again set good role models for the community and the public at large. Under the START scheme, those migrants who have made it into Berlin’s mainstream public life – including in culture, business or public services – volunteer to mentor and coach young participants as they engage in vocational (as opposed to Carrier’s emphasis on academic) training. In order to reach this objective, START involves the local media, public services, youth and social centres, schools and businesses. The Commissioner for Integration and Migration supports the project and provides information to potential participants. The German Society for Professional Training steers the scheme.

This broad cooperation provides the resources from which mentoring expertise is drawn in support of successful school pupils intent on advancing their vocational careers. The START scheme is too recent for its achievements to be assessed. Like Carrier, it is based on a ‘resource’ approach to integration, where successful adult migrants serve as role models and open up their networks and pathways to integration to the next generation, enabling young people to make more effective use of their own particular capacities and resources. (Der Beauftragte, 2004b).

Housing, neighbourhoods and the ‘Social City’ scheme

The traditional policy of improving housing conditions for the poor has long been the rationale behind urban renovation zones. These were located mainly in the inner-city areas of West Berlin, where the housing stock was old and dilapidated, and where migrants were concentrated. During the 1980s, as a major portion of the housing stock in Kreuzberg, Wedding and other inner-city areas was being renovated, modernised and upgraded, many German households moved into the sprawling high-rise estates at the periphery of the city. Migrant households, too, benefited from the urban renovation programmes, but to this day the bulk of migrants’ dwellings remain associated with that portion of the housing stock that is still awaiting renovation. The major socio-economic changes that took place in Berlin in the 1990s dealt migrants a severe blow. Massive de-industrialisation started in the immediate aftermath of unification and hit unskilled workers (many of them migrants) particularly hard. Increasingly, poverty segregation coincided with migrant segregation. This raised the danger of the formation of an ethnic under-class. Concomitant increases in unskilled worker unemployment, the numbers of welfare recipients and rampant poverty resulted in cumulative processes of downgrading in many inner-city neighbourhoods. City authorities responded with redefined urban renovation schemes and designed a neighbourhood development programme to improve the social environment and check social exclusion. In 1999, the Berlin city council launched a programme formally known as ‘Urban integration for underprivileged neighbourhoods’. It is aimed at those urban areas with high unemployment, selective social mobility and high proportions of welfare benefit recipients. Most of the neighbourhoods identified along these criteria are located in the inner-city areas of the western part of Berlin, where migrants contribute some 30 per cent of the resident population. Because poverty and high proportions of migrants coincide in these areas, the problem of urban poverty is often associated mainly with migrants. But poverty is obvious among the German population in these areas as well.

Although it had started eight months earlier, Berlin’s ‘Urban integration’ programme has merged with the federal ‘Social City’ programme launched in the year 2000 (and is formally known as ‘Neighbourhoods with special need for development: The Social City’ – Stadtteile mit besonderem Entwicklungsbedarf: Die soziale Stadt). The merger was a natural step as both initiatives were designed to tackle poverty, encourage local activities and promote social integration. The newly-merged ‘Social City’ scheme features an area-based, integrated approach. It promotes neighbourhood projects that combine improvement in the physical environment with stabilised social conditions for migrants as well as their integration. The ‘Socially oriented urban development’ (Sozialorientierte Stadtentwicklung) programme started as a local scheme to complement the nationwide ‘Social City’ programme, of which it has now become a subset. These three-schemes-into-one highlight Berlin’s specific approach, known as ‘neighbourhood management’.

Under the ‘Urban integration’ scheme, local ‘neighbourhood management teams’ are run by external, private or civil society bodies commissioned for this work by the Berlin authorities. Neighbourhood management teams are private agencies, civil society organisations, etc., who are under contract with the local administration of the district where the neighbourhood is located. The Berlin
administration for Urban Development (SenStadt) steers the ‘Urban integration’ scheme. SenStadt, in turn, coordinates with the Federal Ministry of Building, Housing and Transport.

Berlin’s ‘Urban integration’ programme combines different types of approach, from financial support for housing and the built environment to social work, inclusive participation and community organisation. The considerable amount of funding required for the programme is testament to the political attention and support it has been attracting. Altogether, Berlin has invested 75 million euros in the programme between 1999 and 2001, of which 39.5 million from the Berlin authorities, 22.3 million from the European Union and 13.2 million from the federal government. Further funding is provided by other sources and programmes (Senatsverwaltung fuer Stadtentwicklung, 2003).

The main objectives of neighbourhood management under the ‘Urban integration’ scheme include:
- The socio-economic and socio-spatial stabilisation of neighbourhoods.
- The improvement of local living conditions in terms of housing, the environment, education, employment, health, participation and economic development.
- The bundling of resources in an integrated, cross-functional, cross-sector approach which transcends vertical levels of administration and management.

Under the programme, local civil society bodies, community groups and businesses are involved in policy-making. This is part of an innovative effort to improve and strengthen the local institutional sphere through greater cooperation and coordination. Such a policy is likely to result in better migrant integration on two conditions: (1) integration remains high on the agendas of the various participants, and (2) those in charge at the local level keep it well-focused, so that good governance works in favour of local integration. This cross-functional urban policy can be seen as the most thorough-going reform related to integration policy in Berlin.

The really innovative feature in Berlin’s ‘Urban integration’ scheme is that it targets the local labour market and local economic development through local stakeholders rather than public administration. The scheme encourages local stakeholders to cooperate, combine resources and even expand through the programme. As they delegate neighbourhood management under the ‘Urban integration’ scheme, public authorities at the district, municipal and federal eche-
sources to build upon (Der Beauftragte, 2004c). As the above-mentioned councillor and commissioner see them, these innovations in policy orientation highlight a shift in integration policy towards the local level (Senatsverwaltung fuer Stadtentwicklung, 2004b; Der Beauftragte, 2004b).

5. Lessons learned and recommendations

National policies are often determined by general political and economic interests. Since national schemes are not flexible enough to meet the needs of migrants, local authorities are in a good position to develop diverse and innovative policies. When the migrant community in a city reaches a certain size, municipal authorities can no longer neglect the fact that a growing share of their population lives in particular, mostly underprivileged conditions. This is what leads cities to develop their own urban migration and integration policies.

In Berlin, immigration policies are dominated by the national framework. As for integration policy, it is largely the remit of the municipality and the regional State. Within this framework, cities can and will use only those capacities and resources that are available to them to target migration and integration issues. Nevertheless Berlin, for one, is making efforts to exert more influence on national immigration policy. It remains a moot point whether this is because of its status as the country’s capital (with the main federal institutions located within its boundaries) or because the city and the State of Berlin coincide both geographically and in terms of institutions. Still, Berlin’s Regional State Advisory Board for Integration and Migration Issues exercises political pressure in this direction, since it was established in order to supplement and implement in the best possible conditions the new national Immigration Act 2000. The Board advises and consults with the Berlin Senate and includes respected and influential members of the city’s political decision-making sphere. The board brings together government, civil society, business and migrant groups, and therefore provides an appropriate platform for participation in the development and promotion of Berlin’s integration and migration policies. So far, the board has demonstrated its competent and thorough approach to migrant issues as part of a socio-democratic, multicultural integration policy based on a liberal approach to immigration. Although the board focuses on Berlin and is advisory only, it is not alien (if only tacitly) to challenging national policy where this has a bearing on Berlin’s own. For instance, the board has suggested a number of practical improvements to national immigration policy with regard to the human rights of unwelcome groups, the implementation of which the board has recommended to Berlin’s municipal authorities.

All in all, Berlin’s experience with migrants and their integration suggests four main lessons:

1) Migrant empowerment: The initial response of local authorities tends to be the delivery of a providential, patriarchal type of policy in a bid to care for ‘those poor migrants’. However, this type of approach can only, in the long run, entrench the very discrimination and underprivileged status which migrants are up against, unless the approach includes initiatives and an appropriate framework aimed at empowering ethnic minorities. Important as welfare benefits and special assistance are to migrants, authorities must also recognise their diversity, and support their efforts to regroup and represent their own interests and concerns. Once this institutional capacity-building process responds to the authorities’ encouragements and links up with mainstream institutions, the interactive networks thus set in motion help in the identification and targeting of problems. Inclusive, cooperative governance arrangements make it possible for these resources to feed into policy-making and programme implementation.

This is a lesson from the labour market integration efforts of Kumulus and Carrier, which build on the resources of ethnic entrepreneurs and successful individuals with migrant backgrounds as mentors for the next generation. Moreover, with its six representatives from the major migrant communities, Berlin’s Advisory Board for Integration and Migration encourages self-organisation among non-German residents and provides them with a degree of effective political representation.

2) Tuition and integration: In Germany too, educational achievement is central to the social integration of migrants, and both German language tuition and vocational training have major roles to play in this respect. Since the responsibility for education lies with the Laender, municipal authorities have only limited room for manoeuvre. Cooperation with foreigners’ associations is an avenue that should be accessible to any local institution. One lesson learned from Berlin’s language and integration programme for
migrant parents is that **school is a good opportunity to reach out to parents (particularly mothers) of immigrant pupils with tuition which will have positive feedback on children's learning.** Cooperation with organisations that are well versed in both education and intercultural relations has shown to be of critical importance to the success of the project. This goes to show how the education system can open up to migrants' needs and resources and become more responsive to cultural diversity.

**Religion and multiculturalism:** Dealing with religious differences is of crucial importance, as this is a controversial and intractable issue, i.e., one over which compromises are very difficult to achieve. Singling out religion in isolation usually leads to ideological wrangles. It is much preferable to discuss religion as part of a 'mixed context' such as the improvement of the conditions of culturally diverse populations, on which area-based approaches typically focus. At the same time, confessional differences must not be played down into mere cultural differences: they are a genuine source of conflict, as well as the touchstones for a tolerant and effective 'management of diversity'.

Berlin's municipal/regional and Germany's nationwide programmes in support of social urban development prioritise migrant integration issues and favour a multicultural urban society. The lessons to be drawn from these experiences are that the **local institutional sphere needs significant improvement and that resources must be mobilised in favour of more effective migrant integration** and mainstreaming of relevant issues into local policy-making. Conflicts around the building of mosques are more effectively dealt with by those municipal authorities that maintain good, solid relationships with the different social groups and their institutions.

**Migrant-oriented urban policies develop over the long term.** This is why proposing 'best practice' derived from different countries and cultures would be of dubious value. Local communities change as the numbers of migrants increase. Local politicians should be able to recognise the potential built in these changes, and to support the development of a multicultural city. In the long run, heterogeneous cities find that they are better prepared to cope with economic, social and cultural issues than homogeneous ones.

The new trend at the heart of Berlin's migration and integration policies is a bid at a proactive redefinition of the urban culture. This means a shift away from assimilation, and in favour of a multicultural urban policy based on partnership and cooperation within institutions, among the migrants, and also between these two groups. From this point of view, the international character of the city and its mix of various minority cultures appear as a potential for future development. Area-based approaches aim at developing a dense institutional sphere in a locality, and to establish effective relationships between this sphere and the various echelons of local governance. This new approach to policy-making is apt to improve the resources available to a locality for the purposes of bridging gaps within urban communities and integrating migrants. Berlin's programme of 'socially oriented urban development' stands as a good example of such innovative approaches.
1. Migration and urbanisation in Senegal

During the past decade, globalisation has caused an expansion in transnational migration to Senegal, which is an apt reflection of the intricacies of the links migrants maintain between host and home countries (Mahler, 2000). A traditional migration area, West Africa today provides a privileged ground for the development of transnational migration due to two distinct though related factors:
- The cultural proximity of the different communities united by the history of the region.
- Artificial and porous borders that favour population mobility and regional integration frameworks.

The rapid expansion of transport and communication networks promoting regional connections makes transnationalism a model for the future. As a result, those migration flows that have been growing in all directions and feeding into urban areas, especially such major conurbations as Lagos, Abidjan or Dakar, are now being viewed in a fresh perspective. Apart from the beneficial effects of migration and its specific consequences on areas of both origin and destination, attention should be drawn to the negative impact that can arise at the political, social, economic and territorial levels. Implementation of adequate urban policies has the potential to reduce these problems and favour the development of cities that facilitate smooth cohabitation between the local and foreign communities.

The Senegalese economy returned to growth after the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 2004. GDP grew 2.9 per cent in 1994 and by an average of over five per cent every year between 1995 and 2001. However, this economic performance has failed to improve living conditions for Senegal’s population. Two crucial facts highlight the gap between economic growth and living standards:

1 1,000 CFA franc = 2 US dollar
2 For further information on socio-economic and health conditions in Senegal, please refer to the latest government documents: Document de stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté (DSRP) (2002); ii) Plan national de développement sanitaire (PNDS) - Phase 2: 2004-2008 (juillet 2004)
For all their massive investment in the area, Senegalese authorities have not achieved their objective of universal primary education. The gross enrolment rate in primary school still stands at 70 per cent, and the combined gross enrolment rate (from primary to high school) is estimated at 32 per cent. More than half of Senegal's population is illiterate (over 70 per cent for females, against 48.9 per cent for males), highlighting the dire situation of Senegalese women in terms of education and training.

Health indicators keep lingering below the recommendations of the World Health Organisation (WHO). To be fair, Senegal features as one of Africa's countries of reference regarding the fight against HIV/AIDS, but the health system as a whole is still facing serious constraints. A resurgence of local endemic diseases has been reported and malnutrition is increasing. As for access to clean water, the Senegalese on average have to do with a mere 28 litres per head and per day. Life expectancy at birth is still low (51.3 years) and child mortality is high (7.9‰).

Economic performance has failed to elicit a substantial reduction in poverty. Senegal still belongs to the group of least developed countries (LDCs)³:
- GDP per head is equivalent to 552 US dollars;
- In 2002, close to three out of four Senegalese were living below the poverty line;
- In 2003, Senegal ranked 141st out of 175 in UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI);
- The unemployment rate is close to 50 per cent.

In 2002, 41 per cent of Senegal's population were living in urban areas⁴, the majority being female due to massive worker emigration and particularly males aged between 20 and 40.

The Dakar conurbation is host to two million people, or 20 per cent of Senegal's total population. The latest two population surveys (1988 and 2002) high-

³ The gross enrolment rate for each educational level is defined as the ratio of the total number of students enrolled at that level to the total population of the corresponding age group.
⁴ WHO recommends access to 35 litres of clean water per head and per day.
⁷ The Dakar conurbation, on which this chapter focuses, is an urban centre in the administrative region by the same name. The conurbation includes the Dakar, Pikine and Guediawaye urban districts (départements), which are fully urbanised areas. The fourth district in the region is Rufisque, which includes a rural area where 26.37 per cent of the district population reside.

light the capital's robust demographic growth (51 per cent during the period), although this remained significantly lower than the average 72.4 per cent pace recorded in Senegal's other urban centres.

The city owes its primacy to the wide gaps between its living conditions and those in the rest of the country⁸, which certainly play a major role in the decision made by a majority of foreigners to move to Dakar.

The availability of products, services and socio-economic infrastructure is due both to Dakar's status (as an economic and administrative capital) and to the fact that its population is comparatively more solvent⁹. Dakar is also a haven for the outcasts, social exclusion and slums¹⁰. In addition, it registers as one of those cities where public transport is a serious problem. From this point of view, life is not easy. However, in the collective imagination, the economic opportunities available in Dakar surpass by far those in the rest of the country.

### International migration in Senegal

This chapter is based on the available statistical data and secondary sources. However, we must stress the scarcity of data regarding migrations in Senegal¹¹ and the low amount of public and private investment in data collection regarding international migration¹². Interviews with various stakeholders have made up for some of this statistical gap and also facilitated access to qualitative information regarding Dakar's policies on transnational migration¹³.

8 See: Enquête sénégalaise auprès des mineurs, ESAM, 1997, Direction de la prévision et de la statistique.
9 Living standards in Dakar are higher than in Senegal at large. Up to 51 per cent of Dakar's population have total annual incomes of 200,000 FCFA or higher (compared to 28.4 per cent for the country as a whole). Wage earners are the main source of household income (35.6 per cent of the household's income).
10 Dakar's suburbs are comprised of the towns of Guediawaye and Pikine, which in effect are vast shantytowns and together are host to more than one million inhabitants.
11 As at late February 2009, Senegal's scientific community and decision-makers were still waiting for the publication of the results of the Troisième Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (RGPH-III), that had been completed in December 2002. RGPH-III was carried out in 1988. The outdated nature of official data is a serious hindrance to scholarly research. The country's last scientific research on migration took place in 1993.
12 All official documents warn readers against this lack of information regarding international migration. For instance, the government's Déclaration de la Politique de Population, adopted on 5 March 2002, at an inter-departmental meeting chaired by the prime minister includes the following: “International migrations are important but hardly documented... Their demographic impact is not well known.” A similar statement appears in: RENAMO, see Thévenot et Bocquier (1998:5).
13 As we researched this chapter, we found it fairly easy to access those authorities whose remit includes immigration (Interior Ministry, Dakar's Municipality, relief and human rights organisations), but we failed to obtain all the data we had requested. The Interior Ministry said data on population flows at the borders was to be requested directly from the minister. Our letter to this effect has remained unanswered, possibly because aggregate data are not available. As for municipal authorities, our queries about the management of foreigners in Dakar came as a complete surprise to them.
Senegal’s population grew from 2.5m in 1950 to 10,127,809 in 2003 (Figure 1). Internal migration flows undoubtedly featured in the demographic make-up, although the available data does not include specific figures. There are no specific figures for immigration either.

**FIGURE 1 - SENEGAL’S POPULATION; GROWTH, 1950 - 2003**

Migration flows to Senegal originated in the colonial and even pre-colonial period. During the pre-colonial period, mobility was part of the West African lifestyle and the history of the settlements is closely related to these population flows (Traoré et Bocquier, 1998).

Labour migration first appeared with the slave-trade economy. During the whole colonial period (i.e., until 1960), seasonal workers came from neighbouring countries such as Mali, the Gambia and even from further-away Burkina Faso (then known as Higher Volta) to work on peanut farms. These were the first voluntary and temporary international migration flows to Senegal. Some migrants also came for the construction of the ‘Dakar-Niger’ railway. Among these, many settled down locally with their families or married in the country and became Senegalese. These early migrants also contributed to the creation of the first migration networks, starting a long tradition of migratory links between neighbouring countries and Senegal.

A distinct, more recent stream of migrants to Senegal was originally due to forced migration. The first Guinean migrants from Conakry and, to some extent, from Bissau and Cape Verde, fled their countries for political rather than economic reasons. However, even after the regime change in Conakry the Guinean community remained in Senegal and grew even larger due to its well-established networks (it grew 17 per cent between 1976 and 1993). With their adaptable, dynamic nature Guineans found it easy to integrate in Senegal. On the other hand, in both Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau the independence wars lasted until the mid-1970s, intensifying migration flows from these countries to Senegal.

Apart from the dynamics related to the Senegalese ‘peanut boom’ and to political insecurity in the region, other, longer standing migration factors include French colonial occupation and trade relations across West Africa. For over two centuries, a significant settlement of French migrants contributed to the establishment of Senegal’s public institutions. Colonial civil servants, traders and shopkeepers, together with technical assistants in the education and health sectors, have laid down the basic infrastructures needed for the creation of Senegal as a State.

Another long-standing migration stream came from neighbouring Mauritania. People from across the Senegal River have for a long time enjoyed a de facto monopoly over retail trade across the length and breadth of Senegal. However, the Mauritanian community shrunk by half between 1976 and 1993, a process where the conflict between the two countries in 1989 certainly played a role.

More generally, two major factors keep driving migration flows towards Senegal: - Migration networks maintain social links among a broad linguistic community - often unifying populations established on either side of relatively recent borders - and play a major role in the constant circulation of people in West Africa.

Senegal’s prominent status in the former French West Africa, and Dakar’s appeal as the then federal capital of an extensive hinterland, have also favoured immigration.

With its large population settlements spread across different countries and its pre- and post-colonial history, West Africa is perceived as a region ‘without borders’, a multi-dimensional space where migrants develop social relations at various levels. This ‘trans-nationalism’ accounts for the fact that Mauritanians and Guineans established in Senegal are also drawn to other countries like the Ivory Coast, where their community networks can provide a fall-back position in case of political crisis.

14 In its early phase, this temporary immigration is known as ‘le mouvement navétane’, or winter migration, as it occurs during the rainy season.

15 Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde declared independence from Portugal relatively late (in 1974 and 1975 respectively).


17 After the crisis in the Ivory Coast (from September 2002 onwards), many West African migrants (including Guineans and Mauritanians) left the country and turned to their existing networks in Senegal.
International migrants in Dakar

The majority (58.8 per cent) of foreign residents in Dakar are from neighbouring countries (Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia)\(^{18}\) (Figure 2) and overall close to two thirds are from ECOWAS countries\(^{19}\). Moreover, every year Senegal plays host to some 500,000 foreign tourists.

**FIGURE 2 - ORIGINS OF THE MAIN IMMIGRANT GROUPS IN SENEGAL (PER CENT)**

According to available data, the foreign population in Senegal is relatively small, at around 1.5 per cent of the total (Table 1)\(^{20}\). However, this figure is underestimated because a number of foreigners claim to be Senegalese when questioned by census officers, as acknowledged by the diplomatic and consular representations established in Dakar\(^{21}\).

The percentage of international immigrants is by all means higher in Dakar than in any other region of Senegal, with recent estimations putting it at well over four per cent of the total.


\(^{19}\) ECOWAS is a regional organisation established in 1975 to promote economic cooperation and economic integration among its 15 members, with economic union the ultimate aim. To this end, member States agree on gradual liberalisation, such as the elimination of barriers to the free circulation of people.

\(^{20}\) The Division of Forecasts and Statistics carries out a number of periodical surveys. On these occasions, it often happens that well-integrated foreigners from West Africa pass themselves off as Senegalese, either out of uncertainty about the purpose of the survey, or out of fear.

\(^{21}\) Since registration with the local embassy or consulate is purely voluntary, many foreigners do without it. For example, Guinean consular authorities estimate that the number of their compatriots residing in Dakar is 15 times larger than official figures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988*</td>
<td>123,400</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>65,818</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993*</td>
<td>121,321</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>76,662</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002**</td>
<td>149,199</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>97,481</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: *EMUS 1992-1993, August 1997; **Elaboration from Projections de populations, DPS, January 2004

In 1993, almost two thirds of the foreigners in Senegal were residing in Dakar\(^{22}\) and 15 per cent in the other main towns. The relative number of foreigners opting to reside in Dakar has been increasing (from 53 per cent to 63 per cent between 1988 and 1993). The city’s main attraction lies in its status as the political and economic capital, with the region concentrating all central administrative services and monopolising the main industrial activities and investments, including 90 per cent of the country’s registered enterprises. Its demographic significance (23 per cent of Senegal’s total population in 2002) and better living conditions make Dakar a prime location for informal sector expansion.

Guineans are the largest international migrant community in Dakar, with 37 per cent of the total in 1993, followed by migrants from Europe (11 per cent) and from Mali (8 per cent). A significant proportion (21 per cent) of international migrants falls in the ‘other countries’ category and for the most part is likely to be Lebanese people, many of whom have been residing in Dakar for a long time.

In 1993, rural migrants contributed up to 31.2 per cent of the total population residing in Dakar, as compared to 18.5 per cent for the rest of the country\(^{23}\). Between 1988 and 1992, Dakar took in 183,000 internal migrants aged 15 and over, or an average 46,000 every year. The demographic expansion resulting from these substantial internal migration flows is largely at the origin of the social difficulties (education, vocational training and employment) and urban planning problems the city is experiencing.

The dynamism of international migration in Senegal is mainly related to the flows towards Western countries (Europe and America). Today, immigration...
caused by poverty is increasingly supplemented by migratory inflows related to globalisation, mostly by young, educated people looking for new opportunities. Dakar attracts the majority of these candidates to expatriation, who come to the city in search of the networks that will smuggle them out of Africa to either Europe or North America. Between 1988 and 1992, Dakar recorded the arrival of a total 11,091 people from West African countries, the majority of them males (71 per cent).

Moreover, Dakar is the seat of several international, African and sub-regional organisations. As such, the city is host to a number of international civil servants of various nationalities (Ivorian, Burkinabe, Togolese, etc.). Dakar is also a long-standing centre of higher education, thanks to colonial policies of training for West African elites. The impact of the CFA franc devaluation in 1994 has combined with the crisis of African universities and political insecurity across the continent to strengthen the position of Dakar as a major centre of higher education. The capital is receiving ever more African students, due to the development of private higher education institutions, which are more accessible than those in more developed countries. Finally, the conflicts destabilising some African countries (the Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Congo) have added to the flows of students into Senegal. In 2003-2004, the University of Dakar registered close to 3,000 foreign students of 44 different nationalities.

2. Migrants’ Conditions in Dakar

Socio-economic integration

Dakar power of attraction is essentially due to the presence of a very developed informal sector absorbing unskilled workers. The problems of the formal sector in Dakar’s economy worsened with the implementation of structural adjustment programmes from the 1980s onwards, which left only the informal sector available for economic integration.

As it concentrates the bulk of Senegal’s economic and administrative activities, Dakar needs specialised services for wage-earners (restaurants, maintenance services, house help, food stores, laundries, etc.). The development of the two major suburbs of Pikine and Guédiawaye has brought about the growth of a large informal sector of retail commerce and services that are essential to the sustenance of the poorer segments of the population.

Most foreign African communities in Dakar have adapted well to this economic environment. Testament to this achievement, foreigners are less prone to be without jobs than local people, although unemployment runs high in Dakar. In 1993, the unemployment rate of male immigrants aged six and over was 14.3 per cent, compared to 17.3 per cent for local people. This phenomenon is even more conspicuous among females: the unemployment rate of female immigrants is 5.9 per cent, compared to 15 per cent for local people. Unemployment is lesser among migrants because they are so active in the informal sector. In Dakar, the share of independent workers and employers is higher among immigrants than among local people. In fact (according to figures published in 1997), at 41 per cent, this share is nearly twice higher (as only 21.1 per cent of employed natives are independent workers/employers). The proportion is even higher among females (49.6 per cent for immigrants compared to 32.9 per cent for natives), highlighting a stronger presence of female immigrants with independent extra-household activities.

As in most cities hosting transnational migrants, a degree of occupational ‘socialisation’ by country of origin can be observed in Dakar. This specialisation is the result of the combined effect of the opportunities available in city’s social environment and of the specialisation and skill sets of foreign workers. For instance, migrants from Guinea-Conakry and Guinea-Bissau, whose communities are the only ones spreading across the length and breadth of Senegal, have the virtual control of the fruit and charcoal trades (charcoal being a major cooking fuel). They are now extending further into retail foodstuff trade and in the informal sector as porters, caterers, hairdressers, butchers and bus drivers. Although their level of education is generally rather low, Guineans have smoothly integrated in Dakar’s economic and social fabric, thanks to their homogeneous cultural origin (the Muslim Fulani ethnic group) which favours the development of well-established community networks. Migrants from Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde are often employed as workers in the construction sector and for domestic help, in Dakar as well as in the other major cities. A large proportion of the Cape Verdean community has taken up Senegalese nationality, as they have been in the capital for a very long time. Malians are typically involved in the trading of agricultural produce and live-
other factor reducing intercommunal tensions. There is nothing such as a Guinean, Burkinabé or Malian neighbourhood in Dakar.

- Also furthering integration are the educational facilities made available to migrants’ children through primary and secondary school until the final examination and without any preclusion.

The relationship between Senegal and other countries has not always been devoid of the odd bout of tension and conflict; however, this has not had any repercussion on the relationship between migrant and local communities.

Tension is recurrent between Senegal and the Gambia, as the latter seems to take a lenient approach to cross-border smuggling. With Guinea-Bissau, a border-demarcation problem tends to revive a latent conflict, and Senegal resents Bissau’s acting as a haven to separatists from Casamance. Adding to the tension, the two countries are at odds about sovereignty rights over an offshore area where oil has been discovered.

In neither case (with the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau) has political, inter-governmental tension given rise to any noticeable xenophobic behaviour or intercommunal conflict in Dakar. This stands in a sharp contrast with Mauritania in 1989. In that case, Dakar and Nouakchott disagreed over the demarcation of the common border, and opposing interests among different social groups and communities in Mauritania added to the tension. This Senegalese-Mauritanian conflict triggered purges on both sides of the border. According to some reports, some 80,000 Mauritians were expelled overnight to the northern (i.e., Mauritanian) bank of the River Senegal. In Dakar, the conflict triggered an extensive purge of the Mauritians by the native population; however, the Mauritanian community soon recovered and managed to integrate itself back into the socio-economic fabric of the capital. Against this background, two new factors have emerged that mitigate the prevalent perception of international migration in Dakar as ‘problem-free’:

- The type of economic competition waged by some foreigners against local people, and
- The security issues attendant to urban development.

The economic integration of Guinean migrants in urban taxi services and of Chinese migrants in the wholesale and retail-wholesale trades is raising new stock between Senegal and Mali. Mauritanians are slowly recovering from the trauma of the conflict between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989. They are gradually regaining control of the retail trade.

The European, mostly French, community is active in industry, finance, commercial representation and consulting. Their traditional auxiliaries, namely the Lebanese-Syrians, had massively taken over the wholesale and retail-wholesale trades, but nowadays they gradually redeploy into manufacturing. The Lebanese-Syrian community amounts to several thousand individuals in Senegal, but they do not show up in statistics as they come under either ‘French’ or ‘Senegalese’. Like the Europeans, these groups are rather closed communities with very few marriages between them, including the Lebanese-Syrian born in Senegal and the native Senegalese.

Intercommunal cohabitation: Realities and quandaries

The relatively small share of foreigners in Senegal and Dakar (4.3 per cent of the resident population) is certainly an essential factor that makes it possible to reduce and control any sources of political and intercommunal tension. However, additional factors have contributed to smooth cohabitation between the various communities:

- There is a definite cultural proximity between the Senegalese and the major foreign communities. The bulk of the foreign population originates from neighbouring or other West African countries that share with Senegal a certain cultural and historical background as well as legal frameworks for cooperation and economic integration.
- Senegal’s relative political stability and its open-door policy towards foreigners combine to encourage tolerant attitudes and behaviour. The political climate and attitudes in general do not favour xenophobic behaviour: Senegal is the only African country that has opened up the recruitment of University lecturers to all Africans, granting them the same status as those from Senegal.
- The lack of spatial concentration of international migrants in Dakar is another factor reducing intercommunal tensions. There is nothing such as a Guinean, Burkinabé or Malian neighbourhood in Dakar.

During the annual Tabaski celebration (also known as Eid-al-Kabir - the sacrifice of the lamb), they play an important role in the provision of sheep to households.

24 During the annual Tabaski celebration (also known as Eid-al-Kabir - the sacrifice of the lamb), they play an important role in the provision of sheep to households.
problems as local people perceive this competition as unfair. Senegalese competitors complain of breach of fair trading rules. In the urban transport sector, the Guineans are accused by local taxi drivers of accepting very low wages and extended working hours, which makes them particularly sought after by taxi firms and patrons. As for Chinese traders, they first came to Dakar only recently but their rapid, brilliant success in fancy goods trading is evoking xenophobic feelings among Senegalese competitors. At the same time, the expansion of Dakar has compounded some already severe urban management problems. It is becoming more and more difficult for the administrative and political authorities to provide infrastructure and services, and to deliver goods, housing, and urban planning as required. These difficulties have begun to sow the seeds of resentment among many Dakarois. The local population is well aware that urban life is changing for the worse, especially with the deterioration of some neighbourhoods close to the city centre, increasingly conspicuous appropriation of public space and, above all, mounting insecurity - all problems which, in the local population’s view, are down to immigrants from West Africa’s war-affected countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast).

3. International migration: policies and practice

Senegal’s migration policy

Senegal migration policy is almost exclusively inward-looking, focussing primarily on controlling rural migration. The country's authorities see the flight of rural people into urban areas as a major factor behind the rapid - and often chaotic - process of urbanisation, and they worry about the concomitant depletion of human resources in the countryside. The new orientations in the Senegalese government’s ‘Declaration on Population Policies’ adopted in 2002 set out a two-pronged strategy:
- Rural development, to check rural migration and ensure a better distribution of the population;
- Strengthen capacities in demographic studies and enhance awareness of population issues.

From another angle, the National Land Management Plan (adopted in 1997) aims to balance the occupation of space and seeks to tone down the excessive attractive power of Dakar in favour of provincial, medium-size towns. This is to be achieved through decentralisation and the transfer of prerogatives to local government. Although the major concern of the 2002 Declaration is to prevent rural migration to Dakar, in practice administrative and political authorities are doing exactly the opposite. As they keep allocating the bulk of investments to Dakar, they widen the gap already existing between the capital and the rest of the country, thereby reinforcing inflows of rural migrants. With regard to Senegalese emigration, the government has established a dedicated ‘Ministry of Senegalese Expatriates’, with a double mandate: the monitoring and control of the investments of Senegalese emigrants, and protection of their interests in the host countries. As for the foreigners settled in Dakar, they are under the authority of the Interior Ministry. Several statutes and decrees rule the conditions of admission, residence and activity of foreigners. A closer look at this body of law shows that the Senegalese authorities’ main concern is the political control of immigrants. This legislation stresses the obligation for immigrants to carry a foreigner's identity card to be renewed every year, the need for prior authorisation to engage in professional, commercial, manufacturing and handicraft occupations, along with guarantees regarding repatriation costs. In this legal set-up, foreigners are not granted any voting rights in the national or local elections. Senegal’s lawmakers have strengthened the array of repressive measures against those foreigners falling foul of the law (lack of permit, fraudulent documents, engaging in a money-earning activity without prior authorisation). The statutory book also includes several pieces of legislation on the status of refugees, again with political control as the prime rationale. In practice, this national policy on international migration is not enforced, except in the case of formal money-earning activities. Those foreigners working...
in informal sector business generally do not comply with existing rules. Their presence is tolerated as long as they do not engage in illegal or reprehensible activities. In the latter case, the government resorts to expulsion. In general, and since independence in 1960, all successive governments have consistently sought to portray Senegal as an open, welcoming country, the country of the teranga\textsuperscript{27}. Senegal has always been a leader as far as West African or even pan-African integration is concerned. This image and status account for a fair amount of the great tolerance towards foreigners seeking to settle in Senegal; they also evince the government’s lack of special concern for migration inflows of skilled individuals or potential investors\textsuperscript{28}.

**Why Dakar has no specific migration policies**

Dakar’s municipal authorities have no specific policies regarding foreigners settled in the city. They simply refer to national policies. A number of reasons have been brought up to justify this deficiency. The relatively low proportion of foreigners in the population is often mentioned, together with their problem-free social and economic integration. Moreover, the city council has no obvious reason to worry about cohabitation between local and migrant communities, as it has been comparatively smooth so far. However, closer scrutiny of the issues uncovers a more complex reality. Like many other countries, Senegal has opted for a strategy of gradual decentralisation, in an effort to promote community participation in the construction of the nation. In 1996, two statutes\textsuperscript{29} endorsed a set of prerogatives and duties ascribed to local authorities and devolved certain areas of competence to them. Both statutes explicitly transfer responsibilities for population and social policies to local authorities. However, according to some authorities, the executive decrees\textsuperscript{30} that followed the passing of the laws do not include population among the areas for which responsibility is transferred from central to local government. Such legal haziness hardly paves the way for active municipal authority involvement in transnational migration issues. More generally and as it turns out, most local authorities in Senegal lack the capacities and resources required to make decentralisation effective\textsuperscript{31}.

Even within the formal confines of the Dakar Urban Community, the boundaries are not clearly defined between the distinct municipalities and districts that together make up the Dakar conurbation\textsuperscript{32}. This haziness entails conflicts over the control of resources and diminishes the sense of responsibility of municipal authorities, who prefer to engage in eye-catching actions for the sake of their own political aggrandisement, or in initiatives that will only add to the financial resources available to them\textsuperscript{33}. Against such a background, municipal authorities have little care to spare for foreign communities. The lack or deficiency of urban policies on transnational migration can be viewed from another standpoint. By virtue of its status as Senegal’s political, administrative and economic capital, Dakar has to deal with multiple decision centres. The city is run not just by the municipal and the regional councils but also by the central government which, being located in Dakar tends to stifle local authorities. Such dissemination of decision centres within the same area is not matched by any clear-cut delineation of the respective prerogatives of each authority\textsuperscript{24}. It happens frequently that the central government grabs municipal land through sheer ‘arm-twisting’ of the city council\textsuperscript{35}.

Another factor contributing to the institutional haze that shrouds the governing structures of Dakar is has to do with the fact that all regional, municipal, local and governmental authorities are dominated by one and the same political par-

\textsuperscript{27} Teranga means the tradition of hospitality.

\textsuperscript{28} The new pro-free-market government of president Abdoulaye Wade, elected in 2002, has a policy of promoting investments and welcoming investors.

\textsuperscript{29} Laws 96.06 and 96.07 of 22 March 1996.

\textsuperscript{30} The March 2002 Declaration on Population Policies corroborates this remark.

\textsuperscript{31} The prerogatives devolved to regional, municipal and rural authorities are the following: municipal land; government land; the environment and management of natural resources; health; population and social services; youth, sports and leisure; culture; education; economic and resources planning; town and country planning, and housing. At the moment, local authorities are only interested in real estate, and therefore are constantly involved in illegal land transactions and land speculation.

\textsuperscript{32} As an example, Greater Dakar is made up of 18 municipalities, which are geographic and administrative entities. This excessive segmentation results from purely political factors and accounts for the lack of resources of most of these municipal authorities.

\textsuperscript{33} Municipal authorities are particularly keen on the management of neighbourhood markets, as permits and taxes are a good source of revenues. The drawback is that as a result, the localisation of markets in the city or in Greater Dakar is an occasion for serious wrangles. In addition, local authorities encourage the chaotic occupation of urban space as they build cheap restaurants to be rented out to private businesses. The phenomenon is dubbed the “cantinisation” (cantine) of Dakar.

\textsuperscript{34} For instance, the law on decentralisation allocates the maintenance of primary schools to municipal councils, of secondary schools to regional councils, and of higher education institutions to central government. However, in practice, the management of all educational facilities comes under central government. The fact that local authorities have given up on their own duties is clearly the result of their weak financial resources as well as of the way the political system operates.

\textsuperscript{35} The most representative example of the overwhelming power of central government over Dakar’s city council is the case of a municipal stadium which the central government had sold to foreign investors without prior agreement from the city council. One year after the sale and under pressure from the new owners, the city council convened to endorse the situation created by central government.
affected than nationals by unemployment in the capital.

3) The integration of transnational migrants has been greatly facilitated by the political circumstances of Senegal and the consistently open-minded approach of successive political leaders over decades. These leaders have never condoned xenophobia or rejection of foreign communities. Their approach has always been to welcome all foreigners wishing to settle in the country. Senegal has also benefited from a degree of political stability which to this day remains an exception in Africa. This is one of those rare sub-Saharan countries that have never experienced any coup and whose political experience has been one of unabated peaceful, democratic change.

4) Apart from emigration, central government migration policies focus on rural migration control - where they have proved to be a failure - whereas Dakar city authorities fail to realise the potential importance of a municipal policy on transnational migration. The relatively small size of the foreign community in Dakar and its smooth integration do not justify this approach, if and when put in the right perspective. Reducing the relationship with foreign communities to little else than political manipulation has clear limitations, as will become all-too clear soon enough.

5) The inertia of the Dakar city council regarding transnational migration reflects its lack of a culture of good governance. This shortfall in turn is a casualty of Senegal’s unfinished and ineffective policy of decentralisation as well as of a balance of power that is clearly tilted in favour of central government. In this political and institutional setup, the Dakar city council is unable to exercise all its prerogatives with regard to management of the urban space and its population.

6) Similarly, civil society is hardly active regarding transnational migrants. To be sure, NGOs routinely protect those threatened of expulsion by the authorities, but theirs is a much more subdued approach when it comes to support and guidance of migrants on other issues.

7) Unfortunately, while migrants are left to fend for themselves, several factors threaten to destabilise the smooth cohabitation of migrant and local communities in Dakar. The limits of the prevalent integration model are being felt, and the successful integration of some communities is increasingly perceived as detrimental by some Senegalese economic operators. Whether everyone abides by free market rules is not the point. As long as

4. Lessons learned and recommendations

Lessons learned

This chapter has highlighted the absence of a municipal policy on international migration in Dakar and the scarce visibility of Senegal’s governmental policy towards immigrants. From the experience and circumstances of the West African metropolis, eight major lessons can be drawn:

1) Public authorities - central, regional and municipal - only have a weak perception of the impact of transnational migration compared to ever-expanding internal migration. To central and local government bodies, foreign communities cannot be a major concern, since their economic integration is a success and they cohabit peacefully with the Senegalese.

2) Transnational migrants have adapted well to an economic background dominated by the informal sector and, because of their dynamism, are less

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36 By contrast in Cotonou, the economic capital of Benin, the mayor has well-defined and clear prerogatives, which he uses to the full. But then the mayor is of a different political inclination than the majority in power.

37 Moreover, before the electoral process became more reliable (that is, before 2000), it had been reported that foreigners were allowed to vote - for the party in power.

38 As are, for example, the Lebanese and Cape Verdean communities.
well-accepted arbitration by the rule of law remains unavailable, the way this economic competition is experienced by the Senegalese can only nurture excessive reactions, antagonism and xenophobic behaviour.

8) **Political insecurity in West Africa** keeps driving migration flows from those countries in the throes of internal conflict and into Senegal. Some segments of these flows (from Sierra Leone and Liberia) experience particular communication problems as they are English-speakers in a Francophone environment, and large numbers of others (from the Ivory Coast and Congo) are not Muslims. These two defining cultural traits may make integration more of a challenge for those communities. This stands in sharp contrast to the cultural proximity to be found among Senegalese, Malians, Guineans and Gambians, who are all Muslims and share the same historical and cultural background. Another factor to consider is that many foreign students from countries experiencing political crises may wish to stay in Senegal after completion of their curriculum.

**Recommendations**

1) Senegal should **develop the resources and capacities** required for smooth integration of the new foreign communities on its territory. Therefore, the country must, as a matter of urgency, review and renovate its policies on transnational migration in such a way that they steer clear of any repressive inclination.

2) From this analysis, it appears that one of the priorities when addressing transnational migrants is to gain a better awareness of the basic facts through the creation of a reliable, dedicated database. Keeping statistics up to date is a challenge in Senegal, but no effective policy can be designed without a reliable information system in the first place. Efforts on the quantitative side must go hand in hand with a research programme aimed at a better qualitative understanding of international migration in Senegal.

3) With decentralisation an uncompleted process, any attempts to design effective policies on transnational migration are severely hindered. The efficiency of any such policy at the municipal echelon hinges on an effective partnership mechanism with central government. The new institutional setup must enable the city council to exercise its prerogatives to the full. This new framework can contribute to the strengthening of the capacity of locally elected representatives to act in the best interests of good municipal governance. Without clear awareness of the strategic import of international migration in the city, Dakar’s municipal authorities will not change their stance. Any efforts to enhance awareness among the authorities must consider all these imperatives.

4) The need for Senegal’s civil society to play a more significant role in the management of transnational migration cannot be overemphasised. At present, NGOs usually confine their role to the protection of human rights; in future, they should extend their remit to the preservation of the current smooth cohabitation between local and migrant communities. If it were less hamstrung by political constraints, civil society could make a more effective contribution to the design of Dakar’s future.

In conclusion, Dakar has an extraordinary opportunity to act in the absence of any pressure. If the city today takes in the full dimension of transnational migration, then it can deploy urban policies that will pre-empt on future problems and guarantee continued peace and smooth cohabitation of local and foreign communities in a city that seems bound to play host to ever larger numbers of foreigners.

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39 Quite recently, the population in one of Dakar’s neighbourhoods forced the authorities to expel a group of migrants from Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone from the house where they had been living for some months. The local people complained about the migrants’ behaviour, which they said ran contrary to the values of Senegalese society as it included debauchery, drunkenness, scanty clothing, etc. This case is typical of the cohabitation conflicts that are bound to happen in the future among communities with different values.

40 As demonstrated by the latest census.
REFERENCES


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1. The Existing Situation

Johannesburg is South Africa’s largest and fastest-growing city. At the time of the 2001 census, the city was host to 3.2 million. The annual population growth rate is 4.1 per cent. Johannesburg is also a city of migrants. It was founded in the 1890s after the discovery of gold in a desolate, unpopulated part of the South African high plateaus (*highveld*). Migrants poured into the area from around the world and the region. By 1910, the city population had grown to over 200,000 and Johannesburg itself was the hub of South Africa’s emerging industrial revolution (van Onselen, 1982). In the ensuing decades, white immigrants from Europe and black migrants from the impoverished rural areas of Southern Africa continued to add to the population. After 1910, the government imposed increasingly tight controls on immigration from anywhere other than Europe (Peberdy, 1999). Black migrants from within South Africa and the Southern African region continued to come to the city. Some stayed and became part of a stable urban black population. Others migrated regularly between rural homes and the city. After 1948, the apartheid government imposed increasingly drastic controls on black mobility (Parnell and Crankshaw, 2004). The primary result of a racist immigration policy that favoured whites and movement controls that disadvantaged blacks was that the migration ‘free-for-all’ of the 1890s was never repeated; at least, until the 1990s.

One hundred years after the first mine shafts were sunk, migration to Johannesburg has once again taken on something of the diverse, global character that defined the founding decade of the city. Johannesburg’s new migrants are, as before, a mixture of the internal and the international. The end of apartheid-era controls on internal movement prompted an initial black rush to the city from the impoverished South African countryside (Parnell and Pirie, 1991). After 1990 and the collapse of apartheid itself, South Africa (and Johannesburg in particular) became an attractive destination for workers, traders, tourists and asylum-seekers. 

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1 Based on the inter-census period 1996-2001. The projected population, based on the same growth rate, is now 3.5 million.
from the rest of Africa. Migrants began to arrive in Johannesburg from virtually every country in Africa and around the world. In a decade, a parochial and insular city in a pariah country was transformed into a jostling, dynamic, cosmopolitan ‘global city’ (Beavon, 1998; Bond, 2000; Parnell, in press) or perhaps more accurately, in the words of Robinson (2003), ‘a not-quite global’ city. Certainly, though, the idea of Johannesburg as a ‘global city’ has been taken up in a new international marketing strategy.

The challenges of governing this disorderly city are considerable. In contemporary South Africa, urban governance is not simply about delivery, efficiency, transparency and accountability. The struggle for a post-apartheid system of democratic local government has propelled rapid internal transformation of structures, priorities and personnel. At the same time, the role of city authorities has been defined and redefined by successive waves of post-apartheid legislation and restructuring at the national level. In addition, local government had to face entrenched social and economic inequalities and was challenged to deliver services to an expectant mass of urban poor. The difficulties of building effective urban governance in such a dynamic and challenging environment are well-documented (Beavon, 1997; Tomlinson, 1999a; Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002; Tomlinson et al, 2003).

Johannesburg (like other South African cities) has been faced with the devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic. South Africa now has one of the largest HIV-positive populations in the world (Whiteside and Sunter, 2000). The epidemic is ‘tearing through the heart of the city’ (Monitor Group, 2001) with major implications for many areas of urban governance: ‘HIV/AIDS is not only a health problem. Its detrimental consequences reverberate across the social life of Johannesburg and thus across policy areas’ (Thomas, 2003; Crewe, 2000; Tomlinson, 2001, 2003, 2004). However, it is unfortunate that local government has failed to recognise the close relationship between migration and HIV/AIDS. Recent research has demonstrated that migrant populations are also particularly vulnerable to HIV infection and that traditional intervention strategies fail to have much impact in migrant communities (Crush et al, in press). Given the size of the migrant population of Johannesburg, it is therefore imperative that local government configures migration into its policy responses, as well as its prevention and care strategies. Given the magnitude of the post-apartheid challenges confronting local government, it would not be surprising if the issue of migration management ranked relatively low on the list of priorities. And that, indeed, appears to have been the case. Policies to date have been ad hoc and reactive rather than systematic and proactive. Evidence of the city authorities’ response to international migration is to be found in two arenas: first, city planning, policy and strategy documents and by-laws can be scrutinised for evidence of how migration is configured into city administration, if at all. Second, the way in which city by-laws and regulations are actually implemented is a potential source of evidence for the way in which the city responds to international migrants and treats them. In this chapter, we argue that Johannesburg city authorities can no longer ignore international migration. We go on to suggest what would be required to develop a coordinated response and to facilitate good governance of migration to the city.

2. The issues

The structure of city governance

Unlike many African cities, Johannesburg has a democratic, representative, proactive and interventionist governance structure focused on efficiency, delivery and strategic planning. The Johannesburg ‘unicity’ is under the political control of an elected ANC (African National Congress) executive mayor and ANC-dominated ‘mayoral committee’ (city council). The City also has a professional administration under a City Manager who is responsible for all administrative and planning functions. The manager’s office includes a Corporate Planning Unit (CPU) responsible for developing an integrated medium-term City Development Plan and a coherent long-term City Development Strategy for the City of Johannesburg. The city is divided into 11 administrative districts (‘regions’), each with their own management structures.

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2 The HIV-positive prevalence in the Johannesburg municipal area was estimated at 10.4 per cent in 2000 (or 286,000 cases). Deaths from AIDS were projected to reach 26,000 per year by 2010 and the number of AIDS orphans in the city to grow to 139,000.

3 See the City of Johannesburg website at: http://www.joburg.org.za/

4 In late 2000, city councils around the country were amalgamated, reducing the number of local authorities from 843 to 284. In the process, several large “unicities” were created, in Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, the East Rand and Johannesburg.
South Africa’s post-apartheid institutions – at national, provincial and local levels – are committed to reversing decades of discrimination and economic exploitation through black empowerment, poverty alleviation, delivery of basic services and the extension of rights enshrined in the 1996 Constitution. A number of studies have evaluated the achievements of a decade of democratic local government in Johannesburg in alleviating the plight of South Africa’s poor (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2000a, 2000b, 2003a, 2003b; Fiil-Flynn, 2001). City governance is premised on developmentalist principles (Parnell and Pieterse, 2002). In practice, however, the City’s stated goals of poverty-reduction and sustainability have regularly conflicted with neo-liberal, free-market ideologies and practices, particularly in the area of basic service delivery (Fiil-Flynn, 2001; McDonald, 2002a; Bond, 2003). Whatever its successes and failures, the priority of City government remains an improved quality of life for the underprivileged South African urban poor. The task of improving the lives of South Africans is seen as so urgent that the ‘foreigner’ is explicitly or implicitly precluded from plans and strategies for sustainable urban development. More often than not, immigrants are actually seen as a threat to poor Africans and to city plans to improve their quality of life. The challenge of undoing the legacy of the past and uplifting the urban poor is a massive one. Economic exploitation, social exclusion and deepening poverty are written into the highly inequitable urban landscape of Johannesburg (CASE 2004; Palmer Development Group, 2004). There are stark differences between the wealthiest and poorest districts of the city. In the wealthiest district, Sandton & Rosebank, average annual household income is over 230,000 rand and the unemployment rate is six per cent. By contrast, in Ennerdale & Orange Farm district, annual household income is only 12,307 rand and the unemployment rate is nearly 50 per cent. Unemployment rates stand at over 50 per cent in Doornkop & Soweto and in Diepkloof & Meadowlands. The white population is concentrated in the wealthier districts. The collapse of apartheid has precipitated a reconfiguration of the racial geography of the city (Parnell and Crankshaw, 2004) in three different respects: (1) the new black middle class has triggered a slow process of de-racialisation of the wealthy northern suburbs, (2) traditional black townships such as Soweto and Alexandra have continued to grow, primarily through internal migration. Housing delivery has failed to keep pace with demand, so that a significant proportion of the population now lives in informal, backyard shacks; and (3) numerous informal shack settlements (shantytowns) have sprang up on the periphery of the city. These settlements are home to new migrants as well as people re-locating from backyard shacks in the townships. Some 57,000 informal shack dwellings were erected between 1996 and 2001, raising the total number of families living in shacks to more than 212,000. Finally, there has been a rapid process of de-racialisation of the inner city. Suburbs formerly reserved for whites are now inhabited predominantly by black residents.

The inner-city area of Johannesburg (Hillbrow, Berea, Yeoville, Betrams) consists primarily of high-rise, rental accommodation. In 2001, the area was host to just over 250,000 people with a black population of 82 per cent. In the previous five years, the ‘Central’ area of Johannesburg experienced a 26 per cent population increase, with the African population growing by 82 per cent and the white population decreasing by 20 per cent. This simply reinforced a trend first evident in the 1980s (Morris, 1999). The rapidity of change in the demographic profile of the inner-city has been accompanied by serious economic and social decline. A number of studies have painted a graphic picture of neighbourhoods experiencing infrastructure deterioration, advancing dilapidation of the housing stock and high crime rates (Morris, 1999; Jurgens et al, 2003; Oelefse, 2003). The ‘ghettoisation’ of the inner-city has been rapid and dramatic.

**Typology of international migration**

Since 1990 and the collapse of apartheid, immigration to South Africa from the region, the continent and the rest of the world has dramatically increased. The movements are complex and multi-dimensional, as recent research by the Southern African Migration Project, in particular, has begun to show (McDonald 2000b; Crush and McDonald, 2002). Some forms represent the continuation and intensification of long-standing patterns; others are associated with the collapse of apartheid, globalisation and the opening up of the coun-

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5 A telling symptom of the problem can be found in a recent publication on the challenges of managing South African cities (published by the South African Cities Network (SACN) which devoted less than half a page to immigration; see South African Cities Network (2004), 184. The SACN is a national network bringing together municipalities, the Ministry of Provincial and Local Government and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA).

6 (1.00 rand = 0.16 US dollar)

7 SAMP’s Migration Policy Series is an especially useful research resource; see www.queensu.ca/samp.
try to Africa and the world. Because different types of international migrant present different challenges and opportunities for city management, it is important to draw these distinctions at the outset.

The first category of migrants consists of temporary legal contract workers. This is the oldest form of black migration to Johannesburg from the Southern African region, going back to the early part of the 20th century (Jeeves 1985, Crush et al, 1999). Today, the typical contract worker in South Africa works on the gold and platinum mines and is recruited from the neighbouring countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique or Swaziland. In all, there are around 200,000 mineworkers in South Africa from neighbouring countries. Although Johannesburg was built on gold, and gold mine dumps are a prominent feature of the landscape, there are no longer any active pits within city limits. Consequently, one of the most enduring and important forms of international migration to South Africa is not considered in this chapter (Crush and James, 1995).

Contract employment has not been extended beyond the mining and commercial farming sectors, which effectively bars urban employers in Johannesburg from hiring immigrants from neighbouring countries. Although Johannesburg was built on gold, and gold mine dumps are a prominent feature of the landscape, there are no longer any active pits within city limits. Consequently, one of the most enduring and important forms of international migration to South Africa is not considered in this chapter (Crush and James, 1995). Contract employment has not been extended beyond the mining and commercial farming sectors, which effectively bars urban employers in Johannesburg from hiring immigrants from neighbouring countries under the same terms and conditions (Crush and Tshiterereke, 2002).

Second, there is a category of legal immigrants and migrants with marketable skills. Prior to the mid-1980s, only whites could legally immigrate to South Africa (Peberdy, 1999). After 1985, a small number of black immigrants were allowed in from those African countries on friendly terms with the apartheid government or to work in the rural ‘homeland’ areas of the country. Many predicted that the numbers of immigrants would increase rapidly with the end of apartheid, particularly from the rest of Africa. This has not been the case. Immigration from Europe has declined markedly, but has not been replaced by immigrants from Africa and elsewhere (Mattes et al, 2001). The number of immigrants to South Africa fell consistently after 1990 to fewer than 5,000 a year by the late 1990s. No specific figures exist for Johannesburg. The ‘closed door’ policy of the post-apartheid government has led some to describe the South African government as anti-immigration (Crush and McDonald, 2001; Peberdy, 2001). The new Immigration Act of 2002 proposes a more open policy but as at early 2005 it had not been implemented yet. The ANC has recently announced an immigration policy review which could lead to greater openness in the future.

Skilled international migrants have been allowed entry in greater numbers, though not to the extent demanded by employers. Skilled migrants, in general, enter to work in the South African public and private sectors, or as intra and inter-company personnel transfers of large foreign corporations. Specific figures are not available for Johannesburg, but it is reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of work permits are issued for people to work in the city. Another common means of entry is via the student visa. South African universities and training colleges have been very favourably disposed to the presence of international students’ on campus (Ramphele, 1999). Johannesburg’s training institutions therefore have sizable ‘foreign’ populations on their campuses.

A third category of international migrants are ‘forced migrants.’ Refugee inflows into South Africa and Johannesburg have come in two waves. First, in the 1980s, the civil war in Mozambique forced over 300,000 people to flee their homes and relocate in South Africa (Azevedo, 2002). The South African government allowed them to stay provided that they remained in the eastern border areas. Most did, yet a not-inconsiderable number migrated to cities such as Johannesburg. Following the end of the Mozambican war, the status of refugees in South Africa was extremely hazy for much of the 1990s. Very few voluntarily resettled in Mozambique. Their situation was only regularised in 2000–2001 when an amnesty and legal residence status was offered to ex-refugees. Just over 130,000 applications were received and around 100,000 were accepted. The majority were from provinces other than Gauteng (the province where Johannesburg and the country’s capital, Pretoria, are located) (Johnston, 2003).

The second wave of forced immigrants came primarily from Africa’s ‘hotspots’ of the 1990s: Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, the former Zaire), Rwanda and Somalia (Majodina, 2001; CASE, 2003). Asylum-seekers have arrived from many other African and Asian countries as well. Until 1997, refugee-claimants were dealt with under harsh immigration laws. Thereafter, with the passage of South Africa’s first Refugees Act, forced migrants have been managed under a separate legislation (Handmaker, 2003). South Africa’s refugee determination process tends to adjudicate claimants on the basis of national origin rather than individual circumstances and threat of harm. There is no doubt that forced migrants (i.e., asylum-seekers and accepted refugees) make up a signifi-
A significant proportion of Johannesburg’s new international migrant community. Many forced migrants are highly educated with significant training and skills. The National Refugee Baseline Survey found that only two per cent of refugees were in ‘unskilled’ occupations in their home country (CASE, 2003). As many as 37 per cent are now students with others occupying a range of skilled jobs including teachers (6 per cent), mechanics (4 per cent), health professionals (two per cent), electricians (2 per cent), and so on. However, employment and refugee legislation makes it difficult for them to work at jobs appropriate to their skill sets. Nearly a quarter (24 per cent) are unemployed in South Africa and 52 per cent are in unskilled occupations (including 25 per cent as street traders).

A final, and perhaps the largest, category of migrants in South Africa and Johannesburg are irregular or undocumented migrants. The actual numbers of irregular migrants in South Africa are unknown. Official estimates generally put the figure at over five million and growing, but there is no solid evidence that the figure is this large. Most researchers who have studied the issue think that the number is probably a lot less than one million (Crush, 1999). Some enter legally as visitors and then work, others cross borders illegally and work illegally, and still others tap into a large underground trade in forged documentation or make bogus asylum claims. The national origins of undocumented migrants are also unknown and probably unknowable. They certainly have no interest in declaring their status to the authorities or census-takers. If deportation and amnesty figures are any guide, the majority of undocumented migrants come from neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as they always have.

However, it is apparent that increasing numbers of irregular migrants have arrived in Johannesburg from other parts of Africa and the globe. Overland entry to South Africa is relatively easy and access to illegal identity documentation so ready that the country now attracts economic migrants from almost everywhere.

The rate of employment among these migrants is quite high compared with South Africans and they tend to work in construction, manufacturing, domestic work and the services industry. Many also work in the informal sector. In addition to these categories of international migrant, Johannesburg is also host to a large circulating population of migrants and visitors from other countries. These include large numbers of informal traders who regularly cross South Africa’s borders on a temporary basis to trade, shop and buy-and-sell.

Networks of informal cross-border trade span the entire continent but have grown particularly dense in Southern Africa since 1990, with the deregulation of the informal sector in South Africa and the development of trading as a livelihood strategy. Studies show that informal cross-border trade is multi-layered and complex (Peberdy and Crush, 1998; Rogerson, 1998; Peberdy and Rogerson, 2002). Certain sectors of the trade are increasingly dominated by foreign women. The traders face numerous legal and financial obstacles crossing borders and growing their enterprises, but it is clear that Johannesburg has emerged as a major hub of informal trading for the sub-continent.

This brief typology illustrates the varied nature and complex forms of immigration to Johannesburg. There is no single form of migration and migrant, and therefore no single set of effects. Equally, there can be no single, uniform policy response that can be tailored to suit all. One of the major tendencies in post-apartheid South Africa has been a failure to disaggregate international migration into its various components, combined with an assumption that one policy response will work for all. This is consistent with the tendency among the public to lump all ‘foreigners’ together as a uniformly undesirable threat to the interests of South Africans. Clearly, different groups of migrants have different reasons for being in the city, engage in different activities, place different demands on city services, have variable requirements of city authorities, etc. As Johannesburg authorities begin to articulate a policy on the presence of migrants, it is imperative that they take account of migrant diversity.

**Migrant diversity**

This section builds a demographic and socio-economic profile of Johannesburg’s transnational migrant population at the time of the last census (2001). Comparisons are made, where appropriate, with the South African population (migrant and non-migrant) as a whole. The 2001 census provides important baseline demographic and socio-economic data regarding Johannesburg’s international migrant population, but cannot be

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9 Since 1994, the South African government has deported over one million undocumented migrants, of whom over 85 per cent were from Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

10 This section of the chapter draws on a recent report prepared for the Johannesburg City Council; see Peberdy et al. (2004).
FIGURE 1 - POPULATION OF JOHANNESBURG BY PLACE OF BIRTH


The census also disaggregates the foreign-born by major geographical source region. The majority of foreign-born migrants in Johannesburg were from neighbouring SADC countries (59 per cent) (Table 1). These immigrants make up four per cent of the total city population. European-born residents made up 26 per cent of the foreign-born population (and only 1.7 per cent of the total city population), followed by those from the Rest of Africa (7 per cent) and Asia (6 per cent). Given that the number of white immigrants has fallen dramatically since 1990, it is reasonable to suppose that the majority of the European-born came to the country before the collapse of apartheid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of birth</th>
<th>Born outside South Africa (%)</th>
<th>Proportion of total city population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC countries</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total born outside South Africa</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 provides a more detailed breakdown of international migrants by country of origin. Whereas, as stated above, these figures must be regarded as undercounts, they do provide useful information on the relative importance of different sources. As expected, the majority of international migrants appear to be from the neighbouring countries of Mozambique (19,984), Zimbabwe (17,395), Lesotho (5,882) and Malawi (4,811). As for the rest of Africa, the most important source countries are Nigeria, the Congo, Zambia, the DRC and Swaziland. Smaller numbers of migrants (fewer than 1,000) come from a variety of other African countries. The main refugee-generating countries with a presence in Johannesburg include Angola (1,782), the DRC (1,278), Somalia (207) and Rwanda (222).

In terms of gender breakdown, and in keeping with global trends, the data suggests that increasing numbers of women are becoming migrants in their own right (Dodson, 1998, 2001). Yet, as Figure 2 shows, international migrants from the SADC (62 per cent), the rest of Africa (70 per cent) and Asia (55 per cent) are still more likely to be male. Traditional white immigrants are about 50:50, as is the South African population of the city. Other evidence shows that refugees and asylum seekers are more likely to be men (Majodina and Peberdy, 2000; CASE, 2003). Male refugees are likely to travel further than their female counterparts as they have more access to resources, and tend to move first to establish themselves before their families join them.

Figure 2 - Gender Breakdown of International Migration

In terms of age breakdown, international migrants are more likely to be of prime working age (51 per cent between 20-39 years) with very few children (5.6 per
cent under 15 years of age). This compares with 36 per cent and 32 per cent for the Gauteng-born. Interestingly, internal migrants show an age profile that is more similar to that of international migrants (with 50 per cent between 20-39 years and 14 per cent under 15 children).

As expected, European migrants are older than their counterparts from Africa and Asia (with over half over the age of 50). The bulk of migrants from the rest of the world are in their productive working years and, equally important, have not been in the country long enough to ‘age’ in the same way as the European cohort. In general, the data on the ages of migrant populations suggest that Johannesburg gains from migrants in their most productive years.

Due to factors behind most migration flows, migrants from abroad are more likely to be members of small households than the locally-born or internal migrants (22 per cent in one-person and 30 per cent in two-person households, compared with 12 per cent and 20 per cent for locals). This affects not just the current demand for housing stock, but also the kind of housing that needs to be available in the city if current migration patterns continue. However, it is possible that available housing and other services also shape migrant households. If sufficient adequate, affordable and appropriate housing and education services are not available, it may discourage immigrants from bringing their families with them.

Unfortunately, 2001 census data make it impossible to determine how long international migrants have been living in South Africa, or how long they intend to stay. However, research by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) suggests that the majority of migrants from neighbouring countries, at least, do not intend to stay permanently in South Africa (McDonald et al, 2000a). For example, a study of African migrants living in urban areas of Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces found that 68 per cent of respondents wanted to retire in their home countries and only 18 per cent in South Africa (McDonald et al, 2000b). Only nine per cent wished to be buried in South Africa. Francophone migrants consistently point out that they see no long-term future in South Africa (Morris and Bouillon, 2001).

**Urban migrant livelihoods**

The common perception in South Africa is that the country is a magnet for Africa’s poor and uneducated. In fact, the 2001 census data show that:

- International migrants are more likely to have tertiary education than South Africans (22 per cent with post-secondary educational qualifications, compared with 10 per cent of the locally-born and 12 per cent of internal migrants);
- The proportion of migrants without education is under 10 per cent and is very similar to that of South Africans;
- Female migrants have higher levels of educational achievement than males; and
- Female migrants have higher levels of educational achievement than female South Africans (Figure 3).

**FIGURE 3 - EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF MIGRANTS AND NON-MIGRANTS**


This finding is confirmed in sample research with migrants and refugees. For example, a recent study found that only five per cent of forced migrants had no education (Gotz, 1994). Over half (54 per cent) had completed secondary education and another 18 per cent had completed tertiary education. International migrants have higher rates of employment than either internal migrants or locals. Over 60 per cent of immigrants are employed, compared with less than 40 per cent of locals. As might be expected, refugees and asy-
lum seekers find it harder to access formal employment than other cross-border migrants, since their identification documents are often not recognised by employers. European migrants have the highest employment rates (83 per cent), compared with 69 per cent of SADC migrants and 62 per cent of migrants from the rest of Africa. Employment rates are highly gender-biased for all groups. As Table 3 shows, 69 per cent of male SADC migrants are employed, compared with only 33 per cent of female migrants. Similarly, for the Rest of Africa, the figures are 63 per cent male and 42 per cent female. The differential is smaller in the case of South Africans but still sizeable (50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively).

A breakdown by sectors of employment (Figure 4) shows that the dominant areas of international migrant employment in Johannesburg are the services, finance/business, community services, manufacturing and construction sectors along with private households. The relatively high rates of employment in the financial/business sector may reflect the high levels of tertiary education of migrants. Employment sector distributions are not so different from those of local South Africans. The primary anomalies are the domination by internal migrants of domestic work in private households and by international migrants of the construction sector.

An important means of making a livelihood for many migrants is in the informal sector (Rogerson, 1998; Peberdy and Crush, 1999; Peberdy and Rogerson, 2002). Street trading was banned from the streets of apartheid Johannesburg before 1990. The deregulation of the informal sector led to an explosion of street-level activity. International migrants have inserted themselves into the sector in large numbers and, in many cases, come to dominate particular sectors such as import-export activity, handicrafts trading and the second-hand clothes market. Francophone migrants, in particular, are integrated into regional, continental and even intercontinental trading networks, receiving goods and start-up capital from abroad. The complexity of these networks is well-illustrated by one description of traders from the DRC:

Goods are obtained in several ways. Artefacts such as malachite and wooden crafts and other curios are imported by ‘wholesalers’ through ordinary channels which involve payment of air freight, customs duty and ground transportation. They then resell these goods to retailers for cash or on credit. The choice of the modes of sale depends on the level of trust between the buyer and seller and on the business season. The importation of clothes involves more interaction between the Congolese and other African immigrant communities. Congolese clothing materials are imported from the country for resale in the same ways as the artefacts. However, Congolese merchants also sell West African fashion made from cotton prints imported from West Africa, as there is a relatively larger market for these products, particularly within black South African communities. Thus, Congolese merchants make deals

### TABLE 3 - EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF SOUTH AFRICANS AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS BY GENDER, 2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>SADC</th>
<th>Rest of Africa</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not active</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not active</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 2001, Statistics South Africa, 2004

### FIGURE 4 - MIGRANT AND NON-MIGRANT EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR, 2001

Source: Census 2001, Statistics South Africa, 2004
with other immigrants from Senegal, Mali, Ghana or Ivory Coast and obtain these goods from them (Kadima, 2001).

Other common informal sector niches include hairdressing, taxi-driving, food preparation and selling, and commercial sex work. Migrant women from neighbouring countries such as Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe sell goods made in their own countries (often clothing or handicrafts) and travel home with bought consumer goods for resale. Poorer migrants buy fruit and vegetables from wholesalers and resell them on the streets along major shopping and commuter routes.

Unlike the informal sector in many developing country cities, Johannesburg has a disproportionate number of well-educated migrants working on the streets. International migrants working ‘below’ their educational or professional qualifications are very common. In some cases, this happens because they cannot find suitable jobs or, because of dubious legal status, are unemployable. In other cases, forced migrants have little alternative. The evidence shows, however, that the most successful can do extremely well on the streets.

The relatively high rates of employment and self-employment of international migrants fuel xenophobic fears that they are taking (not creating) employment and income-generating opportunities from long-term Johannesburg residents. It is a common belief among South Africans that migrants depress wages, undercut South Africans in the labour market and offer unfair competition on the streets (Mattes et al 2000). However, international migrants only contribute 6.7 per cent of the population of Johannesburg and fewer than 80 per cent of those are in the labour market. The main employment sectors of migrants do include low-paid, insecure jobs, but it is not possible to know what the effect is on South Africans. Income levels are perhaps a better indicator of poverty levels and degree of marginalisation amongst migrants (Table 4). At the time of the 2001 census, a significant proportion of the city population reported having no income, but this was much lower for foreign (36 per cent) than for internal migrants (51 per cent) and local residents (67 per cent). Internal migrants generally earn less than locals, whereas international migrants earn, on average, more than both. In general, more skilled migrants from the rest of Africa earn more than the unskilled and semi-skilled SADC migrant.

### Table 4: Income Levels of South Africans and International Migrants, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>SADC countries</th>
<th>Rest of Africa</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No income</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 1 - R 400</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 401 - R 800</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 801 - R 1600</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 1601 - R 3200</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 3201 - R 6400</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 6401 - R 12800</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 12801 - R 25600</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 25601 - R 51200</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 51201 - R 102400</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 102401 - R 204800</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 204801 or more</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Living conditions

Given the highly uneven social geography of Johannesburg, it would be surprising if all international migrants were drawn to live and work in the same parts of the city. Johannesburg’s new post-apartheid migrants face a metropolis in a process of rapid change and are drawn to certain areas of the city. In general, skilled immigrants go to the suburbs, including the gated communities on the northern outskirts; semi-skilled and unskilled migrants from certain countries go to the informal townships, with their backyards and shack settlements; Francophone and West African migrants go to the inner-city, as do refugees. The implications of this process of uneven insertion into the everyday life of the city pose significant challenges for city managers seeking to develop a coherent policy response to migration.

South Africa’s traditional white immigrants were integrated into the city’s white suburbs, where most of them remain. Just as middle-class and wealthy black South Africans have been moving from the black townships to the northern suburbs, so too have highly skilled foreign migrants who can afford to live in these areas. In 2001, the population of the wealthiest city district (Sandton & Rosebank) was 32 per cent black (57,936 individuals), although a proportion
of these would have been domestic workers.

While Soweto is a major destination for internal migrants, it is not a particularly welcoming environment for international migrants, unless they are from countries such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland: these origins secure them a higher degree of ‘invisibility’ because of cultural and language affinity. One study of the Orlando East area in Soweto found that Mozambican and Zimbabwean migrants were also living in backyards (Parnell, 2002). A study of Soweto in 2001 found that backyard rental shacks make up 20 per cent of all residential structures and that 37 per cent of Sowetans live in these ‘backyards’ (Crankshaw, Gilbert and Morris, 2000). Across the city, 108,000 households live in backyards. Another study concluded that ‘at least 16 per cent’ of Soweto’s backyard residents are foreign (Parnell and Wooldridge, 2001). The other major apartheid-era township of Alexandra is close to the northern suburbs and industrial employment opportunities. There are clusters of immigrants in Alexandra, particularly from Mozambique.

The census data do not show if international migrants live in single-sex migrant labour hostels in the townships. An estimated 36,000 ‘households’ live in overcrowded and poorly-serviced hostels in Johannesburg (Parnell and Wooldridge, 2001). A case study of Dube Hostel in Soweto in 2001 found that most hostel residents were migrants from KwaZulu Natal within South Africa, but that there were also some foreign migrants from neighbouring countries (Beall, 2001).

Poorer international migrants, like those from inside the country, can afford little more (and often much less) than the basics. In-migration to Johannesburg from both domestic and foreign sources has fuelled the growth of informal settlements on Johannesburg’s periphery. In 2001, a total of over 200,000 households lived in informal shacks. Shack settlements are home to the most socially and economically marginalised migrants, whether Gauteng-born, internal or international. Migrants from the SADC are more likely to live in shack settlements than migrants from the rest of Africa. One informal settlement (Hospital Hill) is part of a large number of small shack settlements 40 kilometres south of Central Johannesburg in an area known as the ‘Valley of the Shacks’. A study of Hospital Hill found significant numbers of foreigners, particularly from Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland as well as Nigeria (Parnell, 2001b).

In this ‘unplanned, unregulated settlement’, conditions are ‘abysmal’, social pathologies ‘shocking’ and the prospects for infrastructural and social uplifting ‘bleak’ (Parnell, 2001b). According to the study, residents could not afford to live anywhere else, but some found it a useful place to live as they could avoid legal scrutiny – whether they were in the country illegally or involved in illegal activities. International migrants tend to cluster in certain areas within the shack settlements. Tension between foreign and local migrants is often high – given the poverty of all and the extremely limited economic and social resources of these areas – and on occasion has exploded into violent confrontation.

The most visible change associated with post-1990 immigration, however, has been a second transformation of Johannesburg’s inner-city. Just as black South Africans displaced whites in the late 1980s, so, in the ensuing decade, have international migrants moved into these areas en masse. There are four main reasons for this development. First, the housing stock of the inner-city is predominantly high-rise, rental accommodation. As in other parts of the world, slumlords are able to make significant profits through minimal investment and overcrowding rental units. Census data does not provide any information on degrees of overcrowding, but other evidence suggests that migrants live in overcrowded conditions in deteriorating buildings. For example, a study of Somali refugees found that 70 per cent lived in a room in a house, 11 per cent in a room in a flat and 77 per cent only had access to that one room (Majodina and Peberdy, 2000). Over 50 per cent shared their room with three to five other individuals and some 7.3 per cent lived in a room with more than 10 people. Over 80 per cent shared their bedroom with non-family members. A study of forced migrants across four South African cities, including Johannesburg, similarly found that 75 per cent rented a room in a house or flat and that over 33 per cent shared that room with at least one other individual (CASE, 2003).

The second factor behind migrants’ move en masse into Johannesburg’s inner city is that living in this area has its benefits, most prominent of which is proximity to employment and economic opportunity. The city’s ‘cheap’ residential areas (townships and informal settlements) lie on the periphery, a long commute from the city centre. The major educational institutions (Witwatersrand University and Rand Afrikaans University) are also very close to the inner-city, which makes it attractive to immigrants seeking to better their educational qualifications. A study of Hillbrow found that foreign migrants, particularly
those without papers or from outside the SADC, find it easier to get accommoda-
tion in the inner-city (Wooldridge, 2001). Studies of refugees and asylum
seekers also show that they find it difficult to get accommodation outside these
areas (Majodina and Peberdy, 2000).
The third factor behind migrants’ move to the inner city is that once the
‘takeover’ process of the inner-city by foreign migrants had begun, a process
of cumulative causation set in. In other words, the area has become attrac-
tive for new immigrants because of the presence of compatriots from home,
social networks and personal contacts, cultural associations (confessional and
otherwise), and protection from the authorities. The inner-city, high-rise area
of Hillbrow is now associated almost exclusively – and very negatively – with
international migrants (Morris, 1999). Other inner-city suburbs of Berea,
Yeoville and Melville have also attracted increasing numbers of international
migrants (Sadie and Borger, 2004). Although the precise national composi-
tion of the foreign population of the inner-city is not known, the majority ap-
pear to be from West and Francophone Africa rather than from the SADC
(Morris and Bouillon, 2001). More recently, the numbers of Zimbabweans ar-
riving in the city have been increasing.
Finally, the inner-city has become an attractive haven for local criminal activi-
ty as well as regional and continental crime networks. Whereas South Africans
tend unfairly to stereotype all international migrants as responsible for the
city’s crime wave, there are clearly advantages for crime syndicates (particu-
larly in the drugs trade) to establish operations in the inner-city (Thulare, 1999;
Lungu, 1999; Leggett, 2001, 2002a, 2002b). The unfortunate irony of this is
that ordinary, law-abiding migrants tend to be disproportionately the victims
of crime, simply by virtue of living in the inner-city.

Although the idea that international migrants from Africa are all living in
penury and on the margins is fallacious, it is clear that a significant propor-
tion do struggle economically. A large majority of these migrants are from
South Africa’s immediate neighbours. Migrants from other areas tend to be
better off although many (particularly forced migrants) are unable to secure
jobs and livelihoods commensurate with their training and skills. The immi-
grant population is extremely heterogeneous from an economic and social
point of view, an observation confirmed by the various case studies men-
tioned in this section.

3. International Migration and Policy Responses

National government policies

The City of Johannesburg has no control or responsibility over a number of key
issues relating to immigration, even though decisions taken at other levels of
government have profound implications for city management. Immigration
and refugee policies (i.e., who is allowed into the country, for how long and for
what purposes) are in the hands of the national Department of Home Affairs
and Justice. The City of Johannesburg has no control over the (still) large
numbers of Zimbabweans arriving every year, and is regularly the subject of
human rights investigations over the treatment of refugees (Klaaren
and Ramji, 2001). South Africa deports 150,000 to 200,000 migrants a year (the
vast majority to neighbouring countries). Most migrants are arrested on the
streets or in workplaces and dispatched to a privately-owned holding centre to
the west of the city called Lindela. This centre has been beset by controversy
and is regularly the subject of human rights investigations over the treatment
of migrants (SAHRC, 2000). At Lindela, detainees are held until their identity
is established and then they are either released or deported. Since the police
engage in unashamed ‘racial profiling’ in identifying ‘foreigners,’ up to 20 per
cent of their arrests turn out to be South African citizens. The fact that the SAPS have free rein on the streets of Johannesburg can cause considerable disruption and even chaos in inner-city neighbourhoods and workplaces. This, in theory, is something over which the city has no control.

The city does have its own police department: the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) which is responsible for traffic policing, by-law enforcement and crime prevention (Palmary, 2004). In practice, the JMPD often conducts joint crime prevention operations with the SAPS. Since, in police circles, ‘undocumented migration’ is a crime against the State, arresting migrants is viewed as a crime prevention activity. The JMPD therefore also regularly accosts and detains citizens and non-citizens suspected of being in the country illegally. A recent study of relations between the police and forced migrants in Johannesburg found that nearly 70 per cent had been stopped at least once and asked for identity documents (compared to only 12 per cent of South Africans) (Palmary, 2004). At the same time, the JMPD has been accused of being derelict in its duties to offer protection to international migrants. This charge takes on extra significance, given that immigrants are more likely to be the victims of violence and crime than local residents (Palmary et al, 2003). Two points need to be made about police ‘conduct’: first, there is little evidence that the JMPD has taken its responsibilities to provide a secure and safe environment for all in a particular way. The police record to date is far from encouraging.

Studies of the treatment of forced immigration to Johannesburg show that refugees and asylum seekers face additional problems in their interactions with the national Department of Home Affairs, national and city police, and other authorities (CASE, 2003; Bhamjee and Klaaren, 2004). These problems persist despite the implementation of the Refugees Act. There is an urgent need for an efficient asylum determination procedure that respects its own set of rules and regulations and does not leave asylum seekers in limbo – without full rights and documentation – for indeterminate periods’ (Tlou, 2004). Quite apart from delays in a flawed determination process, refugees and asylum-seekers face daily harassment at Home Affairs offices, both from the police and when they seek to access basic services such as health and education. Refugees and asylum seekers from the rest of Africa are subject to ‘racial profiling’ and are regularly caught up in police dragnets against undocumented migration (Palmary, 2004). Asylum seekers and refugees in Johannesburg face a set of social problems, including difficulties accessing identification documentation, limited access to basic health services, exclusion of refugee children from schools, denial of foster care grants, inability to open bank accounts and denial of employment opportunities (Bhamjee and Klaaren, 2004; Winterstein and Stone, 2004; Pursell, 2004; Jacobsen and Bailey, 2004). Unaccompanied minors face additional problems of survival and potential abuse (Eyber, 2004). NGOs, confessional organisations and migrant associations all work in trying circumstances, and with limited resources, to provide support, shelter and legal advice to asylum-seekers and refugees (Segale, 2004; Tlou, 2004). The challenge confronting local government is that many of the policies and practices that impact on forced migrants are set and enforced at the national rather than municipal level. What the city needs to ensure is that its own social and economic policies vis-à-vis migrants and refugees are non-discriminative, constitutionally sound and consistent with basic human rights principles.

Another area of concern for international migrants is access to healthcare (Pursell, 2004). South Africa has a three-tiered public healthcare system. Each tier provides different levels of care. Primary healthcare is delivered in provincial and district clinics. District-level clinics are under municipal jurisdiction. They provide services such as family planning, immunisation, low-level infection treatment, child health, mental health, HIV testing and treatment of STDs (sexually-transmitted diseases). Johannesburg’s public hospitals are funded and managed by the provincial government. The city also has a large number of fee-paying private hospitals, clinics and medical practices. The private medical sector is regulated by national legislation. The basic point is that the city has no unified healthcare system for which it is solely responsible. Although all migrants, by virtue of being on South African soil, are guaranteed the right to healthcare services under the Constitution (a right reaffirmed for refugees in the Refugees Act), the practical reality is that migrants who can pay have no problem accessing private healthcare. Those who cannot pay have to rely on a jaundiced public health system. Many healthcare workers at clinics and hospitals either exclude or obstruct access to health services by migrants (Pursell, 2004).
Local government policies

The Johannesburg City authorities have not, to date, formulated a coherent strategy or policy guidelines to deal with international migration per se. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the policy implications have even been properly conceptualised and thought through. Under the national Municipal Systems Act 2000, all municipalities are required to draw up an annual Integrated Development Plan (IDP). Chapter Two of the latest IDP for Johannesburg (2004-2005) draws attention to the role of migration in fuelling city growth but makes no distinction between internal and trans-national migrants. The remainder of the IDP shows that migration in general, and international migration in particular, is not mainstreamed within city planning strategies. The same problem arises in the guiding policy and strategy plan, Joburg 2030. This particular plan suggests that the local economy, if properly managed and reoriented, can be made so vibrant that the serious drain of skills from South Africa will be halted (McDonald and Crush, 2001). Acknowledging a chronic deficit and mismatch of skills, the plan calls for a City Skills Project to educate and re-educate South Africans for the new economy. No mention is made of the possibility that immigration or skills import could meet these needs. The parochialism of this ‘global city’ is somewhat disconcerting. The only occasion on which migration is viewed as potentially benefiting the city is in the admission that Africa is now Johannesburg’s largest source of ‘tourists’.

However, it is certainly important for city managers to begin to understand the challenges which migration poses today. Several reports commissioned by city authorities have stressed the urgency of this matter. In 2001, a group of independent researchers conducted a project for the City on social capital and so-called ‘cohesion’. The project provided most information and analysis on the plight of internal migrants, although it did include an overview of “foreign migration” to the city; see Chipkin (2001). The project showed how little is known about the impact of migration on the city. More recently, a workshop was convened with the City to explore alternative responses to the presence of forced migrants in Johannesburg (Landau, 2004).

Refugee advocates argued that the City should take a number of steps: take advantage of the social and economic opportunities offered by this population; effectively manage negative public perceptions; promote a rights-based management culture and make the city safer, more equitable and more welcoming. In 2004, there were signs that the Corporate Planning Unit (CPU) in the City Manager’s office was taking migration more seriously, when it included internal and international migration as one theme in a broader project aimed at supporting the development, refinement and implementation of a new long-term Human Development Strategy (HDS) for Johannesburg. Other themes on which the CPU is collecting and processing information include HIV/AIDS, urban poverty, children, individuals with disabilities, social services, women and youth. Whereas the contribution highlights the importance of migration for the City, it is clear that the formulation of practical policy recommendations is hampered by the fact that there has been no systematic city-wide research dealing specifically with migration. Until this occurs, the ‘international migrant’ is likely to remain in the policy shadows.

One of the major obstacles to constructive thinking about international migration at the national and local level is the growth of xenophobic intolerance in South Africa after 1990. Numerous quantitative surveys and qualitative studies have dissected this phenomenon (Crush, 2000; Harris, 2000; Valji, 2003). The label ‘xenophobic’ applies without question to the attitudes and behaviours of South Africans towards international migration. This is not simply indifference or coldness to the stranger: it is active, aggressive and often vitriolic. In many societies, the most xenophobic citizens are those most threatened in material or cultural terms by the advent and proximity of the unwanted immigrant. Extensive research by SAMP on this subject has failed to identify a typical xenophobic profile in South Africa (Mattes et al., 2000). In other words, all South Africans, irrespective of race, gender, education and class hold remarkably similar anti-foreign attitudes. In addition, intolerance is directed primarily at black African migrants. There can therefore be little surprise that attitudes translate into action. Migrants are disproportionately victimised by criminals and the target of daily verbal and physical abuse from citizens. Unsurprisingly, too, xenophobic sen-

13 The project provided most information and analysis on the plight of internal migrants, although it did include an overview of “foreign migration” to the city; see Chipkin (2001).
14 See http://www.joburg.org.za/corporate_planning/corpplan_initiatives.stm. The migration report was written by the Southern African Migration Project; see
is probably not a single migrant in Johannesburg who feels comfortable being there, who does not fear the heavy hand of corrupt law-enforcers, or who does not worry that they will be the next victim of violent crime. This cannot be the reputation that Johannesburg wants in the rest of Africa and beyond – but it is. It is a dangerous place to try and make a living; it is not a desirable place that migrants are drawn to and where they feel welcomed. International migrants have become the new pariahs of the new South Africa.

The integration of migrants is a considerable challenge in such a xenophobic climate. Integration is a major issue for municipalities worldwide. Theories of integration tend to assume the existence of a stable, urbanised population with a clear identity and embedded cultural practices (Papademetriou, 2003; Ray, 2003). The challenge is how to incorporate newcomers into neighbourhoods and communities in a way that maximises acceptance and tolerance, fosters diversity, builds social capital and promotes multiculturalism. Some of Johannesburg’s older and more stable residential areas (whether Soweto or Sandton) might be amenable to this kind of approach. Indeed, South Africa’s black townships in general are ethnically quite diverse and have achieved degrees of informal integration, despite the best efforts of the apartheid State to keep people apart. However, there must be some question as to whether traditional concepts and policies of ‘integration’ and ‘inclusion’ have much applicability in a city of migrants such as Johannesburg (Tomlinson, 1999b). The core issue is that modern Johannesburg, like many other developing cities, is a city of migrants. As noted earlier, some 40 per cent of the city population is ‘migrant’. Neither internal nor international migrants are entering a city with a stable, urban population of long and continuous residence. Whereas, as noted earlier, parts of the city have relatively stable urban populations, these are not the areas where international migrants tend to cluster. Many (if not most) are migrants, not immigrants. They are in the city for particular reasons and see their sojourn as a temporary one. They are there on a temporary basis to earn, to remit money and to accumulate resources to improve livelihoods in the rural areas or the home country. They want to keep their outlays and expenditures in the city at a minimum.

The more general evidence on migrant behaviour suggests that most migrants from the Southern African region are involved in a form of ‘circulation migration’ or varying periodicity (McDonald, 2000). Refugees and migrants from the rest of Africa are less likely to be engaged in circular migration of the same regu-

timent permeates the attitudes of the media and the institutions of governance (Danso and McDonald, 2001). No-one has accused the Johannesburg authorities of being more xenophobic than other tiers of government: but there is clear evidence that within the city, migrants do have to cope with displays of xenophobic sentiment by officials and civil servants at all three levels: national, provincial and local. Migrants are sometimes denied the healthcare and educational services guaranteed by law and the 1996 Constitution (Pursell, 2004; Winterstein and Stone, 2004). More often, the quality of treatment is affected by the perception by healthcare professionals of the foreign status of the patient. The right of access of illegal immigrants to these services is a point of debate. National legislation and regulations prescribe heavy fines for schools and hospitals that fail to ascertain the nationality of all pupils or patients and to deny access to anyone without proper identification.

More generally, the problem of xenophobia runs completely counter to the self-image of Johannesburg as a ‘global city’ welcoming to foreign investment and visitors. The press regularly carries reports of the bad experiences of visitors to the city at the hands of officials and ordinary South Africans. Yet, there is very little recognition of the magnitude and impact of this problem, much less any reflection about how it might be countered or eliminated. The City might argue that public education of the citizenry on the benefits of migration and the necessity for tolerance is not its responsibility. Whatever the truth of that claim, a city that wishes to project a cosmopolitan image to the world would do well to look at its own backyard and develop strategies to mitigate xenophobia in the corridors of local government and on the streets.

4. Lessons learned and recommendations

The number of international migrants in the city of Johannesburg is consistently over-estimated by officials, the public and the media. However, this does not mean that they are of no importance and should continue to be harassed on the streets and neglected in policy documents. On the one hand, their very presence in the city is entirely consistent with a country that aspires to cosmopolitanism, global status, regional solidarity, and pan-Africanism. Yet, there
larity and frequency but they, too, do not see South Africa as their final destination. Most see the country, and the city, as a stopping-point on the way to somewhere else (particularly the favoured destinations of Europe and North America). One result is that migrants are neither disposed nor likely to want to ‘integrate’. Municipalities are ‘more or less comfortable responding to the well-recognised household-focused service requirements of paying ‘customers’ but a little bewildered when faced with the needs of as yet unincorporated, and probably temporary, new residents’ (Gotz, 2004).

An alternative view of the South African city perhaps provides a better starting-point for analysis of how local government might respond to ‘transience’ (Simone, 2001). International migration has substantially reshaped inner-city life and commerce in Johannesburg. At the same time, the city is ‘becoming an increasingly desperate place, living on the edge without a core of cohesiveness’ (Simone, 2001). The rapidity of the transition, deteriorating infrastructure and absence of social cohesion means that ‘conventional mechanisms for monitoring and assessing social change have proved largely inadequate’ (Simone, 2001). As a result:

More than anything else, Johannesburg is being treated as a necessary elaboration of migrant circuits – a place where it is still best to remain a stranger. The primary feeling among many migrants in Johannesburg’s inner city is that the social, political and economic situation in the city will grow worse with time, and that their objective is to take advantage of the short-term opportunities. While it is an African city, there is a pervasive feeling that its lack of cosmopolitanness and pervasive xenophobia make it difficult to establish multifaceted African communities (Simone, 2001).

Johannesburg is not a permanent home but ‘a place to pass through, to run from, not a place to collaboratively contest or co-invest in for the longer term’ (Gotz and Simone, 2003). At best, it is a temporary site of opportunity. Amongst the fluidity and transience, there is great tension and hostility between the foreigner and the local and ‘between some sections of the more marginalised sectors of the foreign community’ (Gotz and Simone, 2003). As such, there are too many hurdles for the residents to be interested in set formulas for stabilising the area. International migrants are active agents, remaking the city, enriching its cultural life and creating new forms of associational life. Yet, there is ‘precious little sense of community’ in inner-city Johannesburg, ‘a felt deficit of belonging’ and ‘few grounds for any established sense of social cohesiveness’. The migrant population of the city is relatively small in absolute numbers but is also extremely heterogeneous, both in terms of national origin and life skills. Consequently, migrants do not disperse evenly across the city. They are drawn by affordability, social networks and, in many cases, absence of choice, to certain city neighbourhoods. They are an extremely significant force in those parts of the city in which they cluster, especially in the inner-city where the foreign presence is highly visible. Equally, migrants in the more impoverished shack settlements and backyards of the city cluster together for reasons of affinity and self-protection.

Poorer migrants, primarily from neighbouring countries, cannot afford to live in the inner-city suburbs favoured by refugees and other Africans. They gravitate either to downtown Johannesburg and live in extremely poor conditions in derelict and under-serviced buildings, or to the informal settlements that ring the city. There they compete for scarce resources, jobs and services with South Africa’s own growing poor migrant population. Although the problem of ‘squatter upgrading’ is not unique to Johannesburg, its South African variant presents a particular challenge to city managers. These communities are internally divided, and conflict management between South Africans and international migrants has become a major issue.

To date, judging by the reams of policy and planning documents issued by the Johannesburg authorities since 1994, there is little evidence that the challenge of international migration has been recognised and systematically thought through. To some extent, this is because the city’s other problems must seem completely overwhelming to the average city manager. But there is a more fundamental problem. Johannesburg is, or aspires to be, a global city. One of the major consequences of globalisation, porous borders and a location on a fractured continent is greatly increased mobility. Johannesburg is not insulated from the world. International migrants are a fact of modern, global city life. They can be wished away but they will not go away. There is a pervasive insularity, a failure to see the city in its global and African context, amongst the citizenry and within the corridors of power. International migration certainly brings problems and challenges, but it also offers rich economic, social and cultural opportunities. A fundamental rethinking of the potential and opportunity of internationally mobile people is required.
Several important arguments have been advanced as to why migrants should be taken more seriously and effectively mainstreamed into all areas of city government (Gotz, 2004):

- Internal and foreign migration to Johannesburg is likely to continue and even accelerate in the future. To ignore the challenges and opportunities presented by international migration would be inconsistent with the responsibilities of effective, development-oriented city management.
- The City has certain development obligations to all communities, migrants included, deriving from national and provincial policy and legislation, as well as the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.
- The City needs to work with communities to ‘facilitate the development of denser networks of social capital’ (Gotz, 2004).
- The City should address the ‘blight’ and inner-city decay that has accompanied the rapid transformation of migrant spaces.
- The City has a legal and constitutional responsibility to counter the rampant xenophobia that infests its own ranks as well as a highly-fractious civil society.
- The City needs to recognise and develop strategies to maximise the benefits of the presence of trans-migrants, whether these be in terms of investment, skills deployment, entrepreneurship, and job creation.

In sum, migrants must be seen primarily as an opportunity, not an obstruction. International migrants can be, and are, affected by policies that are not specifically targeted at them. This happens in both positive and negative ways. For example, the role of international migrants in street trading and the informal sector has been alluded to above. This has sometimes led to escalating tensions and even violence between local and foreign street vendors. The City’s general policy on informal street trading has shifted over time in response to broader concerns about public health and hygiene as well as to complaints from formal business and retailers. The primary policy goal has been to get vendors off the streets and into designated and regulated markets. Clearly, this has advantages and disadvantages for those foreign traders who are able to access trading space in regulated markets. Many, of course, will not.

In another instance, municipal authorities have recently announced revitalisation plans for the inner-city, hoping to reverse urban decay and the criminalisation of these areas. Most of these initiatives are targeted at property owners and seek to provide tax and other incentives for property upgrading. Although, successful urban gentrification may make the inner-city a safer and more aesthetically-pleasing environment, it will also deprive migrants of cheap, affordable accommodation which is extremely hard to come by. The only alternative could be to migrate to the backyards and informal shacks, an unenviable option for the educated and relatively skilled migrants who congregate in the inner-city. The primary lesson from both of these examples – street trading and inner-city housing – is that it is important for Johannesburg municipal authorities to factor international migrants into their assessments of the effect of generic urban development or re-development policies.

To achieve the kind of reorientation outlined in this chapter, three pre-requisites are in order:

1) There needs to be a stronger recognition in city governance structures that Johannesburg is a quintessentially migrant city, and that existing strategies, plans and visions assume a city largely disconnected from the countryside, the region, the continent and the world. Migration needs to be mainstreamed in all planning and strategy-making.

2) There is a surprising lack of solid, reliable and current information on the foreign population in the city. Systematic and comprehensive primary research on migration is a pre-requisite for sound policy development. This research still needs to be undertaken in Johannesburg.

3) There needs to be greater dialogue between city managers, migrant experts and migrants themselves. Johannesburg is a globalising city in need of a constructive conversation about the challenges of managing immigration to the benefit of all.
REFERENCES


1. The existing situation

Karachi is the largest city in Pakistan, with a current estimated population of more than 12 million. It accounts for seven per cent of the population of Pakistan, and for over 20 per cent of all people living in urban areas of the country. The city represents the main concentration of industrial and commercial activity in the national economy. The country’s two main seaports are both located in Karachi, as are the bulk of major industrial enterprises. The city is a predominant financial and commercial centre with head offices of banks, insurance companies, large corporations, as well as the key financial and commodity markets. The demographic and economic eminence of Karachi dates back to the 1950s. Before then, and although Karachi was prosperous, thriving and growing, it was not the most populated or largest economic centre of the region that was to become Pakistan. Independence from British rule and the partition of India in 1947 led to unprecedented growth in the size and importance of the city. Being the most modern and cosmopolitan city of the newly-founded State of Pakistan, the city was a natural choice for national capital. It also became the destination for hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees and migrants who left India for Pakistan, leading to an almost threefold increase in the population between 1941 and 1951. Karachi essentially became a city of international refugees and migrants. Currently, the city is both the seat of the Sindh provincial government as well as a City District comprising 18 Town Municipal Authorities, which are elected bodies.
While extremely valuable in setting the context, census data on migration are not sufficient to describe the qualitative, let alone the true quantitative, significance of international migration in Karachi. In fact, census data of a different type – namely on ethnicity – provides quite a different insight into the magnitude of international migration in Karachi’s growth and development. According to the Population Census, nearly half of the residents in Karachi reported Urdu as their mother tongue. The two next most spoken languages were Punjabi and Pushto (Table 3). These three languages taken together accounted for nearly 75 per cent of the city’s population, a noticeable fact given that all three languages are not native to the region. The speakers of the two main native languages of the region – Sindhi and Balochi – were just over 10 per cent of the population.

**TABLE 3 - ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF KARACHI, SINDH AND PAKISTAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Karachi</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushto</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saraiki</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(%)  
Source: 1998 Population Census

The current ethnic make-up of the city is an outcome of at least two successive waves of migration. The first wave started in 1947 at the time of Pakistan’s independence, when Karachi became host to a large population of Muslim refugees and migrants from the newly demarcated international border with India. The descendants of these migrants largely identify themselves as Urdu-speaking. This first wave of immigrants was associated with the departure of non-Muslim residents from the city – Sindhi-speaking as well as others – to India, as a result of violence and insecurity. This initial wave of migration was followed by a second wave in the 1970s, driven by political and religious conflict in the region.
Muslim refugees from northern, central and western India set the scene for further Muslim migration from those regions over the decades, as people sought to join their families settled in Pakistan.

The second major wave was internal migration from northern regions – mainly from Punjabi- and Pushto-speaking communities. This migration started in the late 1950s and accelerated through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, before flattening out in the 1990s. Therefore, some 80 per cent of the population of Karachi consist of people who either migrated themselves, or are direct second- or third-generation descendants of migrants who arrived in the city after 1947. Migrants from what was previously British India and their descendants amount to around half of the city's population. If migration is viewed in terms of culture and ethnicity, then Karachi is essentially a city of migrants in general and, in certain ways, of international migrants in particular.

**Recent flows of international migrants**

Whereas historical flows of international and internal migration became important over time due to the ethnic politics associated with them, they do not represent current or recent migrant flows. Recent international migrants – or people who arrived in Karachi from abroad during the five years that preceded the census – were only 12 per cent of all international migrants, and contributed only 0.8 per cent of the city's population.

However, the census is likely to underestimate the flow of international migrants for two reasons. First, if an international migrant had arrived and resided in some place other than Karachi at the time of migration, and subsequently moved to the city, that individual would be categorised as an internal migrant. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is thought that the census underestimates recent international migrants who might be suspected of being illegal entrants. Although the Population Census is supposed to compute all residents — regardless of legal status — in actual practice there has been confusion on the part of census staff about whether or not to compute those individuals suspected of being irregular foreigners.

Two main flows of international irregular migration, in particular, are considered to be important in numerical terms:

- People from neighbouring countries in South and Southeast Asia, including India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar;
- Refugees and migrants from Afghanistan.

In 2000, the federal Interior Ministry set up the National Aliens’ Registration Authority (NARA) to collect data on international migrants. Today NARA estimates that there might be as many as 1.1 million irregular migrants from Bangladesh, and another 400,000 to 500,000 refugees or migrants from Afghanistan currently residing in Karachi. If NARA figures are to be believed, around 10 per cent of the population of Karachi consists of irregular migrants. Given that reliable quantitative data on recent flows of international migrants are not available, it is useful to summarise the received wisdom regarding the main flows of international migration into Karachi by origin. Different sources of migration have been associated with various periods, as well as the legal barriers that migrants have faced. The older, more established international migrants into Karachi originated from India, whereas the more recent waves of international migration have been from other Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Myanmar and Afghanistan.

**India**: As mentioned above, the partition of British India was associated with a massive flow of Muslim refugees and migrants from various regions of India. Migrants to Karachi mainly came from the Urdu-speaking regions of north and central India, as well as Gujarati-speaking regions towards the west of India. The more significant flows occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Further migrant flows of families and individuals continued into the 1960s and beyond, but these might be regarded as a consequence of the earlier wave. The Muslim migrants from India came from diverse backgrounds — in terms of their regions, social standing, education, and economic conditions. Taken as a group, however, these migrants came to dominate the political and economic life of the

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4 The NARA data are assumed to derive from a survey conducted by the Interior Ministry. The full results of this survey, or indeed its methodology have not been made public. It is not clear whether this survey was based on statistical sampling, and it is more likely to be based on informed guesswork and extrapolation. There are strong grounds for suspecting that the results of this survey, particularly those pertaining to migrants from Bangladesh, might be problematic. Moreover, there are no other known surveys of international migrants — regular or irregular — that can help to verify, corroborate or indeed, query, the figures presented by NARA.
city, and regarded themselves essentially as the core population of Karachi. 

**Bangladesh:** Bangladesh and Pakistan were two provinces of one federal entity (comprised of East and West Pakistan), and there was free flow of migrants between them. In 1971 after the independence of Bangladesh, both Bangladesh and Pakistan were confronted with the problem of ‘stranded’ populations. Several hundred thousand Muslim non-Bengalis residing in former East Pakistan chose to remain Pakistani citizens, and a large proportion of them migrated to Karachi. The main flow of ‘stranded’ Pakistanis (also known as Biharis) is thought to have occurred in the early 1970s. It is claimed that in the 1980s, a large number of ethnic Bengalis also began to migrate towards Pakistan in search of livelihoods, and most of them arrived in Karachi through irregular channels. Whereas the ‘stranded’ Pakistanis or Biharis were quickly assimilated as citizens of Pakistan, the ethnic Bengali migrants and residents are officially regarded as irregular international migrants. Although both groups are thought to be economically marginalised, the Bengalis are also politically excluded, and are considered as one of the poorest communities in Karachi.

**Myanmar:** It is estimated that tens of thousands of Muslim refugees and migrants from Myanmar (formerly Burma) began arriving in Karachi in the 1970s. These flows continued – or indeed accelerated – through the 1980s, when apparent political and religious persecution in Myanmar forced many Muslims to seek refuge abroad. Currently, Muslim Burmese communities reside in several localities. Their conditions are similar to those of ethnic Bengalis, in that they are officially regarded as irregular migrants, and remain economically and politically marginalised.

**Afghanistan:** Although migration between Pakistan and Afghanistan has a long historical tradition, the 1980s saw the arrival of large flows of refugees and migrants from Afghanistan as a consequence of civil war and foreign (Soviet) military occupation. The main destination points for Afghan refugees and migrants in this period were refugee camps established by the government and UN agencies in the border provinces of Balochistan and Northwest Frontier (NWFP). However, there was also a steady flow of Afghans into the cities of Pakistan, and particularly into Karachi. Every episode of political strife and military conflict in Afghanistan led to fresh waves of migration. Afghan migrants reside not only in irregular settlements but also in established middle-class neighbourhoods. Many of the migrants from Afghanistan belong to ethnic groups that have a native presence in Pakistan – predominantly Pashtuns, as well as Baloch, Brahvi, and Hazara. Afghan migration into Karachi also features other groups, including Persian-speaking communities such as Tajiks.

It is possible to classify the main migrant flows with the help of a matrix (Table 4). This matrix differentiates between regular versus irregular migrants on the one hand, and assimilated versus conspicuous migrants on the other. Whereas ‘regularity’ is a description of a person’s legal status, being assimilated or ‘conspicuous’ has to do with social acceptance or vulnerability. In Pakistan generally and Karachi in particular, being a conspicuous migrant implies weak legal protection, even if the individual in question has documents proving that her/his presence in the country or the city is entirely regular and legal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Irregular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assimilated, less vulnerable</td>
<td>Indian Muslims post-1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conspicuous, highly vulnerable</td>
<td>Bangladesh Bengalis pre-1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4 - Qualitative Classification of International Migrants in Karachi**

The ‘conspicuous’ communities of international migrants in Karachi today – people from Bangladesh, Myanmar and Afghanistan – are a subset of historical and even current flows of international migration. Among international migrants from South and Southeast Asia, for example, Muslim migrants from India and ‘Bihari’ migrants from Bangladesh have been more readily assimilated, integrated, and naturalised than people of Bengali and Burmese ethnic origins. Similarly, Pashtun migrants and refugees from Afghanistan, particularly those from areas bordering Pakistan, are far less conspicuous compared to migrants belonging to other more distant ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Therefore, ethnicity seems to play an important role in the treatment of international mi-
grants from various countries of origin.

On the whole, it can be said that the conspicuous international migrants face insecurity and vulnerability in Pakistan due to their uncertain legal status in the country. They tend to reside in clusters, but in this regard their condition is not very different from those of other communities of ‘natives’, internal migrants or naturalised international migrants in Karachi. Conspicuous international migrants are politically marginalised, socially excluded, and economically underprivileged. Moreover, there are differences even among conspicuous international migrants, with the ethnic Bengalis and Burmese being the most vulnerable.

2. The issues

The perceived issues and challenges with respect to international migration into Karachi can be envisaged under three angles: (a) Urban infrastructure, (b) Ethnic politics, and (c) Vulnerability and discrimination.

Urban infrastructure

Historically, migration and population growth have been associated with the decline in the quality and per capita availability of urban infrastructure. In 1947, Karachi was a small but well-endowed city in terms of housing, public transport, civic amenities, water and sanitation, and other public services. The first massive wave of post-independence migration more than doubled the population of the city within just a few years. Successive waves of both internal and international migration and population growth have left the city perpetually behind for infrastructure provision. Therefore, pro-active expansion in the quantity and quality of infrastructure remains the main issue that confronts urban planners and managers today, as it has done for decades.

It is estimated that around half of the population of Karachi resides in irregular settlements known as katchi abadis (literally ‘makeshift settlements’). These are interspersed with planned, developed and regularised settlements across the urban landscape. Whereas a small number of the katchi abadis are old ‘native’ villages that were not regularised in official records, the vast majority of the irregular settlements consist of new localities that accommodate international as well as internal migrants from various origins.

As the city kept lagging behind in the provision of urban infrastructure and services, the gap has been filled effectively through informal channels and the private sector. Whereas in a superficial sense, migration (and population growth) has been responsible for the lowering of the per capita quality and quantity of urban infrastructure, there is no straightforward arithmetic relationship between migration and the strain on public resources. Migrants are both consumers as well as suppliers of urban infrastructure through informal channels and through the private sector. Considering that a vast majority of the city’s population consists of migrants, or second- or third-generation descendants of migrants, there has been little scope to argue that the arrival of ‘outsiders’ has degraded conditions for ‘insiders’.

The problem, rather, is that after 1947, institutions of urban governance failed to keep pace with the growth of the city (which was largely due to migration). The neglect of urban infrastructure meant that the city expanded with the aid of informal provision of public goods and services, which government officials sometimes merely tolerated, at other times encouraged. Today, the overwhelming policy challenge for urban government is to regularise, formalise and modernise what already exists, as well as to plan for improvements in the quantity and quality of urban infrastructure. Migration policies can be held responsible for Karachi’s urban infrastructure problems insofar as they have contributed to deterioration in the institutions of urban governance.

Ethnic politics and violence

The relationship between ethnicity and migration is a complex one in Karachi. The census definition of a migrant as someone who was previously resident in a different location is not loaded with political or social meaning. It is simply a description of an individual’s change of location. Migration, however, is a group-based and social phenomenon. At the very least, people tend to migrate

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5 This sub-section draws upon an interview with Tasneem Siddiqui, Director, Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority, Government of Sindh, which the author conducted in August 2004.
within the socialised context of the family. Nonetheless, more elaborate social relations are also crucial to an understanding of migration. Even when people move physically as individuals, group-based identity plays a key role in qualitative aspects of their migration.

In Karachi, group identities of migrants and non-migrants of various types have always made themselves felt in the politics of the city. These identities came to dominate the scene in the late 1980s and have remained powerful factors affecting not only issues of urban governance, but everyday life and conditions of civic peace as well. Ethnic politics are based on the definition of various groups by themselves and by others in terms of their historical migrant status. Ethnic differences between the ‘native’ non-migrants (Sindhis and Baloch), the first-wave international migrants (Urdu-speakers from India), the second-wave internal migrants (Punjabi- and Pashto-speakers from northern Pakistan), emerged in this period as strong factors in political alignments. Over time, various waves of migration have become associated with ethnic politics and tensions in Karachi. At their most extreme, these politics took a violent turn in the late 1980s, when organisations claiming to represent various ethnic groups engaged in armed conflict and attacks against one another, against ordinary civilians, and with government agencies. The city saw a rise in violent crime in the wake of political violence, resulting in a much higher sense of insecurity among the population. This situation escalated through various political crises — many of which involved ethnic-based political organisations — until the mid-1990s.

From 1992 onwards, and most intensively between 1993 and 1996, government agencies carried out a military and intelligence campaign in Karachi against MQM, an ethnic-based organisation that had emerged in the late 1980s as the largest political party in the city. This period caused a violent turn in which hundreds of casualties among armed militants, political activists, ordinary civilians, as well as government agency personnel. Large numbers were injured and thousands were detained over the course of the campaign. Government repression included extra-judicial killings on top of illegal arrest and torture of suspects, and forced hundreds of people to go into hiding in Karachi and outside. Economic and social life was badly disrupted, with armed gangs enforcing frequent strikes and shutdowns. Violent acts against members of particular ethnic groups — by the MQM, government agencies as well as other organisations — led to some reverse migration from the city, as well as the ethnic homogenisation of many localities. By then, the city had acquired a reputation for lawlessness, ethnic violence, and criminality — both on the part of political organisations and government agencies.

Ultimately, government repression between 1993 and 1996 did result in the end of political and ethnic violence in Karachi. In the process, the authorities curbed some of the extreme features of ethnic-based politics. In terms of ideology, the MQM turned its focus away from ‘Mohajir’ nationalism — or the claim that Urdu-speaking migrants from India constituted a distinct nationality — to a more inclusive brand of middle-class populism, as reflected in the substitution of ‘Muttahida’ (united) to Mohajir in its full formal name. The MQM rose in the 1980s at a time when Karachi had just witnessed massive migration from northern Pakistan (i.e., of ethnic Punjabis and Pashtuns), and from abroad (mostly Afghans and Bengalis). Although they were migrants or descendants of migrants, many among the Urdu-speaking community in Karachi identified themselves as the city’s ‘original’ residents who felt threatened by the arrival of other ethnic groups. There was some irony to this identification, given that the Urdu-speaking ‘Mohajirs’ were themselves regarded as ‘outsiders’ by the ‘native’ Sindhi and Baloch of Karachi and Sindh province. Many among the ‘native’ Sindhis had, in fact, long resented what they saw as the city’s domination by Urdu-speaking migrants, and felt that they had been turned into a small minority as a result of post-independence migration.

Ethnic politics in Karachi emerged in the context of federalism and nationalism in Pakistan. Under its Constitution, Pakistan is a federal State comprised of four provinces. Three distinct echelons of governance — national, provincial, and municipal — are relevant from the point of view of migration, ethnicity and politics. National policies on migration have had an effect on the ethnic demography not only of the country at large and Karachi in particular, but also on the ethnic demography of Sindh province.

Some observers have interpreted Karachi’s descent into violence in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of a mismatch between the political outcomes at the federal, provincial and municipal levels, and the inability of existing political institutions to resolve this mismatch through negotiated settlement. Sharper politi-

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6 MQM stands for Mohajir Quami Movement, literally, “the national movement of migrants”. The organisation changed its name to Muttahida Quami Movement or “united national movement” in 1999. Its history is summarised further below.
cal analysis might conclude that an embattled and centralised military government in the 1980s deliberately encouraged the rise of ethnic politics in Karachi in order to divide and subdue a democratic movement in Sindh province. Whereas some of the extreme displays of ethnic politics of the 1980s and 1990s have subsided, that period has left a lasting footprint on the current and future policies and political context. MQM remains the largest party in Karachi, although in a perpetual minority in Sindh province as a whole and a minor protagonist on a national scale. The party currently participates in coalition governments at the provincial and federal levels, and is expected to take control of Karachi city government in due course. These apparently benign conditions may not endure. Although the MQM has shed its original ethnic-based ideology, it is not clear how far it has made a transition from hegemonism to mainstream representative politics. More importantly, it is not clear how far the government security apparatus (which in the meanwhile has acquired political and economic stakes in Karachi under the pretext of controlling violence) will allow a transition to genuine and autonomous representative local government in the city. The experience of the 1980s and 1990s for the first time raised the profile of national migration policy as a significant problem at the provincial and city levels. With one significant exception, recent international migrants have not been active participants in ethnic politics. The exception relates to refugees and migrants from Afghanistan, who had settled in katchi abadis on the outskirts of Karachi. Violent clashes with Pashtuns in general, and Afghan Pashtuns in particular, had a clear role in the early formation of MQM as an armed organisation. Coming on top of the generally heightened sense of ethnic demography in Karachi and Sindh province, these events led the national government to adopt restrictive policies towards international migrants.

### Vulnerability and discrimination

Turning now from urban governance to the rights and welfare of international migrants, four sets of issues appear to be particularly significant.

- Whereas international migrants of various origins arrived in Karachi in large numbers over the past six decades, some groups – such as people from Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Afghanistan – have been identified as being particularly conspicuous. These migrants – of which many among the Bengali and Burmese ethnic communities claim not to be ‘foreign migrants’ at all – face insecurity due to their uncertain legal status and lack of the protection otherwise enjoyed by assimilated groups.

- On top of their uncertain legal status, migrants deemed to be ‘irregular’ are vulnerable to extortion from corrupt civil servants. Far from gaining protection from government institutions, irregular migrants are the victims of unscrupulous officials demanding bribes. Vulnerability to government institutions also exposes such migrants to abusive practices such as trafficking and bonded labour. The government’s policy of arbitrarily labelling all ethnic Bengali and Burmese people as suspected illegal aliens has contributed to the sense of insecurity and vulnerability.

- Conspicuous irregular international migrants tend to suffer underprivileged economic and social conditions. They are clustered in low-income irregular settlements and work in low-paid jobs. Labour markets are highly segmented and these groups earn a living in some of the most unpleasant and low-paid segments. Bengali and Burmese ethnic groups tend to be found in the poorest localities such as Machhar Colony (including Nur-us-Sabih Mohalla, for which a case study is provided further below), and slum dwellings on the coastal fringe of Korangi. Afghan migrants live in several clusters such as Sohrab Goth (including Jangabad, for which a case study is provided below), Metroville, and Landhi.

As far as Bengali migrants are concerned, there are high concentrations of males in the fishing industry and of females in unpleasant, injury-prone shrimp packaging. Burmese women are typically employed in very low-paid domestic work, whereas rag-picking in Karachi is almost exclusively carried out by Afghan male adolescents. This form of occupational clustering is partly driven by the uncertain legal status of the migrant, and partly by social prejudices regarding particular ethnic groups.

Far from being a special feature of international migration into Karachi, the clustering of international migrants in particular localities and in specific economic activities is a general characteristic of migration into the city. The labour market in Pakistan tends to be segmented along the lines of kinship...
and central India. The Muslim leadership of the areas that were eventually to form present-day Pakistan was a late-comer to the cause of separation from India, and was regarded as a junior partner for the length of the independence movement. In the immediate aftermath of independence, high political office was dominated by migrant politicians from India, who subsequently gave way to local leadership. Muslim migrants from India dominated the military and civil bureaucracy and retained a disproportionate degree of representation in government positions. In the formative years of the Pakistani State, the dominant elite were positively disposed towards Muslim migration from India to Pakistan and pursued relatively liberal policies towards international migration. Pakistan's military and civil bureaucracy emerged as powerful interest groups in their own right, and to this day unrepresentative government has remained a structural feature of the Pakistani State. Constitutional arrangements for federalism were mostly ignored during periods when unelected military governments were in place. During one such period in the 1980s, the military government took critical policy decisions regarding international migration. This included a liberal policy towards refugees and migrants from Afghanistan as well as Muslim migrants from South and Southeast Asia. In the absence of democratic representation, the military government was able to push through policies that turned out to be deeply unpopular among large sections of the population. The restoration of elected government in the late 1980s led to some reassessment of migration policy, both towards refugees and migrants from Afghanistan, and also with respect to migrants from South and Southeast Asia. The authorities made efforts to exercise greater control over immigration. Elected governments were partly articulating the concerns of ‘native’ communities whose political voices had been silenced under military rule, and who felt that migration had left them at a disadvantage. The rise in ethnic politics was also partly responsible for a less liberal approach to international migration. The change of policy was not unambiguous, and in any case, it was too late in the day to reverse migrant flows that had already persisted for decades. On the surface, the current policy towards international migration and the existing migrant population appears to be balanced and rights-oriented. The national government acknowledges that a large number of people have entered Pakistan as refugees and economic migrants. The authorities further accept that these migrants are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse due to their un-

3. National policy

Pakistan's national policies towards international migration have resulted from the evolving ideological, geo-strategic and socio-political objectives of the government. The composition and political orientation of the elite has been another critical factor. One must remember that, under its Constitution, Pakistan is a federal State where provincial government is supposed to enjoy considerable power. In practice, however, decision-making has in the main resided with federal authorities. In any case, migration is part of the federal policy remit under the Constitution.

The political movement in favour of Pakistan’s independence was led by Muslim politicians from the more developed Muslim-minority regions of northern and other social groupings. Such segmentation facilitates the entry of certain groups into particular occupations, and excludes them from other activities. Spatial clustering is also a general feature of the city. Various ethnic groups—including both international and internal migrants—tend to live in clusters. The reasons for this clustering are explored below with reference to the evolution of various low-income settlements.

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In the event, the partition of India was attended by large-scale violence and forced migrations of Muslims and Hindus from India and Pakistan respectively. Even after these migrations, however, around one-third of the Muslim population of the Indian sub-continent remained in India. The free movement of people between India and Pakistan ended in 1951, following an agreement between the governments of the two countries, and residents were obliged to choose the citizenship of one country or the other. Nevertheless, influential voices within Pakistan continued to argue that the country was a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. Muslim migration from India remained a legitimate (even desirable) activity as far as the Pakistani ruling elites were concerned. The principle of the Muslim community was to be selectively extended to regions beyond the Indian sub-continent in subsequent decades.

Geo-strategic considerations

Irrespective of a common Islamic faith, Pakistan's bilateral relations with neighbouring Afghanistan have been mired in controversy over border demarcation and the treatment and status of the Pashtun population in Pakistan. A leftist coup d'Etat in Afghanistan in 1978 led to civil war, and ultimately to the intervention of Soviet armed forces in that country. The violence in Afghanistan gave rise to a steady flow of refugees to Pakistan. Pakistan's foreign policy favoured an alliance with the USA against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and Pakistani authorities welcomed refugees as part of the war effort. UNHCR coordinated relief operations and organised refugee camps where foreign aid was supplied. The government of Pakistan facilitated the flow of refugees, and also gave special concessions to Afghan refugees in various economic sectors. All of this was done ostensibly for humanitarian purposes, but geo-strategic considerations were also conspicuous.

At one point, Pakistan was home to over three million refugees from Afghanistan — the largest concentration of refugees anywhere in the world. However, the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1988 did not lead to a return of the refugees. In fact, warfare has continued in Afghanistan to this day, and new refugees arrived in Pakistan with every fresh twist in the conflict. Geo-

State ideology

The 'two-nation theory' which is often described as the foundational ideology of the Pakistani state asserts that the Muslim and Hindu inhabitants of undivided British-ruled India constituted two entirely distinct national entities and accordingly were entitled to independent territorial homelands. The 'two-nation theory' not only emphasised the difference between the Muslims and Hindus, it also buttressed the notion of a Muslim national community across India. The fact that the territory of what became Pakistan excluded a significant minority of Indian Muslims immediately created the possibility of Muslim migra-

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Certain legal status. The government has launched a policy of regularisation which also allows for eventual granting of full citizenship rights to qualifying migrants. Irregular migrants must register with the government, with a guarantee of an amnesty and the grant of a renewable three-year work permit. In this way registered migrants, it is presumed, will gain protection from State harassment. Qualifying registered migrants will be entitled to apply for naturalisation after a number of years.

The main State authority in charge of implementing policy on international migration and migrants is the federal Interior Ministry. This government department is responsible for regulating the flow of people arriving in the country, and deciding their legal status. As mentioned earlier, in 2000 the ministry established NARA in order to register illegal migrants living in Karachi.

In addition to the Interior Ministry, a key international stakeholder in Pakistan has been the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The policy for Afghan refugees and migrants changed sharply with the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent overthrow of the Taliban government. Pakistan moved from a policy of safe haven for refugees to one of repatriation, under a tripartite agreement with the government of Afghanistan and UNHCR. The agreement led to the establishment of the Afghan Refugees Repatriation Cell (ARRC) — as a UNHCR project — for the registration and voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan.

It is interesting to note that although NARA's mandate covers the whole country its operations are mostly limited to Karachi.

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strategic considerations – now in support of the US-led regime change in Afghanistan – have led to a reversal of the former accommodating policy towards Afghan refugees. While some Afghans residents in Pakistan are regarded as a potential security threat and are to be policed more strictly, others are being encouraged to return home.

Regularisation and policing

Pakistan’s current policy appears to balance the political objective of greater control over international migration and migrants on the one hand, with the rights and welfare of migrants on the other. Irregular migrants from some countries are given the option of regularising their legal status, while the voluntary return home of those from Afghanistan is facilitated. However, these twin policies suffer from major flaws in both design and implementation. Fundamentally, these policies are based upon a misreading of the situation of migrants from South and Southeast Asia, as well as those from Afghanistan.

The quantitative achievements of NARA (responsible for migrants from South and Southeast Asia) and ARRC (the cell responsible for facilitating Afghan repatriation) are telling enough. Of the estimated target of over 1.1 million irregular migrants from Bangladesh, Myanmar and other Asian countries, NARA can claim to have registered under 75,000 – or fewer than seven per cent of the total – in three years. Similarly, from an estimated population of 400,000 to 500,000 Afghans residing in Karachi, ARRC has been able to register just over 30,000, and repatriate around 26,000. The scale of mismatch between target and achievement requires closer examination.

Whereas the policy objective of NARA is to record and regulate existing irregular migrants, the agency’s operational definition of its task focuses almost exclusively on people belonging to specific ethnic groups – particularly Bengalis and Burmese. NARA officially declares all ethnic Bengalis as irregular migrants – regardless of their length of stay, or the fact that they might have arrived in West Pakistan as Pakistani citizens prior to the secession of East Pakistan, or even that the Bengali residents of Karachi are registered voters and many of them have been living in the city for decades. NARA’s almost exclusive focus on ethnic Bengalis means that other possible illegal entrants – say, from India, or Biharis from Bangladesh – are presumed to be de facto citizens. Not only is this operational definition racist in its approach, it also symbolises the complete ineffectiveness of past and current policy-making.

In random interviews conducted for this chapter in Bengali communities, very

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Whether or to what extent these socio-political objectives had a major influence is now a matter of historical investigation or speculation. What does hold true is that formal policy on migration into the country was undermined by government officials themselves – either as a matter of policy, or due to widespread corruption. It is also true that in the aftermath of military rule, regulating migrant flows had become a much bigger concern in Pakistan.

Socio-political objectives

The 1980s were associated with a liberal policy towards international migrants from Muslim communities in South and Southeast Asia. Legal migration from these areas became easier, on top of lax policing of borders and turning a blind eye to migrant flows. In particular, there was a conspicuous increase in the number of people from Bangladesh and Myanmar in Karachi, and in the Sindh province.

This happened against a difficult political background: Pakistan’s military government of the time faced fierce opposition to its rule in Sindh, and it was a common perception that the government was particularly unpopular among ethnic Sindhis.

The opponents of the military government ascribed two related socio-political motives for a liberal migration policy. First, it was believed that an unpopular government sought rare loyal political supporters among newly arrived migrants who were beholden to the military government for their very presence in the country. Second, some critics argued that there was a policy of deliberate change in the ethnic demography of Karachi and Sindh province in order to divide and subdue opposition to military rule. The idea of cynically changing the ethnic make-up of a region was not altogether a fanciful one in the Pakistani context. Karachi’s own experience of the 1940s and 1950s validated such a possibility.

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9 These observations are based on interviews with NARA officials (August 2004), and on NARA’s public information literature.
few individual admitted to having arrived in Pakistan after 1971. Well-placed informants assert that perhaps as little as 15 per cent of the Bangladeshis of Karachi are ‘border crossers’ or post-1971 irregular migrants. Ethnic Bangladeshis argue that far from enhancing their rights, regularisation as migrants through NARA would erode their claims to citizenship. This is why so few have volunteered to register with NARA. Another factor behind Bengali reluctance to give up their claims to full citizenship is the current confused governance arrangements. As mentioned earlier, in Karachi members of this community remain registered voters and even have a number of elected representatives, including over 70 councillors and at least one nazim (head of local government) of a Union Council.

Putting to the test the mutually conflicting claims of NARA and the Bengali community is a challenge. The fact that Pakistani authorities, including the Interior Ministry (of which NARA is an agency) are unable to wield effective control over civil servants is a major problem. Many irregular migrants have been able to obtain the documents required to prove Pakistani nationality — such as a national identity card — through bribes to civil servants. The documents thus obtained are not fakes, in the sense that they have been issued officially. In an implicit acknowledgement of the corruption among their own staff, State agencies arbitrarily operate on the principle that this type of document is not adequate evidence of Pakistani nationality. Instead they fall back on the racist strategy of presuming that all members of a particular ethnic group are irregular migrants.

NARA has had other consequences for ethnic Bengali and Burmese migrants in Karachi. Police squads specially created to enforce NARA regulations have gained powers of detention of suspected irregular migrants. Bengali and Burmese residents complain that these police units randomly arrest people and charge them with being irregular migrants. Such a course of action is of a racist nature, too, since it relies on identifying Bengali and Burmese individuals on the basis of appearance, language and accent. Pakistani courts have tended to acquit those people who have documentary proof of citizenship. Many complain that police officers use their special powers of arrest not in the pursuit of national policy but in a bid to extract bribes from ethnic Bengali and Burmese people. For all its stated intentions, NARA has not gone anywhere near a resolution of the problem of irregular migrants, nor provided protection to these migrants either. On the contrary, ethnic Bangladeshi and Burmese complain that they have been virtually marginalised into particular economic activities, because they feel vulnerable when commuting away from their own localities.

The case of Afghans refugees and the ‘cell’ (ARRC) established specially for them is similarly complicated. When NARA was first established in August 2001 it was assumed that all irregular migrants were to be registered regardless of country of origin. Interestingly, whereas people of Bangladeshi and Burmese origin largely stayed away from NARA, Afghans in Karachi proved more than keen than to register. Some 8,000 actually did so in the first two months. However, within a few weeks the political situation in Afghanistan had changed dramatically, as did Pakistani policies towards Afghan residents as they decided to encourage the registration and voluntary repatriation of these refugees and migrants.

The ARRC repatriation policy raises several difficulties. Far from being homogeneous, the large Afghan community in Karachi reflects the ethnic, tribal, regional, sectarian, political and economic diversity of the country itself. The ARRC has found a favourable response among those Afghans who are very poor and, within this segment, among those belonging to specific areas, ethnic groups, and sectarian affiliations. Even moderately well-off Pashtuns, for example, have been reluctant to return to Afghanistan. On the other hand, the poorest among the Pashtuns complain, that they are discriminated against in the process of repatriation. Persian-speaking Ismailis are also well-settled, and receive a great deal of support from their wealthy co-religionists in the city.

Pakistan’s repatriation policy overlooks two important realities. First, as is the case with Bangladeshi and Burmese migrants, Afghans have not found it difficult to acquire Pakistani citizenship documents. Moreover, and unlike the Bangladeshis and the Burmese, they have less to suffer from harassment and social discrimination. The ARRC’s incentives for them to return to Afghanistan are relatively meagre – frugal supplies of household items and a cash payment of 40 US dollars per individual. Second, border movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains open, and Afghans are able to cross back and forth – to

10 On the issue of “fraudulently obtained documentation”, the courts appear to take a different view from NARA.
11 According to respondents in the Bengali and Burmese communities, bribes of around 20,000 rupees (equivalent to 300 US dollars) will secure the release of an individual. By way of comparison, the standard daily wage for an unskilled worker in Karachi is around three US dollars.
12 One official described scenes of mayhem at the NARA office in Karachi as Afghan migrants rushed to get registered.
13 The situation of Afghans is very different in this regard from those of the ethnic Bengalis, who face many hurdles in travelling back and forth across India between Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Urban planning and “katchi abadis”

The most salient feature of urban planning with respect to migrants to Karachi – both international and internal – has to do with land use policy. This refers to the conversion of publicly owned wasteland into urban space. The city has grown along two distinctive patterns: (1) the development by various city authorities of planned housing colonies with the provision of the basic urban infrastructure, and (2) the emergence of irregular settlements known as katchi abadis. This type of settlement is an outcome of the city authorities’ neglect, in the first instance, of low-income international migrants from India. Subsequent waves of low-income international as well as internal migrants have led to the expansion and consolidation of katchi abadis. Karachi’s response to migration can, to a significant extent, be understood as a function of the evolution and present condition of the katchi abadis.

Today, katchi abadis are estimated to host about half of the Karachi population. These settlements have three defining features:

- They are located on land that was not legally acquired, and therefore had no legal property rights attached. The ownership of the land was formally vested with government or para-statal organisations like the railways or, in some cases, private individuals.
- The settlements were invariably, at the outset, in violation of urban planning and land-use regulations. Land designated for agriculture, public amenities, future infrastructure development, natural dry riverbeds, or simply barren government land with no officially designated use, was taken over for residential and derivative commercial purposes.
- Because they were never officially acknowledged, the katchi abadis were not entitled to public utilities and services such as water supply, roads, electricity, gas, sanitation, State schools, health facilities, or any other publicly provided service or amenity.

This makes it all the more remarkable that around half the population of Karachi has ended up residing, working and conducting business out of settlements that, in strictly legal terms, never existed. Even more remarkably, these settlements have acquired a sense of permanence, with solid, durable buildings, roads, electricity, wa-

4. Urban policies

Urban policies dealing with the expansion of Karachi due to migration from various sources have been both passive and reactive. This has led to a proliferation of informal and private sector responses and initiatives, of which the development of katchi abadis is the most significant. Many aspects of urban development have effectively been left to informal institutions, private entrepreneurs and group-based collective action. Therefore, migration has strengthened rather than weakened informal social networks and parochial identities based on family, kinship, tribe and ethnicity. It was within this context that new political forces emerged on the scene, with ideologies based on ethnic factors and a predisposition and ability to use force.

The present period provides a window of opportunity for the revival of urban governance in Karachi. The establishment in 2001 of the elected City District Government of Karachi (CDGK), with authority over multiple areas of public policy, has created an administrative framework for urban governance on a city-wide basis. At the same time, city politics have been less markedly determined by ethnic factors, as overtly ethnic political parties are now advocating a more inclusive approach. In addition, the city’s pace of growth has been slowing down – as has migration – which in turn is providing some breathing space for the development of urban infrastructure.

This section draws upon Arif Hasan (1999), Understanding Karachi: Planning and Reform for the Future (Karachi: City Press), and the author’s interview with Tasneem Siddiqui, director, Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority, Government of Sindh Province, in August 2004. The case studies detailed here are based on fieldwork by the Collective for Social Science Research.
ter supply systems, as well as relatively secure and negotiable property rights. In Karachi, urban policy towards katchi abadis can be characterised as ‘settle now, regularise later’. Through this policy, or non-policy, transpires the benign neglect of urban authorities to the conditions of internal and international migrants. Virtually all katchi abadis have a history that is closely connected with migration and the arrival and settlement of migrant communities in Karachi. Barring special residential schemes for the first wave of working class migrants from India, city authorities have proved unable or unwilling to plan for the successive waves of migration that were to sustain Karachi’s economy. They found it expedient to allow the migrants to fend for themselves.

The above characterisation of urban planning and katchi abadis provides a general framework for understanding the interaction between migration and urban policy. It is important to understand the nuances and specificities in order to gain a clearer view of how ‘benign neglect’ has actually worked. Who were the main protagonists? How did migrants fare, and how did urban policy help shape the strategies adopted by migrant communities? What role did government officials play, and how were the politicians and political parties involved?

Case studies of selected migrant communities

Given the difficulty of identifying urban policies that are clearly aimed at dealing with international migration, we have carried out primary fieldwork on five communities to highlight the main features of Karachi’s ‘non-policy’. Of these five, three were katchi abadis and the other two were formal settlements with a history of migration and irregular status. The five localities were selected in order to represent diverse poor and lower-middle class localities. Table 5 provides a summary of the five localities.

Lines Area: The area is made of previously distinct residential colonies that have now become contiguous due to expansion, in the heart of the city centre. The Lines Area had several clusters of low-income irregular housing. These irregular clusters were eventually regularised and supplied with basic public services and amenities. The Lines Area is relatively homogenous in terms of ethnicity. The inhabitants are mostly Urdu-speaking migrants from India. Small pockets of native Sindhis as well as migrants from northern parts of Pakistan also exist alongside. The MQM has a strong presence in the Lines Area, the place of origin of a number of its more prominent leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Migrants’ Origin</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Degree of Poverty</th>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lines Area</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>Not poor</td>
<td>Urdu-speaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khokrapar</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>Moderately poor</td>
<td>Urdu-speaking, Kachhi-Memon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kausar Niazi Colony</td>
<td>Punjab NWFP, Bangladesh</td>
<td>KA*, regularised</td>
<td>Mixed: poor and non-poor</td>
<td>Saraiki, Punjabi, Pashtun, Bengali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machhar Colony</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>KA, not regularised</td>
<td>Very poor</td>
<td>Bengali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jangabad</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>KA, not regularised</td>
<td>Very poor</td>
<td>Persian-speaking Tajiks, Pashto-speaking Baloch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5 - SUMMARY INFORMATION ON SELECTED LOCALITIES

* Katchi abadi.
within Mohammadi Colony. NSM has around several segments, and the case study refers to one of these, the Mohammadi certain times of the year. Machhar Colony is a large settlement consisting of is close to the seashore and is low-lying. It can get flooded during high tides at the area is close to the seashore and is low-lying. It can get flooded during high tides at certain times of the year. Machh ar Colony is a large settlement consisting of several segments, and the case study refers to one of these, the Mohammadi Colony, and more specifically to an area called Noor-us-Sabih Mohalla (NSM) within Mohammadi Colony. NSM has around 150 households, of which 120 are ethnic Bengalis. The land on which this colony is located is owned by various government agencies. NSM was first settled by Pashtun migrants from North-west Frontier Province (NWFP). Pashtun entrepreneurs asserted their possession over this former wasteland and encouraged other Pashtun families to migrate here to set up homes. Various segments of the former wasteland were then demarcated into plots and sold to other migrants. The Bengalis arrived in NSM around 1998 and bought possession from Pashtuns. These transactions continue to take place despite the fact that the settlement has no legal title whatsoever. The Bengalis continue on occasion to pay tribute (or protection money) to Pashtun ‘land-grabbers’. They also pay bribes to officials from the port authorities and the police who harass them for money if they extend or rebuild their homes. There is a sense of community among the Bengali families residing here, and they refer to their collectivity as ‘shamas’ within which various matters of group interest are addressed. Machhar Colony and the NSM suffer from extremely unhygienic living conditions. There is no drainage system, and water is bought from private suppliers who transport it in tankers and donkey carts. Although the settlement is irregular, there are proper electricity connections and metered power supply. Jangabad Afghan Basti: This colony is located on the outskirts of Karachi just off one of the main highways. The irregular settlement (katchi abadi) came into being in the late 1980s and its residents are mostly Afghan refugees who had previously lived in a refugee camp in Mianwali, Punjab. The refugees had arrived from Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and were sent to the camp in Mianwali, away from the main border areas. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, camp facilities were downgraded and refugees who used to receive food rations were left to fend for themselves. It was then that a number of families from the Mianwali camp arrived in Karachi. They settled on government-owned wasteland and early on were encouraged to do so by the authorities. Many of the refugees, particularly ethnic Pashtuns, moved out of these squatter settlements and spread out into other parts of Karachi. At the time of our visit, Jangabad was home to several hundred households, a majority of whom were Persian-speaking Tajiks. There is a small minority of Pashto-speaking Baloch Mengals from Afghanistan – people who claim ancient ancestry in Pakistani Balochistan, but who for practical purposes are Pashtun Afghans. The residents of this settlement are generally poor, with many of them working as rag-pickers, carpet-weavers, market porters and other labourers. The buildings are makeshift and people buy water from tankers or other suppliers. Nonetheless, there is electricity in the homes. The Afghans feel that they enjoyed relatively better conditions in the 1980s, and that the current policy of registration and repatriation has given the police pretext for harassment. The Persian-speaking Tajiks feel more vulnerable. Pakistani Pashtuns are said to act as middlemen who facilitate the Afghans’ interactions in markets as well as with the authorities. There is a clear sense of distinction within the Afghan refugees along ethnic and sectarian lines. The residents of Jangabad are among the poorest among the Afghan population of Karachi, and those with the weakest local social connections. The case studies provide glimpses into the history and workings of only a tiny fraction of numerous international migrant communities and settlements in Karachi. However, they allow the identification of some broad patterns and themes. There are marked differences between migrant communities in terms of their economic conditions, security of tenure, and political power. Although all of the selected localities are considered, a priori, to be low-income areas, the differences between various migrant groups are highly significant. Some, such as the early migrants from India, who live in settled low-income localities (such as the Lines Area and Khokrapar) clearly enjoy far greater security than
allowed access to the city for poor people from within the country as well as outside. The city, in turn, has benefited from this expanding population of workers and consumers, and has further enhanced its position as a relatively open marketplace for goods, services and labour. Obviously, though, there have been negative implications for the overall quality of public services available to residents.

It is important to highlight the longer-term institutional implications of laissez-faire and informal provision of public goods. As is the case of the 'land-grabbers' and informal property developers, there exist private sector water suppliers and transporters, all operating in a grey area between the illegal and the socially legitimate. It became the norm that water from public hydrants as well as from other sources would be sold at commercial rates to households and communities across the class divide. Likewise, Karachi's public transport system has been almost entirely run by private operators of buses, mini-buses and vans, who not only operate vehicles, but also manage routes and timetables among themselves.

Migration and the development of katchi abadis have played an important role in the increasingly informal nature of urban services in these other areas. The system of private water tankers first emerged to cater to the needs of the irregular settlements that had not yet become entitled to the installation of water lines. Soon, these tankers were supplying water to residents of planned areas because the public water supply in those localities was failing. An entire network of minibuses (many owned by traffic policemen) emerged to service new localities which, for lack of official existence, were off limits for the formal public transport system. Small-scale electricity production using generators first took off in katchi abadis. This was soon followed by the adoption of generators by households and commercial concerns even in regular planned areas which, though they were connected to the formal electricity grid, had to face frequent power outages.

Informal provision of urban services has important implications for international irregular migrants. Public authorities as service providers tend to make a sharp differentiation between legal regular residents, and irregular migrants. On the other hand, informal service provision does not discriminate between people on the basis of their legal status. The fact that Karachi is dominated by informal service provision has meant that irregular international migrants have been able to access basic urban services – albeit at the low end of the scale.

Implications of informal utility provision

In Karachi, urban policy has been reactive and of a laissez-faire nature not only with respect to housing and infrastructure. For any number of essential urban services – such as water supply, drainage and sanitation, and transport – post-1947 Karachi has consistently lagged behind population growth. However, the city has continued to function through the informal provision of all of these essential public services. In a way, this laissez-faire approach to regulation and urban planning has been keeping Karachi relatively open to migrants and migration. The city's openness has also been in line with liberal attitudes to certain types of international migration in national policy. Undoubtedly, this has lowered the costs of migration and
general, it also highlights the importance of social networks and political capital. If informal social networks provide urban services and even physical protection and security, then those international migrants who have stronger social linkages are likely to be better protected.

Large chunks of the urban economy have come to be operated under informal jurisdictions, with their own systems of arbitration and enforcement. Not surprisingly, the situation has been popularly characterised in Karachi as the rule of the ‘mafias’. It is common to hear and read about the activities of the ‘land mafia’, the ‘water mafia’, and the ‘transport mafia’ among others.

**Regulation and regularisation**

A critical challenge of urban policy in Karachi is how to effect a transition from a city where informal provision of urban services is prevalent, to a modern, well-functioning metropolis that can guarantee civic amenities as well as civil rights. There are many indications that the worst of the violent ethnicisation of the city’s politics might be behind us, though not necessarily violent politics as such. Moreover, the creation of the City District Government has effectively laid out a formal institutional basis for a thorough-going reform of urban governance. While the city is large and complex, and policy details will vary from one sector and area to another, the above analysis points to an overarching matrix in the reform of urban governance in the city.

Karachi will need to negotiate its way through a fine balancing act between regulation and regularisation. It is possible to regard these two processes as alternative, even opposite, routes to development. A strictly legalistic modernist approach will insist on the rigorous implementation of existing law and regulation with regard to urban planning, land-use policy, water provision, public transport, and all other matters relating to city governance – in the process reinforcing the exclusion of many international migrants. At the other end of the spectrum, it is possible to regard all existing informal outcomes as valid, and to adopt an approach that would simply regularise ‘that which already exists’. Implicit in this view is that the formal planning process of an aloof government has profoundly misconceived the project of urban infrastructure, while social and political entrepreneurs operating in the informal sector have found practical and realistic low-cost solutions to the everyday problems of the poor. The ‘regularisation’ approach is likely to have a positive impact on the conditions of irregular international migrants.

Current policy appears to be an awkward and arbitrary coexistence between these two potentially opposite tendencies. Federal, provincial and city authorities simultaneously carry out regulation as well as regularisation. There does need to be some acknowledgment that far from being ends in themselves, both ‘regulation’ and ‘regularisation’ are possible routes towards the modernisation of the city and its institutions. The two tendencies need not be alternatives or rivals, rather potentially complementary to one another, in a judicious and politically negotiated process of modernisation.

**Conspicuous international migrants**

The condition of international migrants depends not so much on their status as irregular migrants, than on their prior position within the social, cultural and political hierarchy. Initial Muslim migrants from post-partition India – particularly from the Urdu-speaking areas – as well as irregular migrants who arrived from those communities subsequently, are well-integrated, and are regarded as the core population of Karachi. Bengalis as a group, however, have been disenfranchised, regardless of individual status, on the basis of race and ethnicity by official fiat. Similar contrasts exist between Pashtun Afghans and non-Pashtuns, and among non-Pashtuns, between those such as Ismailis who have prior sectarian affiliation in Pakistan, and others. It is more appropriate specifically to address the situation of ‘conspicuous’ international migrants, such as ethnic Bengalis, Burmese, and segments of the Afghans, rather than international migrants in general. Pakistan’s national policy towards conspicuous international migrants appears to have been effective to the extent that it has considerably increased the costs and reduced the incentives for new migration from Bangladesh, Burma and Afghanistan. The policy has imposed severe costs and constraints on the existing population of conspicuous migrants – people who are, in any case, amongst the most marginalised communities among migrants and non-migrants alike. The declared welfare- and rights-oriented promises of the national policy of regularisation (through NARA) have not been achieved. Eth-
nic Bengalis and Burmese are more vulnerable now than they have been in the past. Not enough is known about the diverse conditions in the Afghan community, but the declared official policy of repatriation appears to work only among certain segments of that population.

In fact, the local (city) government might be the more appropriate instrument for achieving some of the welfare- and rights-oriented goals of national policy, without subverting its regulatory objectives. There are two important reasons, a priori, why this might be possible.

First, as explained above, international migration becomes a sensitive political issue in Pakistan, mostly at the provincial level. Past policies of ethnic preference and discrimination have led to apprehensions on the part of particular communities — for example, the ethnic Sindhis, Balochis, and Saraikis — that migration is used to alter the ethnic demography of their native regions. In contrast to provincial politics, city politics, while ethnicised, is relatively less sensitive to migration as a threat. In fact, in some areas of Karachi conspicuous migrants represent voting blocks with significant electoral weight.

Second, conspicuous international migrants are among the poorest and most socially marginalised communities in Karachi. The prevalent model of informal provision has allowed these groups access to minimal urban services, but they remain at the margins of the city’s economy and society. Improved public infrastructure will usher in better conditions for all marginalised communities, including the conspicuous international migrants. Modernisation of city governance may reduce the importance of prior social networks — something that places the conspicuous migrants at a relative disadvantage.

In an interview with the author in August 2004, the elected head of the City District Government of Karachi struck a balanced position:

“It is the responsibility of the national government to try and stop irregular foreign migrants if it can. Once someone is in the city, their welfare becomes our responsibility.”

5. Lessons learned and recommendations

Karachi’s experience of international migration highlights the importance of ideological and political factors — in addition to economic ones — in directing flows of migration. A national policy of openness, or even encouragement, for international migrant flows of particular types has found a counterpart in a laissez-faire approach on the part of urban authorities with respect to land use policy and the provision of public infrastructure.

Implications of openness and informal provision

Karachi’s experience with immigration highlights four sets of lessons for migration and urban policy:

1) A liberal national policy towards international migration can work in tandem with a laissez-faire urban policy in order to lower the cost of migration, and to ensure the informal provision of low-cost urban services without massive bureaucratic intervention. However, this combination of openness and laissez-faire is underpinned by prior political commitment to particular flows of migration and demographic changes. The informal sector features sufficient flexibility and adaptive capacity to deal with even relatively large and rapid population flows in the short term.

2) A laissez-faire urban policy and the consequent informal sector response do not coincide with idyllic and competitive free markets, or indeed, a harmonious, cooperative community life. The informal sector — with its proliferation of irregular transactions — is underpinned by the presence of privately-wielded coercive power in the shape of local strongmen, ‘mafias’, and other legitimised sources of violence. There are serious administrative implications for the project of establishing the institutions of the modern State in a situation where the informal system is already very robust.

3) Under conditions of openness and informal provision, migration into urban areas can reinforce rather than erode parochial identities. In the absence of a strong State, informal social networks around ethnicity and/or kinship play a crucial role in facilitating the provision of urban amenities. The historical role of migration and urbanisation as processes of assimila-
4) Although the costs of migration are kept low, and hence the welfare of migrants is enhanced, the reliance on informal provision implies that migrants are divided into those with strong connections to local social networks and those without support and protection from these networks. In the case of Karachi, the contrast between ‘assimilated’ and ‘conspicuous’ international migrants is particularly stark, and the latter form some of the most marginalised and unprotected groups in the city.

**Regulation versus Regularisation**

Looking ahead, Karachi and Pakistan face parallel policy challenges with respect to international migration and urban planning. From a relatively open regime historically, Pakistan has moved towards a more restrictive policy with regard to international migration. At the same time, with the reform of local government, urban planning is moving away from laissez-faire to greater government agency. The policy challenges in the two areas – international migration and urban planning – are parallel in the sense that they share a similar framework. Both for migration and urban planning in Pakistan, there are broadly two potentially contradictory directions for policy action: regulation and regularisation. Previous policy regimes (and failures) in both areas have resulted in a backlog of irregular international migrants as well as irregular urban settlements – where many of the irregular migrants reside. Moreover, irregular migration as well as irregular settlement have not ceased, and instead remain active areas of concern. Stated government policy in both areas can be characterised as being based upon the regularisation of past irregularity, and strict regulation and legal action against current and future transgression. In fact, the regularisation-regulation framework as currently applied can be seen to be failing in both areas.

In the case of international migration, the government’s attempts (through NARA) at regularising people classified as irregular migrants have led to increased rather than reduced vulnerability of conspicuous migrant communities such as the ethnic Bengalis and Burmese. In the case of urban planning, regularisation of irregular settlements has neither prevented the eviction of many old katchi abadis, nor stopped the emergence of new irregular settlements. The regularisation-regulation framework is appropriate, and both national policy on migration and urban policy on settlements must come to grips with it jointly. However, the focus so far has been on the regularisation and/or regulation of outcomes. It has been presumed that both irregular migration flows as well as irregular settlement formation can be arbitrarily divided into discrete time periods – i.e., the past period for which irregular outcomes must be regularised, and the current and future periods for which regulation must be strictly applied. In fact, the failure of policy highlights the possibility of interpreting the regularisation-regulation framework in a different manner. Rather than focusing exclusively upon the regularisation or regulation of outcomes, attention needs to be paid to the regularisation and regulation of processes. Instead of treating stocks of migrants and settlements as being static, it is crucial to see stocks and flows as being intrinsically connected. The existing policy framework says little about the regularisation of processes – i.e., the flow of international migrants, or the way new low-cost urban settlements emerge or function. The main recommendation of this chapter is that policy-makers need to apply the regularisation-regulation framework, not only to outcomes of past irregularity, but to current and ongoing processes in international migration and urban planning.
1. The Existing Situation

Before considering immigration and its current problems in the Naples conurbation, two preliminary remarks are in order: one about statistical data and the other about the local governance framework.

Every 10 years Italy’s National Institute of Statistics, ISTAT, carries out a general survey of the population. Although the latest (2001) census provides some data on immigration, the amnesty that followed the Immigration Act 2002 (see the section Immigration and Italy’s National Policies below) has led to the regularisation of a large number of immigrants. Consequently, this chapter will refer both to the 2001 data (from ISTAT) and to more updated though fragmentary 2003 figures gained from the amnesty (and kept by the local police) which shed light on recent and ongoing trends in immigration since the 2001 census was carried out. Moreover, the data to be considered must reach beyond the sole city of Naples and include those regarding the province of Naples and the Campania region (of which the province is a subdivision and Naples the capital). The city of Naples (population: one million) is part of a metropolitan area which largely coincides with the boundaries of Naples province (population: 3.06 million). Any review of immigration in Naples must include the metropolitan area, since a substantial percentage of immigrants live in the secondary cities around Naples.

In 2001 the Campania region (population: 5.7 million) was host to 40,430 im-
migrants. Of these, 22,375 (or 0.7 per cent of the total population) lived in the province of Naples, and 8,757 (or 0.9 per cent) in the city area. Both percentages are significantly lower than Italy's national average of 2.3 per cent.

As mentioned earlier, the 2003 amnesty enacted under the Immigration Act 2002 (law 189/2002) resulted in the regularisation of many foreigners. Consequently, by the end of 2003, the Campania region was host to some 110,000 regularised immigrants, including about 61,000 in the sole province of Naples. Amnesty data changed the ranking by country of origin compared to 2001 census data: Ukraine rose to the top of the list (with 16,316 immigrants), followed by the USA (8,253), Poland (4,661) and Sri Lanka (4,424). As for the city itself, the number of legal immigrants had increased from 8,757 to 14,574 between the 2001 census and the 2003 amnesty.

More up-to-date data for the sole city of Naples can be obtained from Italy's National Health Service, with which immigrant residents must register by law. As at March 31, 2004, 16,065 foreigners had registered with the Azienda Sanitaria Locale (local health service) serving the city of Naples. Of these, 10,594 were females and 5,471 males, and the top five countries of origin were Sri Lanka (3,378), Ukraine (2,414), Poland (1,208), the Philippines (764) and Cape Verde (607). A breakdown by age bracket shows that most immigrants in Naples were 19 to 50 years old.

The above figures do not include irregular immigrants, whose number can be derived from the aggregate list of so-called Stranieri Temporaneamente Presenti (temporarily resident foreigners), or STPS, as drawn up by public health institutions. The STP scheme enables illegal immigrants to benefit from health services without any prior registration with the police. The 2004 statistics show that some 10 per cent of all the foreigners who had used NHS services in the city of Naples had done so under the STP scheme. Based on this number, we can estimate the number of illegal immigrants at 30 to 40 per cent of the total for legal immigrants. Immigrants in Naples apply for a residence permit primarily for employment reasons (69 per cent), followed by family unification (21 per cent) and self-employment (3.6 per cent). Around one per cent of residence permits are issued on religious grounds (i.e., to non-EU secular and regular clerics of all confessions applying for temporary residence).

One specific common feature of both the province and the city of Naples is the large number of Romany Gypsy (Rom) communities from Romania and the former Yugoslavia, who make their homes in run-down peripheral areas or disused industrial sites. Incidents involving Romany Gypsies are often reported in the local newspapers subsequent either to bloody incidents inside the community, or assaults and other problems linked to intolerance.

**Housing**

Supply of accommodation for immigrants is mostly controlled by local criminal organisations. Decaying and overcrowded houses command rents of up to 10 or 15 euro$ per night. Criminal networks also buy flats or ground floor premises (the so-called Neapolitan bassi) and rent them out to foreign residents, both regular and irregular, at much higher prices than to local people (at times 50 to 60 per cent higher).

The challenges which immigrants face when seeking rental accommodation combine with the scarcity of public housing to confine them to marginal areas, in rundown houses or in emergency conditions. This situation can only compound ethnic and social segregation, which is quite at odds with any intended integration in Italian society.

Sometimes Albanian, Romany Gypsy and African migrants settle illegally in disused prefabricated houses that are lined with carcinogenic asbestos, or in nomadic camps or shantytowns located under viaducts or next to industrial areas.

**Employment**

Ukrainian and Polish females are mainly employed in hourly-paid home help or domestic care, whereas Sri Lankans work primarily as service staff. Most immigrants from Albania and Romania work as construction workers; those from North and Sub-Saharan Africa are generally employed in farming or as street vendors. In Naples as in many other cities in the world, immigrant workers have

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2 The massive US presence is linked to the NATO base at Bagnoli, east of Naples.

3 1.00 euro = 1.3 US dollar.
2. The issues

Patterns of inclusion

The different ethnic groups living in the greater Naples area follow sharply different patterns in their appropriation of relational and physical space. For instance, for Polish immigrants, who contribute significantly to the immigrant population, cooperating with the local church plays a fundamental role. On the other hand, the Chinese community (of whom 25 per cent reside in Naples and 75 per cent in the greater city area, especially around Mount Vesuvius, southeast of Naples), is very much 'self-contained', so much so that outsiders hardly know anything about them: the Chinese have their own doctors and paramedics, their own pharmacies, their own food stores, etc. This community tends to avoid contact with the 'outside world', partly thanks to a self-sufficient economic system. In this sense, culture, tradition and language act both as a potential resource and an obstacle to inclusion for any ethnic group. Moreover, Chinese families send their children home to China at the age of three to enable them to grow in a Chinese cultural context.

The tendency of the Chinese community to shut themselves off from the 'outside world' stands in apparent contrast to the expansive character of their – usually legal – commercial production. This production has spread widely over the city territory. In the Vesuvius area in particular, many textile-apparel businesses have been entirely taken over by the Chinese, who run their own independent distribution networks and have secured street-vending licenses. Good quality manufacturing and an ability to copy designer products, combined with low production costs (as little as one euro for a pair of jeans), help in the widespread distribution of Chinese products in the Naples area.

The local population perceives the presence of immigrants and their peculiar characteristics precisely in relation with the kind of jobs they are employed in, or their inclinations towards specific occupations. Against this background, Neapolitans do not consider the US community that has been revolving around the nearby NATO base for decades as part of the 'immigration' scene. The prejudice of considering as immigrants only those from outside Western Europe and North America is still very much there. Migrants from North Africa, males for the bulk of them, live in the city's his-
Accommodation

For North Africans and other communities alike, accommodation is a most serious concern. Whatever shelter they can afford to rent is wholly inadequate, most notably basements (bassi) or garages.

Immigrants are well aware that Naples has no specific housing policy laid out for them. In any case, most will rather live in precarious accommodation by the city centre, i.e., close to their workplace, than in the periphery where better conditions only come with relatively high commuting costs.

As mentioned earlier, many immigrants employed in caretaking and housekeeping, and particularly those from Eastern Europe, have earned vocational or higher education degrees in their home countries, but find them of little use if any as they look for jobs in Naples. The fact of the matter is, just as there are no housing policies to speak of in Naples, the city is also devoid of adequate employment policies.

Many of the immigrants who have been living in Naples for years have no stable jobs and therefore are unable to buy decent accommodation, even if they work all the time. Nor are there any credit facilities that might enable immigrants to buy property.

The more fortunate immigrant families typically earn 900 to 1,000 euros a month, of which about 400 euros is spent on rent; moreover, around 180 euros is paid every two months for electricity and 60 euros for water. Further expenses are to be added if there are small children or infants. For those immigrants assisting the elderly or working as babysitters and who typically live in the same household as the employer, the monthly earnings are 400 to 500 euros on top of food and accommodation.

Poor access to decent housing often forces immigrant families to share apartments. There is a positive aspect to this otherwise regrettable situation, though, as it encourages ‘community bonding’, with the result that when one individual faces a serious problem the whole community rallies around her/him to help out. As far as the Neapolitan population’s attitudes to immigrants are concerned, distrust is the initial reaction. This is due to the stereotypes associating immigrants with petty crime and delinquency as well as with illegal status and activities – overall, a negative image, for which the local media are a vocal conduit.

Overcoming the initial distrust is clearly not an easy task. However, over time soli-
darity networks emerge, especially in working-class areas. This is due both to the material conditions many migrants live in, some aspects of which they share with the local population (precarious accommodation and work), and to mutual trust which, as it develops, consolidates relationships between the various communities. In the more affluent areas of Naples, on the other hand, distrust of immigrants endures, and over time it translates either into tolerance or a sense of superiority. Many immigrants work in the more affluent areas but are unable to reside there. The local residents’ sense of superiority restricts immigrant access to both housing and jobs in some parts of the city, denying them the possibility of career advancement or an improvement in lifestyles. Very often immigrants find it impossible to reach beyond a certain position, and if they try to change jobs in a bid to improve their lot they will find many obstacles standing in their way. This reflects the mindset of the more affluent segments of Neapolitan society, who will consider immigrants only for a restricted range of roles. As for local employers’ attitudes, at times they try very hard to prevent immigrant employees from changing jobs as it would require the employer to build a trusting relationship with a new employee. Often immigrants are more valued than Neapolitans in the same line of business. However, none of this should detract attention from the basic economic fact that immigrants are paid less and therefore represent an attractive proposition for employers.

It is also important to underline the need to guarantee equal opportunities for foreigners in general, and for women in particular. Even those with high school and/or university degrees can only aspire to housecleaning or babysitting positions. Therefore, a major obstacle to full integration of immigrants in Naples is the local society’s negative perception of their role. To be fair, subjective barriers to integration and inclusion can also occasionally be found among immigrant communities. Whereas some do strive for integration, some others only want a non-problematic type of cohabitation with the Italian host community. Integration is easier for Roman Catholics, such as the majority of Cape Verdeans and Sri Lankans to be found in Naples. This hints at the various ways in which different confessions can shape the notion of ‘citizenship’: whereas Roman Catholics typically understand ‘citizenship’ as ‘integration’, to Muslims this only means ‘recognition’. On the other hand, the Chinese community finds integration almost exclusively through the labour market, with the working place doubling as a community centre and social hub for Chinese migrants.

With regard to integration of second-generation immigrants in the local Italian society, the major problem revolves around the status of immigrants after their 18th birthday. As they come of age, young migrants can opt to retain their double (original and Italian) nationality, provided that their mothers had taken up residence in Naples at least one month before giving birth. In practice, this means that in the Cape Verdean community of Naples, for instance, only two children may keep their existing double nationality when they come of age. The others risk expulsion pure and simple: they will have to go back to a ‘motherland’ where they have never lived, whose language they may hardly speak, whose traditions they are unfamiliar with and where they often have no relatives left. This is happening at the most difficult period in an immigrant’s life, i.e., adolescence, when s/he neither feels integrated in the host country nor as ‘belonging’ with the country of origin.

Against this background, immigrant perceptions of Italian bureaucracy are very negative, again reflecting the authorities’ lack of adequate policies. Civil servants, and particularly Naples Municipality staff, do not appear to be prepared to cope with the administrative procedures laid out by law for immigrant registration. As a result, the delivery of even the simplest official paper takes an inordinate amount of time, leaving applicants (and their individual status) in a state of uncertainty. This combination of policy vacuum and bureaucratic inefficiency suggests that many obstacles to the full inclusion of immigrants in the Naples area also have to do with their lack of information and their dysfunctional relationship with the police administration when they apply for official documents.

The difficulties with residence permits have increasingly turned Naples into a ‘transit city’ for new immigrants to Italy. In the past few years, as many as 60 per cent of immigrants have decided to move to northern Italy after spending some time in Naples. This is also the case with Chinese migrants; many of them continue producing in Naples, mainly in the textile-apparel sector, with others selling the production in Milan, where business is more active. From an economic point of view, and whereas the Chinese community invests earnings locally in new or existing businesses, other immigrant groups in Naples prefer to send savings back home. Remittances sent from Naples province in 2004 amounted to an estimated 3,444,000 euros, or an average 96.00 euros per immigrant. The money is usually transferred through friends who go and
spend some time in the home country, whose currency is often non-convertible and where the euro, as one of the world’s dominant currencies, commands high exchange rates. Such transfers are admittedly more cost- and time-effective than traditional bank transfers, which are associated with high charges and long delays. However, money transfer services such as Western Union and MoneyGram are beginning to deploy across the length and breadth of Naples and area. This is how banks’ disdain for this potential new type of client leads immigrants to embrace alternative or informal systems to handle their monies. Finally, regarding welfare assistance to the more deprived and destitute among immigrants, religious institutions play a major role. Some provide shelter to the very poor. On the first Thursday of every month Caritas (the Roman Catholic charity) and the Italian Red Cross give out food and basic necessities in central Naples. Islamic institutions also operate various walk-in hospitality and support centres in the metropolitan area, and the mosques make some basic services available as well. It should also be stressed that some organisations (without any confession- nal affiliation) have been exposed as frauds, taking money from immigrants without any assistance in return, and even using their IDs for illegal activities.

### 3. Immigration and National Policies

Italy became a destination for immigrants from the 1970s onwards. Immigration to the country has for the most part been of a ‘spontaneous’ nature, that is, without any clear recruitment policy for specific economic sectors. In 1986 the government adopted a piece of legislation that was Italy’s first attempt to deal systematically with immigration issues, following a sudden increase in inflows. The statute affirmed, among other things, the principle of legal equality between immigrants and Italian workers, entrusting regional authorities with implementation of migrant welfare policies. The 1986 statute also enabled Italy’s first ‘amnesty’ to regularise illegal immigrants who were employed in the country. However, this particular move underestimated the complexity of the issue, as most international migrants at the time were registered as ‘temporarily unemployed’, and the results were disappointing. The next piece of legislation (law 39/1990) was targeted at the more comprehensive category of ‘immigrant workers’ and the fresh amnesty declared under its terms resulted in a higher number of regularisations (240,000). The 1990 statute earmarked funds for support to newly-arrived immigrants; it also laid out a more detailed framework for immigrant-oriented social policies and the way they were to be determined at the national level, with implementation entrusted to local authorities.

With the Immigration Act 1998 (law 40/1998), Italy moved a step further as it took a comprehensive, integrated approach to immigration. The statute did more than consider traditional issues like security and control of migration inflows; it also provided a number of instruments for the better integration of legal immigrants, including:

- More effective planning of inflows in relation to the needs of the Italian labour market.
- Tackling illegal immigration.
- Support for the integration of legal immigrants.

The 1998 statute introduced new policy instruments, such as the government’s compulsory Triennial Programmatic Document on Immigration Policy. The statute provided for the decrees that periodically determine the number of immigrant workers which the country needs and who will be legally admitted as a result. Preferential access is to be granted to migrants coming from those countries (such as Albania, Morocco, Slovakia, Tunisia) with which Italy has entered into agreements over immigration (including inflow control and readmission procedures). In this sense, the 1998 statute laid the foundation for a policy of cooperation with the countries of origin and transit of those immigrants knocking at Italy’s doors.

The Immigration Act 1998 also sought to facilitate integration through some radical innovations. One of these was the ‘residence paper’, which is granted to immigrants who have been living in Italy for at least five years and who can prove that they earn an income to support themselves and any family they may have with them. The objective was to give immigrants the same rights as Italians citizens and to foster ‘citizenship’.

The 1998 statute innovated further as it granted all immigrants, whether legal or not, the same rights to healthcare as Italian citizens, in the process waiving any prior obligation for illegal immigrants to report to the authorities (i.e., to apply for a permit). The law also made school attendance compulsory for all under-age
immigrants, again regardless of status, as is the case with Italian children. To support these policies, the government set up a National Fund for Migration Policy and placed it under a Commission for Integration Policy, which brings together representatives from Italy’s regional, provincial and municipal authorities. Also worthy of note in Italy’s innovative Immigration Act 1998 was the introduction of the so-called ‘cultural mediators’. These are foreign citizens who have been in possession of a residence paper or permit for no less than two years (the ‘residence paper’ can be obtained by immigrants who have been living in Italy for at least five years, whereas other regular immigrants are entitled only to the ‘residence permit’). Their role is to act as intermediaries between immigrants (from different ethnic, national, linguistic and religious backgrounds) and the various public administrations which foreigners are exposed to (police, labour, health, education, etc.).

As for local initiatives in favour of immigrants’ integration under the 1998 statute, they can include language courses, information and referral services, initiatives against racial discrimination, and any other action that can support the integration of foreign citizens with all due respect for their diverse cultural identities. Such initiatives can emanate from Italian support organisations or from the immigrant communities themselves.

The latest development in Italy’s statutory book was the Immigration Act 2002 (189/2002) which brought some amendments to law 40/1998, and declared another amnesty for undocumented immigrants. The 2002 statute requires regional, provincial and municipal governments to develop policies promoting immigrants’ rights to housing, language tuition and social integration. The legislation also innovates with a specific clause against international trafficking in human beings. The clause refers to ‘traffic of migrants’ and ‘traffic with the purpose of sexual exploitation’ as criminal offences.4

The successive statues have laid the foundation for Italy’s immigration policies over the past several years. Between 1998 and 2000, policy focused on the management of immigration under its various aspects, including inflow planning and control as well as integration of foreign workers in the labour market and Italian society. Under the 2001-2003 Programmatic Document, the government put tackling illegal entrants at the core of its immigration policies and took a number of measures to this effect, which included strengthening Italy’s Border Police.

Italy’s current immigration policy was set out in the 2004-2006 Programmatic Document, as approved by the government on September 23, 2004. Based on the 2002 statute, its approach is quite different from the two previous Programmatic Documents. Under the new policy, immigrants must satisfy three conditions to obtain a residence permit in Italy: (a) a signed pre-contract, (b) guaranteed accommodation, and (c) proof that they can meet return costs to their country of origin. The Document provides for streamlining of many administrative procedures, further strengthening of border controls against illegal migration, and also for immediate expulsion of any immigrants who fail to comply with the rules. The 2004-2006 government policy document establishes a firm link between admission to the country and legal employment, based on such objective factors as more formal, law-abiding relations between employers and the authorities (including regular payment of taxes and social contributions), along with availability of adequate housing and appropriate professional training. A ‘contract of residence’ (contratto di soggiorno) is established to regulate new entrances; the contract guarantees a legal job in Italy in return for attendance of language and vocational courses in the country of origin.

However, as of early 2005, the proposed steps against illegal migration (strengthened border controls and identification, detention and expulsion of illegal immigrants) had not been implemented yet. The planning of inflows which the 2004-2006 policy document refers to must also go hand in hand with the ability of Italian society to receive and integrate foreign citizens not only in the labour market, but also and more importantly in local communities. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that integration starts with active participation in the labour market; at the same time, there can be no denying that education, language tuition, healthcare, family guidance, housing and cultural mediation also need improvement, especially through local organisations such as the Territorial Councils for Immigration.

4. Local immigration policies in Naples city and province

Employment is the fundamental issue which immigration policies must grapple with in the Naples metropolitan area. Faced with a very high unemployment
rate among the local population, regional, provincial and municipal authorities have given absolute priority to vocational training.

As a result, the local authorities have set up five advisory help-desks with a coordination unit (the Window for the Jobless and the Mila projects, see below), as well as a mobile unit which offers services similar to those of the fixed desks. This mobile unit is particularly useful for those migrants residing outside the city itself (and particularly in those areas where the province of Naples joins up with the neighbouring city of Caserta), who work on farms and therefore need support services to come to them on the workplace. This is all the more the case as most of the offices and services which immigrants need to have access to are located in the city. Healthcare is a good example: accessible though they are in principle to all immigrants (including illegal, through STP status), healthcare services are physically available only in the city.

Cultural mediators and the natural leaders of the different communities provide points of access and contact which, if left to their own devices, public institutions would never be able to provide. The experiences reviewed in this section arose from a need to coordinate assistance, guidance and information for immigrants, as well as from recognition that immigrants’ social adjustment must take precedence over adjustment to the labour market. This is precisely the rationale behind the ‘i.A.m.’ project (interventi per l’Alloggio e l’Alfabetizzazione dei migranti), which is run by Naples province. The scheme promotes housing and literacy for immigrants, as well as access to effective rights through information, guidance and support. Training for the 14 cultural mediators who assist in the social integration of immigrants is under the responsibility of the Mila project for intercultural mediation. As for the Naples Municipality, its strategy for immigrants primarily pursues the following objectives:

- Tackling immigrant illiteracy through support for children at and outside school.
- Developing existing integrated facilities for immigrants’ professional adjustment.
- Developing existing support structures for under-age immigrants at risk of deviance and/or marginalisation.
- Promoting a culture of national and international fostering of under-age immigrants.
- Operating hospitality and transit centres.
- Developing cultural and linguistic mediation services.
- Employing mediators in social services.
- Supporting qualitative research into local immigration in order to identify primary needs and problems and adapt facilities accordingly.
- Operating hospitality services and facilitating integration and repatriation for asylum seekers.
- Operating a ‘Centre for social citizenship’.
- Providing Italian language tuition.
- Developing cultural-social-recreational activities through meetings between different ethnic groups and the local population.
- Assistance for voluntary repatriation.
- Developing social/recreational activities in the hospitality centres.
- Promoting health and ensuring access to healthcare.
- Helping to develop a communication network among all the institutions involved.

The ‘Window for the Jobless’

The Window for the Jobless provides immigrants with information, guidance and assistance on employment opportunities and labour rights. The provincial government launched the scheme in January 2002 to provide practical advice in a variety of areas, including filling out forms, legal support in disputes with employers, various administrative issues and information on the types of services available to immigrants.

During its first three years of operation, the Window for the Jobless and its in-house mediators have assisted more than 6,000 immigrants. The scheme can also occasionally play a more proactive role. Ahead of the 2003 amnesty and in response to the many employers who balked at the prospect of regularisation for undocumented foreign employees, the Window for the Jobless distributed 20,000 regularisation ‘kits’ to immigrant workers in Naples and metropolitan area. The most innovative aspect of the project lies in its emphasis on the relationship

5 See Piano Sociale di Zona 2002-2003 second offence is punished with five to 15 years’ imprisonment and fines of 25,000 euros per victim.
between employers and immigrants: they are not familiar with current immigration policies and undoubtedly they can do with specific assistance with the procedures involved in labour contracting and respective rights. Employers and Window staff keep in touch mainly through a telephone help desk and via the Internet, which enables a quick turnover of both queries and forms. A specific Website is to be created in the near future.

The Window for the Jobless has also given special attention to refugees, in order to help them cope with their extremely awkward social and economic conditions. Window schemes include a training programme for mediators, with special emphasis on counselling with regard to healthcare services and public administration. In 2004, 715 immigrants used the Window facility. The much higher proportion of men (81 per cent) to women reflects the fact that gender relations and dynamics among immigrants often remain skewed to traditional patterns. The two main problems for which immigrants have sought assistance from the Window so far are the following:

- **Delivery of residence permits:** Immigrants and employers alike complain over the inability of the Police Administration to clarify which forms and documents are required when applying for a permit. On top of this, the time it takes the Questura to decide whether an application is valid or not puts both the immigrant and his/her employer in an awkward situation vis-à-vis the law: so long as an immigrant worker is waiting for renewal of his/her residence permit, it is illegal for the employer to withhold social security contributions for the benefit of the worker; however, if the police eventually decide that the permit is not being renewed, the employer finds that the social security contributions he has been making in the meantime were illegal as well.

- **Regularisation:** A significant number of immigrants were left out of the 2003 amnesty, for reasons that had less to do with them than with employer inefficiency or with fraud.

The Window for the Jobless has also embarked on an experimental collaborative scheme to promote vocational training. Two immigrants and two Italians have been selected on account of their potential skills as cultural mediators; they have attended a six-week training programme in public and private institutions in northern Italy in order to gain the skills required to work on the Window for the Jobless. The Window’s experience has highlighted the difficulty of transferring qualifications earned in the home country to the Italian system, as well as the various degrees of literacy across immigrant communities. The Window has already identified interdisciplinary competences, with specific reference to language, work culture, security and contract management.

On the whole, the Window for the Jobless scheme has fulfilled its initial objectives. Its promoters are now looking to strengthen and sharpen their capacities in order to be more effective across the length and breadth of the province of Naples.

**The ‘Mila’ project**

The advisory Window for the Jobless is part of the network of services revolving around another support scheme known as Mila (Migranti: Inserimento al Lavoro in Agricolta, or Migrants: Employment in Agricultural Work), whose raison d’être is to train immigrants, and promote their employment, in farming and agriculture. Mila fulfills four distinct functions: communication and exchange, analysis and problem identification, experimental projects and services, and training and work, as detailed below:

- The work on ‘communication and exchange’ promotes activities which facilitate the social integration of immigrants, with involvement from civil society. Immigrants receive information to assist in their effective participation in such projects.

- The ‘analysis and problem identification’ function assesses trends in the labour market and the best ways of matching immigrants’ demand for jobs with the supply from employers. Mila has carried out a survey of about 200 businesses employing immigrants in various types of activity as well as 500 to 600 immigrants employed on farms, highlighting the social and professional requirements of economic development in the Naples metropolitan area.

- The ‘experimental projects and services’ function launches projects and provides services to advance immigrants’ integration in local communities; these projects and services include the advisory Window for the Jobless and its mobile unit. Moreover, this function supports existing informal assistance net-
information on healthcare; unit members also explain how prostitutes can escape their condition, which includes the creation of solidarity networks among the women themselves.

- A listening centre where women can drop in and meet social workers and cultural mediators for advice and for assistance in healthcare centres, or to handle the paperwork for regularisation.
- A hospitality house where a specialised, experienced team of social workers and cultural mediators provides shelter and tutoring for social integration to women and to under-age immigrants in need.

La Gatta has managed to build a network that involves not only non-official supports such as voluntary groups and local leaders, but also official bodies like the police, migrant communities, local authorities at different echelons and a couple of universities. By early 2005, the project had reached out to some 8,000 sexually exploited female immigrants.

Projects promoted by the Regional (Campania) Government

One important factor in immigrant integration is the promotion of active citizenship and support for community projects. Listening to immigrants’ concerns and providing them with exactly the type of advice they require has a major role to play. The Naples regional government has laid out schemes and arranged for synergies in recognition of these needs. It has also issued multilingual guides with useful information for immigrants.

One of these, the ‘ISI-Campania’ guide, provides information on the National Health System. It comes with a list of the healthcare services available in every town in the region, complete with addresses and telephone numbers. The guide includes details of hospitals, emergency services, family advice services, general practitioners (GPs), ambulances andstp codes. This guide to sanitary services is available in the six foreign languages most commonly spoken in the Campania region, enabling immigrants to avail themselves of their equal right to healthcare as embedded in Italy’s Constitution and statutory book.

Moreover, the regional government has published (also in six languages) a guide to the Residence Paper. The booklet provides information on what a
makes the role of institutions as complex as the benefits are significant in terms of economic and cultural richness. To take a simple example, real estate values around Naples’s main railway station have been driven significantly higher because the presence of various ethnic groups has turned the area into a focal point for major trade routes and cultural influences that reach out across the Mediterranean and to Africa. Moreover, such a mix of immigrant communities creates a rich ethnic and cultural environment which can support immigrants as they face a number of hurdles on the path to integration in the city and its metropolitan area.

Another lesson from Naples has to do with the critical role of effective access to welfare services, which collectively act as the cornerstone for any integration policy. It is indeed essential that immigrants can make effective use of the services available, and therefore the cultural idiosyncrasies of every group must be recognised and taken into consideration. Any service dealing with immigrants must reach out to them and directly involve their communities; this must be achieved not only via the usual information channels, but also through individuals who are closer to their habits and ways of life. This is where cultural mediation has a crucial role to play, as demonstrated with experiences such as the Window for the Jobless, Mila and La Gatta. As these experiences highlight, cultural mediators act as major conduits between institutions and immigrant communities. Most importantly, they serve as ‘amplifiers’ for the services on offer – so long, that is, as they remain a two-way channel in the difficult dialogue between institutions and immigrant communities. In other words, effective cultural mediators end up having a ‘multiplier effect’ on immigrants’ access to welfare services.

On top of ‘advertising’ welfare services to immigrants, cultural mediators have naturally been fundamental to better basic communication between immigrants and institutions. They do more than bridge the linguistic and cultural gaps that obviously stand in the way of better access to services, although this is an important function. In this process, cultural mediators and informal networks in Naples and area have made service-providing institutions more aware of, and responsive to, immigrants’ needs. Those organisations with a time-honoured tradition of assistance to immigrants have gone a long way towards opening up an effective dialogue between the various official and unofficial services and the immigrant communities.

5. Lessons learned and Recommendations

The frequency of amnesties is one of the more questionable aspects of Italy’s immigration policy and makes it rather unique, at least in Europe. Almost all of Italy’s recent successive laws on immigration have included an amnesty to regularise undocumented immigrants and suspend any of the sanctions set out under the previous piece of legislation. However, this system is flawed, especially as it can go on indefinitely: since any illegal immigrant knows that even though s/he did not meet the conditions for a residence permit on arrival in Italy, it hardly matters because sooner or later s/he will benefit from an amnesty.

For all the faults in Italy’s national legal framework, the Naples experience has five major lessons for the design and management of urban policies aimed at improving the conditions of immigrants:

1) Like some other cities around the world, Naples and its metropolitan area showcase immigration as a variety of ethnic origins and cultures. This highlights cultural mediators act as major conduits between institutions and immigrant communities. Most importantly, they serve as ‘amplifiers’ for the services on offer – so long, that is, as they remain a two-way channel in the difficult dialogue between institutions and immigrant communities. In other words, effective cultural mediators end up having a ‘multiplier effect’ on immigrants’ access to welfare services.

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Neither local authorities nor the central government should hold exclusive responsibility for the development of immigration policies. Public initiatives should, on the contrary, stem from constant interaction between local and central government as well as NGOs. In other words, any immigration policy requires consistency and harmony between national and local regulations, together with an ability to recognise and integrate any valuable experiences developed in non-governmental frameworks.

With their focus on immigrants' actual needs and requirements, local public and non-governmental bodies find that their priorities are those of the central government in reverse, as they consider that employment and housing must take precedence over residence permits. As they act accordingly, local civil society and authorities effectively fill in some of the gaps and inadequacies in Italy's national immigration framework, and they do so in a non-confrontational fashion.

The model outlined in this chapter has emerged quite spontaneously in response to immigrants' problems in the Naples conurbation and as provincial authorities coordinated efforts and policies on a day-to-day basis with local institutions (regional and municipal), universities and NGOs.

The main lesson from Naples is that any steps promoting the social inclusion of immigrants should primarily be directed at the supply of services. Moreover, policy-makers should consider immigration as a complex, multi-faceted social issue rather than a political or economic emergency. Immigrants should not be perceived as a threat to the public order; on the contrary, they are a weak segment of the community in need of protection, and at the same time a valuable resource for society.

Projects like the Window for the Jobless and Mila go to show that any integration of immigrants in the labour market must be complemented by actions that support the local population in its relation with immigrant communities. In Italy as in many other countries, the major problem immigrants have to face is the wide gap between their expectations in terms of the employment available to them in the host country, and the mere subsistence they eke out of their actual jobs. In Naples and area, periodical meetings have given immigrants opportunities to spell out more than their basic reasons for moving to Italy and their practical needs; such meetings have also contributed to highlight their individual potential, which in turn has made it easier for social workers to offer suitable alternatives where available.

The activities of various groups and organisations at the local level show that proper management of immigration and its practical implications must involve experiments with new models together with improvement of the old ones, with government allocating resources in support of local initiatives.
1. The context

International migration in Brazil has two distinct facets. On the one hand, some 2.5 million Brazilians have left in search of better opportunities in wealthier countries; on the other hand, an increasing number of international migrants have come to Brazil in search of better opportunities. Both realities reflect the vulnerability and social exclusion experienced by significant parts of the population in poor countries.

The image of São Paulo as a predominantly ‘white’ city with a ‘European’ way of life is part and parcel of the city’s identity, as compared to other Brazilian cities such as Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, whose populations feature higher proportions of blacks. São Paulo’s economy includes a robust industrial and post-industrial base (in contrast to a strong agrarian tradition elsewhere in the country) with a reputedly ‘workaholic’ population. During the 1950s and 1960s, São Paulo saw itself as a city of progress, ‘the country’s locomotive,’ and has more recently been considered as Brazil’s ‘Global City’.

Substantial migratory streams to São Paulo, mostly Europeans who arrived between the late 19th and early 20th centuries, played an important role in the building of this image and influenced the way various communities were received in the city. This may be the origin of the dual manner in which the city deals with immigrants. On one hand, the city maintains this image of multiculturalism, which has an influence on public policy. On the other hand, whole groups of immigrants live outside the law with their rights violated, and are stigmatised by the media although city authorities and the local community turn a largely blind to them.

Part of the history of São Paulo can be told from the point of view of the large flows of migrants who came there at different points in time and had a fundamental impact on the city and its rapid growth. The existing white and black
populations themselves are of immigrant origins: either Portuguese colonisers after the 16th century, or forced slave labour brought over from Africa. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the abolition of slavery (1888) and its replacement with international immigrants ushered in a period of economic development, population growth and urban expansion that continued throughout most of the 20th century.

The years between 1870 and 1920 are when the city and State of São Paulo became dominant in Brazil. The city's population grew from 30,000 in 1872 to 579,000 in 1920. This growth rate has been maintained throughout the 20th century, as shown in Table 1 below.

**TABLE 1 – SÃO PAULO POPULATION GROWTH, 1872 - 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>municipality of São Paulo growth rate (%)</th>
<th>Other municipalities metropolitan area growth rate (%)</th>
<th>Total population metropolitan area growth rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>31,385</td>
<td>241,784</td>
<td>1,568,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>239,820</td>
<td>957,960</td>
<td>4,739,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,326,261</td>
<td>4,095,508</td>
<td>12,588,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3,781,446</td>
<td>7,588,725</td>
<td>4,739,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8,493,217</td>
<td>15,444,941</td>
<td>5,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>9,646,185</td>
<td>17,833,511</td>
<td>5,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10,406,166</td>
<td>4,247,345</td>
<td>7,427,345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: IBGE Demographic Census, various editions

A significant proportion of the European immigrants who substituted for slave labour in the coffee plantations rejected the prevailing work conditions, which owners had largely left unchanged. Upon arrival at the farms, the immigrants were already in debt to the owners, and most had to take out credit until the first payday. Many immigrant labourers escaped from the farms to the cities where they began to build new, urban lives for themselves. At the beginning of the 20th century, it was said that one heard more Italian than Portuguese spoken on the streets of São Paulo. Immigrants swarmed into São Paulo due to its economic development, population growth and urban expansion that continued throughout most of the 20th century.

They began to depend upon the expertise and skill sets which Italians, Spaniards and Germans brought from their countries of origin. European immigrants indeed came to control a significant part of the city's specialised labour, such as construction and related handicrafts. Immigrants worked as carpenters, masons, artisans, joiners, shoemakers, hairdressers, and they also owned a significant part of the city's hotels and restaurants. Within a few decades, some of the immigrants grew very wealthy through their involvement in the retail and service sectors as well as manufacturing. They ended up merging with São Paulo's traditional elite, blurring the differences between 'natives' and 'newcomers'.

The second half of the 20th century saw a decline in European migration to Brazil, partly due to improved economic conditions and opportunities in Europe. After 1950, the number of foreign immigrants to São Paulo decreased and was made up for by internal migrants from other Brazilian regions, particularly the poor Northeast (Nordeste) State. After the 1980s, Brazil's economic crisis brought immigration from the more advanced economies to a halt or nearly so – indeed, after the 1980s migration flows were inverted, and Brazil turned into a country of emigration for the first time ever. Estimates are that some 2.5 million Brazilians are living abroad, or around 1.3 per cent of the total population.

Throughout the 1990s, the foreign population in São Paulo fell by 16.3 per cent, according to census data. In 1991, the city was host to 219,178 foreigners (or 2.3 per cent of the total population); however, by 2000 the figure had fallen to 195,543 (1.9 per cent of the total population), or 23,535 fewer.

Table 2 breaks down São Paulo's foreign population by region of origin. According to 2000 census data, well over 50 per cent of foreigners residing in the city are from Europe (60 per cent), followed by Asia (19 per cent) and South America (11.6 per cent). The high percentage of Europeans is due to the large number of Portuguese residents. On the other hand, massive Japanese immigration to São Paulo in the 20th century accounts for the large number of people of Asian origin.

These figures underestimate the number of undocumented immigrants in the city, who tend to come from other countries in Latin America. There is little research on this group of immigrants, and no reliable figures on their numbers.

Figures on undocumented immigrants are very scarce, resulting in a wide range of estimates for the total number of international migrants. The Bolivian Consulate in São Paulo claimed that 15,000 documented immigrants were living in the city in 2004 and estimated the total number of Bolivians in São Paulo at 60,000, or 20,000 less than an estimate by the Scalabrini Centre for Migratory Studies. The Projeto Mil Povos (‘Thousand Peoples’ Project) of the Municipality of São Paulo (outlined below), evaluates the total number of Latin American migrants (both legal and illegal) in the city at some 200,000.

In addition, research carried out by the Scalabrini Centre between 1985 and 1995 on a sample group of Latin American migrants (based on the services of- fered by the Migrants’ Pastoral (Pastoral dos Migrantes), a dedicated assistance service run by the Roman Catholic Church) (see below) highlights quite different trends depending on the countries of origin.

The numbers of Bolivians and Peruvians using the Pastoral’s services have increased significantly, highlighting their higher proportion relative to other Latin American communities as well as an apparent slide deeper into poverty (da Silva, 1999).

Moreover, a significant number of immigrants to São Paulo are indigenous, with many Bolivians only speaking Quechua or Aymará. This situation highlights a need for specific public policies, since those that work well for Spanish speakers can affect negatively those who speak only indigenous languages.

### Employment opportunities and living conditions

As soon as immigrants arrive in São Paulo in search of work, they find themselves faced with precarious work and living conditions, as well as difficult access to public services such as health and education. The textile-apparel industry is where the bulk of new immigrants find employment – one of the fastest growing sectors and a very competitive one to boot. A significant number of Koreans can be found at various points along this production chain, including

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**TABLE 2 – FOREIGN RESIDENTS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF SÃO PAULO, 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of origin</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia and Oceania</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2,601</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>6,462</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>8,709</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>22,688</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>37,126</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>117,814</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>195,643</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBGE - 2000 Demographic Census

Although the total foreign born population has decreased, since the 1970s the number of Latin American immigrants to Brazil has been growing, highlighting a shift in the pattern of international immigration towards the end of the 20th century. According to Federal Police statistics, between 1995 and 1999 the number of Argentinean immigrants in São Paulo grew by 124 per cent, and the Bolivian registered population increased by a far higher multiple, from 255 to 17,897 individuals.

**TABLE 3 – LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS INTO SÃO PAULO, 1995 AND 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>7,381</td>
<td>16,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>17,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>19,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>4,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>4,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>5,863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal Police, Foreigners Statistics Service

Other groups, including Chinese and Korean immigrants, also increased during the same period, with 4,722 Chinese and 4,799 Koreans officially residing in the city in 2000. However, since these groups are mostly middle class and do not put welfare programmes under any special pressure, this chapter will not include them.

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2 According to da Silva (2001), political persecution forced many Chileans, Argentineans and Uruguayans, among others, to migrate to Brazil. For the same reason, many Brazilians moved to neighbouring countries to escape from what they perceived as Brazil’s authoritarian State.

3 Although the figures date back to the 1990s, no major change appears to have taken place in recent years.
wholesale and low-cost clothes stores in Brás and Bom Retiro, and two traditional shopping areas near the city centre. Koreans are also involved in the design of the clothes that are subsequently sewn together in the sweatshops employing many immigrants from Latin America. Low production costs are of particular importance to the apparel sector, and hiring illegal labour is the major way of keeping costs down. This is one reason why Brazilian citizens are not offered these jobs, although many would probably accept the low wages on offer. 

Korean immigrants once owned the apparel workshops. However, since the mid-1990s many have moved into the more profitable and less risky activities of design and retail. It is very common for a Korean shop-owner to sell their production facilities to a former employee who more often than not is an immigrant from a Latin American country. Rather than paying cash, the new factory owner must provide a certain quantity of items to the shop owner – which usually means months’ or years’ unpaid work. The result is that Latin American immigrants are increasingly exploited.

As noted above, the majority of Latin American immigrants arriving in São Paulo are employed in the textile-apparel industry. On top of offering an abundance of jobs including to illegal immigrants, this type occupation is already familiar to many Latin American migrants, especially Bolivians, and often the only professional skill they have ever acquired. Most Latin American migrants make it to Brazil through relatives or acquaintances working in the textile-apparel sector. In Bolivia, newspapers even publish advertisements calling for workers, with promises including monthly wages of up to US$ 500, free housing and food, and good working conditions – all in all, a very attractive proposition for unemployed Bolivians, Peruvians or Paraguayans.

4 Exploitation of labour in the textile-apparel industry is one of the factors ensuring competitiveness. In addition to the “competitiveness that derives from innovation and distribution, there are specific labour cost reduction strategies, involving precarious labour conditions. Common is the use of subcontracting through home work and illegal international migrant workers.” (Garcia, Cruz-Moreira, 2004).

5 The association of undocumented immigrants and the textile industry can be seen in other cities. In New York, “Korean business owners are buying factories from those of Jewish and Italian origin in the Garment District, and have been subcontracting out the production of low-cost sportswear... the Korean owned businesses have employed workers of Latin-American origin, mostly Dominicans.” (Garcia Cruz-Moreira, 2004).

6 In São Paulo the term “Bolivian” often encompasses other Latin American nationalities such as Peruvians and Paraguayans, who often share the same working and living conditions as the Bolivians. An article in the Folha de São Paulo newspaper dated August 21st 2004 shows us that inside the same illegal textile office there were Bolivians, Peruvians and Paraguayans among the 15 semi-slave workers caught by the police.

7 Some immigrants likely have prior knowledge of the conditions in São Paulo, especially those lured over by acquaintances or relatives, although one claimed he had been cheated by a cousin.

Once in São Paulo, most immigrants are surprised at the actual conditions that they find. Whether the employer is Korean or Bolivian, these conditions are awful: up to 18 hours’ work a day Monday to Saturday in slave-like conditions. Workers often sleep sleep to the machines they have used during the day. The workshops frequently operate in crowded, dark, dusty and poorly aired old houses, which workers and their families use for accommodation as well. Workers usually accept these conditions, and many are paid by the piece, although employers do not always abide by contract rules and occasionally pay a set gross rate. Many immigrant workers struggle on in the hope that one day, they will run their own workshops, which often implies going into debt and through spells of unpaid work. Average monthly wages for those workers paid by the piece vary between 200 and 500 reales. Higher wages are paid during peak production months (August to November) as retailers buy for the holiday season. Those who are paid a set salary receive as little as 70 to 140 reales per month. Each clothing item produced is worth between 0.15 and 1.50 real, depending on the complexity of the production processes and the machines used. These are extremely low costs, and some observers claim that Koreans can afford to force prices down since they control a significant portion of the retail market.

There is no consensus over the use of the phrase ‘slave-like’ to describe conditions in the sweatshops. In oral testimonies immigrants do not see their work conditions that way and feel that the phrase only adds one more negative dimension to the discrimination they already have to endure. Incidentally, one of the objectives of the Migrants’ Pastoral is to make immigrants aware that they are being exploited and that they are entitled to specific rights.

It is important to note that international migration is very responsive to the vagaries of economic conditions. The 2001 economic crisis in Argentina brought about a re-orientation of migration flows from other Latin American countries, away from Argentina and towards Brazil. The 1999 devaluation of the real, Brazil’s currency, has substantially increased the competitiveness of the apparel sector, resulting in a corresponding need for additional labour. One of the most
commonplace. Unaware of alternatives to their domestic situation, ill-treated women do not consider taking action out of fear of deportation and homelessness. On top of appalling work, housing and health conditions, migrants' education standards are also very poor, especially among children and teenagers. Language and cultural barriers stand in the way of immigrant access to the free education provided by State and municipal authorities. Despite these difficulties, immigrant families are increasingly looking for public education in the city.

2. National policies

Immigrants are becoming increasingly conspicuous in São Paulo and are making their presence felt in the public domain, as discussed below. Immigrant communities are concerned with the negative image the media diffuse both of illegal migration and undocumented workers; they seek to counter these perceptions with positive messages and images (including local public access to the fairs and festive events immigrants organise between them).

Although São Paulo's population overall is foreigner-friendly when migrants are white and from developed or European countries, those from poor countries are not as welcome. These groups are often stigmatised as coca growers (Bolivians), drug traffickers (Colombians) or smugglers (Paraguayans). Moreover, international migrants are increasingly perceived as exploited workers, and the fact that many of the textile-apparel workshops are owned by fellow immigrants may suggest to some that these communities are exploiting their own members. These negative perceptions reflect a certain reluctance among the population of São Paulo to integrate 'Latin American' (albeit the city itself is Latin American) ethnic and cultural diversity into the image of the city as a melting pot. 'The ethnic and cultural diversity of these immigrants, instead of being seen as a plus, is associated with poverty and their rural and Indian origins (Quechua, Aymará, Guarani), and, therefore, synonymous with underdevelopment' (da Silva, 1998).

However, this negative image is not the norm. Immigrants in general, including the poorer among them, do not perceive themselves as ill-treated by Brazilians, whom they often describe as welcoming. Second-generation immigrants from other Latin American countries often look like native Brazilians and are assimilated relatively easily. Outside the textile-apparel trade union, there is little talk...
of labour market competition. Indeed, in São Paulo more prejudice may be directed at migrants coming from the poor Northeast of the country than at those from other Latin American countries.

In a city with a population of 10 million and facing enormous environmental, economic and social problems, an estimated 100,000 ‘invisible’ (i.e., illegal/undocumented) international migrants working in poor conditions is not perceived as a major issue. However, in recent years the number of newspaper stories and television programmes on illegal workshops and the work conditions of many foreign migrants has significantly increased, reflecting mounting concern. At present, the Federal Government seems to be more concerned with Brazilian migrants abroad than with foreign immigrants in Brazil. This attitude is understandable, since emigration nowadays is much more sizeable than immigration. The Ministry of International Relations estimates that of the more than 2.5 million Brazilians residing abroad, most live in the USA, Paraguay, Japan and Portugal. Total remittances amount to as much as 5.8 billion US dollars per year. However, in 2005, a new soap opera, entitled ‘America’, is to be broadcast on Brazilian television, where for the first time emigration will feature as a theme. This is a significant event, since soap operas are the most important conduit for mass communication in Brazil, and are often used to reinforce public awareness campaigns.

As for foreign immigration, Brazil’s existing policies are still based upon the clearly inadequate judicial framework inherited from the period of military government. In 1980, a statute set out national immigration policies and established a National Council for Immigration. In 1981, after protests from international organisations over its rigid strictures, the statute was amended to facilitate residence for members of religious orders, and to prohibit deportation of those foreigners who have been married to Brazilians for more than five years and whose children were born in Brazil.

The Immigration Act 1981 (formally known as law No. 6.964/1981) remains the current institutional framework for immigration. Its purpose is fairly broad as it includes migration, refugees, tourism, visa issuance, Brazilian nationality, and extradition. Articles 2 and 3 of the 1981 Act make its aims clear: 'The application of this law attends primarily to national security, to the way public authorities are organised, to Brazil's political, socio-economic and cultural objectives, and to the protection of Brazilian workers (...) granting of visas will always be conditioned on national interests'\(^{12}\). At the same time, other sections in the statute open the door to well-educated and highly skilled migrants: 'Immigration aims primarily at enabling the supply of specialised labour to the various sectors of the national economy, contributing to all aspects of the national development policy, and to an increase in productivity, a transfer of technology and the delivery of resources to specific sectors'\(^{13}\).

The policy regarding work permits clearly highlights the economic focus of the approach. It is much more flexible with regard to managers, researchers and technicians from developed countries. In 1999, 12,708 work permits were issued, of which 17.3 per cent to US citizens, 9.5 per cent to Britons and 6.1 per cent to Germans. The visa policy also makes it clear that not all are treated equally. Whereas most European, US and Argentinean tourists are allowed 90-day stays, Bolivians are normally restricted to 30 days. The Immigration Act 1981 ended up clashing with some of the principles subsequently enshrined in the 1988 Constitution. In 1991, the federal government drafted a bill that would have redefined the legal status of foreign migrants. However, some organisations consider the bill as inadequate and deplore its narrow focus on national security and economic objectives.

Further bills regarding foreign migrants are being debated in the Brazilian parliament. 'In October 2000, 17 bills related to foreigners were standing before the Congress. Besides the new Statute on Foreigners, four other bills dealt with naturalisation procedures, two with the granting of permanent visas and another two with illegal immigration controls. On top of this, there were also bills on tax exemption for poor foreigners, on voting rights and military con-

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9 On July 20th 1997, the O Estado de São Paulo newspaper published a report on slave labour in a factory in Vila Buenos Aires (north of the city), triggered by a tipoff from the textile workers’ union (which seems to be behind most such denunciations). These complaints have led to raids by the Federal Police (responsible for immigration matters) and the imprisonment of textile workers and factory owners. In the following month, the "Jornal Nacional", Brazil’s most popular television news programme, broadcast a report, “Bolivians in bonded labour in São Paulo.” A recent article in the Folha de São Paulo newspaper carried the headline “Public attorney uncovers slave labour in São Paulo.” The same newspaper published a short report on the problem of Bolivian slave labour in the city on July 19th 2004.

10 Folha de São Paulo, July 17th 2004.

11 Federal Law 815/1980 as amended by Federal Law 6 964/81, also known as the Statute on Foreigners.


The project reflects the city's self-image as a melting pot. The Internet site has services to immigrant communities. The user can also get information on the different organisations providing immigration to the city, and on events sponsored by the various communities. This involves a Website where the user can get information on the history of immigration to the city, and on events sponsored by the various communities. The user can also get information on the different organisations providing services to immigrant communities. The project reflects the city's self-image as a melting pot. The Internet site has links to 36 immigrant communities in São Paulo, and yet the Bolivian community was not among them at the time this chapter was being written. According to the site, ‘São Paulo has its place in the world, and everybody has a place in São Paulo’. The phrasing suggests the image of a welcoming city and peaceful coexistence among different groups, and in this regard it is not entirely misleading. On the other hand, the phrasing conceals the fact that some communities are much more welcome and easier to integrate than others. Greater emphasis is laid on the European communities, and Latin Americans are given a noticeably secondary role in the site. Mil Povos conveys a peaceful and harmonious image of immigrant communities, but does not refer to the fact that some of the communities might demand specific social policies from the municipality to address their needs. Yet these poor immigrants do exist, and they are eliciting both fragmented and experimental responses by some municipal services and civil society, as detailed below. One initiative by the São Paulo State government in the namesake city was the transformation of the Immigrant Hostel located in the neighbourhood of Brás. The hostel had been built in the 1880s to house government-subsidised immigrants who arrived in their droves on their way to the area's many coffee farms. The building has now been turned into a museum documenting immigration in the city. However, and as usual, the displays focus on white, European (or Japanese) immigrants and have little to tell beyond individual success stories. Although there is no health policy for international migrants, some isolated schemes stand out. Many stem from the need to face the challenges which municipal healthcare professionals come across on a daily basis.

In 2004 and after receiving reports on Bolivian females' health conditions, the Women’s Coordinating Unit of the Municipal Health Secretariat set up a Working Group to address immigrant women's healthcare requirements. The Working Group has turned into an important forum where various types of practice can be redefined. For instance, Working Group members have found that whereas leaflets in Spanish are helpful for some, many in the community are illiterate, and many others still would be best served by literature and information in Quechua or Aymará. Together with community-based organisations and the Migrants’ Pastoral, healthcare professionals from those administrative districts (subprefeituras) with high numbers of immigrant residents (Pari, Bom Retiro, Moóca, Vila Maria) sit on the Working Group. The group is currently documenting all the health clinics and services that tend to immigrants, including the main projects they pursue and the challenges they face. The group is producing Spanish-speaking literature on women's health and on tuberculosis prevention, on top of organising meetings of medical personnel dealing with immigrant health issues. In São Paulo, both the State and the Municipality run their own schools. The children of undocumented immigrants can attend São Paulo’s public schools, as the Constitution and education legislation affirm individual rights to education regardless of nationality. However, until recently, legislation has prevented migrant children from receiving final certificates, making it impossible for them to prove their educational achievements.

3. Municipal policies and practices

Despite the growing numbers of Latin American immigrants residing in the city, the Municipality of São Paulo has still to devise any specific policy or programme addressing their problems, a shortcoming which in turn may contribute to the already large number of marginalised residents in the city. Against this background, though, two recent initiatives are worth mentioning. The Mil Povos project run by the city’s International Relations Secretariat (Secretaria das Relações Internacionais) focuses primarily on image-building. This involves a Website where the user can get information on the history of immigration to the city, and on events sponsored by the various communities. The user can also get information on the different organisations providing services to immigrant communities. The project reflects the city's self-image as a melting pot. The Internet site has links to 36 immigrant communities in São Paulo, and yet the Bolivian community was not among them at the time this chapter was being written. According to the site, 'São Paulo has its place in the world, and everybody has a place in São Paulo'. The phrasing suggests the image of a welcoming city and peaceful coexistence among different groups, and in this regard it is not entirely misleading. On the other hand, the phrasing conceals the fact that some communities are much more welcome and easier to integrate than others. Greater emphasis is laid on the European communities, and Latin Americans are given a noticeably secondary role in the site. Mil Povos conveys a peaceful and harmonious image of immigrant communities, but does not refer to the fact that some of the communities might demand specific social policies from the municipality to address their needs. Yet these poor immigrants do exist, and they are eliciting both fragmented and experimental responses by some municipal services and civil society, as detailed below. One initiative by the São Paulo State government in the namesake city was the transformation of the Immigrant Hostel located in the neighbourhood of Brás. The hostel had been built in the 1880s to house government-subsidised immigrants who arrived in their droves on their way to the area's many coffee farms. The building has now been turned into a museum documenting immigration in the city. However, and as usual, the displays focus on white, European (or Japanese) immigrants and have little to tell beyond individual success stories. Although there is no health policy for international migrants, some isolated schemes stand out. Many stem from the need to face the challenges which municipal healthcare professionals come across on a daily basis.

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14 Prata, Juliana Mendes, Hospedaria dos Imigrantes: reflexões sobre o patrimônio cultural.
15 According to Dr Ana Paula Beck, a practicing obstetrician in Vila Maria, the situation of Bolivian women is tragic. Bolivians contribute 20 per cent of the 2,500 annual childbirths at the area's Municipal Hospital José Strovopoli. Rates of infant mortality are three to four times higher among Bolivian than other women, and maternal mortality is also alarmingly higher. Most suffer from venereal infections, tuberculosis and/or anemia. Many women decline Caesarean sections, which in some Indian cultures imply loss of femininity and often lead to desertion by husbands.
Following sustained pressure from immigrant communities and the Migrants’ Pastoral, and with support from the Municipal Labour Secretariat, a July 2004 decree ruled that all students, including the children of undocumented immigrants, must receive a certificate upon completion of schooling. With regard to the Municipal education system, the ongoing process of administrative decentralisation has an extremely important role to play, as it makes it possible to adjust policies, curricula and actions to students’ diverse profiles. For instance, the Education Coordinating Unit for the Subprefeitura of Moóca, has proved very responsive to immigrant needs and to the potential for reaching out to those communities via municipal schools. As the Coordinator, Lélia Rodrigues, told the authors of this chapter in a private interview: ‘They [the immigrants] are here anyway, they have to be included, because the school [and] health services are for everybody. This is citizenship, and once they are here, they have to be given citizenship’. In some schools, up to 30 per cent of the pupils are Bolivian or from other Latin American countries. The Coordinator for Moóca reckons that many more migrant children are kept away from school, due to lack of information or fear of the police.

The Education Coordinating Unit for Moóca has begun to work together with the Health Coordinating Unit; the purpose is to appraise school heads of the conditions and needs of some of the immigrant pupils, and to promote integration – including with the addition of Andean features to school parties. Moreover, there has been a request for the hiring of Spanish teachers together with efforts to involve the parents of immigrant children into some school activities. The State of São Paulo runs a separate public education system that does not seem so keen to meet immigrant needs. During a conversation with a teacher in a State school (in Bom Retiro), where around 450 in 700 pupils are from other Latin American countries, it became obvious that no efforts were made to include elements of other Latin American cultures in lessons or activities. In private interviews, teachers were very explicit; as one said: ‘Since they [immigrant children] are in Brazil, they have to learn about Brazilian culture and we are under no obligation to be sensitive to immigrants’ culture or problems’.

Although administrative decentralisation in São Paulo has been under discussion for at least two decades, no effective move took place before 2001. The so-called regional administrations (i.e., the city’s district authorities, in charge of service provision in their area, but without any political or budget autonomy) were transformed into ‘sub-mayoral authorities’ with greater political and budgetary autonomy. Various divisions, such as Health, Education and Social Work, have decentralised service provision in the process, with their local branches gaining a certain degree of autonomy with regard to policy-making in their respective areas as long as they remained in line with the overall policies determined by city authorities.

Quite recent as it is, decentralisation has already resulted in some improvements with respect to specific immigrant groups. Among other things, decentralisation has led to better understanding of international migration and its challenges. Though still small in relative terms, in some administrative districts such as Moóca, Bom Retiro and Vila Maria the numbers of foreign migrants are becoming significant, highlighting the need for pro-immigrant public policies. Regarding the city of São Paulo as a whole, it is likely that policymakers would have made no effort to take foreign migrants’ requirements on board if policies had remained completely centralised.

Decentralisation enables individual administrative districts to focus on the specific demands that emerge at local level. Relative degrees of autonomy with regard to planning, management and budget in the districts have made it possible, for instance, to produce Spanish-speaking versions of information leaflets. In education, municipal schools are much prompter than their State-run counterparts to adapt to immigrants’ needs.

Municipal authorities have devised many inclusive instruments to encourage participation in the new democratic setup. These instruments include people’s councils to monitor and manage various policies, participatory budgets and participation-oriented master plans, among others.

Against a background of inefficient and scarce public services and infrastructure, civil society groups monitor existing services on a continuing basis and demand improvements if and when needed. As a result, local government often prioritises those groups that are best organised. However, in general, only those people with legal status will usually take advantage of ‘participation’ since it was never designed to respond to immigrants’ demands, and there are hardly any signs that anything has changed in this respect. This gap between supply and demand sets a clear limit to immigrant community access to public services and facilities in the State of São Paulo. Being kept away from the various fora and advocacy channels, migrants are unable to voice
care of the Municipality of São Paulo takes guests who are provided with temporary shelter, food (three meals daily) as well as professional and psychological support. The charity runs a hostel, recently renamed Casa do Migrante (Migrant’s House), with accommodation for 120 guests who are provided with temporary shelter, food (three meals daily) as well as medical and dental care. Since 2002, the Municipality of São Paulo takes care of 30 per cent of the hostel’s running costs. Although foreign migration into Brazil is on the increase, the majority of guests are from other areas of the country; however, the number of foreign guests is steadily increasing, currently making up approximately 30 per cent of the total.

Brazilian residents tend to stay at the Casa an average five weeks, as they quickly gain access to least-skilled jobs. Foreigners tend to check into the hostel after five or six months in town, due to a lack of information. Immigrants from neighbouring Latin American countries tend to stay at the Casa an average three to four months, compared to up to six months (the maximum allowed) for Africans. The Bolivian community was a major participant in the amnesty that was declared in 1998 for illegal immigrants: they helped immigrants to qualify and played significant role in the regularisation of 10,525 undocumented immigrants in the city at that time. However, many immigrants were reluctant to regularise their status, due to the difficulties and the costs involved (da Silva, 2003). Since then, and with many more immigrants moving in, illegal immigration and regularisation remain major issues.

The need for new legislation on immigrants in Brazil is a direct function of the inadequate amnesties that were declared successively in 1981, 1988 and 1998. The numbers of beneficiaries are considered as rather low: 27,000 in the 1981 amnesty, 30,000 in 1988 and 37,000 in 1998, for Brazil as a whole. Apparently, various factors account for these figures: the short time lapse allowed, inadequate information, fear of contact with the police, and costs.

The fact is that in many cases, immigrants simply could not afford the cost of regularisation (around 800 reales). Those immigrant rights groups calling for changes to the Immigration Act propose that regularisation costs should not be more than 10 per cent of Brazil’s minimum wage (currently 260 reales per month), and fines for time spent illegally in Brazil should not be enforced, or should not exceed the monthly minimum wage.

A second challenge to immigrant regularisation has to do with bureaucracy. Once a request for regularisation is filed, complete with filled-in forms and fee payment, the request goes all the way to Brasília, the federal capital, for review and approval, and once there it can take years before it is properly assessed. If a permit is granted and issued, the beneficiary must return to the local Federal Police offices, pay another fee and provide yet more papers. Often the immigrant is not personally informed of the decision and (s)he must monitor the Diário Oficial da União (the federal gazetteer) to check whether her/his name

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16 The Pastoral’s Centre for Migration Studies publishes a dedicated periodical, Travessia.
is listed. Needless to say how forbidding this whole procedure is for poor foreign immigrants, not to mention the fact that access to the gazetteer is very difficult even for Brazilians. In the past, the difficulties they ran against have forced many immigrants to begin the regularisation procedure all over again. As long as their regularisation request is being processed, immigrants are not allowed to work. Rather oddly, the legislation requires applicants to prove that they can support themselves and any relatives residing in Brazil. This inconsistency is such that poor immigrants may be forced either to continue working in the informal sector, or somehow to fake evidence that they can survive in Brazil. Some immigrants will go so far as to register children that do not exist (i.e., claim that they have Brazilian-born children), or claim bogus marriages, in order to legalise their status. However, the Federal Police is entitled to inspect immigrants’ homes and if anyone undocumented found there faces expulsion. If, in the course of the regularisation process, the Federal Police cannot find an immigrant’s declared residence, and/or that immigrant cannot be located, they inform the federal authorities in Brasília and regularisation is denied.

Formal calls for reform of the current legislation on immigrant regularisation were first voiced in 2001 during a seminar on the theme ‘The immigrant in Brazil: Legal status, problems and perspectives’. In 2002, public hearings were held in São Paulo (involving the Centre for Migration Studies and the São Paulo State Legislative Assembly), as well as in Foz do Iguaçu, in the southern state of Paraná on the border with Paraguay and Argentina (involving both the public sector and civil society organisations). In 2003, a new discussion was held in São Paulo on ‘Migrants and Human Rights in Brazil’, where signatures were collected in support of immigration law reform.

In São Paulo, immigrants make their mark on some parts of the city – although not in any of the neighbourhoods in affluent southeastern districts. In this sense, the scale of the community certainly matters, and the Bolivian community – the largest – is most conspicuous. Other communities share some of these claimed territories, such as the church of Nossa Senhora da Paz (‘Our Lady of the Peace’, see below).

The Bolivians, in particular, are involved in a string of weekly social-cultural events regardless of their poor living and work conditions. On Sundays and holidays, they walk away from the sewing machines and take to celebrate, in the streets or indoors, in an outburst of sociability that could not be more at odds with the drudgery of their extensive working days. For all their cultural, ethnic and social heterogeneity, the Bolivian communities occasionally meet for common celebrations, when up to hundreds of them gather together. Most of these celebrations are of a religious and popular character and linked to the cult of the Virgin Mary. Two of the most important figures coming up for public veneration are the Virgin of Urkupiña (Cochabamba) and the Virgin of Copacabana, Bolivia’s patron saint (da Silva, 2003).

In all these celebrations, indigenous beliefs commingle with the Roman Catholic ritual, with particular importance paid to ‘Pachamama’ (Mother Earth), the deity that cares for every single individual and protects their health, family, harvest and business.

Since 1995, the Roman Catholic Church has opened its doors to Bolivians for their celebrations at the church of Nossa Senhora da Paz. In 2003, the Bolivians held their first carnival and groups are beginning to participate in the city’s samba schools on the occasion of São Paulo’s annual official carnival.

One of the earlier public meeting spaces for Bolivians in São Paulo was Padre Bento Square, known as ‘Praça do Pari’. This is one of the few open spaces in Pari, near the places of work and residence of the community, and where Bolivians often meet for drinks together on their days off. In the 1990s a Bolivian market was started there, under the management of the Padre Bento Gastronomic and Cultural Association.

As the Bolivian community grew, so did the market, eventually resulting in complaints from non-Bolivian residents and tension between the Brazilian and Bolivian communities. In 2000, a death related to alcohol consumption heightened tension, leading to a public petition for municipal authorities to close the market down.

The conflict ended in negotiations involving the Gastronomic and Cultural Association and the Association for the Revitalisation of Pari and Canindé that had been established by people residing next to the market. The two community groups agreed that they should find a larger venue for the Bolivian market, and in 2002 the Municipality conceded a site in a former industrial neighborhood, which was renamed ‘Kantuta Square’. Since 2003, the Bolivians have set up their stalls there, selling goods from various regions.

The Kantuta Square market is about much more than merely commercial business, though: exchanges are also of a personal, symbolic and subjective nature.
4. Lessons learnt

Immigrants are not a homogeneous group

Municipal authorities in Latin America should be careful not to treat all immigrant communities from other countries on the continent as one homogeneous group: they need to understand the various needs of the diverse nationalities. In addition, they must be aware that the beneficiaries of pro-immigrant policies and services are often Spanish (rather than Portuguese) speakers, who already dominate community institutions.

Municipal authorities must take into account the cultural diversity of immigrant communities and offer specific services that meet the needs of these groups. In São Paulo, the concept of 'Andean' may be more relevant than 'Bolivian' or 'Peruvian' when local authorities interact with these communities, as it blurs national borders and points to a wider regional context with a diversity of cultural groups and languages.

In this sense, decentralisation seems to be a positive move, since it allows the development of locally based initiatives that can better take these differences into account.

Public policy and services must move beyond rhetoric

Public policies and services must come to grips with the multi-ethnic and diverse population patterns created by migrants as well as immigrants from around the world. This must go beyond such simplistic concepts as the 'City of a Thousand Peoples'. Only then can the vision of a welcoming city (which in the case of São Paulo is not ill-founded, as confirmed in interviews with immigrants) be converted into specific policies.

Since significant Latin American immigration to São Paulo is a recent phenomenon, it has only recently translated into demand for public policies. Devising policies for the benefit of immigrants, a challenging group by nature, indeed forces policy-makers to relativise such notions as morality, public space, or hygiene; the task also highlights a need to empower those who struggle against

During the few hours the market opens once a week, a whole universe comes to life. According to organisers, around 8,000 people attend the market every Sunday, including not just Bolivians, but other immigrants and Brazilians, too. Friends and relatives meet at the market after a week in the workshops, children and teenagers use the playground and sports pitch on the square, people look up a local notice board for job opportunities, and services such as hairdressing, photography, etc., are also on offer.

The market is one of the few places in São Paulo where Andean food can be found, along with traditional and contemporary Bolivian popular music, Bolivian clothes and handicrafts. At one end, at a safe distance, a group of young people sells phone calls on 'cloned' mobile phones. Two-minute calls to any location in the world cost around 1.00 real.

Although municipal authorities do not subsidise the Bolivian market, they legitimise it in three different ways: they grant the Association a license to operate the market; they close to traffic a street where the market takes place, and they license the stalls for a fee of 7.00 reales per week. One of the busiest stalls sells snacks and drinks for a turnover of around 800 reales every Sunday, of which no more than 200 reales in profits.

Market patrons change over the course of any single day. The better established members of the community are the first to in the morning, including professionals, retailers and apparel workshop owners, who are all reasonably well integrated in the city's middle class. In the afternoons, the public changes to young people coming to play football, adults with their children after attending mass, and those looking for jobs.

Various Christian groupings take advantage of the Bolivian Sunday market for some proselytism. At times, a corner of the square hosts an evangelical service. Municipal authorities also see the market as an opportunity to hand out leaflets whenever they need to reach out to the community. In late 2004, the Bolivian migrant community was discussing with the Municipal Health Secretariat the possibility of opening a walk-in health clinic in the square on Sundays, with community doctors providing free healthcare to those who need it.

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17 In Brazil, "cloning" a telephone line involves taking over the signal from another mobile telephone. The bill is charged to the telephone owner.
18 Source: the stall owner.
19 We witnessed the arrival of one of these groups that make themselves conspicuous with their white shirts and plastic chairs, gather in a corner of the square and engage anyone passing by in lengthy conversation.
20 The "Andeans" are not the only group with public policy demands but they are the most vocal.
Participation and social mobilisation

In Brazil, the quality of public services is often a function of the capacity of different user groups to organise, exercise pressure and participate in the different spaces and processes laid out under the country’s relatively new institutional framework. However, immigrants, and for that matter the undocumented, have seldom been collectively recognised as an important stakeholder either in the building or in the management of such public spaces.

In all fairness, this is partly down to the inadequacies of immigrant self-help organisations: they do exist, but they fail to focus on policy advocacy, even as social organisation and pressure are among the main weapons the poor resort to as they fight for progressive policies and services in Brazil. A major obstacle in this process is the undocumented or clandestine status of many among immigrant groups.

This poses yet another challenge: will Brazil’s institutional framework for popular participation support the inclusion of undocumented immigrants? International law regarding the rights of immigrants may be a key factor in determining this outcome.

International migration as a human rights issue, not a security issue

Since Brazilian federal legislation considers immigration from the sole angle of national security, its focus is on the legal conditions required of immigrants. Therefore, current legislation does not handle the category of undocumented immigrants in any proper fashion.

Against this background, it falls to municipal authorities to face the challenge of providing minimal conditions and services for undocumented immigrants. This may pave the way for potential conflict if a municipality tries to handle immigration in a more integrated or inclusive way, through specific policies that may be at odds with the relevant federal legislation. So far, this has not been an issue in São Paulo. The situation will become very interesting, though, in case a new federal statute on immigration grants municipal authorities a degree of leeway or autonomy. Brazil’s federal government should recognise that, in more ways than one, local authorities are in the best possible position to address immigrants’ needs and conditions.
1. The existing situation

Immigration to Tijuana has become a notorious phenomenon since the 1980s. Its increase in those years was boosted by two major events that shook the social structures in other Latin American countries: economic stagnation, which caused the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL) to speak of the region’s ‘lost decade’; and civil war in several countries, which proved particularly cruel in Central America. As a result, many Latin Americans decided to migrate to the United States, either for economic reasons or to escape violence. Some of them have used Tijuana as a crossing point towards the US State of California, turning the Mexican border city into a late stopping place on one of the most important terrestrial migratory routes that Latin Americans have ever trodden.

The boundary between Mexico and the United States is considered as having the highest border traffic in the world; it experiences an annual migratory flow equivalent to half of the population of Nicaragua (a country with 5.5 million inhabitants). The migrants come from many countries of the world, but mainly from Mexico, the United States and the rest of Latin America. Some of them have used Tijuana as a crossing point towards the US State of California, turning the Mexican border city into a late stopping place on one of the most important terrestrial migratory routes that Latin Americans have ever trodden.

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At the beginning of the 20th century it was a village hosting only 250, but by 2004 its population had soared to 1,452,000. According to the 2000 national census, 56 percent of Tijuana’s residents were born outside Baja California, but only 3.2 percent of the total was born abroad, including three percent in the USA and 0.2 percent in other countries. This distinction is important in the context of a border town. Those residents born in the USA experience no social problems in the city, either because they share the Mexican culture or their incomes affords those good living conditions and social recognition. In 2004, Tijuana was host to some 44,000 residents born across the border, which split into two groups. The smaller group is comprised of second-home owners from Southern (US) California and retirees from the USA, who hardly speak Spanish and live in self-imposed exclusionary conditions in compounds by the sea. The larger group is made of US citizens who have never resided in the USA. Their parents, most of them Mexicans living in Tijuana, have deliberately given birth on US territory. This strategy gives children two legal options in their future educational and professional opportunities. In view of higher housing costs and wages in San Diego, 56 percent of the working population of this group cross the border every day to work in San Diego, mainly in low-skilled employment; the remaining 44 percent work in Tijuana where they have found jobs with better remunerations or with higher social status (Alegria, 2002).

Those local Tijuana residents born outside Mexico and the USA come from a variety of countries, with China and Latin America at the top of the list. Chinese migration goes all the way back to the foundation of Tijuana. In 1918, the first organization of migrants from China was set up under the name of Asociación de Comercializadores de China (Chinese Traders’ Association). In 1936 it changed its name to Asociación de la Colonia China (Chinese Colony Association). The bulk of its current 480 members are traders and restaurant owners. Mexican migration authorities have 250 Chinese restaurants registered in the city, although the leader of the Chinese community says there are 210, while the consulate of the People’s Republic of China in Tijuana claims there are 300 restaurants. Whatever the real number, nearly all these restaurants are Chinese-owned and run by people of Chinese origin who hardly speak Spanish.

In 2004 Tijuana was host to some 3,000 Chinese citizens; the community also included 6,000 Chinese who had opted for Mexican nationality, according to the Chinese consulate. Paradoxically, the 2000 census did not register a single person born in China among the residents of Tijuana. One reason may be that Chinese-born residents did not cooperate with the officials in charge of the door-to-door census questionnaire, or if they did, they refused to speak Spanish or denied being foreigners.

The leader of the community and the Chinese consul agree over the fact that Chinese residents in Tijuana, whether they were born there or in China, generally do not join in their parents’ business activities (mainly commerce and restaurants). Instead, second-generation Chinese residents go to primary and secondary school in Tijuana. When their parents can afford it, they go to university across the border in San Diego, with only a few returning to Tijuana after graduation. This turns Tijuana into a mere stepping stone for Chinese migration on their way to the USA, only the final destination is reached over the course of two generations. Other Chinese migrants end up as owners of small restaurants after several years’ hard work and regular saving.

An unknown number of illegal Chinese citizens reside in the city and they probably prefer not to make themselves visible for any official registration purposes as they fear deportation. More generally, the self-exclusion from public space of most Chinese residents in Tijuana may also be related to the memory of the bitter events of the late 1920s, when persecution of Chinese migrants led to the destruction of their property in Tijuana and Mexicali. Although in the 1950s the Mexican government pleaded with the Chinese to return to Mexico, fear could have evolved towards caution among some members of the Chinese community in Tijuana.

Apart from US and Chinese citizens, natives of up to 35 additional countries reside in Tijuana. No one single country predominates, but Latin America (mostly El Salvador, Argentina, Colombia, and Guatemala) and Korea feature prominently. Among Latin American immigrants, few see Tijuana as their final destination. The great majority ended up there after failing to immigrate to the United States. A second group is comprised of individuals who had illegally crossed the border into the USA and were expelled back to Mexico, where US immigration services erroneously believed those migrants belonged. The third group of Latin American immigrants is made of individuals who opted to
reside in Tijuana after they were granted a work or residence permit in the USA ('green card') or US nationality. Korean residents in Tijuana include those who came to work in the local Korean assembly plant and those who stayed there after failing to cross into the United States. Based on 2000 national census data and material from informal sources, Tijuana residents born outside Mexico and the USA could be estimated at 16,748 in 2004 (not including any family members born in Mexico), representing 11 per cent of the city's total population. If we take into account the fact that these international migrants usually get married to a Mexican (except Chinese immigrants who typically find their partners within their own community), the total number of families with a foreign migrant member can be estimated at two per cent of the total Tijuana population. The country with the most immigrants in Tijuana is China, with 9,000 individuals (Table 1).

Table 1 - Tijuana 2004: International Migrants by Country of Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granada Island</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>Rest of Europe</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>43,337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's estimates based on National Census data and interviews.

The only available source with data on foreigners residing in Tijuana is the national census. However, as already mentioned, figures on international migrants refer almost exclusively to legal residents, overlooking all the illegal migrants who avoided census registration for fear of deportation. In principle, documented foreigners or naturalised Mexicans are employed (formally or informally) under the same conditions as any native Mexican. Tijuana is a city of immigrants and this is why the age distribution of its residents is at odds with the traditional pyramidal profile. Generally speaking, there are fewer children than young adults (i.e., those between 16 and 35 years old), an age bracket with the highest propensity to migrate (Table 2). However, the age distribution of foreign residents in Tijuana shows a variety of patterns. Those born in the USA feature a conventional age pyramid, which would mark them out as the most ‘local’ group among those living in the city. By contrast, the overall age pattern of those born in other countries is oval-shaped, as is the distribution of native Mexicans; but this overall age pattern differs from the natives with its higher concentration (39 per cent) in the ‘intermediate adult’ bracket (between 36 and 60 years old). Such concentration suggests either a slowdown in the pace of recent immigration to Tijuana, or a higher average age among recent immigrants.

Table 2 - Tijuana 2000: Population Distribution (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Mexicans</th>
<th>US natives</th>
<th>Other foreigners</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-15</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-35</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-60</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 and +</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Census 2000

2 In order to arrive at estimates for 2004, Tijuana’s rate of demographic growth (4.9 per cent a year) was first applied to the number of persons from each country of origin residing in the city in 2000 as reported by the national census. This estimate assumes that immigrants have the same rate of demographic growth as the whole city. This estimate was then multiplied by three for people who come from Latin American countries, almost all of Asia, and Africa (only Egypt in actual fact). National census figures for Tijuana residents from the United States, Europe and Japan remain unchanged. There are two arguments supporting this method: a) undocumented foreign residents usually evade census registration for fear of deportation; most of the undocumented immigrants are from Third World countries and most of them are from Latin American countries; an indication of this is that among undocumented foreigners regularized by the Mexican Government in Tijuana between 2000 and 2004, 77 per cent are Latin American natives, b) nobody knows how many undocumented foreigners reside in Tijuana; in interviews for this research it was suggested that the number should be more than double the number reported in the census. For Chinese migrants there was no estimate (they do not appear in the census); instead, the source for the number immigrants of Chinese origin (9,000) as stated by the Consul of China was attributed to these migrants themselves.
A second defining trait of Tijuana’s immigrant community is the prevalence of males over females. A measure of this prevalence is the masculinity ratio, i.e., the number of men for every 100 women. Table 3 shows that, at (128:100), the masculinity rate of international migrants (excluding US residents) is much greater than the (102:100) ratio for the whole population in Tijuana, especially in the middle-age adult group. On the contrary, the masculinity ratio among the young adult migrants stands at (67:100), obviously lower than 100 but also than the ratio for Tijuana as a whole. These comparative ratios are in keeping with one of the major trends in today’s global migratory process, i.e., its increasing feminisation. This is particularly evident in Latin America (Martínez, 2003) which collectively features more women than men. The implication is that if the more recent arrivals to Tijuana were mainly comprised of young adults (i.e., aged 16 to 35), a majority of them were female. This would mean that female predominance in recent immigration is more pronounced in Tijuana than the average male/female ratio among Latin American immigrants in other countries. The high proportion of females in recent international migration flows suggests either that Tijuana provides women with acceptable life conditions and they want to stay there, or that male migrants only see Tijuana as a gateway to the ‘American dream’ for which they have endured so much hardship all along their long migration.

### TABLE 3 - TIJUANA 2000: MASCULINITY RATIO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Other foreigners</th>
<th>All residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-15</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-35</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-60</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61+</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Census 2000

A third distinctive characteristic of international migrants in Tijuana is their labour participation, which is quite different from the labour participation of Mexicans. Immigrants are employed mainly in the tertiary sector (commerce and other services), where their participation is much higher than that of native Mexicans. From 57 per cent for native Mexicans, the participation rate in services rises to 73 per cent for US-born individuals and to 74 per cent for migrants from other countries. The manufacturing sector is dominated by assembly plants (‘maquiladoras’) which Tijuana’s residents consider as employers of ‘last resort’ in view of the tough work conditions (Coubès, 2003). A majority of those foreigners captured by the census avoided employment in the manufacturing sector, which employed 13.4 per cent of US-born working individuals and 22.4 per cent of international migrants, compared to 33.2 per cent of native Mexicans (Table 4) – which would suggest that on average, immigrants have a professional advantage over the natives. However, as mentioned earlier, the national census fails to capture an important part of the foreign residents in Tijuana who, probably for lack of legal status, are unlikely to enjoy such professional advantage.

### TABLE 4 - WORK FORCE DISTRIBUTION (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Mexicans</th>
<th>US natives</th>
<th>Other foreigner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary, energy &amp; water</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Census 2000

2. The issues

Regardless of the massive migratory inflow which Tijuana continues to experience, and the fact that many would-be migrants to the USA eventually stayed in the city, local residents do not exhibit any particular attitude towards international migrants. When asked in interviews which foreign communities reside in the city, public officials and leaders of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) will only mention US citizens. This group is perceived and depicted as living in expensive homes by the seaside, without any rela-
relationship with the rest of Tijuana residents. The other foreigners do not register in the initial answer. Although there is evidence of migrants, such as the Chinese, and their businesses all over the place, respondents did not mention any other international migrant communities.

This perception probably reflects the fact that no single social group in Tijuana has the legitimacy required to attribute any particular connotation to the migrant condition of other groups. The city’s social structure is made up of small groups who do not form any socially cohesive entity, within a broader community where hierarchies are not markedly defined.

This social structure results from a combination of the city’s nationwide function as a bi-national gateway for migration and of its almost uninterrupted economic growth over the past decades. Many Mexicans have stayed in Tijuana because they could not cross over to the United States, or then they could but only to be turned back; after a time, some of them (or their children) finally made it across the border. This high degree of spatial mobility has slowed down the emergence of clear-cut social roles and their corresponding images: as some individuals leave, it takes recent arrivals some time to make sense of the existing local social order. Internal migration has also added to Tijuana’s ambient diversity in terms of race, cultural heritage, needs and interests. On the other hand, continued economic growth supports upward social mobility which in turn blurs social roles and weakens any fixed images of the different social groups that may emerge. This buoyant community is predisposed to make room for foreigners as groups that add to the existing diversity. The image of international migrants is as weak as that of any of the local groups.

The low profile maintained by international migrants also helps to blur any specific social role attached to them. In particular, the perception of immigrants is not associated with urban violence or criminality, at variance with what often happens in other contexts (Table 5).

The image of Americans in Tijuana is diverse, complex and generally ambivalent. From a symbolic point of view, the Mexican identity has largely been built in opposition to the foreigner, i.e., typically the citizen of the United States, owing to the negative experiences with the northern neighbour from almost the beginnings of the Mexican republic. Mexico was invaded by the United States and lost the subsequent war in 1848, abandoning half the territory inherited from the Spanish colonial period. The last US attempt at military invasion occurred during Mexico’s social revolution in the 1910s. The last major conflict came in the late 1930s when the Mexican government nationalised the US oil companies established on its territory. This experience has contributed to the formation of a negative image of Americans as overbearing and aggressive people who cannot be trusted. However, this perception has a silver lining, as Americans are also seen as people who bring financial resources and invest in Mexico. Moreover, Mexicans admire Americans’ material achievements all over their own country. In practice, Mexicans living along the border combine an abstract stereotype with their actual perceptions of Americans as they routinely interact with them: Americans cross over into Tijuana as tourists and Mexicans go to US California for shopping or sightseeing. The border area itself provides daily occasions of constant interaction. Such awareness as is built in the process generates tolerance towards strangers and a defined but nuanced image of Americans among Tijuana’s native population. These perceptions in turn shape local people’s attitudes to Americans residing in Tijuana whenever they come across an opportunity for interaction.

Apart from their portrayal in the media, the public image of international migrants is strongly associated with the way they use the urban space, whether this is public space or segregated residential neighbourhoods. Tijuana does not feature any neighbourhood whose residents are predominantly from one single country, except for one area where American tourists spend their holidays. For instance, and in a contrast with many other Latin American cities, there is no ‘Chinatown’ in Tijuana, although China is the predominant country of origin of (non-US) foreigners in the city. Moreover, international migrants

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**TABLE 5 - NUMBER OF CRIME-RELATED NEWS, JUNE 2003 - JUNE 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of individuals appearing in news</th>
<th>Crime related</th>
<th>news searched</th>
<th>by word</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreigner*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican and US citizen</td>
<td>1,782</td>
<td>1,394</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,782</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Foreigners not including US citizens

Source: Author’s search from the website of the newspaper El Mexicano

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4 From a total of 3,261 newspaper stories, only four made reference to an international migrant born outside the USA. By contrast, US-born individuals appeared in several press stores, mainly related to drug trafficking activities or public order disturbances. These press articles contribute to the locally emerging image of US-born individuals as potentially untrustworthy.
(to the occasional exception of Guatemalans) do not use the public space for their national or religious celebrations. For example, the Chinese celebrate the famous New Year in a closed locale, rather than on the streets, with more than 1,000 participants congregating every year. On the other hand, when Tijuana authorities organise public celebrations, such as the city’s anniversary, foreigners are not invited to participate with displays of their own cultural heritage either, contrary to what happens in other Latin American cities with strong migration traditions (such as Buenos Aires, Argentina).

The blurred image which Tijuana’s Mexicans have of the city’s international migrants is also related to immigrants’ rampant integration in the local community. This integration process has to do with some characteristics of both the migrants themselves and the city. International migrants in Tijuana contribute a small proportion of the city population. As already mentioned, non-US migrants only represent one per cent of the total. This is probably why immigrants have neither ‘invaded’ the city’s public spaces nor regrouped into ethnic communities with a social life of their own and apart from the local population.

Integration of immigrants also has been facilitated by the racial and ethnic diversity of the Tijuana population. Absorbing Latin American immigrants in the mainstream population has been made easier by the fact that their racial mix and diversity coincide with those of the local inhabitants, on top of sharing Spanish as their common language. Tijuana is host to migrants from 37 countries on all continents, but more than half come from Latin America (Table 6). Immigrants from other parts of the world have integrated in the city with relative ease as well, as they can always find people similar to them, either racially or culturally: Europeans can feel cultural similarities with Mexicans, and Asians can find Mexican people whose ancestors were from Asia.

To Tijuana’s Mexican residents, their mestizo country’s own ethnic diversity is a basic fact of life. This creates a propitious local background for the integration of international migrants, instead of reinforcing their own sense of national identity. As far as Tijuana residents are concerned, they share cultural, racial and linguistic similarities with the immigrants’ countries of origin, whereas it is easy for immigrants to find a similar group in the city; the two combine to facilitate a smooth and effective process of integration.

In an apparent paradox, social exclusion among Mexicans also goes some way towards facilitating the integration of immigrants in the local community. Although economic growth maintains full employment, the wages of the majority of the population are low, and many have to cope with difficult living conditions owing not just to low incomes but to poor housing, too. According to the 2000 national census, 20 per cent of the working population in Tijuana earn less than twice the minimum wage\(^5\) and nearly 50 per cent of the housing stock was built illegally (Alegría and Ordoñez, 2004).

Many international migrants find social integration through any opportunities or spaces which marginal and informal behaviour may open up. According to NGO leaders, those foreign immigrants who establish their housing illegally are only emulating the behaviour of many local residents. When someone invades urban land for housing purposes, it is impossible to prevent others from doing the same even if they are foreigners. For lack of any means to do so, individuals acting informally cannot exclude others. On the other hand, formal land and housing markets keep the poor away, regardless of local or immigrant status. The blind eye which public authorities keep on illegal land occupation results from their own lack of resources but facilitates the social inclusion of international migrants. The government has no means of controlling the use of land and the building of illegal housing. This enables those immigrants who are not obviously ‘foreign’ to find their way in the informal settlements and the underground economy, as any Mexican would. Only a formal denunciation before INAMI would cause an international migrant to face a deportation procedure.

\(^5\) In 2004 the monthly minimum wage was equivalent to 116 US dollars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrants’ area of origin*</th>
<th>As of Census</th>
<th>2004 estimates**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, Russia &amp; Canada</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia East</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Near-East</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (Egypt)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (number of migrants)</td>
<td>3,144</td>
<td>16,784</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not including US migrants; **Including Chinese migrants.

Source: Author’s estimate based on the National Census 2000, assumptions on undocumented immigrants, and information from the Chinese consul in Tijuana.
3. International Migration and National Policies

Migration in Mexico is regulated by the Ley general de población (General Population Act) adopted by the federal government in 1973. The statute underwent significant amendments in 1996 and relatively minor ones in 1998. It is enacted through a derivative piece of regulation, the Reglamento de la ley general de población approved in 2000.

Implementation of the federal law is the responsibility of the National Institute of Migration (INAMI, placed under the control of the federal Secretary of Government) and the federal police. INAMI maintains local offices in almost all federated States. Its head ('the delegate') has the power to decide on almost any issue relating to international migration. Its main office in Baja California is located in Tijuana. Neither State nor municipal authorities have any powers regarding migration, but they are required by law to alert INAMI about any foreigner found in breach of national immigration laws, on top of supporting the federal police in its dealings with international migrants. However, the law does not prevent local authorities from carrying out social programmes aimed at legal foreign residents.

Mexican authorities grant three distinct types of visa to foreigners wishing to work in Mexico: (a) visitor, (b) immigrant, and (c) ‘immigrated’, as follows:

- A visitor visa is granted for work in a single activity, when an employer or an individual applies for it. This one-year visa can be extended to a maximum of five years. It must be approved by INAMI and results in the issuance of a specific migration form (known as FM3). As its name suggests, the visitor's visa can be granted to individuals who are not intending to stay permanently in the country.

- Immigrant visas (with migration form FM2 attached) are granted for up to five years to individuals who intend to reside permanently in Mexico, who bring specific technical, artistic or scientific skills to the country, or who have married a Mexican national or are relatives of an immigrant already established in the country.

- The ‘immigrated’ permit is granted to those individuals who have stayed in the country for the full five-year duration of their immigrant visa. A foreigner can hold this permanent visa provided (s)he will not be absent from Mexico for three consecutive years.

The high demand for labour is another driving force behind the integration of immigrants. Tijuana's economy has been growing rapidly since the mid-1980s, keeping the unemployment rate below one per cent on average. Direct foreign investment in manufacturing (maquiladoras, i.e., assembly plants) has been a major factor, with its beneficial multiplier effects cascading into the other sectors of the local economy. As a result, immigrants can find jobs easily in both the formal and the informal sectors. Therefore, as a group they do not end up being or feeling socially excluded. An abundance of jobs also reduces to next to nothing any competition between immigrant and local workers, which in turn lessens the potential for tension or conflict.

Robust economic growth has also generated one of the highest average wages in Mexican cities, and one to which immigrants have access (Figure 1). Non-US-born earn as much as US-born international migrants, which is more than what native Mexicans get. As mentioned, statistics include neither people of Chinese origin, nor the many undocumented immigrants. The latter likely earn the lowest wages among international migrants, and for this reason statistics probably include a number (although unknown) of undocumented immigrants at the bottom of the earnings scale. Even so, data shows that a significant proportion of immigrants have managed to participate in the local workforce with adequate wages.

![Figure 1 - Level of Earnings per Country of Birth](source: National Census 2000)
More generally, Mexican immigration policy gives preference to skilled individuals – scientists, technicians, researchers or professors – and relatives of Mexicans (Art. 33, Population Act) when granting immigration permits. On behalf of the federal authorities, the Government Secretary maintains the National Population Register which includes a strictly confidential ‘List of Foreign Residents in the Country’. The Population Act is very stringent vis-à-vis undocumented immigrants. In practice, the strictures are mitigated by INAMI, whose policy consistenly favours its own powers of expulsion under the law instead of sending undocumented immigrants to prison. The fact of the matter is, INAMI officials fear overcrowding prisons in those cities with dense inflows of undocumented immigrants waiting until their trial and sentencing by Mexico’s very slow-paced judiciary. Expulsion is all the more preferable to judiciary procedures and imprisonment as INAMI lacks the resources required to indict every undocumented immigrant, who most of the time could not afford their own costs. On top of it all, INAMI officials interviewed for this research said that humanitarian factors also played a role in their reluctance to send illegal migrants to prison. The penalties set out in the Population Act show that its approach to the issue is based on the awkward notion that international migrants are potential criminals. The great majority of illegal immigrants in Tijuana have come with the intention of crossing over to the United States, and nobody knows how many there actually are. Available data includes migrants detained by INAMI, which is more an indicator of the migratory flow than of the number of undocumented residents in the city. Illegal immigrants are typically arrested along access roads to Tijuana, at interstate bus stations and at the airport. In 2003 INAMI detained 906 undocumented immigrants in this area and in the first six months of 2004 the number had already reached 1,109, originating from as many as 57 different countries. These figures do not include citizens of the United States who come as tourists for a few hours in Tijuana’s bars, are detained by the municipal police for disturbing public order and are subsequently dealt with by INAMI.

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The bulk (two thirds) of illegal immigrants detained in Tijuana are Latin Americans, particularly from Central America (Table 7). Immigrants traveling overland typically enter Mexico through the border with Guatemala; they dodge Mexico’s border police or buy fake identification documents enabling them to avoid deportation or extortion as they travel across Mexico to the US border. Migrants from other countries generally arrive in Mexico with tourist visas and try to cross to the US side of the border illegally.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of origin</th>
<th>2003 Jan-Dec</th>
<th>2004 Jan-Jun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean &amp; Canada</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; South Pacific</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; ex-Soviet Union countries</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total foreigners</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>1,109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Institute of Migrations (INAMI)

Faced with increasing numbers of undocumented immigrants, Mexico’s federal government took to regularise undocumented residents in 2000, 2001 and 2004 with a scheme that was specially tailored to large cities like Tijuana. Under the 2001 and 2004 schemes, undocumented immigrants could apply for regularisation if they had been in Mexico since the year 2000 or earlier, had no criminal record in the country and designated two witnesses to confirm their length of residence. Foreigners interviewed for this chapter said this legalisation process had proved both easy and safe for undocumented residents in Tijuana. According to an INAMI official (in charge of legalisation in Tijuana) the number of failed applications had been very close to zero. However, since the beginning of the legalisation programme INAMI has only regularised 698 undocumented foreign residents (from 39 countries ) in Tijuana; the bulk (62.6 per cent) were from Central America, particularly from Guatemala and El Salvador (20 per cent each) (Table 8). The reasons why relatively few undocumented residents have not taken advantage of the regularisation scheme are diverse. Interviews with the consul of Guatemala in Tijuana and an INAMI official suggest that three main factors are at play:

- Immigrants’ fear of deportation when they realise that they may not fulfill all the requirements for regularisation, or their distrust of Mexican officials and

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6. Anyone entering the country illegally can be punished with up to two years’ imprisonment (Art. 122) and repeat offender can be punished with up to 10 years (Art. 118). If the individual entered with a tourist visa but is found working, the prison sentence is 18 months (Art. 120). Those overstaying their visas can go to prison for up to six years (Art. 119). On the other hand, an undocumented foreigner who was found working could go to prison but the employer would not be prosecuted.
whose stay it judges inconvenient quit the national territory, immediately and without any need for prior trial’ (Art. 33). However, a foreigner is granted most civic rights enjoyed by native Mexicans once naturalised, such as the right to vote in elections (though not the right to be elected) or the right to own property along coasts and borders.

Mexico's constitutional framework has two major implications for urban governance:

- Lack of political rights prevents documented immigrants from having representatives to defend their collective interests in parliament (which is where those interests could be negotiated). Mexican lawmakers are reluctant to represent the interests of foreign migrants because they fear being considered as traitors to their country, what with nationalism (if only the rhetoric at times) still running high in Mexico’s political culture. Moreover, there are no incentives or benefits whatsoever for federal lawmakers to speak for immigrants, since foreigners cannot vote. At the same time, Mexico’s political agenda with regard to migration focuses on natives who (try to) cross over to the United States as undocumented immigrants, rather than on foreign migrants who try to do the same. Against this background, immigrants in Mexico are seen primarily as a matter for the police, or at best, as an administrative matter of concern to INAMI. On a local scale, it can be assumed that political representatives sitting on Tijuana’s governing council consider that when it comes to speaking for immigrants, the costs are as high, and the incentives as poor, as they are for federal lawmakers. Additionally, immigrants as a group still do not represent a social problem in the city. Against this background, it does not come as a surprise that in Tijuana, immigrants simply do not register on the local political agenda.

- The other implication of Mexico’s constitutional setup is that immigrant residents will access civic rights (most notably the rights to be organised politically and to vote) only when they become naturalised. Recently arrived immigrants probably do not feel that they are entitled to full (or next-to-full) civic rights; but those immigrants who have settled down in Mexico and are there to stay can feel frustrated at their inability to participate in decisions that affect their overall conditions. Although they have no elected local representatives, Chinese and Guatemalan immigrants have tried to secure support from their respective consular representatives in Tijuana in discus-

TABLE 8 - REGULARISED MIGRANTS IN TIJUANA BY REGION OF ORIGIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of origin</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Total Individuals</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; South Pacific</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; ex-Soviet Union</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Institute of Migrations (INAMI)

Once immigrants are regularised by INAMI, their rights are those defined by the Mexican Constitution. As might be expected, the fundamental law does not grant full civic rights to documented foreigners: ‘Foreigners will not be able to interfere in any way whatsoever in political matters of the country’ and ‘...The Executive of the Union will have exclusive power to have any foreigner...’
sions with the local government. The results have been positive in only a few instances. For example, owners of Chinese restaurants once requested support from their consul in Tijuana to plead with the local government against fines for disregarding government regulations on food. The owners had complained that some Chinese culinary customs were considered as violating Mexican government rules. For all his personal sympathy for the cause, the Chinese consul declined to ask the Tijuana authorities to waive the fines because he considered this issue to be an individual matter, rather than one involving China’s national interest and therefore calling for consular intervention. On the other hand, the consulate of Guatemala reached an agreement with the local authorities whereby immigrants from the country will be allowed to use a park next to the consular building for their occasional national celebrations.

4. Urban policies for International Migration

Under Mexico’s Constitution and statutes, local authorities are in no position to act with regard to immigration. However, nothing prevents Tijuana authorities from implementing social policies in favour of documented immigrants residing in the city, although they have failed to take advantage of this possibility. Minor though they have been, any initiatives have emanated from the two predominant immigrant communities, the Chinese and the Guatemalans. Every year, the Chinese community invites the local authorities to participate in their New Year celebrations. And as mentioned above, the consulate of Guatemala (established in early 2004), has secured use of a nearby park (now known as ‘Guatemala Park’) for community celebrations.

An absence of local policies does not mean that foreign immigrants lack support and only carry out community activities in some underhand fashion. On the contrary, both the public authorities and the local community have facilitated immigrant integration, and have done so in distinct ways:
- Although they are aimed at Mexican nationals only, the social assistance and support programmes of public and non-governmental institutions are indirect through active agents in the process of immigrant integration.
- Local economic growth since the 1980s has enabled smooth economic integration of immigrants without interference from employers or co-workers.
- Tijuana’s local community is tolerant of strangers both because of permanent exposure to migrants and foreigners in this, a border area, and because the community itself is largely comprised of (earlier) immigrants.

The three echelons of government – federal, State and local/city – facilitate immigrant integration in two distinct, direct and indirect ways. Their welfare schemes directly assist the more deprived segments of Tijuana’s population. They also provide indirect support through the (mainly financial) resources they make available to many of the NGOs operating in the city. Again, although these welfare schemes are aimed at Mexicans, immigrants benefit from both types of public sector intervention.

The public sector’s direct support to immigrants is minimal; it happens through the municipal healthcare system and State and municipal welfare policies (the so-called Integral Family Development (DIF) scheme) and activities. DIF offices offer food, basic healthcare and referral information on social services to needy people in Tijuana. To receive help, an individual must declare his/her place of origin, along with other information. Foreigners regularly pass themselves off as Mexicans, but the DIF does not deny services to anyone based on origin and its motives are of a humanitarian nature, as mentioned by a local DIF official interviewed for this chapter. Although DIF and municipal healthcare services are scarce, they are critical to people who arrive in the city without any money but with health problems and poor morale after the journey’s trials. There have also been cases of undocumented foreigners already residing in the city and who successfully applied for assistance from the local DIF, according to an official.

The public sector’s indirect support to immigrants happens through its support of NGOs. The channels used by the federal government are the least indirect as they only go through the Secretary for Social Development (SEDESOL). For instance in 2003, the federal government gave the NGO Casa del Migrante (Migrant’s House) 174,000 pesos for improvements to the hostel it operates in Tijuana. On the other hand, the Baja California State government supports immigrant-oriented NGOs with many more resources, which are also channeled through the Secretary of Social Development. This is how the State granted a

7 1 peso = 0.09 US dollar.
total of around 7.7 million pesos to NGOs in Tijuana, part of which went to those organisations directly assisting migrants. At a more local level, in 2004 municipal authorities granted nearly 31 million pesos to 64 institutions through the city’s ‘Financial Support Programme to OSCs’ (the Spanish acronym for ‘civil society organisations’, as NGOs are known in Tijuana). As is the case with State grants, those institutions working directly with migrants are in a minority among NGOs receiving support.

Most NGOs assist poor local residents and recently arrived migrants on a specialised basis. Up to 298 NGOs have registered with Tijuana’s municipal authorities; there are probably not many more because only registered institutions receive local public resources. Local government has split NGOs in three main specialised categories: education, health, and community services. Those institutions assisting migrants are directly involved in health and community services and can be categorised in three distinct functions: drug rehabilitation, shelter, and migrant care. The number of NGOs in each of these three functions and the totals for each are presented in Table 9.

TABLE 9 - REGISTERED NGOS IN TIJUANA BY CATEGORY AND FUNCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>All 7 functions</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Drug Rehabilitation</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other 5 types</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Migrant care</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other 9 functions</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Copladem 2003

These NGOs help towards the integration of immigrants in the Tijuana community, and those without documents in particular. NGO staff do not care whether the migrants they assist are Mexicans or foreigners, and as a result the latter (mainly of Latin American origin) regularly feature among those receiving assistance from NGOs.

In an interview carried out for this chapter, the local Secretary for Social Development mentioned the case of migrants who had not been able to cross over to the United States or had been expelled once they had. Some lapse into depression and loss of self-esteem, leading them into drugs, and some end up living in sewers or on the banks of the Tijuana River. When they decide to seek rehabilitation they find as many as 50 NGOs willing to help them. Some of these migrants are Latin Americans who passed themselves off as Mexicans when they first registered for rehabilitation. In the case of Cirad, a specialised NGO, the treatment lasts three months, during which patients are provided with accommodation, food, medical attention and vocational training, all of it free of charge. At the end of that period they have the option of staying with the institution while they get a job and accommodation. According to the director of Cirad, the NGO has always had one or two patients of Latin American origins, some of whom had married a Mexican and settled in Tijuana after rehabilitation. Local government support represents only seven per cent of Cirad’s financial resources; the bulk (90 per cent) is derived from the services which its own patients provide as trained mechanics, carpenters, plumbers, etc., on a commercial basis. The Cirad director noted that in Tijuana, a number of companies can afford the NGO’s professional services, but that things would be different in a location with a slower pace of economic growth.

Not surprisingly, those NGOs involved in care play a larger role in immigrant integration in Tijuana than government authorities. The most relevant case here is the Casa del Migrante (the Migrant’s House), which is run by the Scalabrini Fathers, a Roman Catholic religious order. This is the largest institution assisting migrants in Tijuana; it can give shelter to 200 individuals at any one time. The Casa provides each migrant, and for a maximum 15 days, with a bed, food, medical attention, an identification card and contacts with likely employers. The Scalabrini Fathers frequently deal with Latin (mainly Central) Americans who pass themselves off as Mexicans and whose objective is to cross the border with the United States. Among those immigrants who decided to stay and settle in Tijuana, the Casa has helped a number to apply for regularisation with INAMI, an institution with which the Scalabrini Fathers maintain a good relationship. As any other NGO researched for this chapter, the Casa welcomes foreigners regardless of origin; the Fathers provide migrants with support and shelter at the penultimate stop on their migratory route and, for some, a transition prior to final settlement in Tijuana. The Casa del Migrante is funded by private donations and a permanent contribution from the State government (21,000 pesos monthly).

8 The Scalabrini Fathers similarly run a “Casa do Migrante” in São Paulo, Brazil.
Work is the other major conduit for immigrants' integration in Tijuana. As mentioned earlier, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Tijuana has been on the increase over the course of the past few decades, with an average annual rate of growth of seven per cent between 1990 and 2004. FDI has directly created some 150,000 new jobs in 2004, and has strong multiplier effects on retail trade and services activities. Few places in the world can boast such economic momentum; Tijuana owes this to a significant wage differential between Mexico and the United States, and to its proximity to the largest consumer market in the world (and US California in particular). The early months of 2004 provided a graphic example of the significant role of economic growth on migrant integration. This was a time when the assembly plant industry felt a massive need for additional labour and virtually overnight. Therefore firms were ready to hire any available worker and only requested proof of identity after three months, when employers are required by law to register employees with the social security system. This is the formal economic sector where, not infrequently, immigrants can begin the process of integration into the city. As for the informal sector, it is always there, mainly in construction and services.

The respective roles of government institutions, NGOs and the labour market in immigrant integration in Tijuana are summarised in Figure 2.

**FIGURE 2 - INTEGRATION PATTERN IN TIJUANA**

On top of care (rehabilitation, shelter) and inclusion in the workforce, the third major factor of immigrant integration in Tijuana is of a more intangible nature. It has to do with differences and the way they determine role assign-
private decisions: people base decisions on other criteria. For example, immigration officials at INAMI focus primarily on resource savings and conflict reduction when deciding what to do about an undocumented migrant. Legitimacy of differences also influences individual decisions. For instance, the owner of a flat will put trust first when choosing a tenant, and trust primarily arises from a potential tenant’s type of work or income as well as good character references, rather than country of origin or physical appearance.

5. Lessons learned and recommendations

Lessons learned

The social construction of immigrants as differentiated social agents could not be more at odds with the integration of immigrants in the prevalent social structure. With the exception of US natives, immigrants in Tijuana do not form any group or groups that is or are socially differentiated from other groups in the local community. No single group forms segregated neighbourhoods (except for some US natives settling on a small fringe on the coast, which Mexicans perceive as a tourist rather than an immigrant area). On the other hand, the Chinese – the second largest immigrant group – are only known for their restaurants, which are distributed all over the city.

The way in which a differentiated social agent is built collectively, as a process, is peculiar to each individual city. The intensity with which a migrant as a social agent differentiates from others depends on the way in which local social structuring adapts to those that are different. The image of the ‘foreigner’ as a social agent will be associated to the social construction of this agent. In a city like Tijuana, the differentiated image of immigrants is weak because the local social structure is weak on four major counts: a) the social hierarchy is not rigid; b) ethnic criteria are not preponderant in the elaboration of the sense of social order; c) ethnic similarity has low value as a criterion of social belonging; and d) there is no local propensity to attribute symbols related with the prevalent social order to any particular social group (i.e., immigrants). These four characteristics appear in all urban societies, but with different combinatorial intensities which construct the local resident’s image of the foreigner in a singular way. As far as Tijuana is concerned, these generic traits and their combination can be assessed, as follows:

- The social structure is not very rigid due to rapid economic growth. With the upward social ascent made possible by the city’s economic momentum, social groups have a diffuse definition, preventing the constitution of a strong social hierarchy. Social roles are not rigid and, together with a weak social hierarchy, they allow the integration of foreigners into a local social group with a similar type of social practice. Improvement of personal or household economic conditions is the main impulse that governs social interactions. Among members of a social group, the pursuit and achievement of economic improvement overcomes other criteria (i.e., place of origin, race, etc.) as the decisive factor of integration of new members as well as of role assignments to the members of one’s own social group and to others.

- The social structure is imbued with ethnic diversity due to rapid population growth based on internal migration of Mexicans. Tijuana is a young city, with hardly 100 years of existence, and one that has grown rapidly during the 20th century. The diversity of regional and racial origins in the make-up of the city’s expanding population has legitimised diversity in social structures and in the construction of the sense of social order, resulting in tolerance or indifference towards differences.

- Tijuana’s social structure has been influenced by its permanent exposure to foreign people, behaviour and cultures. Because of the city’s location on the border with the USA, Tijuana’s inhabitants are in permanent interaction with foreigners. Interaction happens locally when foreigners, mainly from the United States, come to visit friends or relatives, to shop, or as tourists. Interaction also happens when Tijuana residents visit US California across the border. This recurring exposure is structural; it has allowed Tijuana residents to get to know foreigners, to recognise nuances among them, and to get used to interacting with them. Such recurring and unavoidable interaction with foreigners has acted as an inhibiting factor for xenophobic behaviour among Tijuana’s residents.

- Finally, far from being just a by-product of Tijuana’s particular social conditions, international migrants also owe their smooth integration to some of their own characteristics.
Out of the interaction of these characteristics with some of the city's structural conditions, 10 lessons emerge, as follows:

1) **Immigrant community size.** There probably exist a critical number of foreign residents short of which, a) there are not enough consumers to support the economy of a segregated neighbourhood and, b) there is not enough of the cohesion required to constitute a group with a social praxis separated from the rest of the (resident) community. This critical number would differ across individual cities depending on income level, type and origin of migration, migrants' religion as well as cultural and linguistic similarity between the host country (in this instance, Mexico) and the country of origin. Alternatively, this critical number could be reached with immigrants from a single country or cultural region of origin, such as Latin America whose people share the same language, religion and colonial past. In Tijuana, immigrants from specific countries or cultural regions have probably not reached this critical number yet. However, given the structural nature of the factors that have transformed Tijuana into a destination for international migrants, we can expect the number and proportion of foreigners among the city's population to increase over years to come.

2) **Similarity in diversity.** The Mexican population in Tijuana is diverse and most of it is racially and ethnically *mestizo*, as is the whole country. Under these circumstances, immigrants have the possibility to integrate in one of two ways: a) through *similarity in diversity*: those immigrants from countries with a similar racial mix and the same language as the host country have a higher probability of smooth local integration – as is the case with Latin American immigrants in Tijuana. This makes it easy for them to join the resident community, whether they marry a Mexican or spend their leisure time like Mexicans do and in the same type of space (sports, entertainment, walking around, etc.). And b) the *social diversity of the local community* can also favour integration: Tijuana's population is so diverse that immigrants coming from the rest of the world (i.e., from outside the Americas) always find some people that are similar to them, either racially or culturally. Europeans can feel cultural similarities with Mexicans, and Asian immigrants can find Mexican people whose ancestors were from Asia. Such similarity in diversity encourages immigrants to opt for the integration strategy, instead of asserting their own national identity.

3) **Similarity in social exclusion.** Whenever there is social exclusion in a city, those foreigners with a disadvantage on the labour market can integrate with the local marginalised individuals instead. The marginal situation of the local poor and their weak exercise of 'rights to the city' create inclusive conditions for marginalised foreign immigrants. Poor people in the city are not accustomed to demand public services, or land for their own housing purposes, because they are met with indifference by authorities or repression from the police; they usually do not turn to the judicial system to demand recognition of their rights either, owing to the high cost and their distrust of its impartiality. With the exception of education and public health services, poor people prefer to avoid government institutions altogether when they need any resource, for fear that their social weakness will only bring abuse. They also are hardly aware of the assistance and opportunities available from government institutions. Obtaining resources informally is less expensive and less dangerous for the poor. Under informal system rules, no individual trying to get access to a service can exclude others because the means to carry out the exclusion do not exist. Nor can anyone resort to the legal system to demand exclusion of some other, because of the lack of legal rights to do so. When an individual gets hold of urban land for her/his own housing purposes by invading a property, (s)he cannot exclude others from getting land in the same way, even if the others are foreigners. This goes to show that immigrants with social disadvantages can be integrated in the city through these informal or non-exclusionary spaces.

4) **Low-profile behaviour.** Immigrants in Tijuana are specially known neither for the way they use the urban space nor for violating the law. The city does not feature any particular neighbourhood where foreigners have their residences. Neither do immigrants (except for Guatemalans, as mentioned above) organise any ethnic celebrations (national or religious) in public spaces. On the other hand, foreign residents in Tijuana are not usually involved in criminal offences. These characteristics obviously contribute to immigrants' smooth integration in Tijuana's local community.

5) **Local labour absorption capacity.** With economic growth matched by full employment, as has been the case in Tijuana for two decades, migrants can find jobs just as easily as any local resident. This situation reduces the probability of social conflicts in two distinct ways: (a) local workers do not
consider migrants as competitors on the labour market, and (b) migrants as a group do not end up being socially excluded. Furthermore, migration itself acts as a selective process in its own right. Migrants will often be individuals with some education, with a sense of initiative, and not afraid of taking risks. This type of individual is apt to take advantage of local opportunities and to secure an appropriate income, especially against a robust local economic background.

6) **Local policies.** It should not come as a surprise that in a local community that is tolerant of differences and has no bias against poverty, and in a city where immigrants are law-abiding and use public space without stridency, local authorities have not seen any need for immigrant-specific policies. Some local government policies focus on the poor and on internal migrants, etc.; but foreign migrants have been constituted neither as a differentiated social agent nor as one which the authorities recognise as the beneficiary of any specific policy. Moreover, it might not be legitimate for local authorities to gear resources specifically to foreigners when many problems remain to be solved among the poor population of Tijuana.

7) **Local authorities.** Tijuana city authorities consider that immigration issues come under the federal government’s responsibility, as mandated under the Population Act and the Constitution. However, local authorities do not object to and are even tolerant of the fact that poor foreigners residing in Tijuana benefit from local policies geared towards the native poor.

8) **The role of NGOs.** As individuals move from the status of international migrant to one of foreign immigrant residing in Tijuana, NGO assistance has a critical role to play, at least as far as some immigrants are concerned. NGOs have provided many immigrants with shelter from the very day they arrived in the city, helped them find employment, opened them access to social networks, given them opportunities to find a spouse, and weaned them of drugs. Some NGOs also assist those foreigners applying for work visas under Mexico’s undocumented immigrant regularisation programme. The work of NGOs is directed at Mexicans, but they do not deny services to foreigners (NGO staff are well aware, and tolerate the fact, that foreigners pass themselves off as Mexicans). Overall, NGOs have helped immigrants to integrate in the local community and to settle down for permanent residence.

9) **NGO resources.** NGOs in Tijuana derive part of their financial resources from grants and subsidies from city and State authorities. Government officials and leaders of NGOs are fully aware that a portion of the public funding which the organisations receive goes to the support and assistance of foreign migrants (including undocumented immigrants). There are a number of related reasons for this tolerance. Direct assistance to foreigners by public authorities would run against some legal strictures. At the same time, local government officials know that they should include immigrants as part of the population they serve (mainly with regard to healthcare services) in order to defuse or deflect problems in the city. However, any direct support that was not backed by appropriate legislation would expose those in government to attacks by political opponents. This is why local public authorities tolerate NGOs’ use of public monies as an indirect way of assisting foreigners. However, humanitarian reasons are not absent from this tolerance.

10) **Governance and opportunities.** Governance of a city implies conflict reduction to a manageable scale for both government and the community. Governance is achieved when a community feels that they effectively exercise their rights of access to opportunities to improve their life conditions. Foreign immigrants contribute to city governance when they are integrated into the system of local opportunities in exactly the same way as any local citizen.

**Recommendations**

The historical and geographical circumstances that have formed the benign way in which people, institutions and the government of Tijuana treat foreign immigrants are exceptional. Particularly unique are full employment for more than two decades, and the permanent exposure to foreigners owing as much to visits from the United States as to the constant migratory outflow directed towards that country. For all this uniqueness, the social attitudes and some actions taken by local government have made it easier for international migrants to integrate in Tijuana’s community. This particular experience suggests nine general recommendations which we think are valid regardless of particular circumstances:

- **An inclusive community.** The proper way of achieving immigrant integra-
tion into the local system of opportunities is a polity that grants immigrants the same rights as it grants its own nationals. In a community that has had diversity as one of its defining traits since foundation, such as Tijuana, people are accustomed not to discriminate by place of origin. However, in cities that have begun to experience significant immigrant flows only recently, it is highly probable that native residents do not treat immigrants as equals. In this type of city, a change in local residents’ perception of immigrants should be promoted. This is a medium-term objective, requiring specific efforts to enhance familiarity and interaction with foreigners. This would elicit a more objective and realistic image of foreigners among local populations, thereby weakening the social construction of ‘foreigners’ as people format odds with local society. To start with, primary schools with only native students should open up to foreign pupils residing in town or, at the very least, these schools should organise joint activities such as sports and walks bringing together native and immigrant children.

2) **Local government’s inclusive attitude.** In order to promote positive attitudes to immigrants among the local population and to reduce any social segregation of foreigners, local government should implement inclusive official policies (i.e., that do not discriminate according to national origin) when providing services and allocating resources. For all its positive aspects, the informal practice of government officials turning a blind eye to welfare beneficiaries’ real (immigrant) status (as frequently happens in Tijuana) is not enough: this leaves non-discriminatory treatment of immigrants to the (discretionary) good will of individual public officials. With particular regard to healthcare services, the local government’s policy of including undocumented immigrants can prevent epidemics which may affect many people, including the natives.

3) **Equal access to public resources.** Immigrants should be entitled to the same rights as nationals when it comes to public (welfare) spending. For example, any entitlement to local government benefits in support of the poor and self-employed (micro-entrepreneurs) should require legal residence in the city (for some specific length of time) instead of national origin.

4) **The dangers of positive discrimination.** A public policy of positive discrimination that assigns specific resources to foreigners’ groups is not advisable in a local setting with scarce public resources. The risk is that this may end up having (unintended) negative consequences for the social integration of immigrants. It could indeed paint foreigners as a privileged, pampered constituency and generate xenophobia among the poorer natives for whom it is only natural that scarce local public resources should go to them rather than foreigners.

5) **Same rights as the locals.** To promote inclusion in the social fabric and participation in any collective problem-solving process, immigrants should have the right to elect local officials in regular polls, on the sole condition that they have resided in the area for a certain length of time. In the case of Mexico, this would require an amendment to the federal Constitution. This is difficult because federal lawmakers have little incentive to push this change through in the country’s current political conditions. Even when immigrants are numerous enough to exercise some influence locally in various ways, it is difficult to create incentives for federal lawmakers to change the Constitution.

6) **Facilitate naturalisation for foreigners.** The most effective way for immigrants to acquire civic rights is through naturalisation. The prerequisites for doing so should be relaxed. In the case of Mexico, people of Latin American origin can become Mexican citizens after two years’ legal residence in the country, and those of other origins after five years.

7) **Promotion of non-governmental organisations.** In order to make integration of immigrants swifter and more effective, government should support NGOs with resources to assist the poor, including immigrants or those in rehabilitation, with the condition that organisations do not discriminate by country of origin. Like many other victims of urban exclusion, recently arrived immigrants trust NGOs more than government institutions when looking for help. In Mexico as in many other countries in Latin America, NGOs have been up and running for several decades, are well regulated, and immigrants are aware of their existence.

8) **International support to promote governance.** International cooperation could play a significant role in the local governance of international immigration through conditional assignment of resources. NGOs and municipal social development offices would spend such resources to support the neediest among immigrants. As a condition and an incentive to receive international resources, those institutions should work in a coordinated way.
and abide by local government laws and regulations. Such coordinated efforts would have the integration of immigrants in the local community as a general objective. Some of the above-mentioned instances of cooperation between local authorities and NGOs in Tijuana could be repeated, only this time they would become institutional.

9) Collecting data on immigrants. As happens in other countries, Mexico’s national census does not capture all foreign residents; in particular, it fails to register many undocumented and marginalised immigrants. The main reason why these people avoid census registration is fear of deportation. An efficient, roundabout way of improving data on foreign residents would be to set up a commission bringing together the National Census Bureau, NGOs and local consulates (where available), to carry out surveys and collect more registrations, with the same guarantee of anonymity as is attached to the regular census.

REFERENCES

1. The existing situation

With close to two million inhabitants in its metropolitan area at the time of the latest national census (2001), Vancouver is Canada’s third largest metropolis (or CMA – Census Metropolitan Area) after Toronto and Montreal, and the nation’s gateway to the Asia-Pacific Region. It is easily categorised as a city of immigrants, as indicated by the fact that more than two thirds of the Vancouver CMA’s adult population (aged 15 at least) are considered to have ‘direct ties’ to immigration (Schellenberg, 2004), either as immigrants themselves or as Canadian-born children of foreign-born parents. In certain respects, this ‘immigrant character’ of the city as a receiving zone for immigrant streams from around the world is reflective of Canada’s history as a ‘new world’ society, whose population is essentially made up of immigrants and their descendants. Yet the immigrant character of Vancouver – indeed, its cosmopolitanism – has continued to grow rapidly in recent years: nearly 17 per cent of the CMA population are now comprised of recent immigrants (arriving between 1991 and 2001) in addition to the more than 21 per cent of the population who arrived before 1991 (Table 1). This brings the current proportion of foreign-born residents to more than 38 per cent of the total, second in Canada only to that of the Toronto CMA at 44 per cent. This ongoing internationalisation of Vancouver’s population is only one component, though an essential one, of the city’s broader growth and transformation in recent decades; these changes are intimately linked to Canada’s – and Vancouver’s – changing position in the world today.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1 - VANCOUVER POPULATION ESTIMATES BY IMMIGRATION STATUS, 2001</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier immigrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schellenberg, 2004
The shifting policy context, and particularly the active promotion of multiculturalism, has been central to the policy responses that have developed in response to the exigencies of the city’s rapidly changing society as well as to the ongoing debates regarding the very nature of Canadian national identity in the 21st century. In fact, it is not unreasonable to look upon current Canadian immigration and related social policies as being part of a purposeful attempt to build a multicultural society – that is, to accept socio-cultural diversity as an intrinsic aspect of national identity in the context of a growing understanding of how globalisation, and hence, intercultural interactions, affect the lives of all Canadians. In order to situate the city of Vancouver within the overall international migrant flows in the world today, it should be seen, first of all, that Canada is somewhat of an extreme case. This is a ‘developed,’ or rich country, meaning that in comparative global terms it has relatively higher wage rates, a prominent factor in the push-pull analysis of the traditional neo-classical models of migration. It is also a society that has essentially completed its own demographic transition and is therefore economically reliant on the influx of immigrant labour in order to maintain productivity levels and viable dependency ratios between the working and non-working components of the population. Furthermore, Canada is situated in the region of the world – ‘the North American migration system’ – that has long dominated global systems as the principal destination for transnational permanent migrants (Massey et al, 1998). In other words, the position of Canada in global migration flows is determined – among other factors – by its ‘new world’ character, that is, as a nation-State born out of international migration, and therefore a migration frontier over the course of recent human history. And although the other major recipient country in the North American system, the USA, continues to dominate global flows as the single largest recipient of international migrants, Canada takes in approximately twice as many international migrants relative to total population; this gives Canada one of the highest proportions of foreign-born residents in the world, second only to that of Australia (Statistics Canada, 2003; Hiebert and Ley, 2003). As we enter the ‘urban century’, it is perhaps less consequential to focus on ‘international’ migration per se than it is to think about migrant streams as linking urban localities internationally. Indeed, the portrayal of recent Canadian immigration as a quintessentially urban phenomenon has been a recurring theme in recent official analyses from Statistics Canada; these showed that fully 94 per cent of all recent immigrants are living in Canada’s cities, with the great majority of these (73 per cent) concentrated in the three largest CMAs. A distinct trend toward greater concentration in this regard is apparent over time, as 66 per cent of immigrants arriving in the 1980s were living in Toronto, Montreal, or Vancouver as of 1991, in comparison to 58 per cent of immigrants arriving in the 1970s who resided in these three cities in 1981 (Statistics Canada, 2003; Schellenberg, 2004). This change in perspective, from immigration as a nationwide to an urban phenomenon, highlights its different impacts across the social landscape of Canada. Not only are rural areas and smaller cities disproportionately excluded from the effects of immigration, but its impacts are felt quite differently among the major receiving localities, due to variations in the nature of specific migration streams. For example, one broad characterisation that has emerged from recent studies is how the Montreal CMA disproportionately accepts those admitted under refugee status (21 per cent of Montreal’s arriving immigrants, although only 12 per cent of total arrivals nationwide between 1995 and 2002), while the Vancouver CMA leads the country in its proportion of economic immigrants (67 per cent of Vancouver’s arrivals, compared to 58 per cent of the national total over the same period) (Schellenberg, 2004). The country of origin for specific streams of immigrants also has important implications for receiving destinations; although there has been a decided shift, since the 1980s and for the country as a whole, from European sources to Asian sources, the higher relative proportion of Asian immigrants coming to Vancouver in recent years has, over a short period, turned the city into arguably the most ‘Asian’ in Canada (Hutton, 1998a). Within the Canadian context, Vancouver may itself be seen to represent an extreme case and on two counts. First, as a frontier in the historical westward expansion of Canadian society across the North American continent, and therefore a continuing destination for much of Canada’s internal migration; and second, and more recently, as Canada’s gateway to the Asia-Pacific Region, and therefore as a major node for capital flows, social and economic linkages, and population movements across this economically burgeoning region of the globe. As such, Vancouver has had the fastest growing population of major Canadian cities since the 1980s; in North America as a whole, it has been surpassed in population growth only by a select few of the ‘sunbelt’ cities of the US Southeast and Southwest (Hutton, 1998a). The effects of this growth and internationalisation of Vancouver have been profound over the past two
decades, a period also characterised by an overall transformation of the city in several respects. Most prominent among such changes are perhaps those of an economic nature, with the city moving from an economy based on primary extraction and processing (forestry, fishing, mining) to that of a ‘post-industrial’ metropolis with a high degree of tertiary production. The changing nature of immigrant flows has been central to this transformation, with immigrant-connected capital fueling structural change in the economy, expanding global linkages, and revitalising certain components of Vancouver’s otherwise declining manufacturing base (Hutton, 1998a; 1998b). Beyond this, cultural flows accompanying these human and capital flows have helped to create a supportive milieu for the city’s thickening ties into the Asia-Pacific Region (Olds, 2001); these ties have been further enhanced by the outward-looking leadership styles of municipal and provincial government leaders since the 1980s.

Immigrant flows and the ethnic composition of Vancouver

Vancouver has long been a receiving destination for migrants from throughout the globe, with great diversity apparent in the population since the early days of the province of British Columbia, where Vancouver is situated. By the early 1880s, for example, if one leaves aside the native, aboriginal communities and considers only those residents of immigrant descent, the proportion of provincial residents of Chinese origin was approximately one in five, or considerably higher than it is even today (Hiebert, 1998). From this perhaps surprising historical observation, one may discern something of the effects of exclusionary racially-based laws since the early 20th century; these laws shaped the ethnic make-up of British Columbia and Vancouver over the course of the first half of that century and thus determined the dominant culture of the region to be extracted from European, and largely British, roots. From this position of a dominant European-derived culture by 1950, much has changed over the course of the city’s recent metropolitan transformation. The broad characterisation of Vancouver’s recent immigrant flows (as for Canada in general, as indicated in Figure 1) is that of a decided shift from overwhelmingly European immigration streams to those originating from Asian sources, predominantly East Asian, though with significant components of immigrants from

South and Southeast Asia as well. One can incidentally point to the persistence of historical political forces in this shift, i.e. the continuing importance of British Commonwealth nations (notably Hong Kong, India and Sri Lanka) despite the proportional drop-off of immigrants from Britain itself. Over the same period, the US contribution to Vancouver’s immigrant communities has remained largely unaltered (despite its declining proportional contribution); at the same time, its ethnic make-up has probably changed as well, away from dominance by those of European extraction and to increasingly more diverse flows. Undoubtedly such changes have resulted, from the repeal of exclusionary immigration laws since the 1960s, which over the course of the early 20th century constrained what arguably could be seen as the ‘natural’ pressures for migration flows from across the Asia-Pacific region. Such legal changes derive in large part from a shifting recognition of Canada’s position in the world, or more broadly from the impact of increasing globalisation on Canada as a whole.

FIGURE 1 – PROPORTION OF IMMIGRANTS TO CANADA BORN IN EUROPE AND ASIA

Source: Statistics Canada

Approximately 90 per cent of Vancouver’s population growth (two per cent per year) over the course of the 1990s was due to in-migration, with more than two-thirds of immigrants to the city originating from outside of Canada. Asian-originated flows have come to dominate since the 1980s, with, for example, the largest
stream from Hong Kong adding over 35,000 immigrants to the Vancouver popula-
tion by the mid-1990s. By 1996, the largest component of foreign-born residents
were from Hong Kong (13.6 per cent), compared to the UK (11.9) and followed
closely by the People’s Republic of China (11.5 per cent) and other Asian groups
(India, 8.4 per cent; the Philippines, 5.5 per cent; Taiwan, 4.6 per cent; and Viet-
am, 2.7 per cent), with East, Southeast and South Asia together accounting for
53.4 per cent of the foreign-born residents of the city (Hiebert, 1998).

TABLE 2 - TOP 10 COUNTRIES OF BIRTH OF 1990S’ IMMIGRANTS TO VANCOUVER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number (1996)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>58,495</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong SAR</td>
<td>48,915</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>38,125</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>30,445</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>25,865</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>14,840</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>12,205</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>6,810</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6,225</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6,205</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada, 2003

Between 1991 and 2001, the number of international immigrants arriving in Van-
couver was 324,815, with 18 per cent of these from the People’s Republic of Chi-
na, 15.1 per cent from Hong Kong SAR, and 11.7 per cent from Taiwan, resulting
in 44.8 per cent of total immigrant arrivals to the city originating from what is
considered as ‘Greater China.’ In addition, the greater part of the remaining propor-
tion arrived from other Asian sources, most prominently India (9.4 per
cent), the Philippines (eight per cent), and South Korea (4.6 per cent) (Table 2).
One important consequence of these shifting flows is that Vancouver now has
the highest proportion of what are known as ‘visible minorities’1 of any CMA in
the country, with more than 37 per cent of the total population in 2001 cate-
gorised as belonging to a visible minority group, up from 24 per cent in 1991.
These visible minority groups are overwhelmingly Asian, with the CMA’s Chi-
nese population (342,700) comprising by far the largest single group. The sec-
ond largest visible minority group is that of South Asians2 who comprise
164,400 people (eight per cent of the total population), followed by Filipinos,
with a population of 57,000 (three per cent of the CMA total). Both the propor-
tions and the total numbers of each of these groups have risen significantly
over the past decade (Statistics Canada, 2003). The prominence of these major
groups should not, however, obscure the wide diversity of other, less represent-
ed ethnic groups – Asian and otherwise – who make up the shifting mosaic of
Vancouver’s population structure (Table 3).

TABLE 3 - VANCOUVER CMA IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY PLACE OF BIRTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,813,935</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,967,480</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 This is a Canadian legal phrase, defined by the Employment Equity Act as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who
are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.”

2 “South Asian” is a general term, used by Statistics Canada and other government institutions to refer to immigrants and
their descendants originating from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the other nations of the Indian subcontinent.
A further consequential aspect of changing Canadian immigration laws has been the structure of allowable categories for immigrants, with a growing preponderance of ‘economic’ immigrants, or those admitted to Canada as entrepreneurs, self-employed, investors or other independents – again a recognition on the part of the Canadian government of the potential economic benefits, both nationally and locally, of selective migration (see Table 4 for a summary of recent flows by category). One important outcome of these policy developments, in contrast to the general assumption that international migrants tend to add disproportionately to the low-income population of the city, has been a fairly distinct socio-economic segmentation associated with recent international migration flows into Vancouver. The influx of relatively wealthy, predominantly Asian immigrants over the course of the 1980s and 1990s has had profound effects on local politics in Vancouver, associated in part with fundamental shifts in the ethnic make-up of some of the wealthier neighbourhoods in the city. Such assessment of the local impacts of international immigration into Vancouver might best be considered separately from the lower-income streams of immigrants, who likewise contribute greatly to the overall flows of international immigrants into the city. This ‘lower end’ of the segmented immigrant flows derives in part from those in the category of ‘refugee’. However, Canadian immigration laws have also designated specific categories of economic immigrants to fill lower-level service positions, perhaps most famously that of ‘caregivers’ or domestic workers under the Live-in Caregiver Programme (LCP); in effect, these workers often work for wages below the statutory minimum in exchange for the opportunity of gaining permanent resident status (leading to citizenship) after 2 years’ employment as a live-in caregiver (Pratt, 2003). In addition, the allowable category of family unification has had major impacts, not only by increasing the size of streams, most prominently for those in the lower-income segments of overall flows, but by helping to concentrate streams from particular sending countries or regions. In this sense, the immigrant category of family unification can be seen as having significantly contributed to cumulative migration flows into Vancouver (Table 4).

3 The LCP is probably the single most controversial of Canada’s immigration programmes. Although regulations require employers to abide by Canadian labour laws, there are numerous documented cases of abuse derived from the “live-in” requirements of the programme. Launched in 1992 as an ostensible response to domestic labour shortages for live-in caregivers, the LCP has in practice targeted women from the Philippines, who according to the latest figures, comprise 93 per cent of all immigrants coming to Canada under the programme (Mercurio, 2004).

Another notable effect of international migration on the metropolitan region of Vancouver is seen in the spatial distribution of immigrant communities. Typical patterns of immigrant settlement seen elsewhere in developed countries have inner-city locales serving as the primary receiving zones for new immigrants, followed by second-generation relocation of ethnic communities into suburban locations. In contrast, recent spatial trends in Vancouver indicate a direct, rapid suburbanisation of certain immigrant communities in the inner suburbs of Richmond and Burnaby (largely Hong Kong and other Chinese immigrants) and Surrey (Indian and other South Asian immigrants); this phenomenon has direct implications for structuring social services in support of integration of immigrant households. However, such characterisations must be tempered by the recognition of a great deal of diversity in settlement patterns across the range of immigrant groups; for instance, Philippine immigrant households are notable for their general lack of concentration within any single neighbourhood in the Vancouver region despite their large numbers (Hiebert, 1998).

### Table 4 - Immigrants to Vancouver by Category

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>4,564</td>
<td>13.71</td>
<td>4,924</td>
<td>14.38</td>
<td>4,524</td>
<td>15.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3,882</td>
<td>11.66</td>
<td>4,284</td>
<td>12.52</td>
<td>4,685</td>
<td>15.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Family</td>
<td>8,446</td>
<td>25.37</td>
<td>9,208</td>
<td>26.90</td>
<td>9,205</td>
<td>30.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>18,061</td>
<td>54.26</td>
<td>18,775</td>
<td>54.84</td>
<td>14,739</td>
<td>49.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>3,403</td>
<td>10.22</td>
<td>3,413</td>
<td>9.97</td>
<td>3,313</td>
<td>11.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caregivers</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Economic</td>
<td>22,245</td>
<td>67.42</td>
<td>23,008</td>
<td>67.20</td>
<td>18,775</td>
<td>62.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other immigrants</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Immigrants</td>
<td>30,959</td>
<td>92.99</td>
<td>32,243</td>
<td>94.18</td>
<td>27,902</td>
<td>93.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Refugees</td>
<td>2,327</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>1,991</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33,286</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>34,234</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>29,922</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIC, 2003
2. The issues

The overall effects of increased international immigration into Vancouver in recent years are far-reaching and complex, and not easily summarised. Much of the debate – and consequently the policy responses to immigration – is shaped by public perceptions as reinforced by portrayals of immigrants in the media. Because immigration into Vancouver is largely driven by economic circumstances, with the city attracting a disproportionate number of Canada’s wealthier immigrants, the popular perception of migration is coloured by issues of class as well as ethnicity, often making for a double-edged mix in public discourse. However, the equation of immigrants with wealth is indeed an unfair characterisation; it obscures the socio-economic reality of economic bifurcation of immigrant streams, which has the potential to feed into increasing socio-economic polarisation for the city overall.

The specifics of bifurcation among incoming migrant streams are difficult to deduce from collected statistics. One might assume, first of all, that of the three main categories of immigrants – economic immigrants, family, and refugees – refugees would necessarily be among the poorest, while economic immigrants would be the better off. However, the category of economic immigrants includes business immigrants, skilled workers, and people in domestic employment (or ‘live-in caregivers’). In this particular category, the business immigrants are the wealthiest; those in domestic employment, who are trading off low salaries against the potential for eventual Canadian citizenship, are among the poorest; and the fortunes of skilled workers may be very uneven. In recent years (2000-2002) business immigrants have comprised about 10 per cent of incoming migrants to Vancouver, with skilled workers accounting for nearly 53 per cent and those in domestic employment slightly more than two per cent. In comparison, the ‘family’ class (allowed for the unification of close family members) comprised nearly 28 per cent of the total, while refugees arriving in Vancouver accounted for less than seven per cent (Table 4).

The effects of these trends have been an extremely wide range of income and wealth levels among recent immigrants, with the implication that looking at average or median figures may be highly misleading. Nonetheless, the findings of a recent nationwide study on the earnings of recent immigrants show that on average, males who arrived in the 1990s earned 25 per cent less than their Canadian-born counterparts, while the comparable disparity for females was 24 per cent (Monitor, 2003). It was also found that incomes of recent arrivals tend to increase the longer they remain in Canada, with the income level of an average male immigrant at 80 per cent of their Canadian-born counterpart after 10 years, compared to 63 per cent after one year in Canada. Despite these improvements, the overall income gaps between immigrants and Canadian-born have been increasing over time; whereas a 10-year resident male immigrant earned more than his Canadian counterpart in 1980, this figure had dropped to 90 per cent by 1990 and 80 per cent by 2000. A natural end-result of these trends has been an increase in the numbers of children in immigrant families who are living in poverty: more than 32 per cent of the children of recent immigrants in 2000 lived in low-income households, compared to 20 per cent in 1980, and to only 15 per cent in households with Canadian-born parents in 2000 (Monitor, 2003).

The economic conditions of the immigrant population of Vancouver are extraordinarily divergent, with some of the city’s wealthiest residents among the recent immigrants, as well as some of its poorest. The media portrayal of immigrants and the immigration process, however, has tended to be much more biased, with a great deal of attention given to such high-income phenomena as the ‘monster houses’ of recent immigrants (Ley 1998), and the social effects of ‘astronaut families’ (discussed below). Media coverage also has on occasion included sensationalistic reporting, especially around issues of illegal immigration and distinctions between ‘genuine’ and ‘bogus’ refugees, as for example with regard to the landing of boatloads of illegal immigrants from Fujian, China, in 1999 (Mahtani and Mountz, 2002). In contrast to this general pattern of reporting, however, the local press also regularly published celebratory articles on the changing demographic and socio-cultural make-up of the city and the way the resulting multicultural mosaic contributes positively

4 The issue of illegal or undocumented migration into Canada is not discussed in this chapter, due to the lack of any existing systematic analysis, or any reliable estimates, as to the extent of undocumented migration into Canada. From the various discussions of illegal migration in the Canadian press, however, one has the impression that the phenomenon of illegal migration is considerably smaller in Canada than in other developed countries, including (and perhaps especially) the USA. Nonetheless, illegal migration, and its darkest side – human trafficking – is given a fair amount of attention in press reports, as for example in the lead story recently on the front page of the Vancouver Sun: “Smuggling in humans a growing threat: RCMP” (August 23, 2004). This article refers to a “secret” report by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police warning of the threat to Canada of increasing numbers of illegal migrants. Yet the figures given in newspaper articles, such as the 600 illegal migrants from China who have arrived on the West Coast since 1999, tend to emphasise the relative insignificance of this phenomenon in comparison to legal flows (approximately 160,000 total migrants arrived in Vancouver, including about 24,000 from China, over this same period).
to Vancouver’s status as an emergent ‘global city’. These manifest changes in Vancouver’s socio-cultural landscape and the way they are portrayed and interpreted in popular discourse have necessarily raised debates over the changing nature of Canadian identity, especially so in Vancouver. In particular, the business immigrant programme has provoked a backlash, although it is promoted by the national government as an important strategy for attracting foreign capital and otherwise helping to link Canada to global capital flows (Olds, 2001; Mitchell, 1993; Ley, 2000). What has been portrayed as the ‘commodification of citizenship’ (Waters, 2003) has been challenged as undermining conventional notions of nationalism as derived from feelings of personal loyalty to the nation. Central to such debate has been the interpretation of ‘transnationalism’ – the tendency for recent immigrants to maintain a foothold in both sending and receiving locales – and what it means for the future of Canadian society.

Transnationalism is manifested somewhat differently across the various socio-economic and ethnic group segments that comprise Vancouver’s immigrant communities. The phenomenon that has undoubtedly received the most popular attention in this regard is that of the ‘astronauts’ among the business or entrepreneurial class of immigrants. The phrase refers to families that have relocated to Vancouver from East Asia but whose incomes have nonetheless continued to be derived from businesses located in the countries of origin. This leads to situations where adult parents (the ‘astronauts’) are away on business for large portions of the year, leaving behind school-age children with relatives or servants (or on their own) in Vancouver. This phenomenon was perhaps most pronounced in the run-up to the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, when Hong Kong-based businesspeople sought to establish their households in the ‘safe haven’ of Vancouver, while maintaining their businesses on the other side of the Pacific (Waters, 2002). Despite popular criticism of ‘astronaut’ parents (or alternatively, the ‘satellite households’ they leave behind in Vancouver) as a negative social phenomenon, and the interest the situation has prompted on the part of Canadian tax authorities, such practices nonetheless continue among the more elite components of Vancouver’s business immigrants. In contrast, quite different aspects of transnationalism are manifest within the lower income segments of recent migrant streams. One important example, though still very poorly understood, is that of the household remittance economy derived from Vancouver, whereby recent immigrants direct often significant capital flows back to family members in such countries of origin as the Philippines, China and Vietnam.

A recent survey of transnational activities among recent immigrants to Vancouver (Hiebert and Ley, 2003) revealed a few noteworthy characteristics of the city’s immigrant communities:

- The actual incidence of the type of transnational activities that seem to underlie the ‘astronaut’ phenomenon was surprisingly low in comparison to the popular understanding of this phenomenon. This finding lends credence to the argument that certain aspects of transnational behaviour are often exaggerated in research (and popular perception) by the tendency to ‘sample on the dependent variable’, that is, to focus on the incidents of transnationalism rather than to look at characteristic behaviours across immigrant communities overall.

- The amounts of property ownership in countries of origin were highest among the ‘domestically employed’ immigrant class (52.4 per cent), who tend also to have the lowest incomes, and second highest (38.9 per cent) among business immigrants, who tend to have the highest incomes. This is, in a sense, both an indication of the bifurcation of immigrant streams and a demonstration of the differing nature of the transnational strategies across different immigrant streams (or strata).

Such an assessment is reinforced by the observation that migrant remittances from Canada to countries of origin are also highest among the domestically employed category (the bulk being Filipinas). There are implications here for very different capital flows associated with these two differing strategies of transnationalism, with funds flowing from home countries to Canada among the wealthiest immigrants and funds flowing in the opposite direction (in the form of household remittances) among the poorest. The general point here is that one cannot make blanket assumptions regarding transnational strategies or their economic implications; such analysis always needs to be disaggregated.

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5 For a prominent example along these lines, one can turn to a recent week-long series of articles in the Vancouver Sun, the city’s leading newspaper, entitled “Beyond diversity: Why Vancouver is a world leader” (May 22-26, 2004). These articles emphasize the positive values of intercultural mixing, racial harmony among Vancouver’s ethnic communities, and the city’s relative lack of spatial segregation by ethnic origin in comparison to other North American cities.
and differentiated by socio-economic class. Regarding ethnicity in general, the survey also found that all aspects of transnationalism were notably more significant for immigrants from Asia than for any other region of origin. A further factor potentially at play in the shifting socio-ethnic make-up of Vancouver is the development of ethnic enclave economies among the largest immigrant communities, such as Vancouver’s Chinese residents or the growing Indo-Canadian community. The potential exists for such enclave development to cut across (if only in part) the socio-economic divides within particular ethnic communities through the ties of ethno-linguistic identity. In the process, such developments can provide an increasing basis for socio-economic advancement among the lower-income strata of immigrant communities. Ethnic enclave formation, as commonly interpreted, may also strengthen connections across generational flows in particular migrant streams, with earlier sets of immigrants creating new economic opportunities for more recent arrivals. However, the downside to economic enclave development is the potential that this holds for exclusivity, by strengthening the economic potential for some streams of immigrants while limiting opportunity to others. Furthermore, this raises questions regarding integration into ‘mainstream’ society, and creates challenges to the dominant policy discourse of multiculturalism in Canadian society.

The rapid growth of the immigrant population in Vancouver, as in any city, also raises important spatial issues, particularly the question of the potential for ethno-cultural clustering or spatial segregation. One particularly useful study, carried out in the late 1990s, examined this issue through the construction of standardised indices of segregation for a number of older (European origin) and newer (Asian origin) immigrant groups using data compiled over the course of the 20th century, with particular attention paid to the changes evident from the 1971, 1981 and 1991 census figures. This study found a complex and shifting ethno-cultural landscape with wide differences with regard to immigrant concentration among the various ethnic groups that now comprise the city. One important caveat is that for perhaps the first time in history, the socio-economic differences among immigrants may be as extensive as those among the Canadian-born and there is simply no such thing as a ‘typical immigrant’.

Although the study demonstrated two overall spatial trends – increasing ethnic segregation and the rapid suburban concentration of recent immigrant groups – there were also many divergent cases challenging the broad trend of increasing segregation. For example, while the South Asian, or Indo-Canadian, groups tended to increase their concentration, particularly in the southeastern part of the city and in the suburb of Surrey, the segregation indices for those of Chinese origin have declined overall, with new immigrants of Chinese origin moving into both traditionally poorer and richer neighbourhoods. Perhaps surprisingly, the single most segregated ethno-cultural group, Vancouver’s Jewish community, has shown increases in its segregation indices over recent decades, indicating that broadly speaking, recentness of immigrant flows should not a priori be assumed to be a determinant of ethno-cultural concentration. Indeed, this observation is reinforced in the case of recent Filipino immigrants, who have one of the lowest indices of segregation. Two summary points emerge from these findings:

- The continuing dispersal of many immigrant groups brings on increased challenges for the delivery of social services targeting immigrants; and
- The potential for socio-economic exclusion, long considered to be a critical problem for new immigrants in any setting, is perhaps better examined in terms of socio-economic class rather than ethno-cultural group. This point is evident, for example, in the case of the Iranian community, with many recent immigrants noticeably clustered in the wealthy suburb of North Vancouver, while other, poorer Iranian immigrants are dispersed across other suburban municipalities to the east.

The complexity of the differentiation between class and ethnicity, implicit in what has been referred to above as the socio-economic bifurcation of recent immigrant flows, is also apparent in a recent study of immigrant housing problems in Vancouver (Matu, 2002). In that study, the bulk of the problems documented through surveys and focus groups revolved around issues of socio-economic position, rather than being part of the more generalised ‘immigrant experience’ per se.

3. The evolving Canadian policy context

Two fundamental sets of national policy concerns underlie the broader policy context affecting Vancouver’s shifting socio-economic and demographic make-up. The first of these regards the often sensitive issue of Canadian national identity. In order to set this discussion in a proper context, it is necessary to
In terms of formal legislation, landmarks include the passage of the Official Languages Act in 1969 (revised and updated in 1988) which made Canada officially bilingual. This was followed by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism that gave rise to Canadian multiculturalism policy in 1971. This policy has so far been enhanced by the legislative framework derived from the Canadian Multiculturalism Act; this statute, passed in 1988, instructed all federal institutions formally to adopt multicultural policies as part of their working mandates, and subsequently established the position of Minister of State for Multiculturalism within the Ministry of Canadian Heritage.

The ideological perspective that has come to stress ‘multiculturalism’ over ‘biculturalism’ (that is, recognising the equality of French and English cultures in the historic development of the nation), has also been shaped by other particularly Canadian factors, including deference to Canada’s aboriginal populations (now referred to with the ethnic marker of ‘First Nations’ peoples), and the political benefits of ideologically distinguishing Canada from the avowedly assimilation-prone ethic of the USA, Canada’s neighbour to the south. Nonetheless, in the hotly debated policy contexts of both countries, one may perceive how Canada’s ‘mosaic’ may be as problematic as America’s ‘melting pot,’ with official discourse on both sides of the border emphasising the need for acceptance and tolerance of cultural difference while still working to build a coherent national (or at least, nationally understood) identity.

The second area of relevant national policy concern, and one that may be said to have been co-evolving with multiculturalism policy over recent decades, is that of Canadian immigration policy. The single most consequential change in shaping recent Canadian immigration patterns came with the passage of the Immigration Act of 1967, which explicitly ended racial or culturally-based criteria for immigration into Canada. The act instituted a ‘point system’ that ranked potential immigrants according to age, education, labour skills, language skills and resources. Passage of the act followed upon more than half a decade of debate on the future of Canadian society, and may be seen as a direct response to nationwide labour shortages following from the post-war economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s (Knowles, 1997). The link between economic policy and immigration policy was made explicit in the 1967 Act and was institutionalised at the national level by the creation of the Department of Manpower and Immigration (later Employment and Immigration) to supervise the implementation of the Act.

The debates surrounding the nature of immigration and national identity were revisited with the passage of the Immigration Act of 1976, which was intended to strengthen the humanitarian orientation of Canadian immigration policy with new provisions for family unification and the creation of an explicit category for defining refugee status. Though continuing and reinforcing the fundamentally economic basis for national immigration policy, the revisions of the 1976 Act were intended better to articulate Canada’s position in the world and its response to its international obligations, and this act remains the basis of current Canadian immigration policy.

The underlying economic rationality of Canadian immigration policy is readily apparent from the proportional make-up of immigrant categories, with the bulk of immigrants categorised as economic immigrants (58 per cent in 2000), and followed by family class immigrants (27 per cent) and refugees (13 per cent). In addition to the broad category of skilled workers within the economic class, one also finds business immigrants (six per cent of the 2000 total) who have come to Canada either as entrepreneurs (three per cent), investors (two per cent), or self-employed business people (one per cent). Uran
nder the Business Immigrant Programme, more than 300,000 business immigrants and their families have been allowed to come to Canada since the 1980s (Ley, 2000); the scheme was specifically created to attract overseas capital and create employment in Canada, though how well it has succeeded in this regard has been the subject of a great deal of discussion. However, in Vancouver, the Business Immigrant Programme has had a significant impact, due not only to the disproportionate number of business immigrant landings there, but also to the marked secondary migration of business immigrants from elsewhere in Canada, principally Quebec (Ley, 2000).

How these two sets of policy concerns intersect has been reflected in the ongoing and continually redefined issue of the nature of Canadian identity. In this respect, a perceptible shift in discourse has emerged over the latter half of the 20th century, from an assimilationist ethic (which emphasised the need to encourage the cultural conformity of new immigrants) to a much more fluid interpretation of integration and the emergence of new cultural forms under multiculturalism (Winders, 2000). Deriving from these developments has been the uneven impact of immigration across the national landscape, with the idea that what now constitutes the ‘mainstream culture’ is becoming increasingly differentiated by place, with pronounced distinctions between urban and rural areas along with regional differences arising from the specific features of diverse immigrant streams (Mercer, 1995). The unresolved question in this is whether such increasing spatial and cultural differentiation will come to undermine Canadian national unity, or alternatively, whether multiculturalism as a policy itself can bring a sense of coherence to an increasingly diverse national population. Consequently, the national-level policy emphasis on promoting immigrant integration has become critical to the discourse of national identity. How this is applied in practice across the national territory in turn requires devising means to ‘localise’ strategies through close cooperation with provincial and municipal bodies. This makes it difficult to separate out the myriad complementary and overlapping programmes of national government agencies from those of their provincial and municipal counterparts when promoting national unity in a multicultural context. For these reasons, the following section considers the overall institutional infrastructure of immigrant integration in Vancouver as being comprised of agencies from all three tiers of government as well as critical elements of local civil society.

4. Urban policies for immigrant integration in Vancouver

Turning from the Canadian national context to that of municipalities, and in particular, the City of Vancouver, one may begin with the broad assumption that it is the national government that sets the basic policies shaping international immigrant flows, while it is up to municipal authorities to develop the policy approaches required to address local consequences. Although such an assumption does hold some validity, it is not entirely borne out in the case of Vancouver for two reasons. First, there is the difficulty of clearly separating out local initiatives from national- and provincial-level policies, both in terms of policy formulation and funding flows, the result being an iterative, collaborative approach between levels of government in dealing with questions of immigration and immigrant integration (discussed below). Second, there is the issue of Vancouver’s socio-economic and cultural transformation over the past two decades, arising in part from conscious efforts to reconfigure the city in the context of globalisation as Canada’s gateway to the Asia-Pacific region (Hutton, 1998a). These developments not only have implications for trade and economic exchange across the Pacific, but, perhaps more importantly here, for setting a cultural milieu which promotes deepening connectivity between North American and Asian social formations (see Olds, 2001 for an illustration of this using the case of a major real estate development in Vancouver, or Mitchell, 1993 regarding the use of multiculturalism policy in Vancouver as a conscious strategy to promote globalisation). In short, the Asian components of Vancouver’s new identity are understood to be important parts of the reorientation, or ‘rebranding’, of the city from a western Canadian outpost dependent upon the natural resource economy to a major service centre on the Pacific Rim. Therefore, recent trends regarding the development of municipal level ‘foreign policies’ under globalisation – in Vancouver’s case, the explicit efforts since the 1980s to build linkages to cities in China and elsewhere in Asia (Hutton, 1998a) – also shape the local context of immigration and immigrant settlement. A third point to be made at the outset is that these changes – the shifting relations between levels of government regarding immigration policy and the transformation of the city of Vancouver through globalisation – have been taking place during a period of budgetary retrenchment and the general shrinking of the Canadian welfare State (Creese, 1998), both trends arguably linked to
globalisation and the international ascendency of neo-liberalism. Under these conditions, one may therefore discern a shift from a more Statist, or at least State-driven, approach to dealing with the local implications of international immigration to one which increasingly relies upon State-society engagement, especially at local levels. Such developments reflect what may be seen as an ‘enabling State’ perspective, whereby the role of government has become less that of a direct provider, and instead works to promote the social service contribution of private and non-governmental sectors.

In order to understand this first point in more detail, that is, with regard to the respective roles of levels of government in shaping the local policy context, it is useful to examine what might be called the overall infrastructure for immigrant integration in Vancouver. This notion of institutional and policy infrastructure refers to the hierarchical relations between levels of government, from national to provincial, and on down to municipalities in their dealings with non-governmental and community organisations. Looking first at the top end of this hierarchy, basic policies are set by the federal government through its ministry, now known as Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), which maintains branch offices in the province of British Columbia. These basic policies determine such things as the granting of refugee status, the overall numbers of immigrants, and their proportional structure according to allowable categories, CIC formally co-operates with the provincial government through a legal agreement with the provincial Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services (MCAWS), with programmatic activities organised through MCAWS Multiculturalism Branch (also known as ‘BC Multiculturalism’).

Until the late 1990s, federal funding for resettlement and integration programmes through local community groups and NGOs was determined on a project-by-project basis, with applications directly to CIC and its collaborating federal ministries, in particular, Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) and the Multiculturalism Branch of Heritage Canada. Recent trends, as shaped by the stipulations of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001), have seen the devolution of responsibilities downward from the federal ministries to BC Multiculturalism, with the most recent formal agreement (CIC 2004) placing responsibility for the design, administration and delivery of immigrant services with the provincial government through MCAWS. This devolution in turn has had a strongly determinant effect on municipal policies and actions. This happened not only because of Canadian legal structures, which formally place municipal governments under the jurisdiction of the provinces, but also by virtue of the nature of immigrant flows, with the preponderance of recent immigrants in any province concentrating overwhelmingly in urban areas. For these reasons, provincial policy should therefore be understood to be de facto municipal policy. Although these changes have resulted in the direct transfer of some federal level personnel to the provincial level, such administrative devolution nonetheless comes at a cost, with overall reduced flows from federal coffers for immigrant settlement and integration, and concomitantly more funding responsibility placed at the provincial and local echelons. Despite the negative implications of federal budgetary cutbacks, these trends toward administrative devolution over the 1990s have occurred during a period of increased provincial level commitment to multiculturalism. Such commitment arguably was linked to provincial and municipal efforts to reorient the city toward the Pacific Rim. As a result, increased programmes and funding are now supporting a wide range of activities, from settlement counseling and job training, to language teaching and the expansion of what is known as ‘heritage language’ instruction for the descendants of immigrants.

A further critical factor over this same period has been the parallel expansion of non-governmental organisations (NGOs, including community-based and non-profit organisations) engaged in the delivery of settlement services. These are now seen as a distinctive feature of Vancouver’s multiculturalism scene over the course of the 1990s (Edgington and Hutton, 2002). Although some of these emergent organisations and programmes may be seen to be building off of pre-existing traditions of voluntarism within the Vancouver community, and in some cases linking to earlier immigrant flows, it is reasonable to consider the bulk of this NGO growth as largely deriving from the continuing expansion of newer immigrant communities. To get a sense of the scale and diversity of these organisations, which in total comprise the bottom (and most diffuse) tier of Vancouver’s infrastructure of immigrant settlement, one can look at the Directory of BC Multicultural, Anti-racism, Immigrant and Community Service Organisations, published by the provincial government (BC Multiculturalism, 2003). In this, one finds a listing of more than 50 organisations promoting multiculturalism and immigrant services within the City of Vancouver alone, with another 200 plus ‘ethno-cultural’ organisations in the Vancouver region, many of which are
involved in the provision of services to recent immigrants. The directory also gives a sense of the media presence of immigrant communities, with an additional listing of multicultural and ethno-cultural media organisations, including print and broadcast in roughly two dozen languages in the Vancouver region. These organisations range widely in size and scope and with respect to the degree to which they are focused on immigrant services, rather than multiculturalism more broadly. Those with the greatest presence in terms of immigrant settlement programmes include the Immigrant Services Society of British Columbia (ISS), the Multilingual Orientation Service Association for Immigrant Communities (MOSAIC), and the United Chinese Community Enrichment Services Society (SUCCESS); in addition to their extensive settlement and integration programmes in their own rights, these organizations provide important advocacy and lobbying functions that help shape municipal and provincial policies. Moreover, many of the smaller ethno-cultural organisations with immigrant settlement programmes are brought together through coalitions such as the umbrella organisation Affiliation of Multicultural Societies and Service Agencies of BC (AMSSA). The following sections of this chapter focus on two case studies that explore civil society components of Vancouver’s infrastructure of immigrant integration. In these we observe two distinct pathways for scaling up the influence and capacity of such organisations the better to serve immigrant communities: (1) an overview of SUCCESS demonstrates the ability of a single community-based ethno-cultural organisation to expand and take on new activities over time; and (2) a look at AMSSA shows the potential for networking in order to give a voice and presence to the many smaller organisations and community groups involved in immigrant settlement.

Before turning to these cases of State-society cooperation in the area of immigrant settlement and integration, it is useful briefly to review the findings of a recent study on the responsiveness of local governments in the Greater Vancouver Region to the shifting ethno-cultural make-up of the region’s population due to recent immigration patterns, an area of research which so far has received only limited attention. In this study (Edgington and Hutton, 2002), the 22 local municipalities that comprise the Vancouver Region were surveyed to determine the scope of local multicultural policies and services available to local constituents; these findings were then compared against the proportion of visible minorities in each municipality as a basic indicator of cultural diversity. The overall finding of this study was that there is a distinct ‘policy gradient’ with regard to the degree to which a local government is ‘multicultural ready,’ that is, has policies, programmes and services specifically designed to serve culturally or linguistically diverse communities. The core municipality of Vancouver and its two adjacent suburban municipalities of Richmond and Burnaby, where most recent immigrants are concentrated, scored quite highly in terms of multicultural readiness. However, one finds great unevenness across the broader terrain of the urban region, with outer suburban municipalities far behind in terms of services tailored to recent immigrant communities. Here one sees in microcosm, within Vancouver’s urban region, the uneven impacts of recent immigration as experienced in Canada more generally. From these findings, one may discern that it is the active presence of large and concentrated immigrant groups that shapes responsive local government actions. However, it is also notable that responsiveness to the socio-cultural changes brought on by immigration may also be configured by the presence of pre-existing progressive agencies within local governments; prominent among these is the Social Planning Department of the City of Vancouver which, since its establishment in 1968, has been instrumental in determining municipal service responses to changing community needs.

‘SUCCESS’ breeds success

This section reviews the development of what has become one of the largest and best-established community-based organisations focused on immigrant settlement and integration in Vancouver: the United Chinese Community Enrichment Services Society, better known by its acronym, SUCCESS. This is a good example of the way an organisation developed first within a specific immigrant community in response to local government inaction, or perhaps insufficient capacity, in addressing the needs of recent immigrants, and how, over time, the organisation has expanded both its range of activities and the number of the immigrant communities it serves. Over the three decades since its founding, SUCCESS has grown from its narrow ethnic roots into a multi-faceted, mainstream organisation facilitating immigrant integration into the shifting mosaic of Vancouver society. This organisational history also illustrates how a community group originating as an autonomous local initiative has, through its
networking and collaboration both with local government agencies and other community service organisations, become an important component of Vancouver's institutional social services landscape. In this sense, the success of SUCCESS may be taken as paradigmatic of the collaborative State-society working relationship that characterises the wide base of British Columbia's infrastructure for immigrant integration.

Considering the long and uneven history of Chinese migrants in Vancouver and British Columbia, it is perhaps not surprising that one of the earliest and most committed community groups arising from the recent history of international immigration should have arisen out of the Chinese community, and in particular, from among immigrants from Hong Kong. The Chinese, as has been mentioned previously, constituted a major component of the immigrant population in the early days of the city and province, with many immigrants, particularly young men from the southern Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, arriving in the latter half of the 19th century. They were attracted first by the Yukon gold rush to the north, and sustained themselves over time through a range of manual labour occupations, including domestic servants, porters, miners, seasonal workers in the fishing industry, and perhaps most famously as construction workers in the building of the Canadian Pacific Railroad (Li, 1998). The pronounced presence of this Chinese immigrant population was gradually undermined through racially-based exclusionary legislation, beginning with the first head tax on arriving immigrants from China in 1885 and culminating in the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923.

These patterns of racial exclusion shifted sharply following the post-war reforms of Canadian immigration law, and specifically the introduction of the ‘points system’ in 1967, as Canada sought to expand its labour force through immigration at a time when the previous sources of immigrant labour in Europe were largely reduced. Coincident with these changes on the receiving end of immigrant flows – Canada's shift toward Asia and other developing regions in search of new labour – the politics of China and the position of Hong Kong as a major centre of emigrant and refugee movement out of China, created a large pool of potential Canadian immigrants. By the early 1970s, the Hong Kong Chinese component of immigrant flows into Vancouver was significant. This wave of emigration out of Hong Kong in the wake of China's Cultural Revolution and consequent political disturbances within Hong Kong was supplemented again by a further wave in the 1980s, following the 1984 signing of the Sino-British Agreement for the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Therefore both push and pull factors have been shaping the patterns of immigrant flows from Hong Kong to Vancouver. Given the swift pace of these changes, it was perhaps only to be expected that local governments on the receiving end would not be fully prepared. It was in this context that SUCCESS was founded in 1973. Newly arriving immigrants from Hong Kong found themselves largely excluded from the pre-existing mutual aid societies of Vancouver's established Chinese community, and therefore turned to organisations such as the ChinatownYWCA (known as the Pender Y) for assistance with social services, legal counseling, and finding housing and schools. As immigration flows increased, however, it was soon obvious that demands placed on the Pender Y were far in excess of the organisation’s capacity, particularly as they had only a limited mandate for providing bilingual services for new immigrants. A small group of prominent members of the Hong Kong immigrant community came together to find ways of creating a bridging mechanism between new immigrants and Vancouver's social service agencies. It is noteworthy here that the Chinese name chosen for SUCCESS is Zhong Qiao Hu Zhu Hui (literally, ‘Chinese Immigrant Mutual Help Society’), with the word ‘qiao’ (or ‘immigrant’) having a Chinese language homonym meaning ‘bridge.’ The bridging function of SUCCESS has been prominent in the organisation’s promotional materials since the beginning.

The history of SUCCESS as an organisation may be divided into three phases (Guo, 2004). The first phase was based on an initial three-year funding grant from the federal government (specifically, Health and Welfare Canada) for carrying out the ‘Chinese Connection Project.’ This grant provided funding (1) to identify existing gaps between immigrant needs and the city's social services programmes, and (2) to work with social service agencies in developing new programmes to facilitate immigrant integration. This first funded project demonstrated a clear need for community-based programmes serving new immigrants. Once it came to an end, the organisers of SUCCESS undertook strategic planning focused on fundraising and new membership development. This strategy was facilitated by the acceptance in 1979 of the organisation into the United Way, a long-established umbrella organisation of social service and charitable NGOs. This recognition as part of the United Way is indicative of a conscious strategy of mainstreaming the organisation, which gave the organization the
leverage to obtain a second round of federal funding under the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Programme. It was also at this time that federal support for the settlement of Vietnamese refugees provided the first opportunity for SUCCESS to extend its activities beyond the Chinese immigrant community; this move set the groundwork for its second phase, one of organisational development and maturation over the course of the 1980s. This second phase may be broadly characterised by efforts of the organization staff in two main directions: (1) developing close collaborative relations with existing neighbourhood-level organisations, particularly in those parts of the city where new immigrants were settling; and (2) to develop new, high-profile fundraising strategies in order to guarantee a consistent operating budget for which new funding applications could be made. This second phase, therefore, was also one of spatial expansion, with SUCCESS activities now taking place in the neighbourhoods where the growing Chinese immigrant population was settling: three offices were established (in Chinatown, East Vancouver, and in the expanding suburb of Richmond) by the end of the 1980s. The range of services expanded as well, from basic housing and services referral, to more English language training, to career counseling and job referral services.

The third phase in the history of SUCCESS, over the course of the 1990s (as identified by Guo (2004)), is characterised both by two main initiatives: (1) further spatial expansion, again following the growth of the Chinese immigrant community into new suburban locations; and (2) new language programmes along with outreach to other, non-Chinese immigrant groups. Indicative of this expanded mandate of the organisation has been their successful bid in 1992 to establish and operate the Community Airport Newcomers Network (CANN), a programme funded by Citizenship and Immigration Canada to help newly arriving immigrants deal with landing procedures and to provide initial counseling and referral services. The CANN kiosk at the Vancouver International Airport now provides group and individual orientations and other services in 14 languages. A visit to the SUCCESS website (www.success.bc.ca) gives an indication of the current wide range of the organisation's activities – going far beyond their original goals of settlement, integration and immigrant advocacy, to include business development, technology training, healthcare and education, and family and youth counseling. SUCCESS now maintains a staff of over 350 professionals in 11 locations throughout the Vancouver region, supported by 9,100 volunteers and more than 18,000 members, and has provided over 500,000 instances of client services in the sole 2004. Community support for SUCCESS remains high, with more than one third of the organisation's operating budget derived from community contributions, through such events as the 'Walk with the Dragon' walk-a-thon and an annual Fundraising Gala. In 2004, SUCCESS had an operating budget of approximately Can$10 million, with some 65 per cent of this derived from government grants (38 per cent federal, 26 per cent provincial and one per cent municipal). The history of SUCCESS shows how one community-based organisation, if given the proper environment and institutional support – both with regard to its collaborative relationship with local, provincial and national level government agencies as well as in terms of its close cooperation with other local civic groups – has been able to expand far beyond its initial goals and its immediate ethno-cultural community, and thus to facilitate immigrant integration across the board, and with respect to a wide range of immigrant and community needs.

Scaling up through networking

It may be argued that the success of SUCCESS in becoming one of Vancouver's pre-eminent organisations working on immigrant settlement and integration is indicative of two trends: the numerical domination of immigrants of Chinese origin during the recent wave of immigration to Vancouver, and perhaps also the high social and economic standing of many members of the Chinese immigrant community. SUCCESS, however, is only one of many organisations involved in such work. In order to get a fuller understanding of the broad civil society component of Vancouver's infrastructure for immigrant integration, it is therefore useful to examine the role of networking among the myriad smaller organisations that make up this institutional landscape. Although undoubtedly much of the collaboration and networking between these organisations takes place informally, the umbrella organisation, AMSSA also provides a critical venue for information-sharing, programme and project development, and immigrant advocacy (www.amssa.org).
Like SUCCESS, AMSSA was founded in the 1970s, which nearly coincides with the beginning of Vancouver’s (and Canada’s) current phase of immigration expansion and cultural change. AMSSA now brings together more than 85 member organisations in British Columbia, dedicated to principles of partnership, stakeholder involvement, and cultural awareness, and committed to the goal of promoting social justice and equity in multiculturalism, anti-racism, human rights and immigration. The major components of AMSSA’s work are structured through three major committees: the Collaborative Committee on Multiculturalism (CCM), the Immigrant Integration Coordinating Committee (IICC), and the Multicultural Health Committee (MHC). Each of these committees administers a number of projects and programmes aimed at building collaboration between member organisations and increasing awareness of immigration and multiculturalism issues more broadly. In particular, the IICC, the oldest of these three committees, has received substantial funding from the provincial Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services in support of research and information dissemination. The IICC has over the years also produced a series of position papers addressing such issues as organisational collaboration in support of immigrant services, and contributed to legislative deliberations over immigrant and refugee policy. In addition to such governmental support (which in total provides close to two-thirds of AMSSA’s Can$400,000-500,000 budget in recent years), the organisation also receives funding from VanCity, a local credit union that supports community-based and charitable organisations in Vancouver, and obtains revenues from the BC Gaming Commission, which channels proceeds from legalised gambling to local community groups. Through its various information-sharing and advocacy activities, AMSSA provides both a venue for networking among its member organisations and a mechanism for collaboration between these organisations and government agencies. Networking in this sense refers to interactions between spatially disparate organisations, not only in Vancouver and its surrounding urbanised region, but also in smaller municipalities around the province. Networking also involves connectivity and collaboration between specific immigrant and other organisations committed to multiculturalism, anti-racism and social diversity more broadly. It is noteworthy here that, in contrast to the case of SUCCESS as an organisation which originated out of a specific immigrant group (the Chinese community, or even more specifically, the Hong Kong Chinese community), the membership list of AMSSA contains both ethnic community groups as well as many older, local non-profit organisations that have traditionally been focused on community-building and local social services delivery. It can therefore be stressed that although the work of AMSSA is innovative in seeking to address the needs of Vancouver’s growing immigrant population, it also builds upon a long-standing tradition of community volunteerism in the city that predates current changes in the city’s ethno-cultural make-up. By encouraging and facilitating local community groups in expanding their activities to include immigrant settlement and integration programmes, AMSSA and its affiliated organisations promote the view that immigrant issues and concerns involve not just the immigrant groups themselves, but the community overall.

Such an interpretation may be discerned in the evolving work of the various community-based ‘neighbourhood houses’ which can be found throughout Vancouver and its surrounding municipalities. Vancouver’s neighbourhood houses, many of which date back to the 1950s, originated out of local, grassroots efforts at community-building; these often started with programmes of social and recreational activities for children and families within the neighbourhoods. Although originally independent organisations, in recent years eight of these neighbourhood houses have formed the Association of Neighbourhood Houses of Greater Vancouver (ANH). ANH itself is a member organisation of AMSSA, along with two other independent neighbourhood houses in the city. Over the years, the activities of the neighbourhood houses have typically grown and diversified, to include childcare, family counseling, health programmes, literacy training, and increasingly as Vancouver’s immigrant populations have grown, programmes aimed at immigrant integration, such as referral services and English language training courses. One outcome of these developments has been the formation over time of a dispersed, highly localised network for immigrant services at the neighbourhood level. Although typically reliant on volunteer efforts and contributions from within the neighbourhood, and therefore operating with only limited resources, such organisations are able to respond to immigrant needs at the smaller local levels. In spatial terms, the community-embedded network nature of such organisations improves the accessibility of social services for recent immigrants, given the extent of immigrant settlement in the city and the relatively low level of ethnic spatial segregation found in Vancouver (Hiebert, 1998).
5. Lessons learned and recommendations: Thinking beyond policy

Lessons learned

Lessons learned from the Vancouver case study will find most applicability through comparison to situations in other similar contexts. For this reason, it may be useful first to articulate a basic framework for understanding the conditions of advanced-economy cities with respect to global flows of international migrants and with regard to their national and local policy responses for dealing with immigrant integration. Such a framework comprises three sets of characteristics:

1) Advanced economies are societies that have largely completed their demographic transitions, that is, that they now have less than replacement rates of natural population growth. The implication is that there is an economic need for external (‘foreign’ or immigrant) labour inputs in order to maintain economic productivity and viable dependency ratios (the ratio of non-working to working populations) as the native-born citizens of post-transition societies become increasingly older.

2) Such advanced societies are now characterised by predominantly urban populations, a feature also related to their demographic transitions. Because of this, international migration has become overwhelmingly an urban phenomenon, with municipal government initiatives for addressing immigration issues becoming increasingly salient. This is especially so under conditions of increasing decentralisation or devolution of government powers and responsibilities to lower levels. International migration has therefore come to be more often mediated by local needs and conditions, by comparison with the more dominant role of national level policy-setting in the past. This reinforces the observation from the literature on world cities that major urban settings are now the principal nodal points of connectivity in the current phase of globalisation.

3) The other fundamental characteristic of the framework required to deal with increasing immigration and immigrant integration is the nature of national and local politics, and the political debates regarding the ethno-cultural make-up of the nation and the city. In short, this is the question of identity, an issue conventionally tied to discussions of nationalism and nation-building as a central project of the nation-State. Increasingly, however, such discussions now bring in questions of local culture and local identity, with a new emphasis on how ‘place identity’ shapes notions of belonging and culture. For example, long-standing debates over what it means to be a Canadian are now complicated by the understanding that the cultural implications of being a Vancouverite differ from those of being a Torontonian or a Montrealer, or indeed, in differentiating the local identities of Canada’s many smaller locales from those of these three major metropolitan areas.

The value of this comparative framework lies in its articulation of the central policy tension as being between immigration driven by economic necessity, and policy contexts shaped by the sometimes antagonistic politics of identity, both nationally and locally. Therefore the pivotal question is, whether the economic rationale for immigration is sufficient to overcome the resistance of identity politics in the setting of a pro-immigration policy framework supportive of national and local socio-economic development. In the case of Vancouver, or Canada more generally, the partial resolution of these tensions is rooted in decisions taken since the 1960s, which privilege economic necessity over received notions of identity. The understanding here is that a pro-immigration policy context necessitates ongoing societal deliberations over what it means to be a Canadian, a point that is explicit in the national policy framework for promoting multiculturalism that has developed since the 1970s. The overriding question in thinking about the main issues facing immigrant integration in Vancouver today is, therefore, what does it mean for a nation – and a locality – consciously to build a multicultural society and polity through a pro-immigration strategy?

Considering that the newly emerging, or evolving, national identity of Canada is already markedly different from the country’s dominant European-derived identity of the not-too-distant past, it is helpful also to contrast policies toward assimilation from those emphasising integration. Rather than just a subtle semantic distinction, one may describe assimilation-prone (or ‘assimilationist’) policies to be those which assume the adaptation of recent immigrants to a pre-existing dominant culture, whereas ‘integrationist’ approaches promote a gradual convergence toward a new dominant culture (whether local or national), with the dominant culture itself understood to be dynamic, shifting in response...
to the acceptance of changing immigrant flows and their accompanying cultures. Working to develop a shared sense of citizenship or a common identity within an integrationist framework is challenging. The downside to multiculturalism lies in its potential to legitimise cultural distance, or to build ‘cultural shields’ between particular components of society. As a ‘new world’ society, and one that has long needed to address issues of bilingualism in official federal discourse, Canada is perhaps better prepared to deal with the challenges of multiculturalism than are most advanced economy nations.

In the case of Vancouver, further challenges to the development of a multicultural society derive from the speed of change due to immigration and the overall context of economic restructuring in the city during this period. One particular concern in this regard is over the question of transnationalism, and whether or not transnational activities among recent immigrants to the city should be seen as undermining a sense of belonging and the loyalty presumed by citizenship acquired through naturalisation. As was pointed out above, transnationalism among the various streams of immigrants in Vancouver is manifested in a variety of forms, with varying implications for economic and social connectivity between Vancouver and immigrants’ places of origin. Persistent transnationalism among Vancouver’s recent immigrant streams presents a challenge to conventional neo-classical interpretations of the underlying economic logic of migration, which implies that the decision to migrate is determined by the calculations of individuals deciding on what is best for their own life circumstances. Increasingly, it must be understood how overall household decision-making may play an important role in shaping international migration flows, with the conscious formation of transnational households (that is, where some family members relocate overseas while others remain behind) in order to reduce risk or to maximise opportunities for the household as a unit overall. The unresolved question that will no doubt continue to shape the policy debate in Vancouver is, whether such observed transnationalism among recent immigrant groups is merely a transitional phenomenon, though accentuated by the rapidity of change in the city, or whether this will be a persistent characteristic, intrinsic to the long-distance connectivity now possible through globalisation as currently manifested.

Recommendations

The lessons learned from reviewing Vancouver’s ‘infrastructure for immigrant integration’ emphasise collaboration and mainstreaming as the two main watchwords for progressive policy development in support of multiculturalism and immigrant integration. Local governments cannot do everything themselves when addressing the problems of immigrant integration; they are not sufficiently resourced to do this, nor should this be their exclusive responsibility. For this reason, it may be better to speak of strategies rather than policies to facilitate immigrant integration, as the emphasis here is on how best to facilitate local State-society engagement.

Among the governmental components of the infrastructure for immigrant integration, the emphasis on collaboration may be seen in the close working relationship between tiers of government, with policy input from lower to higher levels, coupled with funding flows from the national and provincial governments to local agencies and community-based groups. With the recent and ongoing devolution of responsibilities to local levels, there is now even more of a need for collaboration between local agencies and non-government bodies, especially with regard to the fiscal underpinnings of immigrant settlement programmes. The most successful strategies in support of immigrant integration are those that are largely based within the immigrant communities themselves, with clear mechanisms of partnership between immigrant communities, other, more mainstream civil society organisations, and local and higher level government agencies. The summary point here is that local governments should take a supportive or facilitative approach to develop efficient, viable frameworks for building the capacity of local NGOs and other community groups to take the lead in promoting immigrant settlement and integration.

From the two case studies of community-level initiatives in Vancouver, we can see that collaboration and mainstreaming can imply somewhat different strategies, depending on the nature of the groups involved. From the history of the development of SUCCESS, we have seen how an organisation that was initially rooted in, and attempting to address, the needs of one specific immigrant group has been able to expand its influence over time through conscious strategies of reaching out to other organisations, working to address the needs of immigrants more broadly, and building partnerships with the city’s main-
With regard to the delivery of social services, housing and employment counseling for immigrant groups, the Vancouver experience demonstrates the need to distinguish between territorially-based and non-territorial approaches. Where immigrant groups are clustered or spatially concentrated, a territorially-targeted approach may be effective. In cases where immigrant groups are spatially dispersed, as is the case with a number of groups in the Vancouver region, it is more effective to develop strategies of cooperation with more mainstream social service agencies or community groups.

Overall, this chapter has tended to emphasise the positive outcomes of immigrant integration in the official multicultural policy context of Vancouver today. Although much has been accomplished in building up a culturally vibrant and comparatively harmonious local milieu out of a diverse palette of immigrant streams and cultures, this has nonetheless been a slow process, and perhaps insufficient in view of the rapid rate of change that has shaped the city in recent decades. As a final normative observation, let us add the caution that a multicultural milieu, such as now may be found in Vancouver, should not be taken as an end in itself. There is a need here to move beyond multiculturalism to cosmopolitanism (Hiebert, 2000), that is, from a situation in which multiple cultural forms are tolerated, exist side by side, and are perhaps even encouraged, to one where residents of one cultural background are personally comfortable interacting with those of other cultures. It is in the emergent hybridities of such cosmopolitanism that one will find the authenticity of new local identities.

Consideration of the Vancouver experience with immigrant integration, and in particular, the twin emphasis on collaboration and mainstreaming, leads to the following recommendations for strategy development in other similar contexts:

1) It is important to develop a media policy or strategy. This should as adopt a two-pronged approach, with (a) support for, and collaboration with, local immigrant language media, as well as (b) working with the mainstream media to build positive images of immigrant communities.

2) A second strategy emphasises language policy more broadly, and may again be envisioned as another two-pronged approach: (a) facilitation of immigrant involvement in community life can be encouraged through the translation of ‘official’ materials into immigrant languages, as this can help to build up a sense of belonging among new immigrants. In addition, (b) this should be coupled with well-supported efforts at language training, to encourage new immigrants to learn the main official language of their new society.
REFERENCES


1. The context

Vladivostok is the capital and major economic centre of Primorye, the Russian Far East region\(^1\) with a total population of approximately two million (including 600,000 in the capital). Reflecting its role as the political and industrial centre of the region, the Vladivostok population is an aggregate of more than 50 different ethnic communities, 30 confessions and more than 150 religious organisations. However, owing to unprecedented emigration from the region after the fall of the Soviet Union as well as to lower birth rates, in the last 15 years, the region's population has fallen by as many as one million, including as many as 400,000 in the sole Vladivostok. Such mass migration came in response to the economic stagnation in the region and the unstable political conditions in the country. According to a recent survey, more than 60 per cent of young people consider leaving Primorye in the future\(^2\), which would drain the region of its workforce. If the current trend persists, by 2010 the Primorye region will reach a critical level where ageing people will make up well over 20 percent of the population. The 1989 census showed that out of Primorye's population of 1,976,600, a large majority (1,721,600) were Russians, with the balance split between Ukrainians (185,000), Byelorussians (21,900) and Germans (4,100)\(^3\). As a result of emigration, by the end of the 1990s the population of the region had changed significantly, with the number of Russians down by 27,600, along with 10,100 fewer Ukrainians and 2,700 fewer Byelorussians. In the same period, some 4,000 new residents from the former Soviet republics (particularly Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, the former Caucasian and Baltic republics) had moved to Primorye. In addition, of the 15,000 foreign workers allowed into the region every year, 77 per cent came from China, 27 per cent

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* The author acknowledges the many useful comments provided by M. Balbo and G. Marconi.

1 Primorye is located on the south-east coast of Russia’s Far East, between China, North Korea and Japan.
2 Third Pacific Forum of Russians living abroad, Vladivostok, October 2003.
3 The 1989 census did not include the military stationed in the region.
from Korea (both North and South) and only 6.5 from the former Soviet Union (Vashchuk, 2002). Korea’s 27 per cent contribution adds to the significant Korean diaspora (over 15,000) that has settled in the southern part of the Primorye region since the end of the Soviet era.

At the beginning of 2004, Russia’s Federal Migration Service registered more than 150,000 legal migrants in Vladivostok and its region (Table 1), a threefold increase on 1994.

**TABLE 1 - NUMBERS OF LEGAL IMMIGRANTS IN THE PRIMORYE REGION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>26,347</td>
<td>106,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan and Armenia</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>13,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7,777</td>
<td>9,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>5,095</td>
<td>6,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former CIS countries*</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>6,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>6,987</td>
<td>2,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>2,519</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>1,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain and Canada</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47,049</td>
<td>154,162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan


The Chinese represent almost 70 per cent of all immigrants to Primorye. What is more, although the Chinese have always gravitated to Vladivostok and the region, between 1994 and 2004 their number has increased more than fourfold. Azerbaijans and Armenians together make up the second most important migrant community and the one that has most expanded in the past 10 years. However, official numbers largely underestimate the size of foreign immigration into Primorye and Vladivostok. The largest, though difficult to gauge, inflow is by far from China: these immigrants come in as tourists and then stay unregistered in the city, many of them only temporarily as they see the USA or Canada as their ultimate destination. Many other foreigners first enter Russia through borders that are a long way from Primorye, and subsequently move to Vladivostok as internal migrants. A local non-governmental organisation (NGO) known as Physicians for human rights estimates that the number of illegal migrants to the Primorye region increased nearly fourfold in the past 10 years, reaching no less than 45,000 in 2004.

Another source which can help gauge the actual extent of illegal migration is the Regional Security Service. For the sole 2003, the service fined over 14,000 foreigners for violating passport and visa regulations. Chinese nationals contributed the bulk of the culprits, followed by those from North Korea, Kazakhstan and Iran.

As mentioned, Chinese migrants represent by far the majority of foreign migrants to Vladivostok, with a large part of them thought to be using Vladivostok as a mere port of call before a bid across the Pacific to the USA or Canada. The inflow is likely to have increased in recent years, following the relative but significant improvement in Vladivostok’s economy, notably in the agricultural, construction and apparel sectors which were experiencing labour shortages. According to the Interior Ministry, up to 150,000 illegal Chinese migrants live in Primorye, a segment of the 400,000 to two million Chinese immigrants in Russia. Unreliable official data combine with alarmist speculation in the media regarding the scale of Chinese migration; this in turn fuel a general negative perception of the phenomenon among the public (Gelbras, 2003). A case in point was a statement from the Federal Migration Service, warning that the Chinese could become the dominant population in much of the Russian Far East later this century.

The irony is that, once a predominantly Chinese city before the Stalin-era purges, Vladivostok was until recently the only harbour city along the Pacific Rim without a conspicuous Chinese community. Even today, there is no genuine Chinatown to speak of in the city, since the Chinese community lives scattered across different peripheral areas, in secondary cities such as Ussuriysk and Blagoveshchensk. This spatial distribution of the Chinese migrants results in fairly good and even improving housing conditions for them (Table 2).

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4 Although registered as the third most important migrant community, the Japanese are mostly short-term and transit migrants.

5 According to the Vladivostok News (October 24, 2003), 70 per cent of illegal immigrants in Primorye are Chinese.

6 Migration from China to Russia in general, and Primorye in particular, has been significant since 1988, after the Soviet Union and China signed an agreement on visa-free cross-border movements.

7 The Vladivostok’ bay was once known under the Chinese name, Haishenwei, given to it by the Chinese sailors who used to harvest trepang (sea cucumber) there.
North Koreans represent the second most important migrant community in Vladivostok, with up to 2,500 legally registered, who work primarily in construction. The numbers have remained relatively stable; border guards and migration officials alike concur that there are few illegal North Korean workers. Vladivostok newspapers are replete with advertisements touting the services of labourers sent by North Korea across the border with Russia. In the Primorye region as a whole (i.e., including Vladivostok), an estimated 10,000 North Koreans are working in logging camps, mining and construction sites.

Korean migration started as early as the latter half of the 1940s, when North Korea sent workers to logging camps in the Russian Far East in exchange for massive economic aid from Moscow. North Korea handled security in these camps and Amnesty International has documented serious instances of human rights abuses, including torture and execution of those trying to escape. Some of these camps still exist, according to Russian media reports, as North Korea provided free labour to help pay off its $3.8 billion Soviet-era debt. Some North Korean immigrants work in teams on big construction projects, while others are sent out to find more menial types of jobs on their own, such as interior decoration, where they earn an equivalent US$ -130 a month. Once a week, they must attend a meeting to report on their activities and hand over the bulk of their earnings. Conditions in the dormitories are poor and many North Korean workers prefer to stay the night on the building sites they are working on. Bribes are essential if a worker wants to get assigned to a more favourable working site with parts and tools available. Even the sending of remittances back home may need the occasional bribe, and some loggers end up accumulating debts as a result.

Although work conditions became even more difficult after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, many North Koreans still aspire to work as loggers in Russia in order to improve their fates. The numbers of North Korean loggers in Russia are said to have plummeted to fewer than 5,000 by late 2004, from a peak of 20,000 to 30,000 in the 1980s. However, according to the Migration Ministry, over 2,000 North Korean workers entered the southeastern Russian region around Vladivostok in 2002, up from 1,500 a year earlier, due to the brisker pace of construction fuelled by Russia’s economic revival. This coincided with a warmer relationship between the two countries after a cool spell in the aftermath of the 1991 Soviet collapse.

Among the region’s foreign neighbours, the Vietnamese play a low-key role because there are only just under 1,000 of them in the region. First brought in under long-term construction contracts, they remained without work amidst Russian economic woes. Today they typically trade in currencies on the black markets in Vladivostok and some other locations around town. At the same time and owing to poor civil service pay, corruption has increased significantly. Government expenditures on border security and tax collection have also decreased nearly fourfold, while anecdotal evidence suggests that Russian officials are willing to bend the rules for personal economic gain. The Zolotoi Rog business weekly reported in April 1999 that Chinese migrants had opened 13 illegal retail and two wholesale markets in Vladivostok. According to the same report, 30 Chinese families had been trading an equivalent $400,000 to $500,000 worth of produce at the well-known Fadeyeva Street wholesale market in Vladivostok without registering their businesses or paying taxes. In Ussuriysk (just north of Vladivostok), where municipal revenues increased threefold as a result of Chinese trade in the late 1990s, the local customs office once prevented the city sanitation department from inspecting the quality of Chinese goods stored at the customs warehouse, for fear of a decrease in customs duty income.

It is estimated that cross-border ‘shuttle’ trade by individuals (both Russian and Chinese nationals) is three times the volume of officially reported trade between Primorye and China.

### TABLE 2 - CHINESE MIGRANTS’ HOUSING CONDITIONS IN VLADIVOSTOK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999 (%)</th>
<th>2002 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gelbras, 2004

8 According to a recent survey of 100 Chinese traders, 62 per cent had to pay “additional revenues” to Russian civil servants, 80 per cent to the police, 55 per cent to border guards, and 60 per cent to transporters.
2. Emerging issues

Depending on the benefits or nuisance accruing to them, the Vladivostok population's perceptions of foreign migrants are very different, particularly with regard to the Chinese community.

On the other hand, there is little doubt that large-scale immigration to Vladivostok has made it easier for Chinese criminal organisations to prosper in the region. As they face racial prejudice and the threat of deportation (since many have no visas), most Chinese migrants accept to pay protection money to the gangs and bribes to government officials. In 2003, the problem of cross-border crime and illegal immigration was deemed important enough for the two countries' respective presidents, Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao, to create a joint working group to curb the uncontrolled movement of people across the Sino-Russian border.

The rise in Chinese organised crime and illegal immigration has fuelled racist attitudes towards the Chinese community in Vladivostok, including towards those who are genuine victims of the Triads9 and their protection rackets. Although the prevailing perception that Chinese migrants form a 'tidal wave' is grossly exaggerated, it reflects local attitudes towards immigration. The number of newly arrived migrants from China does not exceed 200,000, or a mere one per cent of the total population in the region, Nonetheless, many in the local population perceive this as a real threat to their future in the area.

The economic impact of Chinese trade and business in Primorye and the concomitant opportunities for corrupt government officials to take their share of the money flowing across the border obviously depend on the volume of goods produced and services provided for by the Chinese in Vladivostok and the Primorye region as a whole. In the last five years, cross-border trade has been declining, with lower Russian government expenditure a contributing factor. These trends are likely to have opposite effects on the attitudes of Vladivostok residents to Chinese migrants. On the one hand, one would expect more and more local people to be weary of the perspectives of an economy whose growth was so dependent on relationships with China, resulting in heightened ethnic alienation and hostility. The fact of the matter is, the number of reported discriminative acts against Chinese nationals in the northern part of Primorye has increased sharply as a consequence of growing cross-border exchanges, despite the economic benefits they may have provided to some segments of the region's population. Popular stereotypes can only add to the increasing potential for inter-ethnic hostility in the region. Few Russians perceive Chinese migrants as honest, polite and responsible; and whereas they are increasingly perceived as hard-working and entrepreneurial, Chinese migrants are also viewed as aggressive and sly.

Therefore, there is a risk that frustrated expectations may open the gates for more and more negative attitudes to Chinese nationals, and pave the way for a rise in nationalist activism by individuals and groups seeking political influence and power. These trends are consistent with the logic of conflict escalation under conditions of relative economic deprivation.

Moreover, ethnic Chinese and Koreans in Vladivostok form a distinct ethnic and readily identifiable minority with a culture and history that local Slavic residents can hardly understand. Such ethnic and cultural differences between Russians and Chinese migrants may set the stage for potential violent confrontations and perceived threats to the physical security and cultural traditions of ethnic Russians, which the long-standing territorial disputes between the two countries have already nurtured (Alexeev, 2000).

Despite these negative trends in inter-ethnic relations, many government officials have personally experienced the economic benefits of cross-border cooperation with China. For this reason, and even in an area with historically contested territories such as Khasan, local government officials have recently expressed support for the creation of an ‘International Zone for Trade and Culture’ under UN auspices. Moreover, and regardless of mounting hostility toward Chinese nationals in the 1990s, public support for bilateral cooperation remains strong to this day.

Regarding the social-economic role of Chinese migration, the Russian media typically focus on two issues. First, China is often mentioned when the question is raised of potential labour deficits caused by the low birthrates and emigration of local people from the Russian Far East. Second, there is a widespread belief that Chinese migrants cause severe damage to the Russian economy through such illegal activities as currency transfers abroad in violation of foreign exchange controls, black markets in lumber, rare natural and

9 The infamous Chinese criminal networks.
3. International migration and national policies

Migration policy in Russia is both confused and exceedingly complex, with many cross-currents at work. Russian experts tend to focus on the growing need for foreign labour, whereas the population’s fears revolve around the already mentioned rise in ‘invasive’ Chinese and Caucasian immigration. As for the Russian government, its successive contradictory immigration laws attract nothing but criticism. The issue of immigration in Russia is closely linked with the population decline that took place in the 1990s, as a fall in birth rates failed to compensate for higher mortality during the troubled political transition. Since most countries around Russia (especially those along the southern border) have retained high birth rates, they are creating considerable demographic pressure on Russia’s borders, particularly in the Far East region.

Against this demographic background, Russia’s labour shortages represent a strong pull factor that can only add to the migration inflows from neighbouring countries. These economic and social conditions, and the increasing presence of foreigners that ensues, are creating a worrying situation. Although far from being outnumbered by immigrants, Russians feel that people with different cultures and religions are taking their place. This is particularly the case in Primorye on account of Chinese immigration.

Such perceptions often have more to do with phobia than with realities, and yet they seem to be the main driving force behind some government policies and statutory legislation. On the other hand, it is obvious that immigration flows are unlikely to slow down and that Russia’s economic growth requires more and more foreign labour. Therefore, a clear and well-defined government policy is becoming a priority if immigration is to be managed in an appropriate fashion.

Thus the debate over migration policies is gradually shifting away from the perception of migration as just a matter of threats and opportunities, and closer to an acknowledgment that appropriate measures to control immigration flows are urgently needed.

Recent developments suggest that the number of Chinese migrants opting for Russian nationality in Primorye is bound to grow rapidly if Russian attitudes towards Chinese migrants change—in particular, if the police and government officers stop extorting money, and if nationalists put an end to their hostile campaigns. Statistics show that in the past two years, the number of Chinese migrants in Vladivostok who have been granted Russian nationality has increased to reach 1,323 in 2003.

Another important issue is the labour shortage in Vladivostok and Primorye at large, which is estimated to amount to one third of the absorption capacity of the local economy. The reality is that Vladivostok and the region are major employers of foreign migrants. However, widespread perceptions of Chinese migrants as a threat can only add to the pressure in favour of restrictions on them. This will leave the issue of labour shortages unresolved, which in turn will have inevitable detrimental effects on the local economy. An alternative approach would be to exercise restrained activism, such as stepped-up controls over entry, mobility, registration and trading by Chinese migrants, while stopping short of entry quotas or deportations.

Industrial raw materials, and all the way down to poaching, import of drugs and prostitution. The positive contribution of Chinese migrants to the Russian economy only gets a rare mention if any, although local Russians wear Chinese-made clothes, own Chinese-made TV sets and refrigerators and enjoy the odd meal in Chinese restaurants.

For Chinese migrants in Vladivostok and Primorye, radical changes to their economic or political status would not be easy. Their trade networks are organised in such a way that breaking their connections with China would put Chinese migrants’ economic survival at risk. As for changing to Russian citizenship, what had always been a very complex procedure has become even more so with the new legislation recently adopted by the Russian authorities.

In fact, Chinese migrants who have lived in Russia for five or even 10 years have no choice but to retain their Chinese citizenship and to use various legal loopholes in order to stay in Russia. It is also important for them to retain their Chinese citizenship in order to protect their rights and dignity. For all these reasons, only a few Chinese migrants have applied for Russian citizenship, at least until recently.

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ities have taken was of a statutory nature and attracted a significant amount of criticism. Under the new statute, foreigners applying for Russian citizenship must have spent at least five years in Russia, pass a language test and have a permanent job. These requirements are tougher than those in the previous legislation (only three years' residence and no language testing). In a bid to stem multiple nationalities, the new statute also requires applicants to give up any other nationality they have held so far. President Putin said the new statute should 'regulate immigration in the interests of the Russian citizen without at the same time shutting the door on our ethnic kin'. The ITAR-Tass news agency reported at the time the new statute was passed. According to supporters of the new naturalisation rules, the previous requirements were too lax, encouraged illegal migration and fuelled crime. However, critics claimed that the new rules would exacerbate the decline in Russia's population through an immigration standstill. The new statute also requires immigrants from former Soviet republics to go through the same steps as those from any other countries when seeking Russian citizenship, which in practice means that they lose the privileges they had enjoyed since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Critics of the new statute have also accused the government of shutting out ethnic Russians living in other former Soviet republics. However, government officials retorted that those Russians who wanted to migrate back to Russia had already acquired Russian citizenship. Indeed, estimates are that some four million ethnic Russians from other ex-Soviet republics migrated back to Russia between 1994 and 2004. Nonetheless, Russia's population has shrunk by 4.3 million since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and stood at 144 million by 2004. The decline has been driven by a combination of low birth rates and shorter life expectancy, which in turn are blamed on a variety of factors, including widespread poverty, rampant alcoholism and a deteriorating healthcare system. Although the share of foreign workers in Primorye's overall workforce is still relatively small, the situation of immigrants is rather complex since many Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese are employed in activities quite different from those they were admitted for originally. Often former employers force immigrant workers to set up their own independent businesses and support themselves, and simultaneously to make regular financial contributions to the firm that first gave them an opportunity to earn a living in Russia. So far and as often happens elsewhere, foreign workers have been offered the types of employment shunned by the local population, mostly in construction (30 per cent of immigrant workers) and the bottom end of the services sector (24 per cent). Agriculture is another magnet for immigrants, particularly those from the former Soviet Union. By some estimates, up to one six Tajiks (Tajikistan's population is about six million) move if only seasonally to Russia every year to gain employment, mostly in agriculture where they earn four or five times as much as they can make back home. Remittances from relatives in Russia have helped Tajik families to climb out of poverty, in a country whose economic growth rate is painfully slow. Although Russia has hardly attracted professional immigrants until recently, the country and its international business structures most certainly need to do so at this point. Illegal immigration is another concern for Russian authorities. The country is host to between 15 and five million foreigners whose legal status is dubious, and most are believed to be illegal immigrants. Illegal immigration to Russia has reached alarming proportions: over the past 10 years, between 700,000 and 1.5 million immigrants, foreign nationals and stateless individuals have entered the country illegally. Particularly worrying is the fact that Russia is becoming a transition point for illegal migration. At the moment, Russian law on illegal migration is of a purely administrative nature. However, the government is planning to make 'illegal' immigration a criminal offence, a change of attitude that is not unrelated to the country's role as a port of call for undocumented migration to other countries. Russia's Far East region may be too poor to attract huge numbers of migrant workers, who are better off at home in China. However, land is available in abundance, and thousands of Chinese farmers have settled in the border areas where they grow vegetables and other crops. More importantly, business opportunities abound in the region, especially in the booming underground economy. How well connected in high places are the Chinese criminal groups is difficult to determine, but enforcing the law, and curbing corruption within the police and local government, has never been easy.

10 Official estimates put the number of Tajik immigrants at 350,000.
Russian authorities try to counter illegal Chinese immigration, only to find that an inefficient sanction system and inadequate legislation stand in the way. The Chinese can cross the border into Russia without any major difficulty. There are only 87 checkpoints along the borders Far East Russia, or only half of what such a large region would need. Moreover, many basic organisational problems, such as lack of immigration application forms, equipment and experienced personnel, combine to compound the drawbacks of existing arrangements.

Another issue which Russian authorities have to deal with in connection with immigration is organised crime. This has always been a problem in Vladivostok and the Far East, but the last few years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of Chinese, Korean and Caucasian criminal groups operating in the region. Last year, an estimated 200 million US dollars was transferred from China to Primorye, mostly through the Chinese underground banking system, to be invested in gambling, hotels, restaurants, and hostess bars. Large amounts have also been invested in illegal logging and fishing deals; as timber and fish are smuggled away to China, Japan and South Korea, they cost Russian tax authorities millions of rubles every year in lost revenue.

However, and although the Far East has the worst crime rate per head in the whole of Russia, the situation in Vladivostok has improved considerably over the past few years: smuggling, gambling, overt prostitution, kidnappings and car bombings no longer feature among the daily goings-on of the city. In addition, in 2003 the region’s governor recommended that municipal authorities ensure safe living conditions for foreign workers: the guidelines included medical check-ups within five days of arrival, with regular medical checks to be held afterwards.

Turning from problems to opportunities, it seems obvious that the resources derived from cross-border economic activities offer new perspectives for the economic links between Vladivostok and China, which in turn could generate taxes and other revenue for local and federal budgets.

To begin with, commerce and trade generate taxes, fees, charges and other payments for the benefit of local and federal budgets. Businesses and traders generate taxable incomes and corporate profits; customs duties; visa or entry permit fees; bus, train, or boat fares and freight charges; property tax and other.

4. Problems and opportunities

Both the Regional Government of Primorye and the Vladivostok Municipality have to face various issues resulting from increasing international migration to Vladivostok.

The distribution of economic benefits, including those accruing from corruption, is an essential factor behind the different perceptions of government officials, business elites and civil society regarding foreign migration to Primorye and Vladivostok. What happens in practice is that, whereas increasing the number of immigrants, particularly from China, is an economic imperative, government officials are also sending a receptive population more and more signals that focus public attention on the potential security threats posed by growing immigration.

If, instead, cross-border relationships became associated with the economic revival of the region through increased investment and local economic development, the material benefits that currently soften the nationalist positions of government officials would spread to the general public, inducing more benign and cooperative attitudes toward Chinese immigrants. Short of this, the interethnic equilibrium is likely to become more fragile, giving rise to more hostile acts against immigrants.

With 2.2 million Slavs in the Primorye region facing approximately 70 million Chinese in Heilongjiang province across the western border, the security dilemma may have a strong impact on Russian policy-makers (both in Vladivostok and in Moscow). Why so many people in the Russian Far East consider Chinese immigration as the ‘yellow peril’ regardless of the clear-cut economic benefits to the region is a mute point; however, it is clear that economic incentives can help contain any potential for ethnic confrontation. This is particularly the case in a political environment such as Vladivostok’s, where the rule of law and ethical norms are weak and impose few restrictions on purely instrumental behaviour.

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11 Out of 151 bribery cases filed in 2001 and 2002, only 20 made it to court, and, in the end, only one of the suspects received a prison sentence.

12 According to the Chinese police, China’s underground banking system handles more money transfers than the official banking system, including two-way flows with the Russian Far East.

13 1.00 ruble = 0.036 US dollar.
The attitudes of Vladivostok residents towards Chinese migrants are, in general, rather hostile. Of respondents to a recent survey, close to half feared that Russia would lose some territory due a ‘peaceful infiltration’ by Chinese nationals – i.e., through a massive inflow of immigrants in the region for the purposes of work, trade, tourism, marriage, etc. – with fewer than five per cent showing a positive attitude towards the Chinese. Individual attitudes depend largely on perceptions of the scale of Chinese immigration and of the relationship between political security and economic benefits.

For local decision-makers, a rational solution to this dilemma would require a strategic balancing act. They would acknowledge the Russian population’s concerns over the economic and security implications of Chinese immigration and border disputes; at the same time, they would seek to nip in the bud any factors of ethnic friction or confrontation, and accept the presence of Chinese traders, investors, and businesses in the city and the region.

The other problem for Russian local and federal authorities to solve is the labour shortage hobbling economic growth. The country needs to attract more Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese labour. If it is to succeed, Russia must lay out a comprehensive framework, complete with proper schemes for social integration, adequate laws and regulations and effective protection of foreign workers’ rights.

Beyond business networks and Russia’s labour shortages, there is a broader dimension to immigration in the Primorye region and its capital, Vladivostok. Complex as the patterns may be, migration flows into these areas originate mainly from China, as mentioned above. Most Chinese immigrants belong to a well-established trading organisation whose members have no intention to join the mainstream (host) community. Some in Russian society often see current Chinese immigration as part of a ‘soft’ strategy aimed at expanding Chinese economic influence in the area, and one that could cause dramatic changes in both the growth of immigration and the type of activities undertaken by Chinese communities in Russia.

It will certainly be interesting to watch how events unfold in Vladivostok. There is little doubt that Russia’s Far East, and Vladivostok in particular, benefit from a favourable geographic location as a major gateway between the Pacific Rim and Europe. In such circumstances, a diversity of cultures can only add to the resources which the area already has in such abundance.

14 Public Opinion Research Center at the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East (Russian Academy of Sciences)
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CONCLUSION

Marcello Balbo
Rafael Tuts

1. Migration in a global perspective

In an era of increasing globalisation, exchanges do not take place merely in the economic sphere: the transfer of capital and goods also implies the transfer of ideas, lifestyles and people occurring through a plurality of actors and networks, including multinational companies, kinship or ethnic networks, and international criminal organisations.

Far from being a new phenomenon, migration is a systemic component of globalisation. Understanding population mobility and attendant social and cultural changes is essential if we are to design effective strategies to deal with the problems and opportunities which current and prospective international migration flows have to offer.

Until recently, international migration had been viewed primarily as a one-way, final move to a place of permanent settlement, and temporary settlement had been envisaged as a rather improbable alternative. Under both cases, only national governments were entrusted to deal with migration at the receiving end of the process. Recent patterns have undergone a significant amount of change. Globalisation and the ease of movement which lower transportation costs have brought about are resulting in substantial increases in temporary migration, with migrants establishing links in the host countries even as they maintain strong ones with their countries and localities of origin. Informal networks gain and more significance as modes of communication and organisation, which contributes to undermine control-bent public policies and reduces the capacity of local societies to provide traditional modes of inclusion for migrants (Castles, 2002).

Against this background, governments should acknowledge that international migration is a structural element of present-day open economies as well as an integral factor of the survival strategies deployed by families and communities; the rationale behind these strategies is a bid to improve the living conditions of those who migrate as well as of those who remain. Just like internal migration,
international migration once started is a self-sustaining process; as such, it is bound to endure in the future – unless, that is, effective distributive policies are implemented between rich and poor countries, and between dynamic and stagnant or declining cities in different countries.

In the current context, cities are the nodes where national socio-economic systems and international migrant streams get to interact with each other; for this reason, cities have turned into a privileged locus where opportunities arise alongside antagonisms. Cities provide the best possible opportunity to investigate the extent to which local factors influence the effect foreign communities are having on the host community, as well as on the pattern of subsequent social, institutional and policy developments. The city is also the locus where social and community networks and ethnic enclaves are being created. These networks stand among the most innovative features of today’s international migration patterns. They do more than elicit fresh migration: they also ensure the perpetuation of strong links with the countries and communities of origin (UN-HABITAT, 2004).

Work opportunities are the main factor behind the expansion in international migration as they arise particularly, though not exclusively, in the more advanced economies. Labour market deregulation has contributed significantly to the growth of non-regularised activities which, in turn, have fostered illegal migration. However, access to urban labour markets rests largely on migrants’ social networks and, increasingly, on those links maintained between the place of origin and the place of destination. Whether based on kin or ethnic networks, these links induce multiple flows of information, people, goods and money; in actual fact, these flows combine to make up the social capital which individuals and communities alike can rely upon to provide those resources that are so vital to their sustenance.

Macro-economic developments such as poverty and globalisation stand out as the main factors driving international migration. However, such networks and flows as poverty and globalisation activate are shaped after the specific, practical realities they are part of. In this critical interaction, individuals and communities effectively play a prominent role, as it is for them to convert these macro-factors into actual, day-to-day living conditions. The fact of the matter is that migration turns out as a process based primarily on family and community strategies, which are so designed as to generate resources at home while reducing risks. As a result, ‘the rationality of family survival strategies has often confounded the predictions of economic theories’ (Castles, 2002). In some instances, the networks themselves, and attendant flows, have been seen to create (or reactivate) the demand for specific activities, such as domestic help and care for the elderly.

Similarly, international migration is supported by, and elicits, a ‘migration industry’ that includes, among others, labour recruiters, travel organisers and remittance transfer systems. The primary aim of the many participants in this ‘new’ economic sector is to fuel the migration flows, and in the process try to overcome any restriction governments may impose in the receiving countries, including through illegal entry.

Among the many and complex challenges raised by international migrants, the overarching issue is their inclusion in host urban communities. There are basically two, highly controversial (particularly in advanced economies) views regarding migrant integration:

- Assimilation, the process by which migrants adopt the culture and values of the host community, including language and public behaviour, and the policies promoting such assimilation; and
- Multiculturalism, the prevailing stance adopted by many governments in the 1970s through the 1990s, which recognises and even supports the diversity featured by international migrant communities as a valuable contribution to the culture of the host society (United Nations, 2004a). This position has recently been restated by the United Nations, in whose view ‘four principles should inform a strategy for multiculturalism in globalisation; (i) defending tradition can hold back human development; (ii) respect of differences and diversity is essential; (iii) diversity thrives in a globally interdependent world when people have multiple and complementary identities and belong not only to a local community and a country but also to humanity at large; and (iv) addressing imbalances in economic and political power helps to forestall threats to the cultures of poorer and weaker communities’ (United Nations, 2004b). However, a shift seems to have been under way in recent years, away from multiculturalism and towards an approach that encourages and indeed requires more explicit acceptance of host society values, norms and modes of behaviour (Brubaker, 2001).

The ‘assimilation vs. multiculturalism’ perspective that is a hallmark of the ongoing debate on international migration largely relates to cities in advanced
Tijuana has always acted as a bridgehead to the USA for Mexican migrants. However, as they decided to stay or return there, many of those have added to the city's population and economic growth, turning migrants into a common feature of city life, be they from Mexico, other Latin American countries, or Asia. This recurrent and unavoidable interaction with foreigners has acted as an inhibiting factor for xenophobic behaviour.

In Vancouver, international migration has always been considered as one of the driving forces behind the West Canadian city's success, and therefore been not only tolerated but encouraged even as Asia has gradually been supplanting Europe as the main source of inflows.

The same held true in the past for São Paulo, where international migrants nowadays are mostly unskilled Bolivians and Peruvians looking for employment in the often exploitative textile-apparel sector, an important though declining industry in Brazil's largest metropolitan area.

In Bangkok, the contribution of skilled international migrants is clearly perceived as an essential factor in the Thai capital's recent long spell of economic growth, and is encouraged through very specific government policies.

Immigration of non-Germans in Berlin started when the Germany's industrial sector was being rebuilt and a labour shortfall emerged. After the so-called 'guest workers' of the 1960s (mainly from Turkey) came those from the former Yugoslavia, following the end of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, to be followed by migrants from Poland and the former Soviet Union as well as Germans who had been living beyond the Soviet border for several generations.

Vladivostok and its region are experiencing a significant outflow of local Russians, which may jeopardise development perspectives in the area. The migration flows to the capital of the Russian Far East, mainly from China, are prompted by a shortage of Russian labour and a concomitant workforce shortfall in the local economy.

The past role of Dakar as capital of French West Africa still makes it the main hub of economic activity in the region; the Senegalese capital has also become a transit point to the European countries and other overseas destinations for migrants from all neighbouring countries.

Similarly, since Karachi became Pakistan's main industrial and commercial cen-
International migrants as an explicit objective. In Pakistan, the government’s policy of regularisation allows eventual granting of full citizenship rights to migrants, particularly those who entered the country as refugees for economic reasons; however, many Bengali and Burmese migrants see this as a roundabout way of eroding their claims to full citizenship rights. In Brazil, immigration policy is still based upon a legal framework inherited from the military that governed the country until the 1980s, and further north in Mexico anyone entering the country illegally is liable to up to two years’ imprisonment. In Russia, the federal government is still unclear over what stance it should take as it is on the horns of a dilemma: on the one hand, illegal migration is perceived as having reached ‘threatening proportions’, while on the other hand the country as a whole, and the Vladivostok region in particular are confronted with a significant population decline and probably serious labour shortages in the years ahead. However, inadequate resources make the implementation of controls and restricting measures extremely difficult. In most cases, the end-result is twofold: increased illegal immigration and corruption. For instance, in Brazil, the sanitary controls on foreign migrants required by the recently adopted ‘Statute on Foreigners’ have only managed to encourage illegal migration. As for corruption, its development can also coincide with the rapid expansion of criminal migration-based organizations. The Russian Far East is a case in point, where large numbers of Chinese migrants bribe government officials for entry without visas, just as they pay the criminal organisations that control the labour market for undocumented migrants. Even where controls are more effective, policies restricting foreign migrant entry only rarely achieve their objective. For instance, Thailand operates an explicit two-tier policy promoting the migration of skilled workers and wealthy retirees, while curbing entry of unskilled migrants from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar; nonetheless, the government had to declare amnesties in 2001 and 2004 in a bid to deal more effectively with the flow of illegal migrants being employed in jobs supposedly reserved for Thai workers. Italy, too, has had to declare a string of amnesties, most recently in late 2004, despite the introduction in 1998 of three-year plans that were supposed to set the maximum numbers of international migrants legally admitted into the country every year. Since 1955, Germany has offered foreign migrants a wide variety of ‘gates of entry’, regardless of which the rationale behind the country’s migration policies is essentially re-

3. Emerging trends

International migration and national policies

In most cities of the developing world, international migration takes place in the absence of explicit dedicated policies. Where these exist, their chief objectives are to restrict entry and to control illegal migration. This is clearly the case with Senegal, where a government department has been established recently to deal specifically with Senegalese emigrants abroad, whereas immigration remains the responsibility of the Interior Ministry. This is also the case with South Africa, where the post-apartheid government has set itself a reduction in the flow of international migrants as an explicit objective. In Pakistan, the government’s policy of regularisation allows eventual granting of full citizenship rights to migrants, particularly those who entered the country as refugees for economic reasons; however, many Bengali and Burmese migrants see this as a roundabout way of eroding their claims to full citizenship rights. In Brazil, immigration policy is still based upon a legal framework inherited from the military that governed the country until the 1980s, and further north in Mexico anyone entering the country illegally is liable to up to two years’ imprisonment. In Russia, the federal government is still unclear over what stance it should take as it is on the horns of a dilemma: on the one hand, illegal migration is perceived as having reached ‘threatening proportions’, while on the other hand the country as a whole, and the Vladivostok region in particular are confronted with a significant population decline and probably serious labour shortages in the years ahead. However, inadequate resources make the implementation of controls and restricting measures extremely difficult. In most cases, the end-result is twofold: increased illegal immigration and corruption. For instance, in Brazil, the sanitary controls on foreign migrants required by the recently adopted ‘Statute on Foreigners’ have only managed to encourage illegal migration. As for corruption, its development can also coincide with the rapid expansion of criminal migration-based organizations. The Russian Far East is a case in point, where large numbers of Chinese migrants bribe government officials for entry without visas, just as they pay the criminal organisations that control the labour market for undocumented migrants. Even where controls are more effective, policies restricting foreign migrant entry only rarely achieve their objective. For instance, Thailand operates an explicit two-tier policy promoting the migration of skilled workers and wealthy retirees, while curbing entry of unskilled migrants from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar; nonetheless, the government had to declare amnesties in 2001 and 2004 in a bid to deal more effectively with the flow of illegal migrants being employed in jobs supposedly reserved for Thai workers. Italy, too, has had to declare a string of amnesties, most recently in late 2004, despite the introduction in 1998 of three-year plans that were supposed to set the maximum numbers of international migrants legally admitted into the country every year. Since 1955, Germany has offered foreign migrants a wide variety of ‘gates of entry’, regardless of which the rationale behind the country’s migration policies is essentially re-

The economic value of migration

In all the cities reviewed in this volume, the migrants’ rationale is the search for higher incomes and, if possible, improved living conditions. This rationale has been the driving force behind all migration movements for centuries and it remains valid to this day. However, in recent years host country governments have also become increasingly aware that national and local economies ‘need’ migrants, primarily though not only in more advanced countries. Although admittedly to various extents, migration policies in Naples, Vancouver, Berlin and Bangkok are all based on economic grounds; and even though many countries claim they do not need unskilled workers, governments’ privatisation and deregulation policies over the past several years have led to rapid growth in the informal sector.

In Canada, the link between economic and immigration policies has been made explicit since the Immigration Act 1967. More recently, Canada’s Business Immigrant Programme has stood out as probably one of the very best examples of a conscious national strategy to attract international migrants the better to plug a country into global capital flows. In Berlin since the 1970s, just as much more recently in Naples, demand is chiefly for unskilled workers to fill in the low-paid positions that are no longer taken up by the nationals, alongside the newer demand for domestic help resulting from an ageing population and declining family support.

Demand for international migrant labour has also been emerging in cities like Bangkok and Johannesburg, where managers and technicians hired by both the public and private sectors have become a prominent category of migrant. Similarly, the headquarters and offices of regional and sub-regional organisations located in Dakar bring to the Senegalese capital highly skilled professionals from several African countries in comparatively significant numbers, although fewer than in Johannesburg. These relatively well-paid international migrants often come over with their families and tend to concentrate in specific city areas, where they generate very distinct economic, social and spatial environments.

Rapid economic growth boosts the demand for unskilled labour, too. In Bangkok, many migrants moved in from neighbouring countries to fill in the gaps resulting from the large Thai emigration of the 1970s. Similarly, the rapid and unabated growth which Tijuana has been experiencing since the 1980s has consistently kept the unemployment rate below one per cent, with migrants from various Latin American countries working side by side, mainly in the labour-intensive, unskilled commerce and service sectors. This absorption capacity has greatly reduced the risk of social conflicts, since local workers do not perceive migrants as competitors on the labour market, and as a result most migrants do not end up being socially excluded.

Such demand for unskilled labour is obviously a root cause for much illegal migration, an important phenomenon both per se and relative to the total number of migrants. In Vladivostok, Chinese illegal migration is more than twice as high as legal, according to estimates. In Johannesburg, where reduced work permit issuance since 1990 brought about a consistent decline in legal immigration, undocumented migration has been growing regardless and to a significant extent, experts believe. Although Brazil’s 2000 census figures estimate the number of international migrants in São Paulo at around 200,000, illegal Hispanic-Americans are believed to be around 170,000, thousands of Koreans not included. In
practice, illegal migrants from Latin America, especially Bolivians, contribute a significant share of the workforce in the paulista textile-apparel industry. By definition, the precise number of illegal or undocumented migrants is unknown. However, it emerges clearly that in all the cities reviewed, illegal migrants feature higher rates of employment compared with the local population. They often work in the building sector, in domestic employment, in the service sector and in informal activities, including those on the borderline with illegality or beyond, where their unstable conditions are all too prompt to lead them.

Exclusionary and inclusive trends

The perspective for social inclusion is largely related to the positions international migrants fill in the local economy, but not only. In Tijuana, the weak voice of the local poor leaves them in conditions very similar to those of marginal foreign migrants. In Karachi, migrants are split between 'assimilated' and 'conspicuous'. Many migrants from Bangladesh, Myanmar and part of Afghanistan are vulnerable due to their uncertain legal status, even if they can prove that their conditions of entry into Thailand were entirely legal. Consequently, they often find themselves socially excluded, politically marginalised, and all reside in the same areas.

'Concern' is widespread in Vladivostok, too, where many Russian residents perceive the migration of a fraction of the 70 million Chinese from the neighbouring Heilongjiang province as the first step in a potential invasion – the 'yellow peril'. Efforts by the Russian authorities to create an environment that was more welcoming of international migrants and the benefits they bring to the city's economy remain inadequate, due to lack of resources to deal with the issue as well as an inadequate regulatory framework at federal level.

The environmental, economic and social problems São Paulo has to cope with are such that international migration only compounds an already complex situation. Migrants from other Latin American countries are perceived largely as adding to those working under highly exploitative conditions in the informal sector or the drug trafficking organisations. The city authorities' reluctance to promote social inclusion for poor foreign migrants also has to do with the notion that São Paulo is certainly a city of migrants, but not from Latin America. The fact of the matter is that Latin American migrants are perceived as being of rural and Indian origins, and as such they only add to the inflows of poor migrants from Brazil's Northeast State, rather than to the city's cultural diversity.

In South Africa, the magnitude of the post-apartheid challenges confronting local government is such that international migration does not rank high on the scale of current priorities, including in Johannesburg. Nonetheless, most local residents view the relatively small number of unskilled foreign migrants as a threat to South Africans' interests.

The prospects for migrant inclusion depend largely on the socio-cultural conditions of the host city. This is all-too evident in Vancouver, where the recent shift from assimilation to recognition and promotion of multiculturalism has further encouraged the flow of international migrants. For all the ongoing debate over its incidence on the meaning of nationhood, multiculturalism is seen as an essential feature of Vancouver as a 'global' city. The prospects for inclusion are also a function of migrants' own willingness to be 'included'. Some migrant communities are definitely more open to integration than others, depending chiefly on cultural, religious and educational backgrounds that in turn provide a diversity of perspectives on the very notions of inclusion and citizenship. Chinese migrant communities typically display the strongest degree of reluctance to integrate, as illustrated by several of the cities under review.

In the case of Tijuana, where Mexican residents take their own mestizo diversity in their stride, social integration of migrants appears to be a much more straightforward process, and in some ways not even an issue. Prompted by Tijuana's function as a migratory bridgehead and its almost uninterrupted economic growth, internal migration has both contributed to ethnic diversity and taken advantage of it. As a result, the city's social structure is made up of small groups that do not form any socially cohesive entity, within an urban community where hierarchies are weakly defined, with both factors combining into a favourable milieu for international migrant integration.

As for migrants in the skilled and wealthy retiree categories, they are well accepted in a city like Bangkok – but much less so the unskilled migrants, who are often perceived as disease-carriers, job-stealers and criminals. The media play a central role in fuelling this type of perception among the public, often dramatising explicit or latent conflicts and emphasising the consequences of differences in norms and behaviours. In Naples, too, the media nurture the negative stereo-
Tijuana and Vancouver display widely different settlement patterns as far as migrant communities are concerned. Tijuana does not feature anything like an ethnic or country-specific enclave, since Mexican authorities lack the resources that would enable them to control the expansion of those illegal settlements where most migrants (both internal and foreign) reside. In a way you could say that in Tijuana as in Dakar or Karachi, if anything facilitates the settling of international migrants in different, unspecific neighbourhoods, it must be precisely the very lack of government resources, resulting in higher degrees of spatial inclusion or, at the very least, in lower degrees of segregation. Conversely, in Johannesburg, government inability to provide affordable housing for low-income international migrants has resulted in the concentration of Francophone and, more broadly, West African migrants in a number of inner-city areas, whereas better-off skilled international migrants can afford the gated housing developments in the northern part of the city.

On the other hand, and if only in an indirect sort of way, Vancouver typifies a trend towards a complex and shifting ethno-cultural setup, combining increasing ethnic segregation with a ‘concentrated dispersal’ of international migrant communities on the outskirts. The situation is somewhat similar in Berlin, where ‘guest worker’ settlement was initially restricted to a few specific districts on the assumption that they were to stay only temporarily. It took some time before city authorities opened up public housing to international migrants. There is no doubt that as they did so, local authorities improved housing conditions for migrants although, as already mentioned, they also strengthened segregationist trends, as foreign workers found themselves concentrated in particular areas of the city. The diverse patterns of social inclusion, or exclusion, for the different migrant communities are evident in Naples, where local residents’ attitudes towards migrants are directly linked to the type of activity in which foreigners are involved. Such professional profiling also determines migrants’ access to the housing market, probably the most important issue migrants have to cope with. In the Italian city, Senegalese, Pakistanis and North Africans, the bulk of them single males working as street vendors, share rundown apartments in the city centre with up to 15 people to a room, although more and more have been moving to the outskirts for better, more affordable housing. Sri Lankans, Filipinos, Peruvians and Dominicans also live in the historical centre, close to the domestic activities most of them are employed in. Ukrainian and Polish migrants (mostly females) live with the families that employ them; they owe these comparatively privileged conditions to generally higher levels of education, which make their integration much easier although they are of little help in the mainstream labour market.

The uses of urban space

Host society perceptions are also a function of the patterns of international migrant settlement in the public, urban space and the uses they make thereof. In this as in other respects, research shows that there is no single model: although both North American conurbations eminently qualify as ‘cities of migrants’, Tijuana and Vancouver display widely different settlement patterns as far as migrant communities are concerned. Tijuana does not feature anything like an ethnic or country-specific enclave, since Mexican authorities lack the resources that would enable them to control the expansion of those illegal settlements where most migrants (both internal and foreign) reside. In a way you could say that in Tijuana as in Dakar or Karachi, if anything facilitates the settling of international migrants in different, unspecific neighbourhoods, it must be precisely the very lack of government resources, resulting in higher degrees of spatial inclusion or, at the very least, in lower degrees of segregation. Conversely, in Johannesburg, government inability to provide affordable housing for low-income international migrants has resulted in the concentration of Francophone and, more broadly, West African migrants in a number of inner-city areas, whereas better-off skilled international migrants can afford the gated housing developments in the northern part of the city.

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in the process evincing the ‘deep complexity of the intricate contacts between
the institutionally structured space of migration, the public space defined by
streets and shops, and the cultural and social realities that inhabit these places.’
The Naples case study highlights the importance (as already mentioned) of mi-
grant communities’ preparedness for inclusion, this time as far as the use of
public urban space is concerned. The attitude of Chinese migrants in Naples
(and for that matter also in Vladivostok, Bangkok or Vancouver), who tend to
keep themselves well apart from the other (migrant and local) communities,
goes to show that we need a diversity of perspectives when considering urban
space as an instrument for social integration.

4. Recommendations

**Government, international migration and governance**
In an urbanising world, international urban migration appears as an inevitable
consequence of globalisation and it involves essentially all dimensions of urban
policy – from local economic development, particularly the informal sector, to
education, to health, to housing to public security. As they come to recognise
the potential benefits of migration for local and migrant communities alike,
governments must learn to deal with the issue through *ad hoc* programmes and
policies. This is true in particular for local authorities, which are increasingly
vested with the responsibility of designing and implementing urban policies, in-
cluding those concerned with the consequences of international migration.
International urban migration is an area where the functions and interests of
a range of different protagonists interact between them: institutions and indi-
viduals, public and private, legal and illegal. Therefore, if international urban
migration is to be dealt with effectively, it will take prior understanding of the
motivations these different stakeholders may have for encouraging and ‘selling’
migration; the next step will be to set up a governance system that focuses both
on these stakeholders and on urban migrants.

*International migrants to urban areas are very diverse*
The traditional view of international migration was of a permanent inflow of in-
dividuals on one hand, and government efforts to restrict such inflow in the
host country or city on the other hand, along with a notion that migration fell
into two clear-cut categories: legal and illegal. The time has come for policy-
makers to acknowledge the complex and dynamic features of international mi-
gration and the inadequacy of any dualistic approach. Migrants are not a homo-
genous group of people, and migration flows are increasingly of a temporary
and circulatory nature. The fact of the matter is that differences among mi-
grants may be as extensive as those within the host society; each group of mi-
grants moves over for different reasons, has different needs and requires differ-
ent responses. For this reason, there can be no single, blanket policy that can
be tailored to suit all. This makes the role of institutions more complex, but al-
so results in greater economic and cultural richness.
If they are to deal effectively with international migration in urban areas, poli-
cies must meet migrants’ diverse needs, capacities and potentialities, which are
chiefly a function of their socio-economic conditions rather than of their ethnic
or regional groups. Nothing better than this practical reality could emphasise
the need to distinguish between programmes targeted at international mi-
grants and those aimed at the urban poor in general, even though migrants can
often be counted among those as well.

**Policy responses**
In many cities of the South, large segments of the population live in such con-
ditions that public authorities can only opt for largely ‘territory-based’ policies,
addressing the needs and potentialities of whole areas of a city. This approach
is in order when dealing with issues of concern not only to the migrant com-
munity, but to the majority of residents as well, such as provision of basic infra-
structure, access to health and education, support for social networks and com-
munity organisations, or neighbourhood safety. Conversely, where urban con-
ditions are generally adequate, as in most advanced economies, *population-
based* policies are in order if specific groups of residents are to be provided with
essential goods and services, such as housing, school, sanitation and access to
the labour market. For lack of such targeted programmes, many international
migrants are likely to remain excluded from the market as well as from such
goods and services as are provided by public authorities.
However, ‘territory-based’ and ‘population-based’ policies should not be regarded
as mutually exclusive. It is for local policy-makers carefully to consider which of
government and NGOs must rest upon a trustworthy and collaborative relationship and a clear definition of roles. Whereas local authorities must remain in charge of the definition of any approaches and priorities regarding international migration, NGOs can help in the effective implementation of policies, and in four distinct ways: (i) being non-profit emanations of civil society, NGOs more often than not are in better positions when it comes effectively to channel the support services needed by migrants, such as legal advice, health and educational services; (ii) NGOs can play the role of cultural mediators between local institutions and the foreign communities, in the process helping to overcome language and cultural differences that hinder access to services, as well as reducing the potential for conflict; (iii) the issues raised by migration require effective ways of working and communicating with diverse communities and groups, and also experimenting with new approaches which NGOs and local associations are in better positions to explore; (iv) NGOs can help amplify the voices of migrants, increase their influence and promote their empowerment. Therefore, local authorities should help foster the capacity of local NGOs and other community groups, as well as build partnerships based on complementary roles and comparative advantage, in order to enhance the social inclusion of migrants.

Participation, representation and the ‘Right to the City’

International migration raises the essential issue of the ‘Right to the City’, i.e., the right for everyone, including international migrants, to access the benefits the city has to offer and based on the principles of solidarity, freedom, equity, dignity and social justice, irrespective of nationality, race, gender or religion. The ‘Right to the City’ is tightly connected with the notion of urban governance as defined by ‘the sum of the many ways [in which] individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city’. If the ‘Right to the City’ is to be implemented any effectively, two practical issues are of utmost importance: the forms of migrant representation, and how best to promote migrant inclusion in the decision-making process. Designing effective ways of working and communicating with diverse communities and groups is crucial to good urban governance in multicultural cities. Great attention must be paid to two particular tasks: i) identifying appropriate ways of promoting community participation, and ii) understanding multicultural and diver-
sity issues as well as community experiences with regard to access to urban services. However, international migration has taken on an increasingly temporary nature, as migrants move to cities for quick money-earning trips (to send money for relatives to improve their conditions back home), with the expectation that they will return sooner or later. Therefore many migrants may be unlikely, or not disposed, to integrate. However, for those who stay over an adequate period of time, the right to vote and to choose local representatives is essential to their inclusion and participation in the public authorities’ quest for adequate solutions. Since migrants are all-too frequently excluded from the local communities, granting them an effective ‘Right to the City’ would also provide policy-makers with an important guiding principle.

**The importance of decentralisation**

Mainstreaming and collaboration between various levels of government and between local agencies and non-governmental bodies are of the essence if integration policies are to make any headway in practice. However, national policies often deal with international migration as a security issue, whereas local government is more likely to develop innovative initiatives that address migrants’ issues with a greater capacity for integration, including empowerment of ethnic minorities. Adding to this, migrant integration strategies should be based largely within the migrant communities themselves, setting up partnerships between migrant communities, urban civil society as well as local and higher-level government agencies. Therefore, there must be a stronger recognition among local urban governance structures that cities are increasingly interconnected across borders and that regulation and regularisation of already settled migrants (‘outcome regulation’) should go hand in hand with the regulation of processes, since stocks and flows are intrinsically connected. In this perspective, international migration must be mainstreamed in all urban strategies, which in turn can only further emphasise the need to improve the capacity of decision-makers, managers and service providers to make informed choices on the best ways of dealing with international migration. Non-discriminatory behaviour cannot be left up to the goodwill of individual government officials, as is frequently the case today, particularly in the cities of developing countries.

**Education and cultural diversity**

Today, an increasing ethnic diversity of foreign migrants settle in developing-country cities that occasionally have little if any multicultural tradition, evoking anxiety and fear among local residents. However, where migrants’ cultural standards and language are close to those of the local population, integration is greatly facilitated. Language tuition (particularly for parents), mixed schools and educational programmes are of primary importance, since comparable levels of education make it easier for migrants to opt for the ‘integration strategy’ instead of entrenching their own original identities.

One particularly sensitive area is religious diversity. This type of difference is a very conflictive issue, where compromise is difficult to achieve, and it cannot be dealt with exclusively nor primarily in terms of cultural differences. To cope with any latent conflicts they can raise, religious differences should be brought to the fore and explicitly discussed as an intrinsic feature of a multicultural urban society.

**Assessing the impact of urban policies on migrants**

Since most migrants add to the low-income population, the effect that any urban policies in support of the poor may have on international migrants must be assessed. In this respect, one of the most important issues for international migrants, particularly the more recent arrivals, is access to social services, housing and employment. Given the diversity of migrant communities, cultural mediation has a critical role to play if effective access to these services is to be facilitated for migrants, and local authorities should take action to provide cultural mediators, primarily with the help of NGOs. Moreover, any service addressing migrants’ needs must involve the migrant communities, and this must be achieved in a more direct sort of way than merely through the usual channels of information. In this respect, one of the best ways of involving migrants is through cultural mediators, who are closer to their habits and ways of life. Local authorities should also be aware that urban policies have a strong effect on the type of migration they are dealing with. Urban policies may, for instance, seek to encourage rentals rather than ownership, or establish (micro-) credit schemes to facilitate remittances and investment in the places of origin and strengthen cooperation between the home and host communities.
Moreover, new technologies help migrants to maintain strong links with countries of origin, and reduced transportation costs allow more frequent journeys home. High volumes of remittances also go to show that many migrants look forward to returning home. The fact of the matter is that far from regarding the city as a place to invest in for the longer term, a growing number of migrants view it simply as a place to pass through, to run from, as they wait to return home or, in some cases, to move on to further destinations of greater economic opportunity. Such migrants are admittedly less keen than before to engage in the values, language and way of life of the host country and city, since they end up belonging simultaneously to two communities and their status is that of ‘transnational migrants’.

As these realities suggest, assimilation policies appear to be ‘structurally’ inadequate to respond to this multifaceted type of migration, since such policies are faced with a local, national and international context that is very different from the past.

At the same time, the changes resulting from the growing numbers of urban migrants carry with them a wealth of potentialities that must be recognised, as must the need to enhance the development of multicultural cities. Legitimation of cultural distance is one of the challenges of multiculturalism, calling for recognition or even strengthening of ‘cultural shields’ between different urban populations, and all the more so against a background of increasing transnationalism that tends to undermine the sense of belonging.

Developing a shared sense of citizenship or a common identity through an inclusive strategy in a multicultural perspective is a challenging task. However, heterogeneous, multicultural cities seem to be better equipped than homogeneous ones to cope with the economic, social and cultural challenges linked to globalisation.

The twin issue of multiculturalism and inclusion suggests two major recommendations:

- Migrants belong to communities, and inclusive policies should address the communities, rather than the individuals.
- Since migrant communities are different from each other, inclusion cannot be viewed as a single, static concept; rather, it should rather be referred to as inclusions: which type of inclusion, for which migrant community, and over what period of time.

Civic values and responsible citizenship

Inclusion can be part of a new paradigm – but it may not be enough, because it connotes action by the host community and polity alone. The emergence of a transnational class of migrants with weak or no commitment to the host community, coupled with the decline of assimilation as a respectable goal, has led to a decay in civic values. Therefore, foreign migrants’ commitment to the civic values and social norms of host cities should also feature prominently in any efforts to promote inclusion. If inclusion is to work, policy-makers must engage in a lucid review of the values which international migrants recognise as their own. It can be argued that inclusion has implications for any commitment to ‘urban citizenship’ (one of the guiding principles of urban governance) by both host and migrant communities. In this perspective, inclusion can be seen as a compact between migrants and host communities whereby they share certain civic values while other factors of diversity are kept untouched. The nature of these civic values can be derived from general principles of civic responsibility as applied to international migration. However, the key function of negotiating suitable, context-specific value sets falls to city administrations, in consultation with the citizenry as a whole.

Inclusion and civic identity: Assimilation vs. multiculturalism

The prospects for migrant integration depend on three main factors: (i) the structure of the local community, (ii) the value the local community ascribes to ethnic criteria in defining social order and belonging, and (iii) the local community’s propensity to ascribe specific social roles to different populations. Migrating to a new country and city is a multi-stage process and it is difficult to determine the point where integration actually begins. Integration is a function of a number of factors, including migrants’ own expectations and objectives. Most newcomers prefer settling within their ethnic communities, where mutual aid social networks secure them the support which local institutions are often unable or unwilling to provide. In such circumstances, migration may strengthen non-civic identities and reinforce both a condition and a sense of marginalisation that can result in exclusion.
Towards genuinely cosmopolitan cities

Although urban policies in many parts of the world tend to move away from this trend, multicultural cities are likely, inevitable as well as desirable outcomes of current economic and social changes around the globe. In future and more than ever, cities will need to evolve from multicultural to cosmopolitan—i.e., from a situation where multiple cultural forms are recognised and at times encouraged, to one in which residents of one cultural background are personally comfortable interacting with those of other cultures. The best ways of developing cosmopolitan cities and linking international migration and urban development in a more positive fashion evoke complex questions. For this reason, the issue of how best to address urban international migration and what policies and practices can and should be adopted requires further research, particularly in developing country cities, where migration is more recent.

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